“Tactics are based on weapon-power and not on the
experiences of military history. The commander who grasps the true trend of any
new, or improved, weapon will be in a position to surprise the adversary who
has not”.
~ Capt
JFC Fuller
Abstract
The long-drawn Russia-Ukraine conflict
has shaken up geo-political narratives. Whether the conflict will result in
changing the unipolar world order and brings about multi polarity is yet to be
known. The conflict has largely been covered by the media through a prism of
ideology, with a few independent sources covering the event from neutral
perspective. While it is too early to analyse geo-political aspects, the
conflict has brought forth important lessons related to weapons performance,
especially as this is the first conflict involving use of advanced weaponry of
both western and Russian origin by well-trained belligerents. This paper
discusses lessons that can be drawn by Indian Army with respect to force
modernisation and capital procurement.
Introduction
Russia launched a
special military operation against Ukraine on 24 Feb 2022, reaching the
outskirts of Kyiv and withdrawing. This was branded as failure of Russia and
largely attributed to failure of logistics. It has now emerged that this
withdrawal was part of Russia’s commitment under the draft ceasefire agreement.1 While Russia upheld its part,
Ukraine reneged on its commitments. Moot point being that many aspects of the
conflict are shrouded in midst of information warfare. Any meaningful lessons
from the conflict can only be drawn only when factual details are available to
scholars.
Apropos, this article is based on the
coverage of the conflict by news agencies and YouTube channels not only from
both sides of the conflict but also neutrals.
Conduct
of Operations
The
conflict commenced using eastern bloc equipment and few drones. Military
aid flowing into Ukraine comprised of eastern
bloc equipment supplied by former
Warsaw Pact nations. Subsequently, modern western equipment was provided. The
conflict has provided good analysis of performance of equipment developed based
on different operational philosophies and operated by trained and motivated
belligerents.
Success of Bayraktar drones against
Russian Armoured Fighting Vehicle (AFV) led to successful development of mobile
high-powered microwave countermeasures.2 Subsequently,
Russia employed its own drones along with missiles and rockets to attrit
Ukraine military and civil infrastructure. Hypersonic missiles rendered Patriot
systems ineffective, though few
missiles may have been intercepted.3 Extensive use of missiles, long-range
vectors (LRVs) drones and air
supremacy have turned the operational situation in Russia’s favour.
Large numbers of modern western
equipment were delivered to Ukraine Army for the planned spring offensive.
Despite modern weapons and training abroad, the offensive has not made any
headway while many western equipment have been destroyed.
Russians are conducting slow, methodical
and attrition-based operations with focus on avoiding collateral damage. While
military casualties are extensive on both sides, civilian casualties have been
low.
Key
Observations
It
would be prudent to analyse performance of various equipment or arms and
visualise the trajectory to be followed for equipment procurement by Indian
Army (IA).
Drones.
Drones have been employed for tactical as well as strategic targeting by both
sides, though less successfully by Ukraine. Effectiveness of drones in shaping
the battlefield and the psyche of adversaries and global audience has been
established. Initial success of drones led to development of mobile
elctro-magnetic counter measures. Based on evolutionary trajectory, Indian
Airforce should focus on development and procurement of futuristic drones and
counter measures. As strong domestic industrial base for drone and counter
drone manufacturing exists, systems already procured should be extensively
exploited to develop a cogent employment philosophy rather than preserving
these for future conflicts.
AFVs.
While LRVs and drones have inflicted heavy attrition, need to physically
traverse large distances on battlefield has made AFVs a weapon of choice. Based
on emerging threats, review of design philosophy to optimise the iron triangle
needs to be undertaken. Deliberations on whether protection is to be achieved
by heavier armour, active or passive protection or through better agility must
be undertaken. As videos of tank engagements indicate that tank battles have
taken place at shorter ranges, need for powerful guns with ranges of four to
five kms may be reconsidered. Empirical data from the conflict and meticulous
analysis of terrain obtained along India’s borders should be the basis of
legislating desired effective ranges as bigger guns result in weight and size
penalty. Engagements beyond 1500 to 2000 m may be planned using drones and
Loiter Munitions (LMs). Effectiveness of KA-52 Alligators in blunting Ukraine’s
summer offensive suggests the need to provide air defence resources down to
troop level.
Indirect
Fires. Missiles,
rockets, guns and weapon locating radars were critical in shaping the
battlefield.4 LMs, if used in counter bombardment role,
can free guns for other tasks. Considering need for rapid relocation, strike
corps may be equipped with mobile gun systems and pivot formations with towed
guns. Sensors that can see through clouds, foliage etc are needed for targeting
as well as providing real time updates to decision makers. Robust
sensor-shooter links will help achieve desired effects with better efficiency.
Multi barrel rocket systems with precision strike capability have proved very
effective, hence greater numbers should be procured. Hypersonic missiles were
effective in shaping the conflict, or at least the narrative, hence, it is
imperative to focus on developing hypersonic missiles.
Air
Defence (AD). Counter drone capability with a mix of hard and
soft kill systems should be available at troop and platoon levels as well as
all logistics echelons either by suitable groupings or changes in war
establishments. In addition, AD systems capable of interdicting hyper-sonic
missiles need to be inducted, especially along northern borders. With high
manoeuvrability of missiles, aircraft and drones, capability to destroy launch
sites should be enhanced.
Communications. Ukraine was provided Starlink Satellite
Service for seamless internet connectivity which proved useful in planning,
coordination and operations.5 Starlink connectivity remained unaffected due
to easy portability of light weight, battery powered ground terminals. It’s
versatility and inbuilt redundancy presents a strong case for India to deploy
her own swarms of satellites with similar capabilities. There were reports of
effective strikes against Russian positions subsequent to interception of
unsecure communications,6 highlighting
the importance of multi layered secure communications, particularly in enemy
territory.
Electronic
Warfare (EW). Russian EW capabilities were central in destruction
of drones and spoofing GPS guidance of LRVs.7 IA may also focus on developing EW
capabilities to spoof or destroy adversary’s satellite communication,
navigation and guidance systems as well as autonomous systems. These
capabilities need to be developed specific to each theatre based on terrain,
environmental conditions and adversary’s capabilities.
Infantry. Till
commencement of the the summer offensive, media coverage of infantry operations
was restricted to fighting in built-up areas with greater attention to Wagner
militia. There may have been few pitched battles involving infantry, however,
details are not available. From the limited coverage, effectiveness of flame
throwers and thermobaric bombs emerged as an important lesson. It also appears
that infantry was largely used to exploit initial success of armour. This
presents a strong case for infantry to be provided with good mobility,
communication and battlefield situational awareness suites to exploit fleeting
opportunities. During the summer offensive, ability of Russian defences to
inflict heavy casualties on Ukraine Army,8 highlights
the need to equip defenders with mechanical and remotely delivered mining
capabilities along with dedicated artillery and air power for stalling and
destroying enemy columns.
Engineers. Bulk
of the destruction of AFVs seems to have occurred when static. Therefore,
enhancement of tactical mobility in obstacle ridden terrain has to be a focus
area. While each formation fabricates crossing expedients, additional carrying
capacity needs to be provided through induction of additional vehicles capable
of carrying greater volumes of stores. Further, for the engineer task forces to
be effective, support vehicles must be of same class and vintage as the main
AFV. Accordingly, phased procurement should be based on family of AFVs which
include AFV variants like bridges, trawls, ambulance etc. An important lesson
drawn from Ukraine’s stalled offensive is the need to equip strike corps with
large number of mine breaching systems. It would also be prudent to develop
robotic/drone based mine clearance systems to enhance flexibility and save
lives.
Logistics.
Vulnerability of logistics dumps to LRVs and aircrafts underscore need for
engineers to acquire capability to construct underground infrastructure in
field including for strike formations for storage of ammunition, fuel oil and
lubricants, field hospitals etc. Containerised logistics including maintenance
bays should be provisioned at all levels. In peace time, this would lead to
huge savings by doing away with the need for brick-and-mortar infrastructure
while speeding up mobilisation. There is a need to induct trucks with good
cross-country mobility in first and second line fleets. High-capacity
heavy-duty trucks should be inducted in third line fleets.
Obsolete/Vintage
Equipment. As the war progressed, both sides
resuscitated and employed obsolete equipment.9 Russia, reportedly employed T-55 tanks in
artillery role in light of its limited mobility and protection.10 With domestic defence industrial base at
nascent stage and low production capability, IA may formulate discard policy
which involves preservation of certain equipment for contingencies.
Lessons
and Recommendations.
Deterrence.
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s open support against the largest nuclear
power in the world put a question mark on nuclear deterrence. Russia has
maintained a strategic ambivalence. The term ‘existential
Threat’ has been repeatedly used. It is possible that this ambiguity has been a
factor in ensuring that battles have generally been fought on Ukrainian soil
and limited efforts have been made towards fomenting internal turmoil in Russia
or to exploit brief window of the short-lived Wagner mutiny. Beyond the current
conflict, United State’s limited resolve to go beyond sanctions against North
Korea does indicate that direct wars between nuclear powers are not likely.
Being surrounded by two nuclear powers, India should expand her nuclear arsenal
and diversify delivery triad. In order to minimise threat from the adversaries,
anti-ballistic missile systems should also be inducted in an accelerated
manner.
Equipping
Philosophy.
A two front war remains a distinct possibility precluding move of dual-task
forces or re-location of equipment in such scenario. Therefore, each theatre
must be equipped with theatre specific equipment. Qualitative requirements for
equipment to be employed in rarefied high-altitude areas, hot and humid
obstacle ridden or riverine terrain and dry and hot deserts should be
different. This would make equipment development and mass production easier and
most likely cheaper. It would be prudent to procure equipment as per
operational concept. For example, a tank of strike corps would be used for
manoeuvre battles, hence, would need better mobility and a fire control system
that enhances accuracy while firing on the move. On the other hand, tanks employed
for counter attacks or break in battles would require higher rates of fire in
static mode, (hence less powerful engine and less sophisticated fire control
system would suffice) but would require enhanced protection due to ease of
targeting by adversary against static AFVs. Similarly, assault rifles required
by infantry sections in occupation of defence could be heavier and have longer
ranges as compared to requirement of a section undertaking assault.
Synchronisation
of Requirements and Availability. In context of IA, close
coordination between the ‘Strategic and Capability Development &
Sustenance’ (CD & S) verticals is critical to achieve desired outcome from
limited capital budget. At present, Line Directorates initiate proposals for
10-year Integrated Capability Development Plan which is approved by the
strategic vertical. The Five-year Defence Capital Acquisition Plan and the the
two-year Annual Acquisition Plan flow out of this. Battles are won by
synergistic application of all arms and equipment; hence, procurement process
must flow from a doctrine wherein the strategic vertical defines envisaged
capabilities and CD & S completes procurement in a time bound manner. While
there may be a mismatch between requirements and what the industry is capable of
delivering in a finite timeframe, trial directives could be made flexible to
allow for certain tolerances in parameters. It must be remembered that any
equipment inducted in service, even as part of hand holding or limited series
production will remain in service for many years. Therefore, such procurement
should be based on quantity required for facilitating exploitation and product
development rather than for filling voids.
Developmental
Timelines.
Operationalisation of any cutting-edge military equipment is a complex and
long-drawn process. Even the most advanced military-industrial nations take
many years to develop next generation systems. Russia took 18 years to develop
Pantsir system as a replacement of Tunguska Gun Missile System.11 T-90 tanks, despite being an upgrade of T-72
tanks were developed in six years. It took 20 years from conception to
induction of M-142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System in the US Army.12 AH-64 Apaches were inducted more than 10 years
after commencement of development.13 Indian defence sector is still at nascent
stage; hence, the services need to cater for more time for Research and
Development (R&D) and should be prepared on case to case basis in
consultation with R&D organisations as well as industries. Considering the
vast requirement of the three services and the government in sync with various
industry chambers could earmark private industries for specialisation in
specific equipment and sub-systems. This would facilitate focused R&D and
better investments, thereby achieving economy of scales and faster development
of cutting-edge technology.
Atmanirbharta.
Russia’s self-reliance in defence sector and its ‘No Limits Friendship’ with
China have been a major factor in its ability to produce requisite weapons and
ammunition despite numerous economic sanctions. Western countries on the other
hand have not been able to supply adequate weapons and ammunition to Ukraine
due to limited stocks and inability of the defence industries to increase the
output to meet immediate needs.14 Indian
industry is still finding its feet in the defence sector. Its annual production
capacity is limited and industries remain heavily dependent on foreign
countries for critical military material as well as components. The
Russia-Ukraine conflict has broken the chimera of short and swift wars in
future. It is imperative that stocking of 100 per cent War Wastage reserves be
made up on priority. Further, the Govt should lay down a stocking policy, akin
to that for petroleum reserves, for military material, electronics and
components required for production of defence equipment.
Conclusion
Any
meaningful change comes from in-depth deliberations. For improvement in the
capability development process, a cognisant decision needs to be taken at the
strategic vertical of the IA with respect to force structure, organisation,
concept of operations, equipment and training philosophies. Regular firing and
large-scale manoeuvres are necessary to maintain operational sharpness as well
as to draw realistic lessons on performance of equipment. Expenses need to be
managed by restricting inventory and drawing a balance between basic equipment
and niche technology within all families of equipment.
Domestic defence production,
self-sufficiency in raw materials and military materials must be achieved at
the earliest. Promulgation of a realistic strategy (pro-active or incremental
operations) would facilitate equipment preservation by means of mothballing,
thereby freeing up funds for better maintenance of equipment. An optimum
balance between sustenance and modernisation can be achieved by enforcing a
policy on holding of vintage, current and state of the art equipment. It may be
prudent to place capability development and sustenance verticals under Deputy
Chief of the Army Staff (CD & S) as per original plans.
The lessons from the conflict need to be
analysed and incorporated in light of changes in global as well as regional
strategic scenario. Fresh strategic planning with an open mind, independent of
current way of thinking, may be essential to enable incorporation of the
lessons in Indian context.
Endnotes
1 “Putin Shows Initialled Draft Agreement with
Ukraine to African Leaders”, Tass, 18 Jun 2023,
https://tass.com/politics/1634479
2 David Axe, “Russia’s Electronic-Warfare Troops
Knocked Out 90 Percent of Ukraine’s Drones”, Forbes, 24 Dec 2022
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2022/12/24/russia-electronic-warfare-troops-knocked-out-90-percent-of-ukraines-drones/?sh=1562a9ba575c
Parth Satam, “Ukraine War: Russia Claims Developing ‘Revolutionary’
Electro-Magnetic Pulse UAV that can Down Drone Swarms”, The EurAsian Times, 21
Jan 2023
https://www.eurasiantimes.com/russia-develops-a-revolutionary-electro-magnetic-pulse-uav/
3 Hypersonic velocities create plasma screen
ahead of missile which renders it impossible for the seeker to acquire the
target. When missile is slowed down to acquire the target by eliminating plasma
screen, a few hypersonic missiles may have been intercepted
4 Major Patrick Hinton, “Lean on the Barrage:
The Role of Artillery in Ukraine’s Counteroffensive”, RUSI, 12 Jul 2023
https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/lean-barrage-role-artillery-ukraines-counteroffensive#:~:text=The%20use%20of%20artillery%20has,(UAS)%
20for%20targeting%20purposes Lucian Staiano-Daniels, “Why Russia Keeps Turning
to Mass Firepower”, Foreign Policy, 19 Jun 2022 Russia’s Brutal Use of
Artillery in Ukraine Has Historical Roots (foreignpolicy.com) Jeff Schogol, “Russia
is hammering Ukraine with up to 60,000 artillery shells and rockets every day”,
Task & Purpose, 13 Jul 2022 Russia is hammering Ukraine with up to
60,000 rockets and shells per day (taskandpurpose.com)
5 "How Elon Musk’s Satellites
have Saved Ukraine and Changed Warfare”, The Economist, 05 Jan 2023
https://www.economist.com/briefing/2023/01/05/how-elon-musks-satellites-have-saved-ukraine-and-changed-warfare?utm_medium=cpc.adword.pd&utm_source=google&ppccampaignID=
18151738051&ppcadID=&utm_campaign=a.22brand_pmax&utm_content=
conversion.direct-response.anonymous&gclid=Cj0KCQjw6KunBhDx
ARIsAKFUGs_L6fuCVbu1wZF7d7G5vjOoztt7ZoMrTzx45DXgDQUGXaJvp1sm
QOMaAu24EALw_wcB&gclsrc=aw.ds
6 Victoria Kim, “Russia Says
Soldier’s Cellphone Use Led to the Deadly Makiivka Strike”, The New York
Times, 04 Jan 2023 https://www.nytimes.
com/2023/01/04/world/europe/russia-soldiers-phones-makiivka-strike.html
7 Alex Marquardt, Natasha Bertrand & Zachary
Cohen, “Russia’s Jamming of US-provided Rocket Systems Complicates Ukraines’s
War Effort:, CNN, 06 May 2023
https://edition.cnn.com/2023/05/05/politics/russia-jamming-himars-rockets-ukraine/index.html
8 Isabelle Khurshudyan and Kamila
Hrabchuk, he Biggest Obstacle to Ukraine’s Counteroffensiver? Minefields.”, The
Washington Post, 15 Jul 2023
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/07/15/ukraine-war-russia-mines-counteroffensive/
9 Dean Lockwood, “Tank Warfare in Ukraine – An
Unspoken Reality Needs to be Heeded”, Defense & Security Monitor, 19
Apr 2023 https://dsm.forecastinternational.com/wordpress/2023/04/19/tank-warfare-in-ukraine-an-unspoken-reality-needs-to-be-heeded/
10 David Axe, “Russia’s Ancient T-55 Tanks Could
Double as Artillery. But Not Very Good Artillery”, Forbes, , 24 Mar 2023
https://www.forbes.
com/sites/davidaxe/2023/03/24/russias-ancient-t-55-tanks-could-double-as-artillery-but-not-very-good-artillery/?sh=edf35da472e7
11 Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pantsir_missile_system#:~:text=
The%20Pantsir%2DS%20prototype%20from,45%208%C3%978%
20truck.&text=Another%20Pantsir%2DS1%20option%20is,company%20%
22Minsk%20Tractor%20Plant%22.
12 Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M142_HIMARS#:~:text=The%
20HIMARS%20concept%20was%20t ested,a%20modified%20Honest%
20John%20launcher.&text=HIMARS%20was%20then %20developed%
20as,first%20appeared%20publicly%20in%201993.
13 Wkipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M142_HIMARS#:~:text=
The%20 HIMARS%20concept%20was%20tested,a%20modified %20Honest%
20John%20launcher.&text=HIMARS%20was%20then% 20developed% 20as,
first%20appeared%20publicly%20in%201993.
14 Natasha Bertrand, Oren Libermann
and Jennifer Hansler, ÚS and NATO Grapple with Critical Ammo Shortage for
Ukraine”, CNN, 18 Jul 2023
https://edition.cnn.com/2023/07/18/politics/ukraine-critical-ammo-shortage-us-nato-grapple/index.html
Bibliography
1. Based on media reports and discussions on
reputed YouTube channels, certain analysis can be drawn with reasonable
assurance of correctness with respect to performance of various arms and
equipment. It is from analysis of these reports and discussions that I have
drawn out certain lessons from the conflict related to capability development.
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(b) TASS.com.
(c) English.pravda.ru.
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(b) France24.com.
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@Col Ashish Dutta was
commissioned into Armoured Corps in Dec 1999.
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presently serving as Col Capability Development in Acceptance of Necessity
& Categorisation Section/Capability Development Directorate at IHQ of
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Journal
of the United Service Institution of India,
Vol. CLIII, No. 634, October-December 2023.