PAKISTAN’S PUSH FOR NON-DEPLOYMENT OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
Colonel GG Pamidi
Newspaper reports suggest that Pakistan is attempting to push the signing of a pact for the “non-deployment of ballistic missile system” as a major confidence building measure (CBM) between India and Pakistan. Presumably, Pakistan attempted to raise this issue during the recently concluded talks between the foreign ministers of the two nations; however, it has found no specific mention in the joint statement issued after the meeting. Nonetheless, it has been stated that the Ministers attached importance to promoting peace and security, including Confidence Building Measures, between India and Pakistan and have “agreed to convene separate meetings of the Expert Groups on Nuclear and Conventional CBMs, in Islamabad in September 2011”. It can be expected to figure fairly prominently in the next round of talks and hence merits detailed analysis at this stage. The queries that need to be answered include: Should India agree to this proposal? What advantages will it accrue? Conversely, should India not accept? What are the reasons for non-acceptance?
The India-Pakistan Nuclear Dyad
Before proceeding, an important aspect that needs to be emphasized is that the Indo-Pakistan dyad cannot be viewed in the prism of bi-lateral relations alone, since India has to factor in the larger South Asian security framework which includes China. Even in the narrow confines of an India-Pakistan equation, the recent steps taken by Pakistan are far from reassuring. Again, if newspaper reports are to be believed, Pakistan now has a far greater number of nuclear weapons than India. In addition are the persistent efforts by Pakistan to develop and operationalize battlefield nuclear missiles. The reportedly successful testing of Nasr (HATF IX) by Pakistan on 19 April 2011 is being hailed in many circles as not only a major technological feat but is also being credited with providing stability by adding a degree of deterrence to the Indo-Pakistan nuclear dyad. Before analysing the perceived benefits of a non-deployment of a ballistic missile system, it would be prudent to see the manner in which Pakistan perceives the Nasr. According to Lt Gen Khalid Ahmed Kidwai (Retd), Director General of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division, a division of Pakistan’s National Command Authority, Nasr is intended to achieve “ a milestone in consolidating Pakistan’s strategic deterrence capability at all levels of the threat spectrum”. Hence, in any future conflict scenario, it appears that Pakistan may use the Nasr. This is borne out by the statement of Dr Shireen Mazari, a noted Pakistani analyst and journalist, as well as the former Director General of the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, “India has always felt that Pakistan had a loophole in terms of lacking short range battlefield nuclear weapons, which it can exploit on the assumption that it made little sense for Pakistan to respond to such conventional attacks with strategic nuclear weapons. With Nasr, Pakistan has plugged that loophole. Indian dreams of a limited war against Pakistan through its “Cold Start’ strategy has been put into “cold storage”.
Theoretically, in the India-Pakistan dyad, Pakistan has tended to view the protection of a ballistic missile shield by India as a tendency towards a first strike posture. However, the declared doctrinal principle of No-First-Use by India should have put this misgiving permanently to rest. It is apparent that Pakistan does not trust India on this score though the NFU is one of the cornerstones of the Indian Nuclear Doctrine. If there is a lack of trust on a declared doctrine, then the need is to slowly and gradually build up the Pakistanis confidence in the Indian principle of NFU rather than going in for another CBM in an atmosphere of acute mutual distrust.
The non-deployment of the ballistic missile system in an atmosphere of distrust will suffer from a serious lacuna, that of exposing the Indian armed forces to a possible attack by the Nasr in the event of a possible future conflict scenario. While such a situation appears remote, the possibility however remains, and with it, the vulnerability. In such a scenario, an effective ballistic missile defence will not only protect India but also deter Pakistan from use and may, indeed, indirectly contribute to stability in the region. Even more probable is that the ballistic missile system will also provide the much needed protection in the much more likely scenario of an accidental strike or a rogue use/misuse. The argument that this will lead or indeed compel Pakistan to increase the number of its nuclear warheads is a fallacy. The substantial enhancement by Pakistan of its inventory has not been prompted by India’s efforts to get a BMD but rather appears to be on a mistaken belief that it can use it against the Indian armed forces on its soil as a tactical weapon.
The China Factor
China has a declared No-First-Use policy, which it has steadfastly clung to. Even its latest White Paper of Defence reiterates this. However, the modernization of its Second Artillery Corps continues at a feverish pace and is a cause of concern. A few concerns also remain about its professed willingness to use nuclear weapons in response to even conventional weapons against its strategic assets but this rhetoric appears to just that and has been officially denied. Notwithstanding this, the fact is that China has a substantial number of missiles that are in Tibet and can be brought there in a short time. These can conceivably be used against India. In such circumstances, prudence dictates that India adopts all such defensive measures that are needed and topping the list is the fielding of a BMD.
Conclusion
No CBM must be negotiated which has any negative security implications and opens up vulnerabilities. Signing a “non-deployment of ballistic missile system” in the forthcoming talks in September is fraught with danger in the prevailing India-Pakistan context of mutual suspicion and distrust. The perceived advantage that it will assuage Pakistan’s “misplaced” fears may also turn out to be utopian since it is more than likely that a section of the paranoiac “security establishment” may well debunk these well meaning efforts too. With the huge trust deficit existing between the two countries, CBMs at this stage, though desirable, appear to be unrealistic. At the current juncture, the need is to take small, incremental steps which will increase the confidence in each other without adding to the feeling of vulnerability. For this, a mutual acceptance of definitions and doctrinal applications are a good start point. Currently, there exists a lot of ambiguity about the place of nuclear weapons in Pakistan’s security matrix. Pakistan needs to explain its understanding of deterrence by enunciating its doctrine. This will not weaken its security but will enhance it substantially. Both the nations need to take a page from the Cold War experience of arms control and CBMs “Trust but Verify”, being the motto.
Colonel GG Pamidi is a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Strategic Studies and Simulation, USI. (Article uploaded on August 11, 2011).