There are various terms associated with fighting a
defensive battle these range from reinforcement of a locality under attack, to
counter attacking a position that has been captured, a counter offensive and a
counter stroke. Each has its differences ranging from force levels employed, time
frame in which it is carried out, objectives, aims and nuances of execution.
In the eighteen months since the conflict broke out,
the Ukrainians have mostly been on the defensive, preventing Russian forces
from seizing more territory. But with the help of billions of dollars’ worth of
Western military equipment Ukraine launched its counter offensive in June,
attempting to expel the Russians from land they previously captured in the East
and South of the country.
All news reports were focused on the successful launch
of a Ukrainian counter offensive once the weather permitted with troops
equipped with Western arsenal which is far superior to their Soviet origin
equipment. However, equipment is only one part of the matrix, the quality and training
of troops, their battle procedures, tactics and doctrines are yet another
dimension which is essential to ensure the success of any operation.
However, now it is increasingly
clear that the futility of Ukraine’s offensive, promoted relentlessly by the
Western media as a turning point in the war, is being questioned.
Russia Strengthens Its Defensive Lines
In preparation for Ukraine's counter offensive, Russia
spent months fortifying the almost 1,100 km frontline across the territory it
occupied. Satellite images revealed a multi-layered Russian network of
anti-tank ditches, mazes of trenches, concrete ‘dragon’s teeth’ barricades,
steel ‘hedgehog’ obstacles, spools of razor wire and minefields. Russia’s
proficiency in defending the occupied territory through a phalanx of massive
obstacle system which is not easy to breach poses its own challenges to an
attacker.
Russia’s most heavily fortified frontline area is in
Southern Zaporizhzhia Province, where Ukraine was expected to try to break
through and sever the ‘land bridge’ connecting Russian territory with occupied
Crimea.[1]
Ukrainian Progress of Operations
Before the start of the counter offensive, Ukrainian
forces engaged in ‘shaping operations’ to weaken logistics and supply chains
deep inside the Russia occupied territories. According to some reports,
Ukrainian forces had built up an estimated 50,000 to 60,000 soldiers for the
counter offensive, organized into twelve brigades. Three were trained in
Ukraine, and the other nine were trained and equipped by the US.
Beginning in May 2023, Ukrainian forces engaged in ‘localised’
counterattacks on the flanks of Bakhmut, as part of the larger battle in the
city. On 12 May Ukrainian forces forced
the Russians out of the Southern bank of the Berkhivska Reservoir, about four
kms North West of Bakhmut, and claimed gains of 20 sq kms. On 05 June, it was reported that they had
retaken part of Berkhivka, North of Bakhmut. [2]
On 11 June, Ukrainian forces breached Russia’s first
line of less fortified defences and liberated three villages in the South of
the Donetsk region. Over the next two days, four further villages were
liberated. On 18 June, Ukraine struck a Russian Ammunition Depot deep behind
the frontline in Southern Kherson. By 30 June, the Ukrainian counter offensive
had made only modest gains. But Ukraine’s Defence Minister claimed this was
merely a ‘preview’ of a much bigger push to come. [3]
On 04 July several drones were shot down in the
suburbs of Moscow. On 17 July there was a Ukrainian attack on the Crimea
bridge, which connects the occupied peninsula to Russia. The bridge partially
collapsed killing two people. On 30 July and 01 August drone strikes targeted
skyscrapers in Moscow’s main business district.
On 04 August Ukraine’s Navy carried out sea drone
strikes outside the port of Novorossiysk, a major Naval Base and oil-exporting
terminal located East of Crimea. [4]
Ukraine claimed its troops had
retaken the village of Staromaiorske in the Donetsk region. Around Bakhmut, in
the East, where there has been intense fighting, Ukraine has also stated that
it has regained some small areas and it has also made small gains in the
Zaporizhzhia region in the South, a key area where Ukraine aimed at making a
decisive difference.
On 16 August, Ukrainian Marines advanced on the South Eastern
frontlines, towards the key port city of Mariupol, with the recapture of the
village of Urozhaine appearing to have been partially aided by the Ukrainian
use of controversial cluster munitions. [5]
This represented progress for a gruelling
counteroffensive in which the gains have been measured in meters rather than
miles. Ukrainian troops have faced stiffer than expected resistance and there
has been an unavoidable slowdown of tempo due to the heavily fortified Russian
defensive lines, reinforced by vast networks of trenches and landmines.
To put it across simply, the
Ukrainians attempted to advance on three axes and then develop a main one after
the Russians had side stepped their reserves to counter them and these in turn
had been fixed by the Ukrainian offensive. In that process a weakness in the
Russian defensive line would have been created which could have been exploited.
But as Molkte the Elder said; “No plan survives contact”. The Russians remained
strong enough to hold the offensive on all thrust lines without permitting a
major breakthrough.
With reserves being
committed and depleted at the initial stages, the momentum seems missing and
unless Ukrainian forces are able to generate substantial tempo the gains will
continue to remain incremental. Currently it appears that its massive efforts
are yielding only negligible results.
Dilemmas Posed
The first dilemma that was faced by the Ukrainian Army
was whether to strengthen a defensive line and fill up gaps or to commit fresh
but experienced troops into a counter offensive. The next issue was the aim of
such an offensive ranging from pushing back all Russian intrusions or making a dash
for the sea and cutting off Crimea.
It was thought that a Ukrainian push through the
swathe of Russian-held territory to the Sea of Azov would disrupt Russia's
supply routes and cut off their forces in Russian-annexed Crimea and further
West.[6]
Ukraine launched the counteroffensive in early June
hoping to replicate its stunning success in last year’s push through the
Kharkiv region. However, the counter offensive
push has, thus far, failed to gain the same momentum as their counter attacks
last autumn, despite previously high expectations.[7]
In order to break through
the Russian defences Ukraine will no doubt incur increasing casualties and
thereafter they will need fresh troops to exploit the success. Given the
attrition they have undergone over the past eighteen months, this may not be
possible.
In fact, with little
training on the new equipment it was unrealistic to expect that there would be
dramatic changes in the way Ukraine fights. The Russian Army appears to have recovered from some
of the mistakes it made during the first few months of the invasion, and is
proving to be surprisingly innovative and effective in defence.[8]
The Russian military is also taking advantage of its
air power, such as using its Ka-52 Alligator attack helicopters. These helicopters
are being used to fire rockets at Ukrainian Armoured Vehicles which have been
forced to slow down or stop after encountering a minefield.
Kyiv
was under considerable international pressure to show results in order to
maintain enthusiasm from its Western allies on whom it is depending for its
weaponry and economic support. But by diverting more troops for a counter
offensive they are creating a weakness in their own defensive layout which the
Russians may exploit. Hence the dilemma regarding the quantum of troops to be
launched for a counter offensive and the need to have available reserves to
fight a defensive battle is a predicament that cannot be easily answered. Surprisingly, one of the prerequisites of a successful
counter offensive, a favourable air situation over the battlefield is
nonexistent as far as Ukraine is concerned.
An Assessment
While Russia was strengthening its defences, Ukraine
was putting together newly-formed Armoured Brigades, many of them trained in
Europe and supplied with better equipment than the Russians. But these need to
be validated and integrated before being launched into battle. Optimum
utilisation of state-of-the-art equipment can only come after streamlining
training in tactics and procedures and carrying out integration with other
arms.[9]
While Ukraine now has the capability to launch
missiles, rockets or shells deep behind Russian lines, hitting their fuel
depots, ammunition hubs and Command and Control Centres, which could weaken
Russia's defences, they need to follow up aerial strikes with a ground
offensive.
As per a Washington Post report The US intelligence community assesses that Ukraine’s
counteroffensive will fail to reach the key South Eastern city of Melitopol. Should
it prove correct, it means Kyiv won’t fulfill its principal objective of
severing Russia’s land bridge to Crimea in this year’s push.[10]
In an interview quoted in The Washington Post, General
Mark Milley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said the United States has
been clear about the difficult task facing Ukraine. “I had said a couple of
months ago that this offensive was going to be long, it’s going to be bloody,
it’s going to be slow. And that’s exactly what it is: long, bloody and slow,
and it’s a very, very difficult fight”.[11]
There is no doubt a fine balance that needs to be
maintained and that is where the art of ‘generalship’ in war lies. The side that is able to "create an
asymmetrical attrition gradient” that conserves manpower and equipment while
gradually wearing down the adversary’s manpower and equipment will no doubt
prevail even at the cost of loss of territory.
The issue is – Does Ukraine have the availability of
adequately trained troops and resources to overcome the odds and outperform the
Russians ensuring that their troops are sufficiently degraded.
Conclusion
The Ukrainians had for months poured tremendous
resources into Bakhmut, including soldiers, ammunition and time, but lost
control of the city, the clarity of a rear-view mirror shows that this has led
to a weakened force availability for the counter offensive.
The question is that two months into this
counter-offensive, and with time of the essence before the onset of winter, are
Ukrainian troops making any real progress? and why is Ukraine's progress so slow?
In the last two months Ukrainian forces have been
attacking on three fronts, using Western-supplied equipment and training, and
probing for weak spots along the entire 1100 km front line. While progress is
being made, it is slower than Ukraine and its Western allies had hoped.
But did the Russians foresee their intentions, and
spent months building the most extensive fortifications in recent history. Russia
still occupies nearly one-fifth of Ukraine - including the cities of Donetsk and
Mariupol, which it captured after months of siege and its forces are well dug
in. Ukraine
is now having to scale back its ambitions in the south, including aspirations
to take back Crimea as its ambitions do not match its military capability and
ability.
Presently, the counter offensive seems to be
sputtering and the culmination point, as far as Ukraine is concerned, is
reaching before achieving their stated objectives. The critical question remains as to what is an
achievable definition of victory for Ukraine and defeat for Russia, at least in
the current impasse of a contest that presently seems to be at a stalemate?
[1] Christopher Miller, Military
briefing: how Russia is fortifying its frontline for Ukraine’s
counteroffensive, The Financial Times, 22 May 2023 https://www.ft.com/content/7582506b-1337-4570-abcc-31f5f602bde7
[2] Olena Harmash and Ivan
Lyubysh-Kirdey, Russia acknowledges retreat north of Bakhmut, Wagner boss calls
it a 'rout', the Reuters, 13 May 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukrainian-tanks-join-attacks-along-60-mile-front-russia-says-2023-05-12/
[3] Ukraine Says It Retook Two Villages
As Counteroffensive Gathers Steam, Radio free Europe, 11 June 2023, https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-heavy-fighting-russia-donbas-counteroffensive/32454060.html
[4] Nadeem Badshah, Vivian Ho, Tobi
Thomas and Helen Livingstone, Russia-Ukraine war: two drones shot down near
Crimean bridge – as it happened, 12 August 2023 https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2023/aug/12/russia-ukraine-war-live-moscow-says-it-has-destroyed-20-drones-over-crimea
[5] Frank Gardner & Jake Horton,
Ukraine counter-offensive against Russia yields only small gains in first 2
months, The BBC, 05 August 2023 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66383377
[6] Ibid
[7] Jo Adetunji, Ukraine war: gaining a
bridgehead east of the Dnipro river would be a gamechanger for Kyiv – here’s
why, The Conversation, 17 August 2023, https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-gaining-a-bridgehead-east-of-the-dnipro-river-would-be-a-gamechanger-for-kyiv-heres-why-211692
[8] Frank Gardner & Jake Horton,
Ukraine counter-offensive against Russia yields only small gains in first 2
months, The BBC, 05 August 2023 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66383377
[9] Ibid
[10] John Hudson and Alex Horton, U.S.
intelligence says Ukraine will fail to meet offensive’s key goal
[11] Ibid
Major General Jagatbir Singh, VSM (Retd) is a Distinguished Fellow at the USI of India. Commissioned in 1981 into the 18 Cavalry, he has held various important command and Staff appointments including command of an Armoured Division.
Uploaded on 12-09-2023
Disclaimer : The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the organisation that he/she belongs to or of the USI of India.