Abstract
Russia
and India have enjoyed a particularly close strategic relationship over the
last half century of time, which has withstood geopolitical pressures of the
Ukraine operations. The two countries continue to have common interests as they
look for a multipolar world, and support each other closely in various
multilateral fora such as the Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation (SCO), Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South
Africa (BRICS) United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) etc. While trade and
technology cooperation did take a hit with post-sanctions Russia, other
opportunities presented themselves to the benefit of both. There is much to
learn from recent geopolitical experiences of either country, even as they
steer their individual course through an uncertain world situation.
Introduction
Number ‘Six’
is a unique number in relations between India and Russia! Six times India abstained
on UN resolutions against Russia over the last one year or more, despite
pressure from the West.1 Six times the USSR used its veto to rescue
India at the UN, between 1957 and 1971. When times get difficult and uncertain,
the two nations have resolutely stood by each other against attempted isolation
at this multilateral forum.
The pandemic in 2020, military
operations in Ukraine, and heightened tensions in the Indo-Pacific Region have
made the last three years tumultuous. Vaccine ‘apartheid’ during the Covid
pandemic shook the faith of the Global South in its hopes to receive any
support by developed nations of the Global North. Indeed, the chimera of global
equality and equitable growth opportunities has faded. Human rights as a
diplomatic pressure tool, to be used selectively, is now recognised as a skewed
approach to international relations even as the debate on alternate forms of
governance deepens. Weaponisation of economies has permanently altered the,
so-called, inevitable path to an inter-dependent globalised trade system.
Bretton Woods institutions are seemingly powerless, weakly manoeuvring their
way through great power contestation in obvious attempts to survive or remain
relevant. Seemingly robust global supply chains have been suddenly disrupted,
with nations scrambling to ‘de-risk’ and improve resilience in trade
strategies. The current global order is in the throes of a long-drawn process
of re-ordering, as all nations, big or small, re-evaluate their positions in
realigned groups. Yet, uncertain times throw up big opportunities; and strong
relationships get an opportunity to grow. Will Russian and Indian relations
enter a phase of re-evaluation towards growth, or fall into ferment? Time alone
will tell.
President Putin visited India in Oct
2000, when India and Russia signed the declaration of ‘Strategic Partnership’,
enhancing levels of cooperation in ‘almost all areas of the bilateral
relationship’ viz., political, security, defence, trade and economy, science
and technology, and culture.2 In 2010, it was elevated to ‘Special and Privileged
Strategic Partnership’. Ukraine has put this relationship to test, and India
has proved to be a staunch support to Russia, even as it believes that
boundaries between nations need to be respected and issues resolved by other
means. Prime Minister Modi’s statement that “today is not the era of war” needs
to be seen in this context.
Multipolar
World Order
There
is a notable convergence on the pressing need to usher in a multi-polar world
order which allows a say to other major global powers, and emerging players
despite being part of the Global South. The containment strategy of proxy
players in Ukraine against Russia, has, in the short term, succeeded in
unifying Europe, increasing its expenditure on developing defence capabilities
with greater contribution to the NATO coffers. This may not last over the long
term, as many of them could return to depend on Russian resources and energy
supplies, even if indirectly. However, the crisis and broad swathe of sanctions
by the West, and its allies, are bound to take its toll on the Russian economy
and military. As Russia turns its focus to Eurasia, the ‘heartland’ and its
Asian partners offer opportunity.3
The US and its western allies view India
as a balancer in the Indo-Pacific, creating an alternate power centre to China
in a regional context, and wish to see its involvement in a possible military
confrontation. While India is in the process of resolving its border issues
with China, it perceives its national interest to keep away from any direct
military confrontations over Taiwan or the South China Sea (SCS). Border issues
with China are being dealt under bilateral arrangements.
Multi-lateral
Fora
Apart
from the strongly institutionalised interaction between them, Russia and India
also participate in a number of larger groupings; most intimately at the
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), grouping of Brazil, Russia, India,
China, and South Africa (BRICS) and the Russia-India-China (RIC). A number of
points of convergence emerge between the two nations as elaborated below:
n SCO.
This has huge implications on trade possibilities in Eurasia. Under its aegis,
the North South Corridor from Moscow to Mumbai, International North–South
Transport Corridor and Vladivostok-Chennai Sea Link, if operationalised,
present possibilities as emerging ‘corridors of prosperity’. The SCO also
enables India to raise anti-terrorism issues, which sooner than later affect
all participants. Days ago, in May 2023, at the Foreign Minister’s meet in Goa,
Mr Jaishankar, India’s Foreign Minister, reminded the members that terror was
one of the original mandates of the SCO and that ‘state actors cannot be
allowed to hide behind non-state actors’- directly alluding to Pakistan.4 A collective approach would be beneficial to
all members, rather than opportunistic leveraging of this double-edged sword by
countries, like China, who turn a blind eye to epicentres of terror in Asia. A
common anti-terror agenda is inevitable if these groupings are to engage in
meaningful interaction.
n BRICS.
This is a vibrant grouping in which all five states are also members of the G20
grouping. Representing 41.5 per cent of the global population, and 32.5 per
cent of global GDP (PPP), it is the closest rival to the G7, now seeking to
represent the voice of developing nations. After the first formal summit held
in Yekaterinburg in 2009, the idea of a new global reserve currency was mooted,
resulting in a fall in the value of the dollar. The current refrain of
‘de-dollarisation’ is bound to have a similar impact, although contemplating a
de-coupling from the dollar in the mid-term is not practical. However, unprecedented
sanctions against Russia and weaponisation of the dollar has exacerbated the
need to reduce dependency on a single reserve currency. BRICS nations did focus
on the issue during the summit in South Africa in Aug 2023. 19 countries had
expressed their desire to join the BRICS, out of which six were inducted during
the Aug summit. Clear guidelines were to be followed to ensure coherence in the
group.5
n RIC.
While SCO and BRICS have gained traction, RIC has languished, mainly due to
divergences between India and China on their border issues. The recent SCO meet
was also an opportunity for the foreign and defence ministers of India and
China to meet on the sidelines. The Chinese side sought to project the border
situation as ‘generally stable’, and that everything else could continue
between the two countries. India, however, categorically stated that the border
situation was ‘abnormal’ and countered that until the disengagement process is
carried forward, and peace and tranquillity remain disturbed, other activities
cannot be considered under the pretence of normalcy. China’s possible strategy
to bleed the economy of India and tire out its army by enforced deployments
along its 3,500 km long Line of Actual Control (border) over prolonged periods
(akin to the breakup of the USSR) is not only misplaced but also
counterproductive. In its current predicament caused by the Ukraine crisis and
broad swathe of sanctions by the West, Moscow is already being shown as
‘Beijing’s junior partner’ seeking economic and, possibly, military assistance.
Russia, as the third player in this trilateral, has a weighty role to play in
pressing upon the two sides to resolve issues bilaterally, in the larger
interest of RIC becoming a Eurasian multi-pole. This is predicated to the understanding
that ‘all three players in this trilateral enjoy equal status’. China needs to
understand that any perceived tilt of India towards the US, by joining the
QUAD, does not guarantee India’s military participation in the SCS. India is
acutely cognisant, as are South Korea and Japan, that they do not wish to be
the next Ukraine-like proxy of any power struggle over Taiwan in the
Indo-Pacific.
Trade
and Technology
Currently
the fifth largest globally, the Indian economy, with a projected annual growth
rate of about 6 per cent, is likely to be the third largest by 2030 as per an
Ernst & Young Report of January 2023; even as fears of recession loom over
other major economies. India is not only
digitally enabled across its 1.4 bn population, it is now poised to be a
manufacturing powerhouse in the next few years, as the ‘Make in India’ policy
is enforced. Its internal demand is enough to drive growth and sustain the
economy. Two thirds of India’s energy consumption will come from renewable
sources by 2030. Massive investment opportunities await those who do business
with India.
Western businesses have aggressively
begun to look for joint ventures and co-production arrangements. Russia has
traditionally been India’s biggest defence equipment supplier. Earlier pegged
at 68 per cent, it is now down to around 59 per cent and likely to go lower
unless delayed deliveries are expedited despite the Ukraine crisis. In keeping
with government policy, Indian defence industry is looking for self-reliance,
banking on technology transfers, collaborative R&D (such as the Brahmos
missile), and co-development and co-production in state of art technologies.
Dependence on any one country is not an option. Economic interests coupled with
geostrategic convergences will define its path. France and the US are possible
technology and manufacturing partners, provided their overtures to India are
sincere. Yet, Russia must note that India is a proven reliable long-term
partner in maintaining Intellectual property
(IP) and technology transfer arrangements, and must be trusted. Cooperation in
licensed production and co-development has been fruitful.6 Brahmos missiles, nuclear power generation, T
series tanks, frigates and corvettes, fighter aircraft etc., are good examples
but these now need to be taken to the next level of collaborative R&D in
state of art technologies such as the fifth-generation stealth aircraft and
frigates, metallurgy, high performance engines, air independent propulsion
technologies for naval vessels and the like.
Russian and Indian business have reached
out to each other, but working arrangements and some changes in law need to be
streamlined before trade gets a substantial boost. There is a need to find a
faster mechanism to synergise Russian and Indian requirements. the old slow processes enshrined in the
India Russia Inter governmental Commission for Trade, Economic, Scientific
& Cultural Cooperation and Military Technical Cooperation need to be
revised and made more business friendly and agile. Should there be any delays
in these processes, the close defence dependence relationship will drift apart
as India will be forced to maintain its operational readiness by falling back
on alternative sources available with the West.
Currency
Issues
like the rupee-rouble trade arrangement need to be
addressed. While India benefits from the low cost of oil from Russia, the
latter benefits by earning revenue despite the sanctions regime. Even as the
balance of trade is tilted towards Russia, it needs to consider investing the same
rupee back into Indian companies
to establish a win-win paradigm. Mr Lavrov, Russia’s Foreign Minister, is on
record in the Indian press, during the SCO meet in Goa, that Russia has little
use for the rupees accumulated
due to the sale of oil to India over the last year. Solutions to this lie in
encouraging Russian business investments in India, and benefitting from their
export to Russia to offset the trade imbalance, or exporting to third countries
and sharing profits in those alternate currencies. Indian business could be
encouraged and incentivised to cater to Russia’s specific import requirements,
to reduce the trade imbalance, putting the rupee
surplus with Russia to good use.7 This could also be done by re-balancing trade
or goods imported from other countries currently. Trust and goodwill are great
instruments to maintain the value of relationships and mutual interests between
friendly nations, through innovative solutions.
It may be quite some time before a
common BRICS currency is floated, duly counter-weighted against their
five-member country currencies. The proposal to trade in each other’s
currencies at the earliest may be feasible and holds merit. It is to be
understood that the dollar is not going away as a reserve currency for a while,
but creating a blockchain based common currency may be feasible in the
medium-term.
Reviewed
Nuclear Deterrence
The
Ukraine crisis has changed the existing nuclear deterrence paradigm. Forward
deployments of weaponised vectors on the western borders of Russia have
drastically reduced reaction times and raised the chances of a nuclear
conflagration, re-starting the nuclear arms race, and raising the spectre of
use of tactical nukes and dirty bombs.8 Its implications have been felt not only in
Europe but also in the Indo-Pacific, as Western allies review the efficacy of
the US umbrella, and their stakes in a possible armed conflict over Taiwan. A
survey in South Korea, almost a referendum, reflects the mood of the
people-almost 70 per cent of the youth feel the need to develop an indigenous
nuclear deterrence program. India faces two nuclear armed neighbours as well
and has much to learn from the experiences of its partners. Intelligence
sharing over safety of nuclear assets in other countries would create greater
levels of confidence and build deterrence capabilities.
Conclusion
Russia
and India share a strategic relationship built on trust over a period of time.
The current uncertain times call for strong efforts to retain this trust and
build pathways to take forward the mutually beneficial relationship to a new
level.
Endnotes
1 Mitra D, 2023, “For the 6th time,
India abstains on a resolution on Ukraine at UNGA”, The Wire, 24 February 2023, https://thewire.in/diplomacy/india-abstains-ukraine-united-nations-unga-resolution
2 MEA Release October 2000,
https://www.mea.gov.in/Images/pdf/Decleration StrategicPartnership.pdf
3 Trenin Dimitri, 2017, “Russia and Grand
Eurasia”, Horizons: Journal of International Relations and Sustainable
Development, No. 9, WINDS OF CHANGE (AUTUMN 2017), pp. 106-119 (14 pages)
Published By: Center for International Relations and Sustainable Development
4 Jaishankar s, 2023, “Jaishankar talks tough on
terror at SCO Summit”, The Hindu,
https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/jaishankar-talks-tough-on-terror-at-sco-summit-with-bilawal-bhutto-in-attendance/article66815608.
ece
5 Zhang Xiaoyu, 2023, Global Times, “BRICS
expansion shows Global South’s quest for development, political autonomy”,
Published: Aug 27, 2023
6 Indian Embassy in Moscow Release, 2022, “Bilateral Relations: India-Russia
Relations”,
https://indianembassy-moscow.gov.in/india-russia-defence-cooperation.php
7 Wion News Edited By: Shashwat Sankranti,
Updated: Sep 13, 2023, “India to offer Russia to invest trapped rupees: Sergey
Lavrov”, https://www.
wionews.com/business-economy/india-to-offer-russia-to-invest-trapped-rupees-serei-lavrov-634749
8 Lidia Kelly and Andrew Osborn, “Belarus starts
taking delivery of Russian nuclear weapons”,
Reuters June 14, 2023,
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/belarus-has-started-taking-delivery-russian-tactical-nuclear-weapons-president-2023-06-14
@Major General (Dr)
Pawan Anand, AVSM (Retd) has operated Russian equipment in the army, done
international procurements and been a member of the IRIGC-TEC. A Gold Medallist
from NDA and Sword of Honour from IMA, he is a qualified Mechanical Engineer,
Double Masters in Strategic Studies and Management, a PhD, and has several
publications to his credit. He is
currently a Distinguished Fellow with the USI of India, and a Mentor at the
National Defence College.
This
is an updated version of the article first published by the prestigious Valdai
Discussion Club, as an Opinion Piece in May 2023.
Journal of the United Service Institution
of India, Vol. CLIII, No. 633,
July-September 2023.