Author : Dr. Bhartendu Kumar Singh,

SINO – INDIAN BORDER TALKS: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

By Dr Bhartendu Kumar Singh*

First, there was the unexpected deferment. A month later, it was announced that China and India would be holding their 15^th round of Special Representatives (SRs) level border talks in January 2012 at New Delhi.  Going by the camaraderie in which the recent round of talks concluded recently, it may appear that the two countries have overcome the bitterness of recent deferment and the talks are progressing in the right direction. In reality, the SR-level talks are plagued with a series of problems. Unless these talks are reoriented with a new approach, China and India stand to loose the last opportunity to bring a logical conclusion to what could be described as the oldest border talks in contemporary international relations.

Deferment of the talks: a technical hitch or a political game?

The 15^th round of talks was initially scheduled for last week of November 2011 at New Delhi. When the talks were abruptly called off, it was not a technical hitch about the availability of dates, as was sounded in diplomatic explanations from both sides. Rather, they were deferred at the instance of China that was not happy at the World Buddhist Congregation in New Delhi at around the same time where the Dalai Lama had been invited. As Shen Dingli, director of the Centre for American Studies at Fudan University (Shanghai) told an Indian newspaper, China viewed the holding of the conference as a provocation considering Chinese sensitivities on Tibet. The Communist Party-run Global Times, in an editorial, rather described India as beginning to adopt “a bold stance when dealing with China” and an approach that was “a bit pushy,” in reference to the boundary talks (Ananth Krishnan, 2011).

The November deferment was not a stand alone exception. China has used deferment tool quite liberally in past to derail the negotiation process. In recent times, the border talks have also become a victim of other developments in Sino – Indian relations. These include bilateral irritants, differences over regional and global developments and even domestic issues. For instance, China had been critical of India’s ONGC presence in the South China Sea and was quite vocal about it even in the Bali Summit of the ARF. Its isolation on the issue only made it to look for other excuses to defer the 15^th round of talks.

China has played the deferment game with other engagement mechanisms as well. The bilateral military dialogue, another prominent institutional engagement for promotion of confidence building measures (CBMs) on the LAC, has also become a victim of peripheral developments in bilateral relations and was postponed on some occasions. There is a possibility that this attitude could affect the economic dialogue as well that is still in fledgling stage and has seen only two rounds so far.

Thus, politics, rather than technicalities, propel the Chinese attitude towards various dialogue mechanisms with India. Apart from the Dalai Lama and the Tibetans in India, China has also used its claims over India’s Arunachal Pradesh and even Jammu and Kashmir (an issue in which China has no stakes). The tone and tenor of Chinese politics has got further aggravated in recent times and runs concurrently with China’s new strides in military modernisation and new stakes in the border talks such as the demand for Tawang. Beneath such aggressivism lies the inherent belief amongst the Chinese leadership that it has an asymmetrical advantage over India in all aspects of power projection. Therefore, the pleasures of the two countries returning to the negotiating table is ephemeral since future rounds of border talks are not immune from deferments.  

Overall Gains from the Previous Rounds of SR-level Talks

While the core issue of border remains unresolved in spite of 15 rounds of SR level talks (in vogue since 2003), sustained engagement at the highest level has led to incremental gains in at least three ways. First, a series of confidence building measures (CBMs) have been instituted along the LAC. Prominent among them are the Agreement on Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the LAC (1993), the Agreement on CBMs in the Military Field along the LAC (1996), and the Protocol on Modalities for the Implementation of CBMs in the Military Field along the LAC (2005). Second, the two countries have also been looking for procedural contours within which the overall resolution for the border problem would be sought for. An example of this would be the Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India – China Boundary Question (2005). This agreement carries significant accommodative provisions. In addition, as hinted on several occasions in past, both the countries had agreed to a three stage package for resolving the border dispute: of agreeing principles, a framework and finally drawing the boundary line. Just ahead of the 15^th round, the Indian SR Shivshankar Menon said that the boundary talks had reached the second stage. Third, the talks have allowed the two countries to adopt an open approach and discuss other related issues. This has enabled relative peace on the LAC, gradual separation of economics and politics, opening up of old trade routes like Nathu La and increased border trade, China’s recognition of Sikkim as part of India, and finally, opening up of relationships in other areas and establishment of diverse network of relations between the two countries.

Developments in the 15^th Round

Prior to the talks, it was widely expected that the diplomats from the two sides are finalising an agreement on the ‘Establishment of a Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India – China Border Affairs’ resolving disputes in certain pockets on the LAC, as agreed to during Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to India in December 2010. The 15^th round of the SRs indeed gave it a final shape. Accordingly, a team of diplomatic and military officers headed by a Joint Secretary level from both sides will deal with future border incidents. This is a significant step since the LAC has been known for too many cross-border movements and stand offs. The Working Mechanism will also address issues and situations that may arise in border areas that affect the maintenance of peace and tranquility and will work actively towards maintaining the friendly atmosphere between the two countries. In addition, it will study ways and means to conduct and strengthen exchanges and cooperation between military personnel and establishments of the two sides in the border areas.

The official statements issued from both the sides immediately after the negotiations reflected a general sense of satisfaction among the interlocutors. It was explained that positive progress has been reached and both sides agreed to push for the process of framework negotiations based on the political guidelines already reached on the border issue and seek a fair, reasonable and mutually accepted solution.  

Given the environment of political bitterness and deferment of the talks sometime back, ‘substantive progress on the comprehensive resolution of the border was not anticipated’, rather, the emphasis was on ‘talking down the tension’. The focus, both before and during the talks, was to rebuild the spirit and atmospherics that was dampened because of the November deferment. The SRs from the two sides visited each other’s embassy to create a congenial atmosphere for the talks (Shyam Saran, 2012). Dai Bingguo, the Chinese SR, even penned an article in an Indian Daily on the eve of his visit (Dai Bingguo, ‘A brighter future when China and India work hand in hand’, The Hindu, 16^th January 2012), to pledge everlasting friendship and a ‘golden age’ in India – China friendship.  

Problems with the SR-level Talks

The above achievements notwithstanding, the SR-level talks are plagued with many problems that threaten them with the same fate like earlier rounds of talks.

First, the SR-level talks were instituted after the preceding rounds of talks at Joint Secretary – level and the Foreign Secretary – level had failed to make any progress and were rather caught in bureaucratic quagmires. It was presumed that raising the talks to SR-level would give it a new push and possibly bring an agreeable resolution. Today, even after 15 rounds, an amicable resolution to the border problem still remains allusive. On the contrary, the ‘protracted’ talks are being criticised for being ‘too slow and painful’. There is a fatigue and ‘expectational frustration’ with the entire dialogue process. However, insiders blame the Chinese insistence for the Tawang sector of Arunachal Pradesh as holding the talks from making any progress. In the 15^th round, for example, Dai Bingguo had apparently asked Menon how much territory New Delhi would part with in Arunachal Pradesh (Saurabh Shukla, 2012).

Second, call it the bane or boon of expanding relations between the two countries, the border talks no more seem to occupy the core of bilateral relations. Today, apart from the border issue, the two countries are also talking trade and defence issues through exclusive dialogue mechanisms. These are in addition to their parleys on multilateral platforms like ARF, SCO and SAARC. As a result, the attention span on the border talks seems to have been lost along with its centrality. One example should supplement the statement. Both the strategic economic dialogue as well as the defence dialogue get adequate coverage in the media where the agenda points are well known and subjected to rigorous scrutiny. The border talks, on the other hand, no more engender the same level of enthusiasm that they used to generate till some time back. There is a ‘veil of secrecy’ on agenda points and there is hardly anything to discuss in media other than speculations and rehearsing old themes.

Third, the talks have been expanded in recent times. As one former foreign secretary puts it, ‘…over the past several rounds, these talks have invariably covered a whole range of regional and global issues as well. They have provided a platform for the two sides to exchange perspectives on such issues’ (Shyam Saran, 2012). While there is no denying this, the focus is lost since the exclusive dialogue is used to discuss other aspects of bilateral relations and not ample space is left to discuss key aspects of border talks. Actually, as a veteran journalist explains it, the second phase has got stuck and the talks have been going round and round since 2009 when the two sides actually expanded the scope of the SR's talks, signaling that they had come to a roadblock on their primary mandate to resolve the border dispute (Manoj Joshi, 2012).   

Fourth, incoming political transition in both the countries will hamper the continuity and mutual comfort built over the years. As facts stand, the 15^th round was last for the Chinese SR Dai Bingguo since he is expected to retire soon. Later this year, the 18^th Chinese Communist Party Congress would initiate the transition process for the top leadership that would culminate by early 2013. China will, therefore, have major domestic preoccupations. Foreign policy issues (with the exception of relations with Taiwan) may not get priority. Southern Asia, including India, would be further lower in Chinese priorities (Robert Sutter, 2012). In India, the new political equations might emerge by 2014. Also, by that time, Shivshankar Menon could be hanging up his boots as the National Security Advisor and Indian SR for the border talks. Either way, there will be a break in the momentum built over the years.

Fifth, country specific problems have also prevented the talks to be more meaningful and outcome oriented.  In case of China, the PLA seems to be working against the progress of the SR-level talks. It has enhanced its strategic advantage in border areas along India and convinced the leadership to adopt a rigid position in talks. In case of India, there had been no conscious effort by the political class to take a stand and engender a build public opinion to back its negotiators. While all political parties would sincerely wish the SR-level talks to succeed, they feel shy of talking about the possible contours of the possible solution to the border dispute because of electoral compulsions. In the absence of any political consensus, the negotiators do not want to go for any decision that could turn out to be erroneous and attract jingoistic response.

Border Issue and the Future of Sino – Indian Relations

While the SR-level talks may have relegated on its centrality, the border issue remains at the core Sino – Indian relations. Much will depend on the success or failure of the ongoing SR-level talks. Four different scenarios can be visualised. In the first scenario, sustained engagement on the boundary issue leads to a border treaty. Overall bilateral relations remain amicable and cordial. A new era of Sino – Indian camaraderie begins. A second scenario could see the boundary remaining unresolved but the engagement continuing and expanding into other areas. Although this may not resolve the impasse over the boundary, the ‘status quo’ may continue. In scenario three, the boundary is resolved but differences emerge in other areas that may lead to even open hostilities depending upon the management skills of the political leadership of the two countries. Under a fourth scenario, the unresolved boundary and differences over other issues may lead to open rivalry and even war. The probabilities increase if China continues with its military modernization and displays an aggressive strategic culture (Bhartendu Kumar Singh, 2011).

Factors Influencing the SR-level Talks

The above mentioned scenarios are hypothetical and several factors could affect the working of SRs from both the sides in exploring the prospects towards a final resolution.

First, the unfolding bilateral, regional and global security scenario would certainly propel or undermine the progress made in the SR-level talks. If China gains a disproportionate strategic advantage over India near the LAC, it may be tempted to impose a quick military solution like 1962. Similarly, an asymmetrical gap in the military power of the two countries would propel China to constrain India’s power projection through other mechanisms. India, therefore, needs to watch out and ensure balanced bilateral and regional security relations with China. Sustained investments in upgradation of border infrastructure and military buildup along the LAC would ensure China’s commitment to a pacific settlement through SR-level talks and not otherwise.

Second, the expanding network of economic relationship between the two countries would also have a positive impact upon the SR-level talks. Presently, China is India’s largest trade partner while the later also ranks in top ten trade partners for China. If the bilateral trade grows rapidly and both countries open up further to each other through membership of regional trade agreements, the overall environment for SR-level talks would remain conducive. The opening up of more border trade points and communication lines across the LAC could further supplement the process.   

Third, political processes in the two countries, more so in China, is likely to affect the talks in near future. In case China’s incoming leadership is stronger and can overrule the pressures from the PLA, prospects of an early settlement would brighten. Similarly, if the Indian leadership is able to hammer out a political consensus amongst mainstream political parties, the Government of India can adopt a more flexible approach within the contours of the 1963 Parliamentary Resolution on the Sino – Indian border dispute.

Conclusion: SR-level Talks: The Only Alternative

The SR-level talks have been a victim of peripheral developments in Sino – Indian relations. The November deferment was just one of the recent examples. At the same time, the SR-level talks suffer from many structural limitations that have prohibited the border talks from reaching to a conclusive agreement. Worst, the talks have been painfully slow and frustrating. And yet, there is no other alternative (TINA) to these talks that might eventually lead to a ‘breakthrough’ or ‘break in talks’. The SR-level talks offer the last opportunity for the two countries to resolve their differences through institutionalised dialogue.

There is, therefore, a need to reorient the approach to make these talks more meaningful.

First, If the SRs from the two sides keep on adding to the basket of incremental gains, that will provide a congenial atmosphere when the two sides sit together to hammer out the final resolution. The SRs would need to meet more frequently to enhance the basket of incremental gains.

Second, political support and interference would be required when the two sides enter the third phase of negotiations where hard bargaining is expected to take place. One of the political initiatives could be fixing a time frame for conclusion of talks and agreement.

Third, a domestic political consensus and public opinion needs to be created to supplement the diplomatic efforts. Only time will tell if Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh, who had shown perceptive leadership on the Indo – US nuclear deal would like to bite the bullet and clinch a deal with China before his term ends in 2014.  

 References

• Ananth Krishnan, ‘China sees a new assertive India’, The Hindu (New Delhi), 30^th November 2011.  
• Bhartendu Kumar Singh, ‘India – China relations: rising together?’ in D Suba Chandran and Jabin T Jacob (eds), India’s Foreign Policy: Old Problems, New Challenges (New Delhi: Macmillan Publishers India Ltd; 2011), pp. 25-42.  
• ‘India – China Agreement on the Establishment of a Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India – China Border Affairs’, http://www.meaindia.nic.in 17^th January 2012.
• Manoj Joshi, ‘Don’t talk up Chinese enmity, http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/india-vs-china-dai-bingguo-shivshankar-menon-pla-indian-army/1/168402.html  12^th January 2012.
• Robert Sutter, ‘Foreign affairs a secondary priority but salient challenges ahead’, China Brief, Vol XII, Issue 2 (20^th January 2012), available on www.jamestownfoundation.org
• Saurabh Shukla, ‘Arrogant China raises its pitch for Arunachal Pradesh’, http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/sino-indian-boundary-china-arunachal-pradesh/1/170938.html  28^th January 2012.
• Shyam Saran, ‘Talking down the tension’, Business Standard (New Delhi), 18^th January 2012.
• Sino – Indian talks positive, says China,’ http://zeenews.india.com/news/nation/sino-india-border-talks-positive-says-china_753435.htm  18^th January 2012. 

 

*Dr Bhartendu Kumar Singh is employed with Indian Defence Accounts Service (IDAS). (Article uploaded on March 06, 2012). 

Disclaimer : The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the organisation that he belongs to or of the USI.