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The 18 July 2005 Indo-US Nuclear Deal has provoked tremendous debate, not only within India, but also in the US. Michael Kripon, a leading US non-proliferation expert argues that the deal significantly shakes the foundation of the global non-proliferation regime. Amitabh Mattoo, an expert on nuclear issues in India, indicates that the deal is good for India as it provides opportunities for further civilian nuclear cooperation with countries besides the US. In that context, India and France issued a declaration on 20 February 2006 on "development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes" under International Atomic Energy Safeguards (IAEA) during the recent visit of French President Jacques Chirac to India. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh promised that any such civilian nuclear facilities available to India through international cooperation would be placed under IAEA safeguards and that India is committed to "honouring the letter and spirit" of the 18 July 2005 Indo-US nuclear deal. Given that, France expressed willingness to provide India nuclear power plants and fuel. However, a full fledged Indo-France civilian nuclear deal would hinge on the implementation of the Indo-US nuclear deal and the relaxation of Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines.
With the forthcoming visit of the US President George W. Bush to India next month, there is a sense of urgency amongst the Indian establishment to finalize a credible separation plan of the civilian and military components of India's nuclear programme. This is the criterion set by the US for civilian nuclear cooperation with India. During talks with under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns in December 2005 at Washington D.C., Indian Foreign Secretary, Shyam Saran had provided a conclusive list of Indian civilian nuclear sites that would be under IAEA safeguards. India's fast breeder reactor (FBR) programme was not included in that list. The two officials met again in January 2006 at New Delhi but made no headway in clinching an understanding on the separation process.
The obstacle in implementing the deal seems to be the US insistence that India must not only provide for separation of the two aspects of its nuclear programme, but also agree to "in-perpetuity safeguards" and include its nuclear breeder programme under IAEA safeguards. The nuclear breeder programme consist of the 40 MWth (13 MWe) Fast Breeder Test Reactor, and the upcoming 500 MWe Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR). According to Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) chairman, Anil Kakodkar, placing the breeder programme under safeguards would compromise India's military programme. In an interview to the Indian Express recently, he said that "both from the point of view of maintaining long term energy security and for maintaining the 'minimum credible deterrent', the fast breeder reactor just cannot be put on civilian list. This would amount to getting shackled and India certainly cannot compromise one {security} for another". Since a "minimum credible deterrent" is crucial for India's national security, strategic tenacity and technological vitality, the FBR, which is a vital component of India's weapons programme, must be kept out of safeguards.
However, the US pressure on India continues. Recently, a US non-proliferation think tank, Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) came up with a six page report by David Albright and Susan Basu on how the separation should be carried out. The report provided that India must place all facilities, not directly associated with nuclear weapons or production or deployment, under international safeguards. This criterion should apply "in perpetuity", with minor standard exceptions. The report also stated that nuclear material, not under safeguard must not co-mingle with safeguarded nuclear material, unless it is placed under safeguards. The report concluded that for civil nuclear cooperation and to administer the prevention of civil nuclear technology benefiting India's nuclear weapons programme, such conditions were, indeed, necessary. The implication of this report is an underlying attempt to influence India's plans on civilian and nuclear separation, while keeping US national interest at the core. An exercise such as the report mentioned above reflects the US's desire to establish that the Indian plans for separation are credible, acceptable and transparent to them. Interestingly, the 18 July declaration had placed the onus on India to carry out its own separation plans.
The Indian establishment's desire to keep indigenous programmes such as the FBR outside international safeguards is legitimate. Accepting safeguards on the FBR would amount to sacrificing the integrity of the weapons programme and compromising on India's right as a sovereign independent state to take crucial policy decisions. Indeed, the demand for "in-perpetuity" safeguards on all Indian civilian facilities including the FBR is an attack on India's sovereignty.
Another interpretation of the 18 July joint declaration is that it reflects a deft move by the Bush Administration to promote India as a counter-balance to a rising China in the region. George Perkovich, a distinguished non-proliferation theologian, refutes this view expressing his reservations on India being seen as a counterweight to China. In a significant policy outlook paper brought out by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Perkovich indicates that historically, India has stayed clear of any broad alliances and political maneuveurs. India is too vital a country for the US to merely view it as counterbalance to China. Despite his fear that the Indo-US nuclear deal would undermine an already fragile global nuclear non-proliferation regime, he applauds the benefits of the nuclear deal for India: US civilian nuclear technology would provide India with an important source of energy that is crucial for its economic development.
What are the significant benefits of the deal for India?
The benefits could be on four counts. First, by proposing to revive civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries, the Bush Administration has accepted India as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology. Second, President Bush has specifically referred to India's strong commitments to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Hence, India must acquire the same benefits and advantages in nuclear commerce enjoyed by other states in the system. Third, in 1978, the US enacted the Nonproliferation Act, which laid down the provision that in order to receive future nuclear exports from the US, non-nuclear weapon states such as India had to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. (India is a non-nuclear weapon state under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty {NPT} and US laws). In that backdrop, the 18 July 2005 joint declaration is significant as it has reversed a thirty year US non-proliferation policy against India. If the Bush administration could convince Congress and the NSG to implement the Indo-US nuclear deal, it would amount to a de facto recognition of India's status as a nuclear weapon state. Fourth, the declaration has facilitated similar civilian nuclear deals between India and other major nuclear powers, for example, Russia and France. The UK has also exhibited interest in concluding a civilian nuclear deal with India.
The crux of the 18 July 2005 declaration now lay in its sound implementation by both countries. The US has to persuade the 44 member NSG to amend its guidelines to permit nuclear cooperation with India without requiring the later to accept safeguards on all its programmes. Such a move could face obstacles with regard to provisions of the NPT. For instance, if India is given all the benefits of civilian nuclear cooperation, specified in Article VI of the NPT, without it having to fulfill conditions in Article I that endorses forswearing of nuclear weapons, and Article III implementing full scope safeguards, other non-nuclear weapon states under the NPT could demand similar concessions. Moreover, to implement the Indo-US nuclear deal, the US Congress has to impose further conditions on the US Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Section 123 of the Act requires that any peaceful nuclear agreement, which the US signs with non-nuclear weapons states must include amongst others, full scope safeguards. The US must also approve the reprocessing of nuclear materials in the recipient state. Amending US domestic laws by US Congress would require a majority vote in both houses of Congress.
The task of implementation is difficult as the 'devil lies in the detail'. It remains to be seen how both sides work out an implementation process, without shaking the foundations of an already fragile nuclear non-proliferation regime. Moreover, India must ensure that the process of implementation does not compromise its weapons programme. Including the FBR under IAEA safeguards could compromise its sovereign decision making on its weapons programme. Once placed under safeguards, the FBR cannot be reverted back to the weapons programme in the future. Herein lays the necessity for prudent decision making on the part of the Manmohan Singh government to facilitate civilian nuclear cooperation while maintaining the sovereignty of its nuclear weapons programme.
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