Publication

Author : Colonel GG Pamidi,

DETERRING VIOLENCE: ALL OPTIONS INCLUDING USE OF FORCE MUST BE EXPLORED

Colonel GG Pamidi*

Genesis: Law and Order

It is an universal truth that all men are not peace loving and non-violent by nature. There are quite a few deviants who will go to any lengths in pursuit of their selfish and often misguided goals. This phenomenon is not new and from time immemorial, society has framed rules and regulations to curb the violent nature of man and “coerce” him by a system of rewards and punishment to adhere to laid down norms. This is what is called as the rule of law and that is what makes a society safe. India has a set of well defined laws and a respected judiciary to administer justice. However, sadly, what is lacking is that there is no clear cut strategy regarding critical issues such as a hostage policy. Should the state agree to unconditional release of convicted terrorists in return of abducted hostages? Such a vital issue is dealt on a case by case basis, thus weakening the law enforcement apparatus irrevocably.

Terrorists and Maoists : Common factor is violence

In addition to state sponsored terrorism from Pakistan, India also faces Left Wing Extremism (LWE) in a considerable part of the country. In a significant development in 2004, the People’s War Group (PWG), then operating in Andhra Pradesh, and the Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI), then operating in Bihar and adjoining areas, merged to form the CPI (Maoist)[1].  The central theme of Maoist ideology is violence. The Maoist insurgency doctrine glorifies violence as the primary means to overwhelm the existing socio-economic and political structures. Without a doubt there are serious imbalances in society and a governance deficit that are the underlying causes for this menace. However, the fact remains that violence is no answer and there can be no sympathy for such misguided elements. It is a known fact that such individuals are irrational, that they are willing to incur any cost, including death, to achieve their goals, and are extremely difficult to identify and locate following an attack. For these reasons and others, such violent individuals must be branded as dreaded criminals and those few that are caught must be subjected to the severest of punishment permissible under the law so that it can ‘deter’ others. Deterrence is not a new concept, and has been used throughout the history of man in various facets. In its most elementary form, it can be understood as measures that seek to prevent potential offenders from committing a crime. Any criminal that knows about such measures will only get ‘deterred’ if he is certain that he will be punished severely. This is the pillar of deterrence and has, by and large, served the stated purpose to an extent in the entire world. Then why not in India?

Failure to Deter

In India, terrorists and extremists who are captured at a tremendous cost of precious lives of the security forces are subjected to the due processes of law, which unfortunately take many years, if not decades. There has been much debate on the State’s ‘capitulation’ and the obvious and adverse consequences of releasing active terrorists from jail. However, what is even more significant is that this has emboldened and encouraged hostage taking as a tactic, given the success of the past instances. Due to vested interests, India has often pandered to popular political opinion and disregarded the ‘deterrence’ aspect of the punishment. This has dangerous consequences and needs to be zealously guarded against. This is not to say that the government should not negotiate; it must but it must not give in. Protests from various groups are part of the democratic process but capitulation is the easiest but blatantly wrong answer. The need is to stick to not only the letter of the law but also the spirit of it. No act must come in way of justice being meted out. All the mitigating factors must only be argued in court and not at the point of a gun. Blackmail has no place in the scheme of things.

Hostage Situations: Analysis of Past High Profile Incidents

Is this a recent development? What has been the pattern in the past? To cite only a few cases:-

  • Possibly one of the first instances of hostage taking was in 1984, when an Indian diplomat, Mr Ravindra Mhatre was taken as a hostage in UK and the JKLF’s  Maqbool Bhat’s  release was demanded by the terrorists as a condition for his release[2]. The State refused and went ahead and hanged Bhat. Though Mhatre was killed by the terrorists, abductions as a tactic was abandoned by the terrorists, albeit temporarily.
  • This was followed by the Rubaiya Sayeed abduction in 1989. In that case, the kidnappers had demanded the release of five of their comrades in exchange for Rubaiya's release. The State capitulated and freed the jailed terrorists.
  • The next high profile incident was the hijacking of IC-814 in December 1999. Again the State accepted all the demands of the terrorists, including the release of Maulana Masood Azhar, the person who founded the Jaish-e-Muhammed(JeM) in 2000[3]. This dreaded terrorist is said to have masterminded the  attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001.

Options in a Hostage Situation

Primarily, there appears to be a broad impression that only one of the two divergent approaches is available in a hostage situation. One is the policy of ‘No Negotiations with Terrorists’ and the second is ‘Negotiations are Mandatory’.

No Negotiations with Terrorists. Proponents of such a policy envisage absolutely no talks with the abductors. Some experts have insisted that such negotiations are not permissible under any circumstances[4].

Negotiations are Mandatory. Proponents of this policy argue that negotiations are mandatory on humanitarian considerations and that the life of the hostage is far more important than that of meeting the terrorists’ demands which may include release of certain imprisoned terrorists.

Use of Force

Quite surprisingly, nobody appears to be considering use of force to resolve the issue. History is replete with examples when a determined response has brought about a favourable end situation. The dramatic rescue at Entebbe immediately springs to mind, wherein a counter-terrorist hostage-rescue mission was carried out by the Special Forces of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) at Entebbe Airport in Uganda on 04 July 1976[5]. The operation was a success and the hostages were freed but it needs to be remembered that there were five Israelis including a commando who lost their lives in the operation. This is not to say that there have not been any failed rescue missions. There have been a few operations that have failed, to cite one example, Operation Eagle Claw best illustrates it. This was an American military operation  to put an end to the Iran hostage crisis during April 1980[6]. The aim of the operation was to rescue 52 Americans held captive at the US Embassy in Teheran, Iran. The operation was a disaster, the mission had to be aborted and eight US servicemen lost their lives in the failed mission. 

Analysis of the Use of Force Option

This option does not preclude negotiations. Negotiations by trained personnel must be put in place. While this is going on, all available intelligence must be gathered so that a rescue operation can be mounted. Thereafter, the operation must be launched. This will have the following advantages:-

  • All available might of the State will be put into effect. This includes the technical means of surveillance and humanint to fill in the gaps.
  • Today, India has a considerable amount of technical expertise. There are various means of tracking down a terrorist hiding place including satellites, UAVs and drones. This is not to say that there are no voids, these voids must be expeditiously addressed and the capacity built up.
  • Furthermore, trained specialised manpower that can mount such an operation is also available in the country. Resolve and a power of conviction to put such a policy in place are, however, sadly lacking.
  • Such a rescue mission, if successful, will pay rich dividends in the fight against terrorists and Maoists. Not only can precious lives be saved but the perpetrators also brought to justice. Those already in jail will serve out their sentences.

Conclusion

There can be no ‘one size fits all’ kind of a response to a hostage situation.  However, it is imperative that the State must be prepared   to use force, if required, to enforce its writ and secure the release of innocent hostages. On no account must it be perceived by the terrorists that their demands will be met and that the State would accede to their demands. Fear of a vengeful response from the State will accrue the desired end state and bring about a perceptible decrease, if not, end the menace of regular hostage taking. This will not only dent the terrorists and Maoists but also boost the morale of the security forces as well as the common man of the land.

Endnotes

[1]. Naxal Division, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India wesite http://mha.nic.in/

[2]. Ajai Sahni,  “The Hostage State”, South Asia Intelligence Review, Weekly Assessments & Briefings, Volume 10, No. 43, April 30, 2012.

[3]. Ibid.

[4]. Ibid.

[5]. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Entebbe

[6]. CT Kamps, “ Operation Eagle Claw: The Iran Hostage Rescue Mission” acesssed at www.airpower.au.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-s/2006/.../kampseng.htm...

 

*Colonel GG Pamidi is a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Strategic Studies and Simulation, USI.

(Article uploaded on May 10, 2012). 

Disclaimer : The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the organisation that he belongs to or of the USI.

 

 

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