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A very interesting characteristic pervades much of the discussion on Sino-Indian relations in India. It is of "unease", both who see China as an adversary or as friend are equally afflicted. The advocates of adversarial relationship discomfit over the inadequate recognition and response to the ascent of China. While the friends disquietude is over explaining away the real concrete evidences of China's belligerent actions. One such issue was of the Pareechu lake controversy. In fact most of the strategic analysts in India largely analyse the Sino-Indian relations as being hostage to the boundary issue, which if solved will push this relation on to a frictionless plane. Or the clash is over status and prestige between a perennially emerging great power and an already emerged great power. It is hardly recognised that India and China do not only share boundaries or competing territorial claims but also very large river watersheds. Which makes India strategically vulnerable for the river water supply, as China is in the control of upstream areas. Pareechu lake was formed of one such river, Sutlej or Langchen Khabab in the year 2004.
The news of an artificial lake on the Chinese side of border threatening lives and property in the areas of Himachal Pradesh generated "unease" in the Indian establishment. The predominant thrust was over explaining away the incident as naturally caused or at a very generic level due to the environmental degradation plaguing the earth in the form of global warming. Despite the Chinese insistence on its ecological causes, there was pattern to the whole issue, which implied otherwise. Predictably Indian side was found unaware of the formation of such a big obstruction reported to be around eighty metre wide and one hundred and fifty metre thick. India boasts of state of the art satellite capability but which couldn't collate the occurrence.1 It was China only who informed India of the landslide but only after one month of its occurrence. The Chinese response to the whole crisis was very symptomatic of the Chinese strategic practice that is of ambivalence. Despite Indian requests to allow the experts to examine the topographical details of the lake formed and its cause, visa was denied by China, generating unease among China watchers.
The strategic and otherwise implications of the whole issue are fairly long term. At the very basic level it did threaten the loss of life and property around 350 villages of which eight were evacuated. However in a fairly long term perspective it was a test case for China to test the reaction and vulnerability of Indian establishment to the efficacy or threat of "environmental bomb". Indian reaction was bumbling at one side and focused on prevention and mitigation of disaster on the other. This is more insidious implication of the whole Pareechu lake controversy since China is aware of the environmental vulnerability of India. There are reports that China with the help from International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development, Kathmandu, is extensively mapping the Himalayan region. Raising the spectre of China using Himalayan glaciers as a weapon, which is dangerous for water flow will combine with the gravitational force to acquire a particularly potent force2. The vulnerability is also more since China faces severe water scarcity coupled with that Tibetan Plateau can be its major source of water. Himalayas is a source of some of the major rivers of India viz., Indus, Sutlej and Brahmaputra (Tsangpo). It is also stressed by some analysts that in the long term Pareechu lake can reduce the flow of Sutlej to India.
Further the formation of Pareechu has rendered unviable the Nathpa Jhakri Project for the tremendous increase in silt inflows. The 1500 MW Nathpa Jhakri Power Project was commissioned in the year 2003. Due to the siltation it has not been working to its full capacity or closure of the turbines. As it happened in the year 2004 its underground water turbines got stuck due to massive flow of silt. This was really surprising as the Project was commissioned in the year 2003 only. Despite the various generic causes of the massive increase in silt, one of the reasons put forward by the experts is that increase in silt flows might have been due to the dumping of the road building wastes in the river3. It is not improbable since it is well known that China has embarked on road building spree in the Tibetan region.
The circumstances surrounding the whole controversy to the Pareechu lake issue points to the Chinese culpability. Nevertheless it is certain that China has embarked on a massive construction drive in the Tibetan region. India's recognition of Tibet as an integral part of China will prove to be strategically myopic. China has constructed a thousand kilometre long railway line between Golmuz and Lhasa. According to analysts, there are various dimensions to it. Firstly, China has sets it sight on the 2008 Beijing Olympics as part of the exercise. China wants to develop the region for tourism. Secondly, China wants to rapidly integrate Tibet in the rest of China predominantly through demographic change .The earlier settled Han Chinese were moving out of Tibet for they were finding its climatic conditions hard. With building of metalled road networks and rail lines, it is sought to make it easier for them to adjust. Hence the reports that the explosions were the cause of debris build up appear very plausible4.
Conclusion
The strategic implications for India are profound. The historically nourished idea that the Himalayas was an impregnable fortress providing security to India may increasingly come into question in the twenty first century. This will destabilise one of the strongest strategic coordinates of Indian strategic calculus. Commenting on Indian nuclear explosions of 1998, Dr. Van Evera of MIT remarked thus, "truth is, the Himalayas are between you two, and China's never coming over the Himalayas". In fact Himalayas could become the Achilles heels of Sino-Indian relations. India needs to watch out.
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Notes
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National Remote Sensing Agency (NRSA), Hyderabad is the nodal agency collecting satellite imagery. The issue triggered mutual blame game, where its director told a news agency that it has given information rather satellite imagery in the second fortnight of July much earlier than the Chinese. Though they privately admit that analysis of each and every image is not their job particularly images across borders.
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| 2. |
Avilash Roul points out that Himalayas are prone to the glacial lake outburst floods (GLOF) which can affect India for its downstream topography. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) estimates that there are 44 glacial lakes in Nepal and Bhutan which can become GLOFs. See Avilash Roul, "Environmental Threat beyond McMohan Line",
No.3,September12,2004,http://www.sspconline.org/prnt_article.asp?artid=art2.
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| 3. |
The normal permissible limit for the silt flows is 5,000ppm (parts per million),in the aftermath of the Pareechu lake floods in 2005 it shot up to 151,000 ppm and even when the floods subsided it was around 20,000 to 30,000 ppm. In a study of twenty five years between 1972 and 1996 it has been seen that silt above the permissible level stays only for four or five days .But in the last two years this has been happening for around two months. See "A Dam Squib on Silt Route", Outlook, 10 October 2005.
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| 4. |
Tibetan Government -in-exile based in Dharamshala made the same claims that extensive developmental work in the region is the cause of the artificial lake .See "Tibetans say dangerous lake result of China's developmental work",August 15,2004, www.phayul.com.
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