WHY CHINA WENT BACK IN 1962?
Colonel Amar Ramdasani, YSM*
“He who holds Tibet dominates the Himalayan piedmont; he who dominates the Himalayan piedmont threatens the Indian subcontinent; and he who threatens the Indian subcontinent may well have all of South Asia within his reach, and with that, all of Asia”[1]
Introduction
Why did China go to war with India in 1962? A lot has been written on this subject. However, why China declared a unilateral ceasefire by 31st day of conflict, retained captured tracts in Northern Sector and pulled back from all captured areas in Eastern Sector post conflict in 1962 remains to be analysed, aided by hindsight. This analysis would yield important lessons for our policy makers, to safeguard national security interests. In my opinion following factors necessitated Chinese withdrawal from captured tracts of Indian territory in Eastern Sector :-
(a) Geopolitical realities of 1960s.
(b) Logistics across the Great Himalayan Wall.
(c) Tibet issue.
(e) Religious and cultural incongruences.
(f) The US military assistance to India.
(g) Fear of the weather Gods and approaching winter
(h) Resilience of the Indian Troops.
Geopolitical Realities of 1960s
The Anti Communist Environment of 1960’s. In 1960s the Çold War between the US and USSR was peaking. The Sino-Indian war of 1962 broke out right around the time when the US-USSR were in midst of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The West was increasingly intolerant of the Communist ideology; and on that account, having been attacked by a Communist nation, the International public sympathy had begun to lilt towards India. Indian lamentations, that China had embarked upon a programme of aggressive territorial expansionism; and that it was refusing to negotiate its territorial disputes with neighbouring countries was almost universally accepted.
However, the Chinese were right in their perception that retention of Indian territory, would have been taken as confirmation of Chinese aggressiveness and expansionist intent. Consequently, that would have helped India to seek American and British support to launch strong counter offensive operations in due course of time.
The Sino Soviet Split of 1960s. The term Sino–Soviet split (1960–1989) denotes the worsening of political and ideologicalrelations between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) during the Cold War(1945–1991). [2] The doctrinal divergence is derived from the Chinese and Russian national interests, and from the respective régimes'interpretations of ’Marxism’, ‘Maoism’ and ‘Marxism–Leninism’.
The ideological roots of the Sino-Soviet split originated in the 1940s, when the Communist Party of China (CCP), led by Mao Zedong, fought theSecond Sino-Japanese War (1937–45) against the Japanese Empire, whilst simultaneously fighting the Chinese Civil War against the NationalistKuomintang (KMT), led by Chiang Kai-shek. In fighting the overlapping wars, Mao ignored much of the politico-military advice and direction from Joseph Stalin and the Communist International (Comintern) viewpoint. He saw practical difficulty in applying traditional Leninist revolutionary theory, because in China there were only peasants and no urban working class, as in Russia.
In the 1950s and the 1960s, ideological debate between the Communist parties of Russia and China also concerned the possibility of peaceful coexistencewith the capitalist West. Yet, to the Chinese public, Mao Zedong proposed a belligerent attitude towards capitalist countries, initially rejecting the thinking of peaceful coexistence, which he perceived as Marxist ‘revisionism’ from the Russian Soviet Union.
By 1961, when the doctrinal differences proved intractable, the Communist Party of China (CPC) formally denounced the Soviet variety of Communism as a product of “The Revisionist Traitor Group of Soviet Leadership”, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, headed by Nikita Krushchev.
The split was further widened when the USSR Premier Khrushchev met the US President Dwight Eisenhower (1953–61) to decrease Soviet–American tensions; supported the Western world in the Cold War; denounced Chinese nuclear weapons development and refused to side with China in the Sino-Indian War (1962) by maintaining moderate relations with India. These actions were deemed offensive by Mao as the Chinese Leader and he perceived Khrushchev as far too-appeasing to the West. The Sino-Soviet split of the 1960s would also have contributed greatly towards China’s, decision to pull back.
The PRC was also right in concluding that if China had retained the captured Indian territory, that would have facilitated the US and the West to draw other smaller neighbours on China’s periphery towards them. Since, China had always believed in the ‘Concept of Security Periphery’, that would have led the Chinese to feel insecure. Given this kind of prevailing unfavourable international geopolitical environment China did not want to get labelled as an expansionist Communist nation; and thereby, having to bear the brunt of West’s ire in times to come. Thus , having secured a military victory in the 1962 conflict the, PRC leadership thought it prudent to pull back to avoid any confrontation with West; and also to prevent her peripheral neighbours falling on to the US side .
Logistics Across the Great Himalayan Wall
The entire Indo-China international frontier territory runs through the highest features of the Himalayas and the two countries are naturally cut-off from each other.[3] It is logistically impractical for a substantial army to fight its way through the few passes that exist, and it would be utterly impossible for either country to sustain an army there in the long term.[4] China had already occupied and still continues to occupy the Tibetan plateau, which gives it operational and logistical capability over India in the event of a military contingency, and has little to gain militarily by extending its sovereignty over the region.
Had the Chinese troops stayed back across the Himalayas in Arunachal Pradesh, they would have been separated from the rest of mainland China by the Great Himalayan Wall. It would have been hazardous to maintain logistics support over and through the challenging Himalayas. This by no means was operationally feasible in 1960s; and PRC’s hold over captured territories would have been vulnerable to flank attacks by regrouped Indian military in times to come because the US military assistance had been expeditiously released on 20 Nov 1962. This was another factor that contributed towards the decision of China to pull back.
Tibet Issue
US Involvement. In mid 1957, the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) began covert assistance to rebels in the Kham region of South-Eastern Tibet. Assistance rendered through this CIA programme was actually quite limited totalling only 250 tons of munitions, equipment and supplies between 1957 and 1961. But CIA operations came to the attention of the Chinese intelligence; and thus, became a concern of the Chinese government. China got worried that retention of captured Indian territory would only lead to increased dissent in Tibet with active involvement of India and the US.
India’s Stance on Tibetan Movement. Once the Tibetan national rising began in Lhasa on 10 March 1959, India did not wash its hands of the Tibetan affairs as Beijing insisted. Rather, Indian media and elected Indian politicians (including Nehru) and virtually every other Indian politician, expressed greater or lesser degree of sympathy with Tibet's struggle.
Apprehensions of Insurgency in Annexed Areas. Having secured a politico-military victory over India in 1962 war, Chinese considered it more prudent to consolidate in Tibet rather than annexing captured territory and having to face potential future insurgency; not only in Tibet but also in captured areas. With Taiwan already becoming a breakaway Republic, the prospect of Tibet, the ‘Water Reservoir’ of China and South Asia, breaking away along with annexed areas was unacceptable to the Chinese strategic thinking.
Religious and Cultural Incongruences
Religion in China. Han Chinese constitute about 92 per cent of the population of China.[5] Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism are the main religions of the Han people. The Chinese folk religion comprises a set of worship traditions of the ethnic deities of the Han people. It involves worship of various figures inChinese mythology; folk heroes such as Guan Yu and Qu Yuan; mythological creatures such as the Chinese dragon, family, clan and national ancestors. Confucianism, a governing philosophy and moral code with some religious elements like ancestor worship, is deeply ingrained in the Chinese culture. Belief in spirits and reverence of ancestors influence the Priests to perform blessing rituals such as purifying space exorcising evil spirits (“hungry ghosts”) and to seek astrological divination.
But religious freedom is still not universal in China. The State only recognises five official religions—Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Catholicism, and Protestantism—and considers the practice of any other faith illegal. Religious organisations are required to register with one of the five state-sanctioned patriotic religious associations, each of which is supervised by the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA).Religious groups that fail to affiliate with one of the five official religions are denied legal protection under the Chinese law.
Religion and Culture in Arunachal Pradesh. Due to its ethnic and cultural diversity, Arunachal Pradesh has long been a spot for the syncretism of different traditional religions.[6] Most followers of the native Donyi-Polo religion live in Arunachal Pradesh, and the province is also home to substantial Hindu, Buddhist and Christian populations, the latter introduced by the Missionaries over the past century. A small Muslimpresence also exists in the province. According to a Census, the breakdown of religious population in Arunachal Pradesh is as follows :-
(a) Hindus: 379,935 (34.6 per cent)
(b) Others (mostly Donyi-Polo): 337,399 (30.7 per cent)
(c) Christians: 205,548 (18.7 per cent)
(d) Buddhists: 143,028 (13.0 per cent)
(e) Muslims: 20,675 (1.9 per cent)
(f) Sikhs: 1,865 (0.1 per cent)
(g) Jains: 216 (<0.1 per cent)
These wide religious and cultural incongruences between mainland China and Arunachal Pradesh would have played on the minds of PRC leadership on fruitfulness of the amalgamation of captured territory in 1962 (along with its people) with mainland China.
The US Military Assistance to India
It was at the end of October 1962, when the Indian government made frantic requests to the US and UK military assistance; and on 03 Nov 1962, the first aircraft carrying military aid arrived from the US. By mid Nov 1962, the tide of international opinion had swelled in favour of India; and internationally, China was being seen as an expansionist nation. Late on the evening of 20 November 1962, the Prime Minister, Nehru made an urgent and open appeal to the US for armed intervention against the Chinese. He also asked for bomber and fighter squadrons to begin air strikes on Chinese troops inside Indian territory "if they continued to advance" and air cover for Indian cities "in case the Chinese air force tried to raid them." An American aircraft carrier was dispatched toward the Bay of Bengal; but it was ordered back on 21st November, as China had declared a ceasefire.
Fear of the Weather God and Approaching Winters
Last but not the least, approaching winters also forced China’s decision to pull back. The best time for military operations in the Himalayas was July-September. By October the weather was already becoming cold and heavy snowfalls were anticipated. The Tibet military district would have reported to the PLA leadership that with the beginning of snowfall, the PLA would encounter “great difficulties” in moving supplies and reinforcements across the high passes to front line Chinese forces.
The attack was set for 20 October 1962; and later by 20 Nov 1962, the winters had set in. Prospects of Chinese troops occupying captured high altitude areas, on other side of Himalayas, in extreme winters with virtually non existent lines of communication for operational logistics , these troops would have been extremely vulnerable; both from the vagaries of weather and due to the possible air attacks by the Indian Air Force ( IAF). Thus PRC leadership was not left with any other option but to declare a ceasefire & pull back!!
Resilience of Indian Troops
There were several instances during the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict, wherein the Chinese troops had to face unparalleled resilience and resolve of the Indian troops. Possibility of a resolute Indian counter offensive by regrouped Indian Forces, supported by the IAF aimed at severing the shaft of Chinese offensive along tenuous lines of communications, was also playing on the Chinese minds. This factor also contributed to the PRC leadership’s decision to pull back, rather than to continue with the offensive any further.
Conclusion
China’s main population centres are surrounded by buffer states — Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang and Tibet. So long as all these are in Chinese hands, the core of China is invulnerable to land attack. If, however, Tibet were to become independent/ it permitted India to base substantial forces in its territory and to build major supply infrastructure there, then — and only then — India could be a threat to China.[7] Having captured Tibet in 1954 and basing there as many as 40,000 troops China was already in control of the Himalayan piedmont. The gains made in the Northern sector in 1962 further consolidated Chinese positions in this strategically vital area. Thus, within 31 days of the conflict with India in 1962, Chinese decision of unilateral declaration of ceasefire and withdrawal from gains made in the Eastern sector, while retaining gains in militarily vital Northern sector, was strategically a prudent decision that factored the then prevailing geopolitical environment and the military imperatives.
Today after half a century of the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict, growing bilateral trade and political engagement, the fundamental underpinnings of the Sino-Indian bilateral relationship still remains highly unpredictable and an air of mutual mistrust prevails. It is common knowledge that China is expanding its network of trade and security linkages and it has maximised its zone of influence in South Asia-Indian Ocean Region (IOR). There is every reason to believe that China is apparently attempting to deny India a peaceful periphery, using its “String of Pearls” stratagem. China’s military rise, growing geo-economic clout, her all weather friendship with Pakistan and aid to Pakistan’s nuclear and conventional military capabilities has serious ramifications on India’s security. It is time for our policy makers to evolve a sound strategy supported by optimal force structures to dissuade the Chinese from undertaking any military misadventure in future.
Endnotes
[1] ‘Communist China and Tibet: The First Dozen Years’ (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1964),p.210.
[2] http://en.wikipedia.org
[3] ‘The Geopolitics Of India-A Shifting Self Contained World’ ,Dr George Friedman, Dec 16,2008, http://www.stratfor.com/
[4] Ibid
[5] ibid
[6] ibid
[7]Ibid, ‘The Geopolitics Of India-A Shifting Self Contained World’ ,Dr George Friedman, Dec 16,2008, http://www.stratfor.com/
* Colonel Amar Ramdasani, YSM, HQ IDS.
(Article uploaded on November 22, 2012).
Disclaimer : The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the organisation that he or she belongs to or of the USI.