Author : Col GG Pamidi,

Can Pakistan Secure Its Crown Jewels?

Colonel GG Pamidi

Introduction

The entire world is terrified about the possibility about terrorists laying their hands on a nuclear device. This doomsday scenario was vividly captured in fiction over three decades ago in the best selling novel “The Fifth Horseman”. Today, terrifyingly, this doomsday scenario appears alarmingly close to reality.

Three recent events in Pakistan make this catastrophic possibility as plausible:-

(a)          The killing of the moderate Governor of Punjab Salman Taseer by a police officer and his body guard, Malik Mumtaz Hussain Qadri, evidently for the politician’s outspoken stance against the proposed blasphemy law. If this was not bad enough, the public show of support for Qadri amply demonstrated the fact that the battle with radicalism and right wing fundamentalism is not restricted to that nation’s fringes.

 

(b)          The US raid on the world’s most wanted terrorist Osama Bin Laden’s hideout in Abbottabad and his killing by a crack US Navy Seal Team.  The raid was apparently not known to the Pakistani establishment and what is most surprising is that instead of being apologetic for the pervasive intelligence failure that allowed bin Laden to spend more than five years in a military cantonment, the Pakistani response was belligerent. Gen Ashfaq Kayani, the head of Pakistan’s Army released a public statement warning that he would order his troops against any American forces who entered into Pakistan in the future.

 

(c)          The attack on the Pakistan naval base by a jihadist group which resulted in the killing of several Pakistani servicemen and the responsibility for which was owned up the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). This attack on PNS Mehran, a well-guarded military installation, at a time when reportedly Pakistan is on its highest state of alert raises serious concerns over the ability of Pakistan’s security forces ability to guard their nuclear assets.

Location of the Nuclear Assets of Pakistan

The nuclear weapons are kept in secret locations, but they are generally believed to be in storage sites (most probably in Punjab) and not in a high state of alert. Pakistani experts say that they are also mobile to keep their locations secret. Shireen Mazari, Pakistani strategic affairs expert, dismissed Taliban takeover fears in a post-Osama briefing. “The nuclear programme has matured, is robust, self-sustaining and widely dispersed”. [1]

According to a US Department of Defence Report,[2] Islamabad’s nuclear weapons “are probably stored in component form”. This suggests that the nuclear warheads are stored separately from delivery vehicles. According to some reports, the fissile cores of the weapons are separated from the non-nuclear explosives.

It warrants mention that, although separate storage may provide a layer of protection against accidental launch or prevent theft of an assembled weapon, it may be easier for unauthorized personnel to remove a weapon’s fissile material core if it is not assembled.

Dispersal of the assets may also create more potential access points for acquisition and may increase the risk of diversion. Most of Pakistan’s nuclear sites are close to or even inside areas dominated by Pakistani Taliban and Al- Qaeda.[3] These groups are more than capable of launching terrorist attacks in these areas.

Pakistan’s Perceived Fears

Pakistan is a country consumed by conspiracy theories. There appears to be growing fear in the minds of the Pakistani people that the US drone strikes, the NATO helicopter attacks and the recent US raid on Osama at Abbottabad is the harbinger of far broader action and that is the ultimate seizing of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. This conspiracy theory is nothing new.

In the book “Obama’s Wars”, written by the American journalist, Bob Woodward, the author recounts comments exchanged at a dinner with Zardari and Afghan-born Zalmay Khalilzad, former US Ambassador to the UN, to Iraq and Afghanistan. Reportedly, during a meeting held on 06 May 2009 between the Presidents of the US, Afghanistan and Pakistan, Zardari is said to have accused Washington of being behind the Taliban attacks inside his country. [4] Khalilzad reportedly took issue with Zardari’s contention, which led to the latter responding that what he had described “was a plot to destabilize Pakistan”, hatched in order that, according to Woodward’s version of his words, “the US could invade and seize (Pakistan’s) nuclear weapons.”

In an article which appeared in the English daily newspaper “the Nation”, AR Jerral opines that, “that the ongoing war on terror in Afghanistan is aimed to take the operations into the Pakistani territory. The real target is Pakistan’s nuclear potential; they have no plausible security threat from the ill-equipped Talibans or ragtag extremists”. [5]

The Real Threat

The main threat to Pakistan’s nuclear security is not from India nor is it from the USA or the perceived paranoia of the Indo-Zionist threat. The real threat is from within. The threat is from people from within the nuclear facilities and who may harbor sympathies with the jihadi groups and extremist elements.

The American Ambassador Anne Patterson stated, “Our major concern is not having an Islamic militant steal an entire weapon, but rather the chance that someone working in government of Pakistan facilities could gradually smuggle enough material out to eventually make a weapon”. [6]

Worrying Factors

Competence of Pakistan’s Security Establishment.  The US  and western officials and experts are weighing the possible implications for atomic security if Pakistani and intelligence leaders were, as they insist, unaware that the world’s most wanted terrorist was living deep inside Pakistan for close to six years. This apparent incompetence does not inspire confidence in the ability of Pakistan’s governing or security institutions to oversee their nuclear weapons programme. Added  to this is the terrorist attack on PNS Mehran on 23 May 2011. This raises serious questions, answers to which are not easy. Even accepting the fact that nuclear weapon storage sites may be secure, this successful attack by the Taliban puts a real question mark on the security of nuclear plants and research facilities whose locations are well known.

Extremist Sympathisers.  Even if an assembled nuclear warhead cannot be stolen, jihadis can access the fissile material which could then be used to make a “dirty bomb”. Extremist factions working within the Pakistani military could facilitate this. For quite some time now, there have been incidents of several mid-level officers who have been found to be helping the jihadi cause. The level of infiltration of such elements and the numbers of such ideologically motivated officials is not known. However, the threat of ‘abduction’ of a nuclear weapon while being moved within Pakistan by an outsider group or an insider group collaborating with terrorists is definitely high. A number of Pakistanis also might take a different view of what best serves their national interests. Millions have been spent by the US on strengthening the Personnel Reliability Programme, which involves evaluating the suitability of personnel. The incident of killing of Salman Taseer by his bodyguard, Qadri and the subsequent reaction has put a huge question mark on this vital aspect of reliability.  As a bodyguard for a senior public official, Qadri would reportedly have been evaluated by the government’s Personnel Reliability Programme, which also vets personnel with access to the nation’s nuclear weapons. That Qadri passed inspection has raised questions over whether extremists might have obtained nuclear clearance.

Conclusion

Pakistan has the fastest growing nuclear arsenal in the world and Pakistan treasures its nuclear weapons and treats them as their crown jewels. The weapons are under the control of the Strategic Plans Division of the Pakistan Army. Pakistan claims that fears over its nuclear weapons are misplaced and unfounded saying that it has a very robust, multi-layered command and control system. Pakistan has 10,000 soldiers guarding its facilities and the SPD has its own independent intelligence section. Pakistan is also believed to have developed its own Permissive Action Link (PAL) system to electronically lock its nuclear devices.

However, as recent events have shown, the security is as good or bad, as the personnel responsible for it. In the current extreme radicalization of the Pakistani society and by extension of its military, the situation is indeed grim. The country and the Pakistan Army has now an opportunity to decide whether it wants to decisively confront Islamist violence or face the consequences of its current policy of giving support to selective jihadis groups. Such a dangerous game cannot continue and it has already started to backfire.  The world, and particularly India, has been emphasising on this aspect for a long time. It is hoped that better sense will prevail on the powers that be in Pakistan and, hopefully, the Pakistani authorities will mend their policies. But it is not easy to be optimistic about it.

Endnotes