Publication

Author : Col GG Pamidi,

TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE INDO-PAK DYAD: STABILITY OR INSTABILITY?

Col GG Pamidi*
 

The reportedly successful testing of  Nasr (HATF IX) by Pakistan on 19 April 2011 is being hailed in many circles as not only a major technological feat but is also being credited with providing stability by adding a degree of deterrence to the Indo-Pak nuclear dyad.

Brief Characteristics of the Missile

Before going on to analyzing as to whether this development does indeed contribute to increasing the strategic stability in the region or otherwise, a brief recap of the salient aspects of the missile itself is in order.

  • Nasr is an Arabic word meaning “victory”.
  • It is a solid-fuel ballistic missile.
  • Developed by Pakistan’s National Development Complex.
  • The warhead can be tactical nuclear or conventional high explosive (HE).
  • Has an operational range of 60 kilometres.
  • Its launch platform is a double-tube transporter erector launcher (TEL) capable of carrying two missiles.
  • Is a quick response system with “shoot and scoot” capability.

Possible Operational Employment

 According to Lt Gen Khalid Ahmed Kidwai ( Retd), Director General of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division, a division of Pakistan’s National Command Authority, Nasr is intended to achieve “ a milestone in consolidating Pakistan’s strategic deterrence capability at all levels of the threat spectrum”.[1]

Pakistan appears to be contemplating use of Nasr as a tactical nuclear weapon only. This is borne out by the statement of Dr Shireen Mazari, a noted Pakistani analyst and journalist, as well as the former Director General of the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, “India has always felt that Pakistan had a loophole in terms of lacking short range battlefield nuclear weapons, which it can exploit on the assumption that it made little sense for Pakistan to respond to such conventional attacks with strategic nuclear weapons. With Nasr, Pakistan has plugged that loophole. Indian dreams of a limited war against Pakistan through its “Cold Start’ strategy have been put into “cold storage”. This will allow for a reassertion of a stable nuclear deterrence in the region”[2].

Deterrence Stability

 Dr Shireen Mazari’s assertion that the Nasr has added to the “creation of stable nuclear deterrence” merits a deeper analysis. The perception appears to be that the Indian Army’s “Cold Start Doctrine” envisages rapid forward movement of compact, highly mobile forces to occupy small slices of enemy territory to obtain a bargaining advantage[3].

This has been debunked by India on more than one occasion and it has been emphasized that no such doctrine exists. However, Pakistan still appears to harbour deep suspicions and the development of the short range nuclear capable ballistic missile is its response. Theoretically, Pakistan seems to be banking on the premise that introduction of tactical nuclear missiles in the Indo-Pak nuclear dyad will minimize the scope for escalation. Let us examine if this premise is indeed true.

Conceptually, deterrence works on the perceptional and psychological levels as much as it relies on the rational and logical[4]. It relies heavily on the rationality factor of the principals involved in the conflict. The underlying assumption is that since the effects are so horrendous, no sane and rational actor will even contemplate its use. In other words, deterrence works because it believes in the “non-usability” of nuclear weapons as a military weapon to achieve discrete military objectives.

By lowering the threshold of nuclear weapons, Pakistan appears to be making a major shift from nuclear deterrence to nuclear war fighting itself.  It appears that the Pakistani analysts are of the opinion that it can justify the use of a tactical nuclear weapon as a defensive measure of the last resort by using it on Pakistani soil against Indian forces. This, they opine will negate India’s conventional superiority and desist India from taking any action at all and thus provide the elusive “stable nuclear deterrence”.

Pursuing the Argument

Pakistani logic of deterring any and all military actions by India by the Nasr, needs to be taken further. Let us take the logic as perceived (or postulated) and carry it further. If tactical nuclear weapons are indeed used by Pakistan on Indian forces on Pakistani soil, it is perceived by them to be acceptable and unlikely to unleash any violent international reactions or even a massive strike by India, notwithstanding the stated Indian Nuclear Doctrine. Even if this is to be accepted, and it is taken that India would reciprocate in kind with nuclear strikes on Pakistani forces, escalation control will be well nigh impossible. There will certainly be nuclear exchanges eventually graduating to massive strikes.

This is the reason the Indian Nuclear Doctrine postulates that there is only one viable option to a Pakistani nuclear strike, whether on Indian military forces or counter value targets, whether in India or on Pakistani soil, and that is massive punitive retaliation with the full force of India’s nuclear capability.[5]

Rational Option

It clearly emerges that the employment of tactical nuclear weapons in the Indo-Pak context is not rational. According to Bharat Karnad, a noted Indian strategic affairs expert, “In the South Asian context, any use of nuclear weapons is tactical use, which the Indian Government has wisely foresworn”.[6] The First Use nuclear posture adopted by Pakistan is not only morally repugnant, it is also inherently destabilizing, dangerous and naturally escalating. Pakistan appears to be  attempting to make nuclear weapons usable by claiming to limit their effects on soldiers on the battlefield, presumed to be justifiable targets even for the otherwise forbidden nuclear weapons. This will only result in a massive retaliation; “Any nuclear weapon, of any quality, or delivery, or yield, used against any type of target, will result in a strategic impact to which the logical response would be use of nuclear weapons, more often than not, on an overwhelming scale.”[7] Once the realization dawns on Pakistan that suing for peace is the only rational and logical option, it is hoped that they will give up the irrational option of employment of a tactical nuclear weapon.  



[1] Ali Ahmed, “ Making Sense of Nasr”. IDSA, 24 April, 2011.

[2] Anita Joshua, “Pakistan tests short-range ballistic missile”. The Hindu, 19 April 2011.

[3] Rajesh Basrur, “South Asia : Tactical Nuclaer Weapons and Strategic Risk Analysis”, RSIS, 03 May 2011.

[4] GG Pamidi, “ The Nuclear Tests: Needless Controversy Over Yield,” Indian Military Review, February 2010.

[5] Gurmeet Kanwal, “

[6] Bharat Karnad,”Going Thermonuclear : Why, With What Forces, At What Cost”, USI Journal, July-September 1998.

[7] Jasjit Singh,”India’s Defence Spending: Assessing Future Needs, IDSA and Knowledge World,New Delhi, 2000.

 
*Colonel GG Pamidi is a Senior Research Fellow at USI, New Delhi. 

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