Author : Gp Capt AK Agarwal,

DEMYSTIFYING SOME FACTS ON THE MAOIST INSURGENCY

By Gp Capt AK Agarwal*

The CPI (Maoist) was formed on 21 Sep 2004 with the merger of the CPI (ML) People’s War Group and MCC (I). It takes its political ideology from a combine of Marxism, Leninism and Maoism. The party’s name indicates that it leans towards the Maoist ideology. This party is engaged in revolutionary guerrilla warfare with an aim of overthrowing the government of India.[i] As per a press statement made on 14 October 2004, the CPI (M) aims to carry out an ‘armed agrarian revolution’ or a Protracted Peoples War by capturing the country side and finally the cities. The press statement also indicated the formation of the Peoples Liberation Guerrilla Army which would transform the existing guerrilla zones into Base Areas.

When we analyse this statement in the light of Mao Tse Tung’s writings on insurgency, we see that the godfather of modern insurgent warfare, promoted the concept of a protracted, three-phased conflict. The three phases being the Strategic Defensive, characterised by guerrilla warfare, the Strategic Stalemate in which the insurgents consolidated their position, trained and prepared for a counter-offensive against the government and finally the Strategic Counter-offensive which is a conventional war.[ii] Mao’s concept began with the establishment of secure base areas.[iii]The insurgents controlled the base areas and utilised these areas to blossom the insurgency by the creation of a political infrastructure, growing in strength; progressed with guerrilla attacks on the government and actions to build popular support. The insurgency culminated in a more conventional war seeking quick and decisive victory. Based on his experiences in China, Mao knew such a struggle could continue for years if not decades. His concept included the flexibility to move from one phase to another in either direction depending upon the situation at hand. Quick victory was not important because time and the continuing insurgency would, in Mao’s view, eventually bring victory to the rebel cause.

Insurgents would naturally find it difficult to overthrow the legitimate government and achieve a quick victory. The protracted nature of the insurgency acts as a double edged weapon. On one side, time permits the insurgency to strengthen its movement, gaining momentum, popular support and military strength. On the other hand, as time keeps passing with an active insurgency, it tends to weaken and discredit the government’s ability to govern effectively and maintain law and order. Each day that passes with the insurgency on the hands of the government, it tends to add legitimacy and creates an air of certainty amongst the effected population on the subsequent victory of the insurgency.

The CPI (Maoist) in their statement have emphasised on the word ‘People’. Fundamental to an insurgency’s strength and key to its survival and progression is the indistinct political infrastructure deeply entrenched in and spread through the general population. In an insurgency, there will always be an active minority supporting the insurgents, a passive majority which needs to be won over by both the insurgent and the government and an active minority opposing the insurgency.[iv] 70 to 80 per cent of the population is neutral, while 5-15 per cent is active or hostile towards the insurgency.[v]

Without some support from the people, or at least their neutrality, the insurgency’s infrastructure would be quickly endangered and eliminated. Without an infrastructure, the insurgency has no political arm; it is deprived of an intelligence apparatus, basic source of military manpower and logistical support. At the same time, the government’s power also ultimately depends upon the support and loyalty of the general population. In the long run, no government can survive without the consensus of the people--least of all a government actively opposed by an appealing and aggressive insurgent movement. The centre of gravity for each side in an insurgency is located within the general population. For the insurgents the support of the active minority is required to favourably influence the neutral majority and win it over for its active and tacit support. For the government, it is the support from the people and acceptance of its legitimacy[vi].Whoever wins over this centre of gravity, wins the battle. We must remember that political power flows from the people.

As brought out by David Galula in his book ‘Counterinsurgency Warfare’, when the security forces of a country are called out of their barracks for counterinsurgency operations, the country’s map reveals three kinds of areas. Firstly areas effectively controlled by the insurgent, secondly, areas where the insurgent is trying to expand his control to and lastly, areas which though not yet threatened are on the insurgents’ radar.

The map of India of India[vii] depicts three such areas. Red areas are those areas highly affected by the insurgency; yellow depicts areas moderately affected while green areas are those areas marginally affected. If allowed, the red areas will grow, engulfing the yellow and green ones. An important question is does the government’s political climate support the Maoists as per its political compulsions or is the political climate determined to defeat the insurgency. Is the strategy adopted by the security forces sufficient to defeat the insurgency? Are they trained and equipped for such operations? Will the judiciary deliver timely justice or act as the proverbial tortoise?

 

The Solution

The centre of gravity for counterinsurgency operations is the population. The neutral majority needs to be won over by the government so that there is an active majority opposing the insurgency.  Or at the worst, the neutral population requires to stay neutral and not won over by the insurgents. If the insurgents are able to control the population, the minority which opposed the insurgency will go underground. This minority lives in fear of the faction which supports the insurgency and reprisals from the insurgents. The anti-insurgency minority will not emerge unless it feels secure to a great extent. Even if it feels secure to a certain extent, this minority will not be able to motivate the neutral majority to oppose the insurgency as long as the population is assured that the government has the will and conviction to defeat the insurgency. The people will not co-operative and provide valuable inputs on the insurgents if it feels unsafe. Intelligence has to be provided by the population. It will do this only if its safety is ensured by the government and it fears no retribution from the insurgents.

Therefore, the government must ensure that anti-Maoist operations by the security forces precede economic, social or political reforms.  It needs to demonstrate to the local population that it has the will and ability to defeat the insurgency and provide them with protection. No reform will be effective if the insurgents’ writ runs instead of the government’s. A comprehensive response combining first security and then development would be the best response. This response must start from those areas where the probability of success is higher – the yellow areas. Thereafter, move on to the areas highly affected by insurgency (red areas). The security forces would learn from their mistakes made in the yellow areas and hone their strategy. Successful operations in these areas would also increase the confidence of the people in the ability of the security forces in protecting them from the insurgents. For the insurgents, it would be a setback. Areas which are marginally affected should see a higher level of development. Once security and safety of the people is ensured, the government will start earning the support of the people. The immediate actions that are required to be taken by the government to contain the situation would be:

(a)        Increase anti insurgency operations in selected green areas. This action would reinforce the authority of the government and drive out the insurgents from these areas. The security forces must make sure that the insurgents cannot regroup. Towards this, combing operations by security forces should continue. Simultaneously, the security forces must ensure their continuous presence in the areas where they have been able to drive out the insurgents. The security forces must try and make the insurgent loose face with the population by taking the fight to the insurgent’s doorstep and defeating him.

(b)        The authorities must indoctrinate the security forces to guarantee that no atrocities are committed on the population by them in the name of targeting the insurgents. If this is not done, the support of the population cannot be won over.

(c)        The security forces must deploy outposts in the insurgency affected areas to protect the population. The outposts must be located in the villages and not in areas which have traditional military value such as high grounds. These troops will also assist in protecting the development work being carried out by the government.

(d)        After isolating the population from the insurgents and re-establishing its authority, the government must now take actions to win over the people by implementing social, economic and if required political reforms. This process should be continuous so that all insurgency affected areas are slowly but steadily covered.

The Role of Air Power

Air power would have a supportive role to play in these operations. Rough terrain and poor surface connectivity can be serious impediments to counter insurgency operations while they are advantageous to the Maoist. Airpower helps overcome these obstacles. Helicopters would offer the fastest and safest means of deploying troops and denying the Maoists the opportunity of ambushing them. Troops could also be resupplied from the air. Combing operations can also be assisted by air power. Air borne surveillance allows ground forces to patrol in smaller numbers and be positioned in isolated villages without the risk of being attacked by a larger insurgent force or taken by surprise. Helicopters or UAVs can also support patrols by flying ahead to detect possible threats. Armed helicopters could be used as a vantage point from where an engagement can be directed from and also provide fire support with the help of machine guns. Air power can also support the civil administration once a secure environment has been established. For example, air transporting the civilian officials to oversee development work in isolated areas, or, to airlift food and medical supplies to citizens living in remote areas is a very effective way of winning the hearts and minds of the insurgency effected local population and their support. The presence of helicopters over the area would also have an adverse psychological effect on the Maoist, driving home the seriousness of intent of the government. For the local population, it would be a morale booster.     

Endnotes

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