Introduction
The People’s Republic of China recently passed the ‘Law on Foreign
Relations’, which marked a modification in the nation’s foreign policy and
global engagement. This law, which took effect on July 1, 2023, gives President
Xi Jinping more authority to shape the foreign policy while providing a legal
framework to protect China’s sovereignty, security, and prosperity. This law provides
legal cover to China’s essential diplomatic principles by providing a legal
foundation for dealing with issues like external sanctions and interventions.
Without defining the precise limits of these acts, it gives China the authority
to prevent or restrict actions that harm its essential interests. This
open-ended phrasing allows China on the one hand, to respond to threats and, on
the other hand, creates uncertainty for foreign entities operating within China.[1]
Implications for Foreign Entities
The new law allows China to punish private companies that engage in
actions seen as ‘harmful’ to China’s interests. This means that foreign
businesses operating in China will have to be careful and more sensitive to
China’s interests, which could affect private companies’ operating style. The
problem is that the law is unclear about what foreign companies should avoid
doing in order to uphold Chinese interests, as there is room for different
interpretations of the law. Therefore, the law can be misused by the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) to preserve its power.
Implications for India
Several sections of the law have implications for India. For instance, Article
6 implies that different organisations, such as state institutions, armed
forces, political parties, businesses, and citizens, must protect China’s
sovereignty and national security during international exchanges and
cooperation.[2] Through
this law, the Chinese Government may target foreign businesses that are operating
in China, as well as Chinese businesses operating worldwide, to adhere to protect
China’s national security and sovereignty. As a result, the Chinese Government
can now legally request critical data from any private company owned by Chinese
citizens, and further, the ambiguity in the law may be construed that they can
also ask foreign companies operating within China to also share the data. For
example, Chinese smartphone companies operating in India, such as BBK
Electronics, which owns smartphone brands like OnePlus, Xiaomi, Oppo, and Vivo,
are now legally obliged to provide sensitive data to the Chinese Government of
Indians, who are using their smartphones, if requested by China. This data can include
confidential information of any Indian user, whether that Indian is a general citizen
or someone working in the Indian Military/Indian Government. Similarly, the Chinese
Government can also request confidential data of Indians from Indian companies operating
in China. Thus, China, through a codified legal framework as a countermeasure,
uses raids and inquiries aimed at foreign companies, to pressurise these
companies, not to criticise them and to follow China’s instructions. Additionally,
Article 8 states that those involved in international exchanges who harm China’s
national interests and break the law shall be held accountable.[3]
Therefore, it can also be construed that if any company which is owned by any Chinese
citizen or operating in China does not provide confidential data to the Chinese
Government, then legal actions can be taken against that company. Article 18
emphasises the importance of developing relationships with adjacent countries
based on friendship, partnership, amity, sincerity, and mutual benefit.[4]
As a result, China aims to further improve its relations with its
neighbouring countries like Nepal, Bhutan, Pakistan, and Myanmar, which happen
to be India’s neighbours as well. Therefore, through this law, the Chinese Government
may legally force or encourage its private companies to establish their
businesses in neighbouring countries and promote Chinese influence and presence.
Article 31 says that treaties and agreements should not be implemented or applied in a way that harms China’s sovereignty, national security, or public interests.[5] This provision of protecting China’s sovereignty might impact future negotiations in signing agreements with India to settle border disputes as China considers many parts of Indian territory as its sovereign. In other case, if a foreign non-governmental organisation (NGO) working in China or elsewhere expresses concerns about the environmental impact of infrastructural development near Chinese borders, it may be regarded or perceived under this law as an NGO working against China’s national interests. Therefore, the Chinese Government can legally take action against that NGO. Under Article 33, the Government has the authority to conduct countermeasures in response to acts that threaten China’s sovereignty, security, and development interests or violate core principles of international law.[6] However, because the law doesn’t specify what constitutes activities against China’s national interests, Chinese authorities have a lot of leverage in deciding how to apply the law. Therefore, Xi Jinping can use the law to protect its interests and uphold power. Article 26 states that China is still committed to safeguarding and promoting Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and will continue encouraging external economic cooperation, including investing in various countries.[7] Therefore, China may continue to use the strategy of providing financial incentives to countries to gain influence in various regions leading to a debt trap. This could pose security challenges for India, as seen in the case of Sri Lanka leasing its port to China due to falling into the Chinese debt trap.
Party Leadership and Xi Jinping’s Power
According to the BBC, one significant feature of the law is that it
emphasises President Xi Jinping’s growing power and influence in formulating
and shaping foreign policy. This aligns with President Xi Jinping’s efforts and
objectives to uphold his influence within the party and further marginalise the
role of the government in international affairs. The law recognises the party’s
centralised and unifying leadership and highlights Xi’s ideology, increasing
hold on power and his desire to mould China’s overseas engagement in line with
his ideological goals.[8]
For instance, Article 3 of the law states explicitly that China will conduct
its international relations in accordance with Xi Jinping’s Thoughts, Mao
Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Marxism-Leninism’s political ideologies, as well as
uphold its socialist system with Chinese characteristics, protecting its
sovereignty, advance economic and social development.[9]
This ideological dimension highlights that China will align foreign policy with
China’s domestic political goals and reinforces the role of ideology in guiding
China’s global interactions. The law may restrict open discourse and
disagreements on foreign policy issues within CCP since it strives to enhance
centralised and unifying leadership, the increased power of Xi Jinping
for international policy formulation. Due to the implementation of
ideological components in the law, the emphasis on party leadership and the
ideological foundation of China’s international relations may deter alternative
opinions and may inhibit productive debates within China.
China’s Aggressive Diplomacy
The Law on Foreign Relations reflects China’s increasingly assertive
approach to diplomacy. Dr Chong Ja-Ian, a scholar at Carnegie China, states that
this law signifies a more proactive pursuit of China’s interests through
coercion, pressure, and countermeasures.[10]
This aligns with China’s growing confidence on the global stage and its desire
to assert itself as a significant player in shaping international norms and
systems by engaging proactively in international multilateral institutions, as
stated in Articles 18, 26 and 39.[11]
Conclusion
China’s Foreign Relations Law is a significant step forward in President
Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power and China’s assertive foreign policy
stance. This law offers a legal foundation for China’s responses to foreign
acts, and the use of this legal framework is a tool to justify their actions and
an attempt to showcase that China operates inside the framework of law and
order. However, its broad language and ideological overtones cause uncertainty for
foreign businesses and further raise concerns about the limitation of open
debate on foreign policy issues. The law seems to help Xi Jinping in controlling
private businesses operating in China and Chinese businesses operating
elsewhere, a hint to private businesses not to act against his interests. The
actual impact of the law will be determined by its interpretation and
enforcement with punitive measures. As China seeks to balance its pursuit of
economic development and national security, the tensions between attracting
foreign investment and asserting its interests might rise.
ENDNOTES
[1] “The Law on Foreign Relations of the
People's Republic of China,” China Today, June 29, 2023, http://www.chinatoday.com.cn/ctenglish/2018/zdtj/202306/t20230629_800335399.html
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Kelly Ng, “China tightens Xi
Jinping's powers against the West with new law,” BBC, July, 02, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-66050926
[9] “The Law on Foreign Relations of the
People's Republic of China,” China Today, June 29, 2023, http://www.chinatoday.com.cn/ctenglish/2018/zdtj/202306/t20230629_800335399.html
[10] Kelly Ng, “China tightens Xi
Jinping's powers against the West with new law,” BBC, July, 02, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-66050926
[11] “The Law on Foreign Relations of the
People's Republic of China,” China Today, June 29, 2023, http://www.chinatoday.com.cn/ctenglish/2018/zdtj/202306/t20230629_800335399.html
Manav Saini is Research Assistant at the Centre for Strategic Studies and Simulation (CS3), United Service Institution (USI) of India. He holds a Master of Arts in International Relations from South Asian University.