Introduction
As the war in Ukraine is entering its third
year, few observers would have imagined that it would still be raging. After
the dramatic swings in territorial control during 2022, when the Ukrainian
military managed to recapture parts of the Kharkiv region and the city of
Kherson, the war settled into a positional and attritional grind in 2023, with both
the tempo of operations and the intensity reducing.
The
Ukrainian counteroffensive failed to deliver substantial territorial gains. The
momentum generated by Ukraine’s success in the first year of the conflict has
given way to a sense that, despite ongoing fighting, the frontline is not
moving, and the risk of a forever frozen conflict is growing.
The
US is wrangling over funding, and although most European leaders remain firm in
their support for Kyiv, it is becoming increasingly difficult for them to
maintain that same level of support among their public. Cost-of-living concerns
are leading many Europeans to question the sustainability of continued funding
for Ukraine, and the outbreak of war in the Gaza Strip has divided the West’s attention.
Reasons
for Long Wars
The Ukraine
War has upended many of the theories of war including one that modern wars will
be short and swift. Why is this war
dragging on? The fact is that war is the worst way to settle political
differences. As the costs of fighting becomes apparent, adversaries usually
look for an agreement to end the conflict.
Many
wars, of course, do last longer. There are many reasons why compromises fail to
take place. These could range from public opinion against a compromise, to
leaders thinking that a defeat or an end of a conflict could threaten their own
position, when there is a lack of understanding on one’s own strength and that
of the enemy, as articulated by Sun Tzu many centuries ago, leading to
underestimating the damaging consequences of the conflict and when there is a
fear of an existential threat. This manifests itself with Russia being uncomfortable
with North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) at their doorstep and Ukraine fearing
the loss of their sovereignty. All these
factors have kept the war going.
Of
course, the above reasons are rooted in a situation where there is not a clash
of ideologies such as Communism versus Capitalism and autocracies versus
liberal democracies or on religious grounds. Peace is impossible if ideological
barriers prevent negotiations. Such values and ideas will continue to play a
leading role in the wars waged in the future. The West has grown more
rights-based over time: resulting in them defending certain liberal principles,
whatever the consequences.
The Situation
Today
Compared
with last year, Ukraine faces two challenges. Militarily, it has been pushed
due to the failure of its counter offensive and by sheer force of troops in
Russia's favour. A Ukrainian victory will require strategic endurance and
vision as well as the ability to sustain losses.
Apart
from this the West, and particularly the US has struggled to provide the
military aid Ukraine needs to sustain the fight. Ukraine can't turn the
military tide without more Western military aid, but it has struggled to get
more military aid; unless it can demonstrate that it can win on the
battlefield. The two key challenges are obvious. The first is how to get more
weapons to Ukraine. The second is how Europeans can defend themselves without
US backing. [1]
Russia
on the other hand is now operating from a position of strength. After the
capture of Bakhmut and the creation of the Surovikin Line they spent 2023
consolidating their positions. Coupled with improvements in shortening the time
between target detection and the carrying out of battlefield strikes, the
Ukrainians faced an adversary in 2023 that was very different from the one it
faced in 2022.
To
overcome this evolved enemy, Ukraine was forced to adapt its tactics,
technology, and operations, in part by sending some troops to Poland and other
European countries for additional combined arms training before the
counteroffensive began. But Kyiv’s efforts were still insufficient to the task
of retaking more of the South. [2]
This
year the Russians have met with success by capturing Avdiivka. The
now-destroyed city carved a bulge in the front line that undermined critical
Russian logistical operations. It sits only a few miles from the city of
Donetsk, which Russia has occupied since 2014. Its fall allows the Russian
military to move troops and equipment more efficiently as it presses in other
directions.[3]
President
Zelenskyy said publicly that Ukraine lacks the funds to pay so many new conscripts.
General Zaluzhny countered that Ukraine is already short of forces because of
mounting casualties and needs to match 400,000 new soldiers that Russia plans
to mobilize. In an opinion
piece for CNN General Zaluzhny wrote about “The inability of state institutions
in Ukraine to improve the manpower levels of our armed forces without the use
of unpopular measures”. [4]
The
issue is Ukraine cannot be faced with the prospect of having western weapons
without soldiers to operate them or soldiers without weapons in case the ‘Air Bubble’
regarding the supply of these weapons is overcome. Both these are disastrous. President Zelenskyy’s famous response “I need
ammunition, not a ride” to a US offer to evacuate him in 2022 holds just as
true today. Without a constant stream of military aid, Ukrainian resistance
will be very hard to sustain.
Negotiating
a Ceasefire
The Ukrainians fear that in
case they do settle the issue they would be negotiating from a position of
weakness having lost a considerable portion of their land to Russia. The fear
that Russia will simply regroup, and attack again also remains. But in spite of
the hardships being endured the Ukrainians are in no mood to compromise. Even
if a third party could get both sides to a negotiating table it is unlikely
that the Ukrainian public or the Ukrainian Parliament will accept a permanent
loss of territory.
Concessions
to domination are simply abhorrent, even for the weak. Ukraine needs to
overcome its ideological barriers and trade some degree of sovereignty for
peace. Converting the present line of contact into the’ LoC’ seems to be a
workable solution to end the conflict.
International
Pressure to End Conflicts
The
fog of war lifts slowly. Take the current situation in Ukraine. The Ukrainian
forces initially exceeded everyone’s expectations by preventing the fall of
Kyiv and by their dogged resistance and were even successful in recapturing
certain areas but the failure of their much-vaunted counter offensive after
being armed with western weapons has revealed that it is difficult for them to
drive Russian troops out of the country.
A
European Council on Foreign Relations survey conducted across twelve European Union
(EU) countries revealed that most Europeans support Ukraine in its war against
Russia but only 10 per cent think Ukraine can win.
Most
Europeans ‘Are desperate to prevent a Russian victory but do not believe Kyiv
can win militarily’. The report's authors have argued that, based on these
findings, EU politicians should take a more ‘Realistic’ approach that centres
upon establishing how peace can be achieved. The voices sceptical of the
Ukraine’s prospects are growing.[5]
The
question that needs to be answered is for how long can Europe sustain the
support for Ukraine? A fatigue is setting in as costs grow. Domestic concerns
from inflation-led cost-of-living could also make it difficult for governments
to spend huge sums on Ukraine. This thought is not new but is increasingly
being echoed and reflects a grim truth.
Looking
at the End Results
What
matters is the end result. For Ukraine, it would mean restoring its territorial
integrity and bringing those responsible for international crimes to justice.
Meeting those objectives would ensure a just and lasting peace in Ukraine.
These objectives can only remain militarily feasible as long as two factors are
in place: adequate military aid and the rapid development of industrial
capacity to cater for Ukraine’s military needs.
As
far as Russia is concerned, it currently holds the strategic initiative.
President Putin had admitted that invading Ukraine was about restoring what he
saw as Russia’s ‘Historic Lands’. It is unlikely to run out of weapons, having
massively ramped up domestic production of armaments and has been sourcing drones
and ammunition from countries such as Iran and North Korea.
However,
a visualised aim of capturing Ukraine in its entirety seems distant, but
cutting off Ukrainian access to the Black Sea by capturing the area up to
Odessa remains a possibility though not in the near term. While incremental
gains may continue, the prospect of a regime change in Ukraine by having a
pro-Russian government in place which drops its demand to join NATO would be
considered as victory.
Conclusion
The
war in Ukraine is an example of a fight that grinds on not because of strategic
dilemmas alone but because both sides find the idea of termination of the
conflict impossible.
The
conflict has also established new benchmarks in the ways of modern warfare and
demonstrated just how dangerous the world we are living in is. Countries therefore need to remain ‘Fighting Fit’
which involves building deterrence by developing hard power backed by a strong
military industrial base to ensure a fair degree of self-reliance.
It’s
an old adage, that wars are world-shaping. Their outcomes are far-reaching:
redrawing maps, establishing new fault lines, and ushering unprecedented
changes. This war is proving to be no different.
Endnotes
[1] “Behind the Debate over U.S. Military
Aid to Ukraine | Crisis Group,” February 26, 2024. https://www.crisisgroup.org/united-states/behind-debate-over-us-military-aid-ukraine.
[2] Ryan, Mick. “Russia’s Adaptation
Advantage: Early in the War, Moscow Struggled to Shift Gears—but Now It’s
Outlearning Kyiv.” Foreign Affairs, February 27, 2024. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/russias-adaptation-advantage.
[3] Santora, Marc, Scott
Reinhard, and Josh Holder. “Maps: Where Ukraine Is Fighting to Hold Back
Russian Onslaught.” The New York Times, February 20, 2024.
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/17/world/europe/russia-ukraine-war-map.html.
[4] Khurshudyan,
Isabelle, and John Hudson. “Zelenskyy to Oust Ukraine’s Top General amid
Tension over New Mobilization.” Washington Post, January 31, 2024.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/01/31/Zelenskyy-zaluzhny-ukraine-commander-ousted/
[5] Henley, Jon. “Barely
10% of Europeans Believe Ukraine Can Still Defeat Russia, Finds Poll.” the
Guardian, February 21, 2024.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/21/barely-10-per-cent-of-europeans-believe-ukraine-can-defeat-russia-poll.
Major General Jagatbir Singh, VSM (Retd) is a Distinguished Fellow at the USI of India. Commissioned in 1981 into the 18 Cavalry, he has held various important command and Staff appointments including command of an Armoured Division.
Article uploaded on 05-03-2024
Disclaimer: The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the organisation that he belongs to or of the USI of India. .