Author : Gp Capt AK Agarwal,

EMPLOYMENT CONCEPTS OF PLAAF IN AIR DEFENCE OPERATIONS

By Gp Capt AK Agarwal

The PLAAF is in the midst of a transformation and becoming a modern, highly capable air force for the 21^st century. The PLAAF has phased out many old aircraft and is operating more than 300 modern fighter aircraft with more under production. These include Su-27s, Su-30s and the indigenously developed J-10. Employment concepts are also undergoing a change, which would have implications for the IAF.

Chinese Military Strategy

In March 2011, the Chinese government issued a white paper titled ’China’s National Defence 2010.’[1]According to this paper, Chinese military strategy is defensive in nature and it practices a strategy of "attacking only after being attacked," or ‘Active Defence’. However, it is unclear as to what actions taken by an adversary may be considered as an initial strike. As per the Annual Report to US Congress “Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2011, a publication titled ‘The Science of Military Strategy’, asserts that “the definition of an enemy strike is not limited to conventional, kinetic military operations. Rather, an enemy strike may also be defined in political terms.” Therefore, we can infer that China may consider a political aggression against her as a first strike. From this we can conclude that, PLA forces may carry out pre-emptive strikes in the name of defence.

China has formulated a doctrine of ‘Local Border Wars’.[2]Though the probability of such a war in the near future is low, a conflict with China may break out over territorial disputes with India, especially in the eastern sector.The mountainous state of Arunachal Pradesh shares a 1,030 Km border with China. China has given up its claim to Sikkim. However, it still lays claim over a vast stretch of Arunachal Pradesh. According to the defence ministry, there have been about 350 border violations by Chinese soldiers since 2008.[3]

If a conflict was to break out, the PLAAF will try and render inoperable Indian airbases, attack Indian Army strong points and interdict our lines of communication.[4] Any retaliation from the IAF would be met with PLAAF air-defence assets. This article goes on to examine the employment concepts of PLAAF air-defence.

Trends in PLAAF Air Defence Thinking

The Rand Corporation carried out a study to try and understand how the Chinese military thinks about air power and concepts of its employment. There are six new trends which have been identified in PLAAF AD concepts[5]:

(a) With an increase in radius of action of aircraft and stand-off capabilities for weapon delivery, the conception of ‘point defence’ has changed to ‘large area defence’. PLAAF thought process is that enemy aircraft must be engaged as early as possible. This can be achieved by pushing the aerial battle space towards the adversary’s borders, ensuring as early an interception as possible.

(b)  There is a trend of employing mobile ground AD assets in ‘Shoot and Scoot’ tactics. This aims at reducing gaps in air defence cover from the ground.

(c)  Defensive AD concepts are moving towards offensive AD concepts. This is in consonance with the thinking of active defence. The purpose of offensive defence is to integrate defensive action with a form of attack. The endeavour is to seize the initiative from the adversary and carry out attacks on his resources with the objective of disrupting his plans and destroying his offensive posture.

(d) The fourth trend is securing information or ‘information air defence’. This is aimed at protecting the flow of information for command and control, and at the same time, denying this to the enemy.

(e) The fifth trend is integrating air and space defence or aerospace defence. Chinese thinking indicates the concept of ‘whoever controls space controls the planet’.

(f)  The sixth trend is towards integrating AD operations with the PLA and PLAN. This indicates the importance the Chinese are giving to joint operations.

Mission of Air Defence

PLAAF AD is generally organised around a theatre level campaign. The three missions of Air Defence are:

• Protecting the capital against air attacks.
• Protecting other important strategic and tactical targets.
• Achieving and retaining air superiority.

Objectives of Air Defence

The objectives of PLAAF AD campaign are:

• Destroy or attrite the enemy’soffensive air capability.
• Ensure the protection of vital areas or vital points.
• Avoid or reduce damage from enemy air attack.
• Degrade or destroy the enemy’s offensive plans
• Create conditions for victory on ground, sea and air.

Air Defence Operations

The PLAAF executes three types of AD operations.[6]

‘Resistance Operations’ or in other terms – air defence missions. Resistance operations include intercepting the adversary as early as possible by long range Surface to Air Missiles (SAMs) and fighter aircraft. These operations will be carried out in three zones.

The first zone will be as far forward as possible and is termed as the ‘Interception Zone’.  In all probability, this zone will be outside the cover of any radar. Therefore, only fighter aircraft equipped with modern air to air radars, avionics and beyond visual range air to air missiles will operate here. They may not be very effective but will pose as a nuisance value, by diverting resources in monitoring them.  These fighters will also try and target any high value asset such as AWACS or airborne refuellers.

The second zone will be in the middle area, aiming to shoot down or make the adversary turn away from his objective. This zone is termed as the ‘Blocking and Destruction Zone’. It is the most lethal zone and will have the full array of Air Defence weapons and sensors such as Early Warning and Ground Control Interception (GCI) radars, SAMs and Combat Air Patrols (CAPs).

The third zone, termed as the ‘Deep Covering Zone’, consists of terminal defence weapons such SAMs, AAA and balloon barrages. The Chinese high value assets such as AWACS and aerial refuellers will also be located here.

‘Counter-attack Operations’ will be launched against the adversary’s air bases using the Second Artillery and fighter bomber aircraft. The Second Artillery would carry out attacks to render military facilities un-operational, keep the adversary’s air force down during certain periods of time in which the PLAAF would launch attacks, or, simply carry out attacks to harass the adversary. Air field attacks by aircraft may be carried out by night and will also employ low altitude, terrain masking tactics. The intention of these attacks would be to disrupt the adversary instead of destroying, thereafter, gradually seizing the initiative from him. Counter-attack operations also include raids by Special Operation airborne forces on airfields, support facilities and Command Headquarters. It may be noted that Special Operation Forces also form a part of the PLAAF.

‘Close Protection Operations’ or Passive Air Defence is the third type of AD operations undertaken by the PLAAF. The PLAAF gives great importance to camouflage and concealment and dispersal of assets and protecting aircraft by parking them in hardened shelters. Another new concept is ‘Extensive Mobility’ which involves repositioning SAMs and AAA to new pre-prepared sites. This is to counter the difficulty of defending fixed sites from precision attacks.

Implications for the Indian Air Force

Radar Cover.  Ensuring gap free radar cover at high and low levels along our borders with China will is the first step towards securing the defence of our skies and territory. For high level surveillance, the IAF is inducting mountain radars, which are phased array radars capable of operating at an altitude of 5,000 metres in extreme weather conditions. To guarantee seamless radar cover at medium and low levels, the IAF is also inducting Medium Power Radars and Low Level Transportable Radars.[7] The ability to pick up PLAAF aircraft through the most likely ingress routes is crucial to the siting of these radars. Deployment of these radars in high altitudes will be a challenge. Locating these radars to ensure clutter free pickup of the threat directions would be a major consideration.

Strengthening Air Defence.  To augment the offensive arm of Air Defence, there will be a requirement to protect airfields and other strategic targets from aerial attack. This will be achieved by deploying Surface to Air Missiles and Air Defence fighter aircraft. The IAF is planning to induct six Akash Surface to Air Missile squadrons and have deployed Su-30 fighter aircraft in Tezpur and Chabua.[8]

Protection of High Value Airborne Assets.  AWACS and Air to Air Refuellers would need to be protected from the first tier of the PLAAF air-defence aircraft which would be operating as far forward as possible. Aircraft escorting PLAAF strike aircraft would also pose a threat to these high value assets. 

Ground Defence.  Protection of airfields, radar units and other key installations from raids from the PLAAF Special Forces is another area that needs to be focused on. Presently, the ground defence of these places is entrusted to the personnel of the Defence Services Corps, airmen guards and Territorial Army troops during times of heightened tensions. Their efficacy and training levels need to be reviewed to assess whether they are suitable for this task during a war. Though the IAF has its own Special Forces – the ‘Garudas’, their role during hostilities would not be airfield protection.

Ground and Passive Air Defence.  PLAAF would prefer to attack the adversary’s Air Force on the ground.[9]  With the induction of SU- 30 aircraft and modern radars, protecting them for aerial attack on the ground would be a pre-requisite for their continuous operations. Hardened shelters capable of parking these large sized aircraft would be the solution. To ensure runways stay operational after attacks, rapid and effective runway repair capability could be enhanced. Effective camouflage would make these targets difficult to spot from the air. Providing sufficient and effective blast protection for personnel to increase survivability from attacks by the Chinese Second Artillery needs to be given consideration. Trenches of the old wars may not serve the purpose.

Ballistic Missile Defence. As part of its Counter Attack Operations, the PLAAF will target the adversary’s airfields. China has deployed the CSS-5 (DF-21) missiles against India. The CSS-5 is a medium-range, road mobile, solid-propellant ballistic missile; with a range of 2150 Km. All airfields in the eastern sector of India will be within range of these missiles. Therein lies the importance of missile defence. The DRDO is indigenously developing the Advanced Air Defence system to intercept enemy ballistic missiles, which is scheduled to become operational by 2015.[10]

Protection of Command and Control Centres.  Towards ‘Information Air Defence’, the PLAAF will try and deny the flow of information by hard or soft kill. Hardening communication and creating redundancies to protect them from information attacks or network intrusions is an area of great importance.   The IAF should also plan and regularly practice for operations under conditions where these systems may be compromised.