Introduction
07 Oct Israel’s
long-standing security doctrine crumbled in the face of the Hamas attack. Its
intelligence and military institutions were unable to keep citizens safe. The
attention of the West once again shifted to the Middle East and the Palestinian
cause resulting in Russia-Ukraine Conflict no longer dominating the front
pages.
This
war is of a different scale and significance than many previous rounds of
violent confrontation in the region and that will have reverberations
throughout the Middle East. Ramifications of this attack and Israel’s response can
no longer be localised or confined to the region and will affect Europe, West
Asia, Indo-Pacific and South Asia. There is an interplay of conflict which is
taking place and the US is now confronted with engagements both in Ukraine and
Gaza and has to manage the consequent chaos.
The Gaza Strip
The Gaza Strip is one of the
most densely populated areas on the planet. It’s also one of the most heavily
locked down, surveilled, and suppressed. Palestinians in occupied territories,
including the West Bank and Gaza Strip, have faced surveillance and control for
years, with many calling the conditions an apartheid.
In
September 2021, Israeli forces completed a barrier around the Gaza Strip—that
is essentially a ‘smart wall’ equipped with radars, cameras, underground
sensors, and an array of other surveillance instruments. Yet the Hamas was able
to plan and execute an attack which shocked the world.
Hamas War Aims
Hamas was probably
encouraged by the impression that Israel’s internal political crisis—sparked by
extensive protests against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s proposal to
curtail the power of the Israeli Supreme Court—had diverted attention from Gaza
and significantly undermined Israel’s social cohesion and military
preparedness.[i]
This probably led a previously constrained Hamas to challenge the existing
Israeli balance of power.
Hamas’s
fundamental aspiration was to inflict harm on Israel and undermine the state.
But the Israeli intelligence and decision-makers had felt that Hamas’s
responsibilities in Gaza had tempered its extremism. Hamas encouraged this
misperception, posing as a reliable actor and warning of escalation if Israel
did not allow funding from Qatar to arrive in Gaza and did not permit more Gazan
workers in Israel.[ii]
Israel
had operated on the premise that a deterred and weakened Hamas was preferable
to a governance vacuum in Gaza and would allow Israel to focus on what it
perceived as more critical strategic challenges, such as Iran’s nuclear aspirations
and Hezbollah’s military build-up. Accordingly, each time a flare-up occurred
in Gaza; Israel’s aim was to re-establish deterrence through a limited use of
force. This allowed Hamas to carry out a long-term build-up of arms and
military infrastructure and to improve its operational capabilities.[iii]
Over
the years there have been differing viewpoints regarding the Hamas being a
terror organisation or a governance organisation. al-Omari, who served as an
Advisor to the Palestinian negotiating team during the 1999-2001 Permanent-Status
Talks has said; “What we saw on October 7 … is that ultimately, [terror] seems
to be part of their DNA. Using terror and violence for achieving political
means won the debate within Hamas”.[iv]
In
the past decade, the Israel Defence Forces has succeeded in mitigating two
central threats from Gaza: rocket attacks (which Israel’s Iron Dome Defence System
intercepts) and tunnels infiltrating Israeli territory (which were neutralised
by an underground anti-tunnel barrier that Israel completed along the border
with Gaza in 2021). But Israel failed to imagine an aboveground invasion and
did not reinforce defences around Gaza in proportion to Hamas’s growing military
capabilities.
The
Hamas’ ultimate war aims are the destruction of Israel and the retention of
power in Gaza. Hamas will exert a total effort—diplomatically, economically,
politically, and militarily—in order to win, or, not lose. Hamas obviously views
its existence as vital; however, the question being asked is whether this is
the view held by the majority of the Gaza populace, who Hamas is using as human
shields. Because Hamas views the Israeli war aims as unlimited, with its
complete destruction as Israel’s goal, it will try to convince the people of
Gaza that this translates to their destruction as well.[v]
Israel: The End of Status
Quo
From the moment Hamas broke
through Israel’s security barrier with the Gaza Strip on 07 October and began
its rampage, it was clear that Israel would never be the same. Israel cannot
return to the status quo that existed. The state’s policy of blockading Gaza
had failed to make them safe. The government’s calculation that it could lure
Hamas into pragmatism, whether by allowing Qatari funding for Hamas or by
giving work permits for Gaza labourers—had lured Israel into complacency. And
the belief that most threats from Hamas could be neutralized by high-tech
surveillance, deep underground barriers, and the Iron Dome Missile Defence System
had proved wrong.[vi]
Its
task now is to bring all the hostages back home and to make it impossible for
Hamas and other adversaries, notably the Iranian-backed Lebanese militant group
Hezbollah, to threaten their security. In order to bring the hostages back
Israel entered into a ceasefire which brought a halt in their momentum of
attack and disrupted the tempo of operations but the ceasefire, though extended,
has only, so far, seen 105 hostages released
from Hamas captivity in Gaza which includes 81 Israelis, there are reports that
137 hostages still remain.
The
era of intermittent cycles of fighting and cease-fires in Gaza is over. What
will replace it is a continuous, protracted military campaign, driven by
Israel’s paramount security interests and an unwavering commitment to the safe
return of the hostages being held by Hamas. [vii]
The
question that needs to be answered is can the world move beyond the revolving
pattern that has become apparent over the past two decades: support for Israel
to defend itself at the onset of a conflict; followed by mounting international
and domestic pressure on leaders for a ceasefire and diplomatic solutions; and
Israel’s withdrawal before the completion of its objectives.
Israel’s Perceived Strategy
An effective Israeli
strategy demands the integration of several interrelated, parallel
endeavours—military, civilian, and political—executed methodically within a
structured framework, which must be continually realigned with the expectations
of the Israeli public and combined with a diplomatic campaign that will secure
the assistance and support that the country will need from allies and partners.
The
broad Policy/Strategic Objectives of Operations in Gaza could be; a stable
Gaza, with a broad-based government that renounces the use of terrorism to
threaten Israel or the Israeli people. The outcomes in Gaza should convince or
compel other countries in the region to cease support to terrorists. Finally, a
restoration process to reach an Agreement with Saudi Arabia to normalize
relations with Israel, and an expansion of the Abraham Accords.[viii]
If
these are the broad strategic objectives, the military objectives of Operations
in Gaza which flow are to destabilise, isolate, and destroy Hamas and provide
support to a new, broad-based government in Gaza. This includes destroying
Hamas’s military capability and infrastructure. It must aim at protecting Israel
from Gaza-based threats and attacks.[ix]
Finally,
destroying Hamas and its supporting nations’ terrorist networks, gathering
intelligence on regional and global terrorism, capturing or kill terrorists and
war criminals, and freeing hostages detained by the Hamas regime.
Palestinian Frustrations
The initiation of violence
by the Hamas was triggered by the deep frustrations the Palestinians felt
towards their plight. Hamas designed its attack to bring the Palestinian issue
to the fore and stoke an overreaction from Israel that would undermine international
sympathy for Israel.
There is, of course, a school of thought that
feels that the intensity of the Israeli reaction was necessary to prevent other
non-state actors from joining in.
Conclusion
The attacks no doubt have
revealed the terrible failure of the idea that the Palestinian political
question could be side-lined indefinitely without any cost to Israel. There had
been no Israeli-Palestinian negotiations on a final status peace deal for years,
even as Israel pursued normalisation with a growing number of Arab states.
Even
as fighting rages, questions abound about what happens when it finally stops. As
per the Economist; “The visible dilemma facing America Israel’s staunchest ally
is for how long it can support the war”.
There
are many questions that need to be answered including; ‘What can be salvaged
from the wreckage? Will Hamas survive, if not as an organisation, then as an
ideology? Who will govern Gaza? What will be needed by both the Israeli’s and
Palestinians to broker any type of lasting peace’?
Unfortunately,
violence cannot be a solution even for an intractable conflict.
[i] Congressional Research Service,
Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations, September 27, 2023 https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44245
[ii] Amos Yadlin and Udi Evental, Why
Israel Slept, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2024 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/why-israel-slept-yadlin-evental
[iii] ibid
[iv] Middle East experts explore
deep-rooted challenges in Israel-Hamas war, Stanford Report, Novemeber 30, 2023
https://news.stanford.edu/report/2023/11/30/middle-east-experts-explore-deep-rooted-challenges-gaza-israel-conflict/
[v] Kevin Benson,
What Is The End State? Assessing Israel’s Objectives For A Gaza Campaign,
Modern War Institute 19 October 2023 https://mwi.westpoint.edu/what-is-the-end-state-assessing-israels-objectives-for-a-gaza-campaign/
[vi] Amos Yadlin and Udi Evental, Why
Israel Slept, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2024 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/why-israel-slept-yadlin-evental
[vii] Ibid
[viii] Middle East experts explore
deep-rooted challenges in Israel-Hamas war, Stanford Report, Novemeber 30, 2023
https://news.stanford.edu/report/2023/11/30/middle-east-experts-explore-deep-rooted-challenges-gaza-israel-conflict/
[ix] Ibid
Major General Jagatbir Singh, VSM (Retd) is a Distinguished Fellow at the USI of India. Commissioned in 1981 into the 18 Cavalry, he has held various important command and Staff appointments including command of an Armoured Division.
Article uploaded on 29-12-2023
Disclaimer: The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the organisation that he belongs to or of the USI of India. .