STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF AGNI V
Dr Roshan Khaniejo*
Introduction
19 April 2012 is a red letter day in the history of India’s scientific research. Agni V the Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) with a range of 5000 + kilometer was successfully test fired from Wheeler Island.The17.5-meter long missile which has the capacity to carry1 to1.5 tons of conventional and nuclear warheads will be the most formidable missile in India’s strategic military arsenal. Scientists claim that there has been a ”giant leap” in the missile development programme from a single stage liquid propelled surface-to-surface Prithvi Missile (first launched in 1988) to the present three stage solid propelled Agni V(launched on 19 April, 2012). Eulogies from scientists, politicians and the media both print and electronic continue to pour in. After the initial hype and euphoria it is now time to analyse its strategic implications.
Reactions
Considering the fact that the world was vociferously criticizing North Korea for its failed missile launch, the timing of India’s launch of Agni V was a little inappropriate. Though the two countries could not be compared as North Korea is considered a rogue state and India with her nonproliferation record is a major developing country. China, however, was more vocal in their reactions claiming on one hand to be India’s “cooperative partner” and on the other hand releasing statements saying that India should not have any “missile delusion”, “China’s nuclear power is stronger and more reliable”. These contrasting statements depict a dichotomy in their approach towards India. Unlike previous occasions when the major nuclear countries went in for embargoes and financial cuts this time the response was generally muted. Although the United States urged for restraint, they still praised India for her solid nonproliferation track record .The dual reasoning behind this change in posture can be seen as economic and strategic. Economically the United States government recognizes India’s stable economic growth and it sees India as a potential market for its companies. The Indo-US Bilateral trade agreements are getting stronger. Strategically the emergence of an economically and militarily strong China is a cause of concern for the world community. Its aggressive posture in the South China Sea, Taiwan, Indian Ocean and its manipulation of International Organizations to its own interest is a cause of anxiety. Although the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) claim that Agni V “is not any country specific” the fact remains that the missile can reach most parts of China including Beijing and Shanghai. Once it is inducted it can not only target the western sector of China but also the economically and industrially strong eastern sector (hitting the enemy hard where it counts). Secondly Chinese media had projected the ranges of Agni V to be much higher than what has been claimed. It has the potential to hit even Europe .In the long run if India plays its card properly it can emerge as a security provider to a lot of countries in Asia /Africa especially the ASEAN countries. This subtle shift in the power nexus will go a long way in maintaining the multipolarity of power structure.
No First Use
India’s nuclear doctrine has a declared no-first-use policy, but it also states that it will respond with punitive retaliation should deterrence fail. In case of no first use ,Agni V may be a deterrent ,but for a punitive retaliation one not only requires accurate nuclear weapons to inflict damage, unacceptable to the aggressor, but also to survive the first kill sufficiently , a number of survivable and operationally prepared silos and well trained nuclear forces are essential. Agni V with its three stage solid propellant is claimed to be a “game changer” as it will be a great asset in developing ICBM with MIRV (Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle). But Agni V is just a delivery system, its operational feasibility in India’s triad of aircraft, mobile land-based missiles and sea-based missiles from ships and other moving platforms, anywhere in India is still to be tested its terminal phase accuracy on land and air is yet to be assessed. Lastly the payload which it is going to carry is also debatable as after 1998, because of India’s self-imposed moratorium, no tests have been conducted in India, unlike in China and the United States with their advanced technology, they are constantly working on miniaturizing their nuclear warheads.
Indigenization
The question now arises is how indigenous is our space programme? DRDO has emphasized that 80 per cent of Agni V is indigenously built but what is the nature of the remaining 20 per cent? Does it comprise vital sub systems like solid propellant rocket motor, or high precision guidance system? It has taken India more than 24 years to advance from Prithvi to Agni V stage. The reasons for such a slow progress are multifarious. Firstly it is due to the expensive and time consuming import of key components like electronic devices such as computer processor chips, radio frequency devices, electro hydraulic components, composite fibers etc. Secondly the infrastructure is not conducive for indigenization for example there are no “ System Integrators” to integrate all the sub systems also the Public Sector Units(PSUs) face resource crunch due to lack of finances and delayed clearance of projects. These two reasons can be addressed by partially allowing the private sector to manufacture a few of the vital components which are feasible. Thirdly there is no synergy between the scientists, the assembly liners that is the PSUs, and the end users the defence forces. To rectify this, services of retired / serving vertical specialists should be used during the conceptualization of projects in defence service specific missions keeping security aspects paramount. There should be insistence of user trails (no waver) in the fields and not confining only to laboratories. The manufacture/design observations by the defence forces should be liquidated in order to yield optimum result in a focused manner rather than being disjointed with critical gaps. This would require systemic changes .The defence may require a special task force comprising specialists from all the three services, so that its representatives could be available at all the stages. Finally efforts should also be made to improve and drastically increase the financial budget for Research and Development wing of the government to keep abreast with the technology as it is changing at a very fast pace. This detailed assessment of our strengths and weaknesses along with strategic direction, increased financial budgets requires a political forethought both externally in terms of active diplomatic and economic collaborations with friendly nuclear power states and internally by creating various systemic changes which will enhance our indigenous missile and space development programme.
Space
Neutralizing enemy satellites and protecting our own is the key to space research. India has been doing endo and exoatmospheric missile defence intercept tests. Agni III had the capacity to hit a satellite. Agni V will enable us to intercept target missiles with a longer range thus giving India the ability to intercept ICBMs. India is already working on an Advanced Air Defense (AAD) system, however, a full multi layered defence against Ballistic missiles requires both terrestrial as well as space based surveillance and kill system which is very difficult to achieve due to its cost and advanced technology. India is trying to adapt existing Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) technologies to the ASAT role but there is ambiguity in declaring whether India’s ASAT capacity can be used either for weapons programme or simply a capability ancillary to missile defense. Though Agni V has been a milestone for our scientists but the operational aspect that is the actual induction in our armed forces and the ABM system is still far off.
Conclusion
Until India achieves a credible nuclear deterrence she should be cautious in her approach towards China. Overemphasizing the significance of Agni V is not desirable as history proves how an ill judged albeit, unintended provocation of China could spell disaster for the region. India should take advantage of the declaration made by China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Weimin stating that India and China were not “competitors but partners”. A mature approach now would be to organize a series of dialogues with special reference to nuclear issues, to reassure each other about their intentions, along with CBM (Confidence Building Measures). This would be beneficial to both as a stable external environment is necessary for the economic growth of each country. India should also reassure the world about its peaceful intentions and its historical nonproliferation track record. As India’s erstwhile Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee had rightly said that India’s foreign policy would ”continue to reflect a commitment to the sensibilities and obligation of an ancient civilization, a sense of responsibility and restrain”.
* Dr Roshan Khaniejo is Associate Research Fellow at the Centre for Strategic Studies and Simulation, USI.
(Article uploaded on May 10, 2012).
Disclaimer : The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the organisation that he belongs to or of the USI.