The Collins English Dictionary defines a military base as a, “Facility
for the storage of military equipment and the training of soldiers”. A military
base is any location owned, run, or utilised by the armed forces that serves as
a refuge for soldiers and their equipment as well as a hub for operations and
training. An overseas military base is geographically located outside of the
territory of the state whose armed forces are the primary inhabitants of the
base. Such bases are typically established through treaties between the host
country and the country that requires the military post for a variety of
reasons, including strategic and logistical considerations.
The 2019 Chinese Defense White Paper mentions: To address deficiencies in overseas operations
and support, it [People’s Liberation Army (PLA)] builds far seas forces,
develops overseas logistical facilities, and enhances capabilities in
accomplishing diversified military tasks. This synchronises with Hu Jintao’s
bid to make China a ‘maritime great power’ and Xi Jinping’s aspiration to turn
the Chinese military into a ‘world-class’ force by 2049. Foreign military bases
and logistics support are desiderata for a navy to become a ‘blue-water navy’.
For China, seeking multiple military outposts and logistical support from the Western
Indian Ocean to the Pacific is mandatory as it needs to secure 'overseas interests’— securing sea lanes on which Chinese
economic growth and prosperity depend, safeguarding Chinese overseas citizens,
ensuring food security, defending against an attack from the sea, and recovering ‘lost’ maritime territories.
In 2019, it was alleged that, under a secret agreement between China and Cambodia, a Cambodian
Naval base would be used by Chinese armed forces, which would assist the latter
in projecting its military power. The pact provides for China to have exclusive
rights to a part of the Ream Naval Base on the Gulf of Taiwan. However, both
Cambodia and China outrightly rejected the possibility of having a ‘military
base’. Cambodian Prime Minister, Hun Sen, commented, “No such thing could happen because
hosting foreign military bases is against the Cambodian constitution”. Both
Chinese officials and Cambodian Defence Minister, Tea Banh, emphasised that
upgrading the naval base was only for protecting the territory and sovereignty
of Cambodia and was not aimed at any third party. Later, in 2022, however, a Chinese
official in Beijing confirmed that a portion of the base would be used by the
Chinese military. To exculpate and lessen the seriousness of the charges, the official added that the Chinese would not be
involved in any activities on the Cambodian portion of the base.
Even if there is little truth in
accusations, the base is certainly going to boost China's ability to project
naval power in the region. The pier at the base is similar in size
and design to the one
at the Chinese military base in Djibouti. It will provide the PLA Navy with a
base at the southern end of the South China Sea (SCS), where China has claimed
jurisdictions inside the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of other states.
Strategically, it is also located east of the Malacca Strait, through which 80
per cent of China’s energy demands are met. In case of any major conflict over
Taiwan, China would need to secure its sea lanes in the SCS and make sure that
the strait is not blocked by any power, especially the U.S. In case of any
conflict in the SCS or around Malacca, the presence of a naval base with its
supplies of fuel and ammunition and the presence of medical facilities offer
strategic advantages to China.
Albeit Cambodia has claimed that the
dry dock facility at Ream is for the Royal Cambodian Navy, its size and
construction make this claim implausible as the Cambodian Navy barely has any
vessels over 50 metres in length. The main pier at Ream is large enough to berth a Chinese
aircraft carrier. Moreover,
a new airport built at Dara Sakor, about 40 miles northwest of Ream, is a force
multiplier. This features a 2-mile-long runway, big enough for Boeing 747s and China’s long-range bombers.
Military operations from the naval base, airport, or both would significantly
add to China’s capacity to enforce its claims in the SCS and pressurise states,
such as Vietnam, Singapore, and Malaysia. It is also reported that the ground
station technology for a BeiDou navigation satellite system— whose high-accuracy positioning and
navigation service facilitates Chinese force movements and precision-guided
missile attacks— was established at the Chinese portion of the base. It was
disclosed that Cambodia had allocated 157 and 30 hectares to the Ministry of
National Defense on September 15, 2022, to develop an ‘air defense command
and general headquarters’ and a ‘naval radar system’, respectively. This air defence
system would likely comprise surface-to-air missiles and hardened shelters. Thus,
basing is also about ‘global tracking and space assets’.
Cheng Heang suggests that the Naval base does not provide
much strategic advantage let alone provide any benefit in the event of a
military conflict. The shallow depth (10 metres) of the Bay of Kampong Som,
which hosts the base, would not permit China to undertake major naval actions
in the Gulf and the use of submarines would be rendered impractical. However,
recent satellite images showed how several Chinese warships; including
a submarine, a Type-52D destroyer, and two Type-54 frigates; were berthed even at
the Karachi port, which is around 13 metres deep.
Though China has access to military
outposts in the Spratly Islands too, they are highly vulnerable to attacks
during wartime. Cambodian Naval Base provides a diplomatic dilemma for
attackers. It would complicate any military response during a military conflict, as it
would be Cambodian territory which would be bombed. Nevertheless, the base
provides the ability for maintenance and repairs of warships, which is critical
to sustaining any combat operations. Ci Le Yi, a Taiwan-based military expert,
argues that the Cambodian base would allow the PLA to berth its aircraft
carriers and submarines for resupply. It would also increase the endurance of
the Chinese distant naval patrols and enhance the flytime of Chinese fighter
aircraft and bombers, by providing logistics, refuelling, repair, and other
services. Likewise, it could be a valuable outpost from the vantage point of
intelligence collection.
The
Cambodian naval facility is going to aid Beijing’s expansive maritime
territorial claims in the SCS and help realise Xi Jinping’s ambition to turn
China into a first-class military power capable of projecting force over
greater distances.
Anshu Kumar is a Master’s student at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru
University, New Delhi, India. Previously, he has worked at the Centre for Land
Warfare Studies, New Delhi, India.
Article uploaded on 11-23-2023
Disclaimer : The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the organisation that he/she belongs to or of the USI of India.