CAN WE IGNORE THE ROLE OF AIR POWER IN COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS
By Group Captain AK Agarwal
As per a study conducted by the Rand Corporation titled ‘Air Power in the New Counterinsurgency Era’, “the role of airpower is downplayed, taken for granted, or simply ignored and it (air power) is usually the last thing that most military professionals think of when the topic of counterinsurgency is discussed.”
Insurgencies do not lend themselves to the more strategic roles of air power and the use of immense fire power. Some would say that using air power in counter insurgency operations is a waste of an expensive resource. However, not using it also is a waste of a resource which is available. Insurgencies lack large transportation, communications, or military targets which can easily be targeted from the air. In addition, the insurgent is difficult to identify from an innocent bystander. The possibility of collateral damage is high. Therefore, as insurgencies do not present opportunities for an overwhelming application of air power. Hence, air power has been relegated to a less-perceptible supporting role of Intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance missions (ISR), troop mobility, Casualty Evacuation (Casevac) and providing fire support to ground forces.
Neither the air force, army or other para military forces, can by themselves defeat an insurgency. Rough terrain and poor surface connectivity can be serious impediments to counter insurgency operations while they are advantageous to the insurgents. Airpower helps overcome these obstacles. Insurgencies cannot be defeated from the air—but airpower serves as a tremendous force multiplier and enables the security forces to operate more effectively. It gives the security forces a notable asymmetric advantage over the insurgents.
When used wisely, air power can assist in establishing a secure environment within which the other counterinsurgency mechanisms such as the local administrative machinery can work. For example, using air transport to airlift or drop food and medical supplies to citizens living in isolated areas is a very effective means of winning the hearts and minds of the insurgency effected local population and their support in the fight against insurgency.
The major contribution of air power in combating insurgencies is restricting the use of conventional options by the insurgents, improving the response time of the security forces, and enabling the security forces to seize the tactical initiative.
Restricting Options
Air power ensures that the insurgents are left with no options but to operate only at the tactical level. With the capability of airpower to conduct surveillance easily over large areas, locate concentration of insurgent forces and direct ground fire power against a concentration of insurgents in the open, air power makes it difficult for the insurgents to shift to conventional tactics and carry out attacks at their will.
Air power can help contain an encounter and deny the insurgent the option to escalate the situation. For example, in Algeria during the insurgency of 1954, surveillance from the air made it difficult for the insurgent forces to move in large numbers or to concentrate onto a target without detection. Air borne surveillance allows ground forces to patrol in small numbers or to be positioned in isolated villages without the risk of being attacked by a larger insurgent force or taken by surprise. In short, air power makes it difficult for insurgents to shift from hit and run tactics to a conventional phase or even to concentrate for an attack.
Improved Response
The insurgents follow guerilla tactics, taking the initiative to attack security forces at their choice of place and time. They will ambush the patrolling security forces in isolated areas, and then disappear before reinforcements arrive. On the other hand, counter insurgency operations are reactionary in nature. A classic example is the Dantewade ambush in 2010 on the paramilitary forces. Without air power, the paramilitary forces had limited means of responding to such attacks. With air power, multiple options could have opened up.
The use of airpower could have provided the option of observing the movements and locating insurgent locations from the air, flying in reinforcements, providing fire support as necessary, directing the ground forces towards these locations and Casevac. Casevac of wounded forces from the field directly to medical aid in turn would have a positive effect of boosting troop morale.
The characteristics of air power such as speed and range, enables besieged patrols or outposts to be reinforced on the ground when under attack. Such an immediate response would be difficult if the reinforcements had to travel by ground. Armed helicopters can be placed in orbit over high-threat areas to provide immediate covering fire.
Seizing the Initiative
Continuous airborne surveillance of insurgency infested areas, when combined with other sources of intelligence, increases the possibility and probability for security forces to take the initiative from the insurgents. For example, as brought out in a Seminar ‘Army Aviation Looking Forward’ held in New Delhi on 13 Sep 2011, such surveillance has led to the detection of insurgent camps and their movements. As a result, the security forces would be able to locate and attack the base, moving to the target by air and providing surveillance, communication, and fire support. Military history is replete with examples of troops being moved by air deep into enemy territory, resupplied and provided with fire support and extraction as required.
Air power can help gain the initiative at the tactical level as well. For example, helicopters or UAVs can support paramilitary patrols by flying ahead to detect possible threats. Once detected, the ground force can manoeuvre around the threat or call in air or other fire support against it. Airborne surveillance can also monitor the likely escape routes that the insurgents will take and guide the security forces accordingly.
Vulnerability of Air Assets
Air assets are naturally vulnerable to attacks from the insurgents. Machine gun fire and shoulder fired Surface to Air missiles (SAMs) would be the most likely threats that helicopters or other air assets would face during counter-insurgency operations. Rules of engagement would demand that for self-defense, these threats are suitably responded to from the air, implying return fire. Civil air traffic, transiting across insurgency affected areas would need to fly at heights to keep them beyond the range of machine gun fire or SAMs. There would also be a requirement to sanitise and secure helipads and approach funnels to enable government officials to visit insurgency affected areas by air. Not with standing these vulnerabilities, the distinctive characteristics of air power — speed, ability to overcome physical barriers, range, flexibility, and psychological effect — makes it essential to counterinsurgency operations.
Gp Capt AK Agarwal is a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Strategic Studies and Simulation, USI. (Uploaded on 4 Oct , 2011).