Author : Gp Capt AK Agarwal,

 

UAVs AND INTELLIGENCE GATHERING IN ANTI MAOIST OPERATIONS

By Gp Capt AK Agarwal*

1.         In the last three months, Maoist cadres have carried out three attacks. On 03 December 2011, they attacked the convoy of former Jharkhand Speaker, killing eight people.[1] On 21 January 2012, the Maoists carried out an attack on security forces who were escorting a Zilla Parishad President.[2] In this attack, 13 people were killed. Then on 01 February 2012, they attacked and killed three policemen.[3] In all these attacks, the Maoists triggered landmines to blow up the road and target the security vehicles. They were also successful in looting arms and ammunition from the security forces. Targeting security vehicles by mining roads has become a favourite modus operandi of the Maoists. Patrolling the roads and ensuring that they remain safe for vehicular traffic is a back breaking task for the security forces who are as it is hard pressed in quelling the insurgency.

2.         Intelligence inputs also indicate that the Maoists are regrouping for carrying out a major attack on security forces in Jharkhand to regain the lost ground in the state.[4] We can definitely expect more such attacks in the near future. Therefore, there is a need to augment the intelligence gathering capabilities of the security forces.

3.         Obtaining intelligence is very important to the success of counterinsurgency operations. Airpower provides a very efficient collection method. The ability of airpower to provide opportune, wide area surveillance and reconnaissance in counterinsurgency operations remains vital to the chances of their success. Aerial surveillance and reconnaissance makes it difficult for the insurgents to shift to conventional tactics and carry out attacks at their will. Modern technology has enabled aircraft to monitor large areas from the air.

4.         With the advent of Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs), airborne surveillance has become more effective. Modern UAV platforms have the ability to stay airborne for long durations. They are equipped with state of the art surveillance equipment that has the capability to provide real time and clear imagery of large areas to remote ground stations. These platforms can operate over areas of interest unobtrusively and persistently. Thus they are ideally suited in the ISR role for counterinsurgency operations. A UAV is like having a satellite constantly over the insurgency affected areas.[5] With the ability to provide 24 hour surveillance, ISR capabilities are able to establish a pattern of life more effectively than inputs from ground based sources.

5.         Airborne surveillance of economic and communication targets such as oil pipelines and roads are a very cost effective way of ensuring their protection from insurgent attacks and sabotage. The United States had created a Task Force in Iraq code named ODIN, which stands for Observe, Detect, Identify and Neutralise, specifically for reconnaissance, surveillance, targeting and acquisition. The concept employed Army aviation assets such as helicopters and UAVs, to maintain a constant watch for enemies placing bombs or improvised explosive devices (IEDs) on Iraq’s roads.[6] This ability affords unprecedented situational awareness and physical presence over the insurgency affected areas.

6.         In December 2011, the security forces in Chattisgarh utilised inputs from a UAV to locate a probable Maoist camp. Armed with the visuals provided by the UAV, the paramilitary forces mounted an operation against the camp. The camp turned out to be a nondescript village. The whole operation was planned solely on the UAV camera footage showing several huts and human movement.[7]

7.         Intelligence gathered by aerial platforms can give you a great amount of data. It can observe villages, roads and the pattern of life and discern any changes in such routine patterns. However, it cannot differentiate between a Maoist and a common man, nor give answers to the reasons for changes in the routine pattern of life. Counterinsurgency operations are dependent on effective intelligence, which can be analysed only by individuals who are familiar with the ground situation and also have sufficient operational experience in fighting the insurgency. Intelligence gathered through air assets must be quickly routed for timely analysis to a joint intelligence centre. This centre would build a picture by painting in intelligence inputs from other sources such as HUMINT.  The availability of actionable intelligence to the field is hastened by the combination of gathering data through aerial assets and ground based assets and analysis by experienced individuals.

8.         The UAV inputs with regard to the village in Chattisgarh was treated as a major breakthrough since the drones deployed in the area had so far failed to provide sufficient intelligence inputs.[8] The intelligence analyst in the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) control room made the mistake of jumping to conclusions without confirming the veracity of the visuals and assuming that the village picked up the cameras was a Maoist camp. But, this operation highlights the ability of the UAV to locate obscure villages / camps in remote areas and in assisting the security forces in planning operations against the Maoists. The employment of UAVs in anti-Maoist operations is still in its nascent stage. Other states like Odisha are also planning to induct UAVs in anti-Maoist operations.[9] It will only be with experience that Standard Operating Procedures will get streamlined enabling the best exploitation of the UAVs.

Endnotes