Dynamics of Chinese Policies in Xinjiang

 Ms Anisha Kinra

Abstract

The paper proposes to examine the manner in which notions of nationalism and strategic concerns interface in the formulation of China's policies in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). Chinese policy towards its minorities is intrinsically linked with its understanding of nationalism. This concept of nationalism, in turn, is guided by its strategic concerns. Xinjiang is significant for China, both in location as well as its resource potential. This significance is a crucial determinant in Beijing's formulation of its policy for the region. This paper attempts a critical dialogue between the two issues. It begins by presenting a thumbnail sketch of Chinese concept of nationalism and how this determines its policies towards minorities, including the Uyghurs. The next section underscores the strategic and economic significance of Xinjiang and posits this as the prime motivator for China's interest in the region. The paper concludes with the understanding that by couching its strategic interests under the garb of nationalism, Beijing has reinforced rather than appeased separatist sentiments in the region. 

Nationalism and Minority Policy in China

Beijing's policy towards its minorities draws from its understanding of nationalism, nationality and nation. Before exploring the construction of national identity in China, it may be instructive to comprehend what nationalism means. Nationalism may be understood as a distinctive and unique identity conferred upon those who may be variously regarded as nation, populace or race¹. The sociologist John Hutchinson identifies two kinds of nationalism; Political and Cultural². Frank Dikötter adds racial nationalism as another form of nationalism.³ Political nationalism concerns itself with the individual rights of equal citizens. It is based on a cosmopolitan and rationalist conception of the nation wherein individuals are united by common laws. Cultural nationalists, on the other hand, consider the nation as an organic being with a unique individuality and not merely a rational political unit. Instead of consent and laws, it is the culture and history that binds individuals to the nation. Racial nationalists also view the nation as a unique entity with a distinctive history and culture. But they carry this forward and portray the nation 'above all as a pseudo-biological entity united by ties of blood.'⁴ For racial nationalists, cultural features derive from an imagined biological specificity. Individuals are thus ascribed membership to the community first on the basis congenital endowment, and only secondly on the basis of cultural features. These three forms of nationalism may be overlapping or alternating. In the case of China, it is cultural and racial nationalisms that have pre-dominated. 

The Chinese state conceptualizes itself as a civilizational state whereby all those people who live within its sphere of influence are regarded as Chinese.⁵ Nationality is thus defined as a group of people living in a common area, speaking the same language, and having a 'sense of group identity in economic and social organization and behavior.'⁶ By viewing nationality as a distinct ethnic group, which is historically part of the Chinese state, the term minority became associated with people and did not entail a distinct political character.⁷ Thus, inherent in the Chinese understanding of a civilizational state was the notion that

The national minority policy of China is rooted within this understanding of nation and nationalism. The primary objective of this policy is to hold the borderland territories, which have been formally annexed, as an integral part of the Chinese state. All policy initiatives in the borderlands are aimed towards this objective.⁹ Essentially, three aspects form the crux of Chinese national minority policy. These include the ethnic classification project, limited autonomy and repressive policies.¹⁰ 

The ethnic classification project of the Chinese state was crucial in determining its policy towards minorities. Benedict Anderson describes the nation-state as an 'imagined community' and argues that in many instances this 'imagining' was done through three institutions; the map, the museum and the census.¹¹ All these offer possibilities of establishing order in an otherwise diverse populace. By placing each individual in a certain category, everything from language to people to religion became countables. After 1949, in China, the Communists identified 56 distinct 'peoples'. However, the notion of one china or Chinese was retained. Chiang Kai-Shek, who assumed leadership of the Guomindang after Dr. Sun Yat-sen's death in 1925, held the view that although centuries of isolation had resulted in differences in language and culture, the minorities in the borderlands were still part of the Chinese race.¹² Thus, since the establishment of the PRC, the question of ethnic identity has been complicated by the rigorous, modernist ethnic classification project of the communist regime. As ethnic identities became state-sanctioned, the fixed categories that became the ethnic markers posited the majority against the minorities to an extent that the majority identity was constructed at the expense of the minority identity.¹³ The politics of identity is also simultaneously a politics ofothering. The state identified with the majority Han community as against the other minority communities; making Chinese and Han synonymous of each other. National identity has therefore been constructed with indigenous meanings that are specific to the Han community. This ethnic difference, which is a result of inequitable state policies, is today pivotal to the conflict between the state and its minorities in general, and the Uyghurs in particular. A constructivist approach is needed to comprehend the identity politics, which lies at the root of the conflict. 

Identity issues, however, are interwoven with structural issues. Limited autonomy and repressive state policies have further complicated the problem. The areas dominated by the minority communities have been accorded limited autonomy by the Chinese constitution. In fact, the constitution of 1954 made the right to secession illegal. Binh Phan gives a detailed account of how the constitution has been used to institutionalise discrimination by including provisions for limited regional autonomy.¹⁴ Since ethnicity was a construction of the states claims to universality and everybody within the territory was Chinese, autonomy had cultural rather than politico-legal connotations. 

Along with limited autonomy, repressive policies have also become part of official policy. Unfortunately, attempts at curbing growing demands for self-determination have backfired and the Uyghur movement has been further cemented through its encounters with the state. The establishment of Bingtuan-a quasi-military institution to maintain state control in the region and curb ethnic unrest; and encouraging massive Han immigration in Xinjiang, which has caused drastic demographic changes within the region are some of the state policies that have caused discontentment amongst the Uyghurs. Attempts at repression have been further strengthened post 9/11 as China joined the American-led war on terror. Since then, Chinese authorities have actively worked to justify their crackdown in Xinjiang under the rubric of 'counter-terrorism'. 'Terrorists' have replaced 'separatists' in official parlance and criminal law has been made more explicit despite official claims that no incident of explosion or assassination has taken place in the region in the last couple of years. 

Thus, notions of nationalism have impacted upon the national minority policy of the Chinese state. This policy has been formulated with the understanding that no piece of territory can be separated from the Chinese mainland and no region can constitute an independent unit. Ethnic classification and assimilative tendencies form the crux of the national minority policy. The next section carries forward this argument to establish that while this notion of 'one China' forms the subtext, the resource potential and strategic location of Xinjiang have emerged as crucial determinants that guide Chinese policies in the region. In other words, economic and strategic objectives of the state in the region have reinforced its notions of nationalism. The two have converged together to form the basis of Chinese policy in Xinjiang.

Significance of Xinjiang 

Owen Lattimore described Xinjiang as the geographical "pivot of Asia" and asserted that it was significant in determining the geopolitics of the region. Its strategic position, at the crossroads of five distinct regions-Russia, Central Asia, the subcontinent, Tibet and China-makes Xinjiang both a 'back door' to China and 'China's corridor' to Central Asia. It occupies 1/6th of China's landmass, contains some of the world's largest oil deposits and houses China's nuclear test site- Lop Nor. All this has made it imperative for China to tighten its hold over the region and curb any separatist tendencies. 

The Xinjiang region of China is critical for the country's security. China's policies within the region are determined by the larger understanding of its security environment. Beijing is aware that the current threat environment is characterized by a low probability of war breaking out among major powers. But there is a significant danger of local conflicts, arising from ethnic and territorial disputes, escalating. There is growing perception of threat emanating from the possibility of nearly 10 million Muslims in Xinjiang aligning with the pan-Islamic, pan-Turkic movement in the Central Asian region. This not only has the potential to bolster the separatist thrust in the region, but also the potential to destabilize the region.¹⁵ Besides, the Chinese leadership fears a ripple effect in Tibet and Taiwan if it accedes to the demands of the Uyghurs. To promote and protect Xinjiang as an integral part of China is therefore essential for the Chinese leadership. 

In addition to this, Xinjiang is being increasingly looked upon as the new energy production base of China. The importance of the region is two fold. It is not only a resource rich region itself, but is also a key supply artillery that facilitates transport of oil and gas from the northwest and from the adjacent central Asian nations to the eastern and central parts of China. Xinjiang is expected to supply over one fifth of China's total oil by 2010, including an import of 10 million tons of crude oil from Kazakhstan. Since the silk route passes through the region, it gives China the opportunity to build an energy supply line along this route, which consists of nations rich in oil and gas resources.¹⁶In addition to being the supply artillery, the region is itself rich in resources. It accounts for 40% of the country's wool and is a rich source of gold and copper. Significantly, it sits on 30 per cent of the nation's total oil reserves and 34 per cent of its natural gas resources. Last year, Xinjiang produced 22.28 million tons of crude oil, which is expected to grow to an estimated 50 million tons annually, replacing Heilongjiang Province in the northeast as the top oil producer in the country.¹⁷ In fact, since 1993 crude oil production in the region has increased at an annual average rate of more than 1 million tons, ranking first in the country.¹⁸ The potential for energy sources in the region has made integration of Xinjiang paramount for China. 

Concluding Remarks

From the analysis of the various aspects of Chinese policy in Xinjiang we can conclude that there are a number of complex and interrelated issues that need to be assessed in order to understand the policy dynamics in Xinjiang. Identity and structural issues are interwoven in a complex web that forms the roots of conflict in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. In order to grasp the rationale behind Chinese policies in the region, it is critical to examine the interplay between the two. 

The concept of nationalism, to which Chinese state subscribes, has inevitably resulted in a politicization of ethnic identity, which forms the central part of conflict between the state and the Uyghurs. The state has come to constitute a universal rationality for organization and conflict prevention; and nationalism has been understood as the 'political principle, which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent.'¹⁹ This process has unfortunately led to the creation of exclusionist identities. The paper attempted to examine the complexities of this phenomenon to comprehend the causes and mechanisms of Chinese rule in Xinjiang.

While polarization between ethnic groups and nationalism are vital to conflict dynamics, they contribute only partially towards formulation of Beijing's policies in Xinjiang. The strategic and economic significance of the area is pivotal in Chinese thinking. With the country depending on imports to meet 45% of its oil supply needs, it has become vital to tap the resource potential of Xinjiang. Twenty years ago China was amongst the largest oil exporters of East Asia. Today it is the world's second-largest importer. In 2004, China alone accounted for 31 percent of global growth in oil demand.²⁰ China's growing appetite for energy has made the integration of Xinjiang a crucial policy goal of the Chinese leadership. 

The Uyghurs thus face a double assault. There is a cultural threat as the state, in its drive for national integration, asserts its right to represent and define 'people' through the creation of a universal, all-inclusive 'Chinese' identity. There is also a tangible economic threat as the state siphons off the regions resources without any accompanying socio-economic development. Repressive measures and assimilative tendencies have not succeeded in integrating the Uyghurs. In fact the Uyghur identity has become more pronounced in its encounters with the Chinese state. Beijing needs to acknowledge that any struggle, which fails to address the concerns of the people it affects, cannot achieve the goals it has set to undertake. China's policies towards the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region must be formulated within this understanding.