Abstract
The ‘Make in India’
initiative was launched by the Indian government to make India self-reliant in
major weapon platforms. A number of enabling provisions were rolled out to
provide the desired traction to Atma Nirbhar Bharat. An analysis of the ground
covered indicates that systems reaching a stage of maturity are primarily those
on which Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has put in
sustained effort over a period. Platforms that are at various stages of
induction are those having substantial, at times more than 50 per cent import
content. This is bound to create critical vulnerabilities in any prolonged
conflict. In pursuit of new acquisitions, the Do Nothing Syndrome for legacy
systems aggravates conventional readiness, ushers hollowness, and puts the
defence budget into a tailspin. The army ends up possessing thousands of
platforms but only a fraction is truly fully mission capable.
The grave
consequences of employing such legacy platforms in the war in Ukraine are there
to see and have thrown up important lessons. In 1973, during the Yom Kippur war
too, initial setbacks suffered were a big learning experience for Israel which
set out to achieve self-reliance. Half a century later, it figures amongst the
top 10 exporters of arms in the world. India too needs to evolve a strategy to
accelerate self-reliance. Achieving technological parity with China by 2045, or
earlier, should be the under pinning philosophy of this strategy. Such a goal
can provide technology security to India besides enhancing strategic assurance
and influence amongst friendly foreign nations. The article gives out a road
map to accelerate self-reliance, making the ‘Make in India’, a truly global
brand in the stride.
Background
It has been
a while since the Make in India policy was launched by the govt to make India self-reliant
in major weapon systems. A number of initiatives were rolled out to provide the
desired traction to Atma Nirbhar Bharat; the promulgation of the Indigenisation
lists, Innovation for Defence
Excellence (IDEX), supporting pole-vaulting in Research & Development
(R&D) through innovations for
defence excellence for developing
niche technologies. There is also the provision of Technology
Development Fund (TDF) under DRDO for upgrades, incubating game changing
technologies and providing a firm base for self-reliance in weapon platforms.
However, an analysis of the ground covered indicates that systems reaching a stage of maturity are primarily
those on which DRDO has put in sustained
efforts over a period ; like missiles, helicopters, marine vessels, fighter
aircraft, combat bridges, towed gun system, etc. Nothing concrete seems to have
emerged from the industry, either in niche or foundational technologies or
conventional hardware. Whatever platforms are at various stages of induction,
incorporate substantial, at times more than 50 per cent import content at
hardware and software level. This is bound to create critical vulnerabilities
in any prolonged conflict.
Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute has ranked India as the largest importer in the world for the period
2018-2022, accounting for 11 per cent of the imports, followed by Saudi Arabia
at 9.6 per cent.1 Russia, France, and the US are the largest
suppliers to India, accounting for 85 per cent of the imports. The implication
of this large import dependence on structural readiness and military
effectiveness is not difficult to visualise; a huge outflow of capital for life
cycle sustainment, the absence of which will push the military towards
hollowness i.e., tanks, guns, missiles, radars, and soldier systems without
skilled personnel and spare parts to keep them running, giving appearance of
readiness when in fact the capability is really not there. Add to this, the
large scale battlefield attrition seen in the war in east Europe and one can
visualise the rapid degradation of combat power with each passing day of wars
in the future. Responsive industrial and maintenance surge will be essential
for operational effectiveness. Traditionally, sustainment readiness issues find
few takers in the army where the thrust is more on acquisition of new gadgets.
Engineering support remains firmly positioned on the back burners, a third
class activity behind logistics (rations, general stores, ammunition). Lately,
emergency procurement has kicked in, adding to complexity and diversity of
equipment. Its impact on operational effectiveness remains a moot question.
Speaking at the India Today Conclave,
the Chief of Army Staff (COAS), when asked about the major lessons that have
emerged from the ongoing conflict in east Europe, stated that the significance
of hard power has been reinforced and land warfare remains the decisive domain
in our context. The duration of wars will no longer be short and swift as war
could be prolonged by the adversary, spanning multiple domains. Hence the
importance of self-reliance to support the war effort. These observations from
the COAS should initiate a rejig in the manner the army handles its acquisition
to turbocharge army‘s capability development initiatives and consolidate
strategic readiness. Traditionally, acquisitions have been based on first-past-the-post
principle. Given the complex acquisition procedure and stringent QRs, new
acquisitions often get delayed, inservice platforms await reset and backlogs
spiral.
The
Capability Problem
In
the never ending race for new acquisitions, budgetary support for Maintenance,
Repair and Organisation infrastructure and resources has become scarce, so much
that serious equipment capability gaps surface due to technological
obsolescence. Operationally, these gaps
need to be plugged immediately through technology insertion. Absence of
indigenous innovation,and dependance on foreign supply chains for upgrades and
spare parts leads to cost and time overruns. Such defence thinking results in a
‘Do Nothing Syndrome’, which aggravates conventional readiness, ushers
hollowness, and puts defence budget into a tailspin. The army ends up
possessing a fleet of thousands of platforms but only a fraction are mission
capable. Figure 1 illustrates the expanding capability gap with time.
Figure 1
The grave consequence of such hollowness
is visible in the war in Ukraine which has thrown up important lessons. The
most significant lesson is that readiness is a complex attribute that
dissipates with time. It cannot be taken as a constant factor. Skills and
competencies are lost due to move of personnel and early retirement while
platforms become unreliable with age and usage. Even if platforms are taken out
from deep freeze (preservation and mothballing), their performance cannot be
assured, without painstaking engineering support before and during combat.
Mechanical failures and heavy attrition grounded the Russian advance to Kiev.
The Russian military lost its reputation as an invincible fighting machine,
despite large no of platforms and huge stockpiles of ammunition. Malfunctioning
platforms and attrition caused by drones, precision fires, and Special Forces
denuded its combatpower. Ukraine has suffered heavily in terms of military
hardware, destruction of powerand communication infrastructure, industrial
base, roads, and human lives. This has seriously impacted its operational
readiness for the long haul. Being short on industrial and maintenance surge,
it has barely sustained a readiness rate of 50 per cent.
Since a large portion of the army‘s
inventory specially the big four or five platforms is of Russian origin, it is
important to review the performance of these weapons and identify critical
vulnerabilities. This will enable a holistic assessment of equipment capability
gaps and resilience of formations for long drawn operations. In this war in east Europe, demand for ammunition,
complex platforms and spare parts has far outstripped the industrial capacity
of both the warring sides, and their allies.
Equipment
Performance and Force Regeneration
One
factor that stands out clearly is that weapons designed to meet the doctrinal
needs of any nation cannot be employed as such in any other operational
environment. Knowledge of platform vulnerabilities by the adversary could
enable exploitation of such gaps by
launching a surprise, as was achieved by Ukraine in the destruction
of Russian warship Moskva and large no
of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles,
Infantry Carrier Vehicles (ICVs), guns, and combat vehicles. This is the
foremost reason for India to put defence self-reliance in the overdrive, since
PLA has deep insights into the technologies behind Russian systems and has established a versatile Defence Industrial
Base (DIB) that has rolled out state of the art
bespoke platforms using a mix of Russian and western technologies. It
has emerged as the fourth largest arms exporter cornering 5.2 per cent of the
global arms trade. It, thus, possesses the industrial capability to rapidly
transform into a war economy to support long duration conflicts.
According to Oryx, a Dutch Open-Source
Intelligence defence analysis website, and media reports, Russian forces have
suffered very heavy attrition. Around 1500 tanks were destroyed and 440
captured of which approximately. 160 tanks were damaged or abandoned which
could have been recycled with forward repairs. Around 60 per cent of artillery
guns were damaged. Total losses of other combat vehicles were close to 4000. It
is estimated that 50 per cent platforms could have been regenerated with close
engineering support, as drone attacks, missiles and other shoulder fired
weapons normally immobilise platforms. Despite these losses, Russia‘s
investment in Strategic Readiness (SR) and industrial resilience has placed it
in a relatively stronger position to thwart the Ukrainian counter offensive.1 SR
in military terms is the ability to architect, manufacture, maintain, and
balance combat capabilities to provide an operational overreach to the military
across multiple domains. It flows out of Comprehensive National Power (CNP)
which is a composite measure of economic, demographic, military, diplomatic,
industrial and technological capabilities.
An important finding is that performance
benchmarks of equipment achieved during combat operations were sub par, leading
to frequent malfunctions and low usage rates. This issue assumes critical
importance in our context where platforms are being deployed in much harsher
terrain and weather conditions that adversely impact residual useful life and
performance. Hence the need to not only preserve equipment capability but also
to evolve quantifiable metrics of performance for regular measurement of
operational readiness rates. This will enable the army to be forearmed for
intensive, long drawn combat operations. Akin to the feat accomplished by
Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) during Yom Kippur War, force regeneration at the
Line of Actual Control could emerge as a significant combat enabler, hence, the
need for self-reliance and industrial resilience.
Israel‘s
Shift to Self-Reliance
In
1973, IDF were struck by a massive strategic surprise which sent them
scrambling to hold back the Arab military, both in Sinai and Golan Heights.
Israeli armour, that moved out to launch counter attacks, was met with swarms
of infantry operated anti-tank guided missiles. Israeli losses were so
staggering and it shook its military to the core. In first three day of the war
IDF had lost 400 tanks and 44 aircraft that rose to 109 by the end of the war.
All in all, IDF had 840 damaged tanks. Half of these were fixed and returned
back into action. Of the 236 aircraft that were damaged, 215 were repaired and
returned in a week. Such rapid was the dissipation of combat power that Israel
had to turn to the US for supply of fighters, tanks, armoured personnel carrier
and artillery pieces.2
This setback was a big learning
experience for Israel, which set out to achieve self-reliance from the very
next year. Half a century later, it has not only secured itself with an Iron
Dome but also figures amongst the top 10 exporters of arms in the world. A
remarkable achievement! This impressive journey has been made possible due to
consistent support of government and effective technical leadership of the IDF.
Growth of defence industry was achieved by a blend of imported technology and
Israeli innovation courtesy domestic and foreign firms. A well planned and
efficient government intervention
facilitated establishment of a versatile DIB and emergence of
government-owned conglomerates like Israel Military Industries, Israeli
Aerospace industries, Rafael
Advanced Defence Systems, along with a host of
private companies. A focussed R&D funding programme providing up to
66 per cent match by government for innovative projects, with no repayment requirements,
accelerating the process. Former IDF members provided knowledge leadershipin
pushing innovations into the development pipeline. Israel‘s trailblazing of
this difficult course has created the Tel Aviv Haifa Information And
Communication Technology (ICT) Corridor (Figure 2); an outstanding example of
how government support, hand holding by the military, and a collaborative
culture can make the dream of
self-reliance a reality.3
Figure 2 : Tel Aviv
Haifa ICT Corridor
Indian
Defence Industrial Base
A
unique advantage of the Indian industry is that it is modern, matching global
standards of manufacturing with adequate availability of local talent. However,
indigenous innovation and creativity leaves much to be desired. Supply chains
too are dependent on foreign sources for materials and lack capability and
capacity. A host of in service platforms, rolled out under Transfer of
Technology (TOT) from the government owned DIB are still dependant on foreign
Original Equipment Manufacturers for critical spare parts. This can put the
military on backfoot in case of hostilities. The country has capabilities to
design and manufacture complex platforms like fighters, helicopters, howitzers,
and aircraft carriers. Some very niche industrial capabilities have been
created in private sector like low earth orbit satellites, unmanned systems,
payloads and munitions. However, the performance has been achieved mostly using
foreign foundational systems like propulsion, navigation, sensors, aviation
suite, weapons, etc. This is a vital industrial capability gap. Localisation of
4000 odd components has reduced imports from 46 per cent to 36 per cent, but
serious efforts have to be made beyond these lists towards generic,
foundational and game changing technologies. It can be done by providing conditions
that enable our youth to innovate ahead of the world.
To achieve this, private enterprises
need to join not as competitors but as partners. If more than 50 per cent of
the sub systems for Tejas or Arjun or Vikrant are ex-import, it is important to
shift focus to indigenisation of sub systems alongside components, using the
enormous intellectual firepower of our youth and Non-Resident Indians. TDF/IDEX
initiative should provide mission oriented funding for projects that seek to
address technological capability gaps. Government backed venture funds and
recruitment of overseas talent could be considered. The aim should be to
manufacture next generation platforms with locally developed foundational
systems and generic technologies. A strong DIB can help achieve this. The US
military has always been supported by very high levels of technology that has
increased its mobilisation readiness and resilience. This has been possible
because of its versatile Military Industrial Complex.
Eco
System of DIB
A
calibrated development of DIB is essential to achieve self-reliance. It cannot
be left to evolve on market forces else the end result may be half baked as has
happened with a number of free trades zones and high tech parks. It needs to be
scripted according to a planwith pre-defined milestones.The DIB comprises:
n Prime Contractor or Systems
Integrator. An entity with industrial capability to deliver a complex
system or product like an armoured fighting vehicle, ship, or aircraft.
It requires high grade systems engineering skills, processes and tools to
integrate a complex system and testing facilities to test and prove system
functionalities.
n Partial System Manufacturer. These
manufacture independent systems which can work in a standalone mode or become
relevant when integrated to a platform e.g., air defence missile, radar.
n Sub-System Manufacturer. These
are specialist’s outfits that manufacture systems and foundational modules like
mobility, fire power, survivability; which give a capability only when integrated
with the platform e.g., a power pack, or aero engine.
n Component and Aggregate Manufacturers. These
entities, generally Micro, Small & Medium Enterprises (MSMEs), provide
finished assemblies/aggregates/Line Replaceable Units which form part of a
sub-system/system e.g. engine parts, printed circuit board, power supplies,
harnesses, etc.
n Design Houses. These are
knowledge based organisations (Design Authority) with unique systems
engineering skills, a suite of modern modelling & simulation processes and
tools and facilities to test & prove at system/sub-system level. They
pick up sub-contracts from prime SIs for designing/testing of system and have
specialists who have deep insights into all levels of engineering of the system
as a whole.
n Anchor Institutions. These provide
finance from research grants to promote technological innovation and
collaboration. They provide consulting, mentoring, lab testing, and TOT to move
an innovation into the manufacturing pipeline. Anchor institutions like Category A establishments of the military,
IITs, NITs have to encourage a culture of collaboration between the military,
industry, and research institutes to enable creation of technology incubators
and accelerators.4
Underpinning
Philosophy
In
order to achieve self-reliance in defence – a massive but achievable objective,
it is important to lay down a guiding philosophy. The fundamental approach has
to be spelt out alongside the end state to be achieved and resources to be made
available. China was in near similar condition as India during the 70s,
dependant on vintage platforms being manufactured under technology transfer
from the then Soviet Union. The Chinese adopted the strategy of Introduce,
Digest, Absorb and Re-innovate (IDAR) by on-boarding current technologies into
legacy systems and developing weapons de-novo. Technology gaps were filled
through import and joint ventures. This enabled them to transform their
military and become a leading exporter of arms. Besides an enduring military
capability, a vibrant DIB offers a number of advantages like strategic
assurance, and influence, and civilian spin offs of technology. In the light of
the above, how does India embark on its journey of self-reliance? Achieving
technological parity with China could be the kernel of this philosophy. It is
time to recalibrate the entire approach to self-reliance focussing on this end
state.
Indian
Development Strategy
I
propose a development strategy centred on system effectiveness i.e., capability
of platforms to accomplish stipulated missions in our operational environment.
Development of new platforms may take several years. hence, to retain military effectiveness; on-boarding of new
technologies in legacy platforms to make this future ready and coverinterim
risks, is indispensable. Such Capability Enhancement Programmes also fuel
innovation and invigorate MSMEs. The corner stone of this strategy has to be a
commitment by all stakeholders to the self-reliance call by the Prime Minister,
hand holding of the industry, giving access to current technologies and
platforms, experimentation, testing, course correction and retesting. A large
portion of Israel’s ICT achievements have been attributed to its hi–tech Unit
8200 that played a key role in providing advanced training and high quality
technical support. DRDO and technical establishments of the military could
provide the much needed facilitation to the industry to build up foundational
know how to innovate and rebuild. This is the crux of what ails the indigenous
innovation system –knowledge sharing; a reluctance of government entities to
share tacit and pragmatic knowledge and assist industry in experimentation and
trials. It is only through a collaborative stance that local platforms will
achieve system maturity to enable the military to out manoeuvre the adversary.
Strategic
Planfor Self-Reliance
In
order to achieve self-reliance and technological parity with the adversary, a
long term view encompassing two to three decades becomes necessary. We should
aim to achieve comprehensive technology security in the region by 2045. All
activities have to take place under an overarching national strategy to
optimise resources. The tremendous potential of
game-changing technologies requires long term investment and consistent support by the
government with a robust collaboration between the military and leading edge
innovators. The following action plan
could help channelize the nation‘s
strengths towards this goal.
Short
Term (2023- 2035). This
could be a decade of knowledge consolidation, creativity, and collaboration to
achieve self-sufficiency in foundational systems, generic technologies, and
energetics that are essential to build platforms and munitions ground up. It
could be through indigenous innovation and foreign collaboration using the
technology insertion route. The US-India initiative on critical and emerging
technologies can assist in the development of generic and radical technologies.
Concomitantly, we need to establish world class system architecting, system
engineering and life cycle system management skills and competencies. This will
facilitate design and development of bespoke weapon platforms optimised for our
operational requirements. Like the Production Linked Incentive scheme in
manufacturing, the government could consider technology linked incentives for
companies coming forward to develop foundational and game changing
technologies.
Long
Term (upto 2045).
Aim at building ground up next generation combat systems for the military and
export market, powered by indigenous innovation and foundational systems. Our
weapon platforms should be able to out perform foreign designs and be
affordable. A sustainable military capability resting on technological parity
and technological dominance in some domains like cyber, electronic warfare,
space, directed energy, energetics and munitions, advanced materials, etc. is
sine qua non for India to be truly secure from external threats. End state 2045
should aim at providing all-encompassing technology security to Mother India
and a distinctive rise in our CNP. This would ramp up strategic readiness in
all domains.
Conclusion
To
become truly self-reliant in defence manufacturing, it is essential to
recalibrate our gunsights, aim long term and stage forward in a calibrated,
surefooted manner. The war in Ukraine has placed mass and technology on equal
footing. The emerging threats in the sub-continent where war could open up on
multiple fronts and domains, military effectiveness requires the military to be
ready for operations over long durations. This will be feasible only if major
platforms are designed and manufactured within the country, alongside a
localised supply chain that canguarantee the depth to absorb losses and
continue combat operations. Industrial and maintenance surge will provide the
staying power and resilience and inhibit fighting forces from degenerating and
fighting employing technological capital of World War II. We have to look at a
fine the balance between combat usefulness, cost, and complexity of
technologies. As we approach 100 years of Independence, it would be a befitting
tribute to our freedom fighters if the goal of self-reliance is not only
achieved but recognized worldwide by making the proud ‘Make in India’ brand, a
truly globalbrand.
Endnotes
1 India
world’s top arms importer in 2018-2022:
SIPRI,https://imrmedia.in/india-worlds-top-arms-importer-in-2018-2022-sipri/
2 https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html
3 “Taking a Look under the Hood… The October War
and What Maintenance Approaches Reveal about Military Operations”, Colonel
James S. Powell, U.S. Army LAND WARFARE PAPER 128 / August 2019
4 “Creating an Innovation System for Knowledge
City”, Shanthi Nataraj, Howard J. Shatz, Keith Crane, Steven W.
Popper, Xiao Wang, Chaoling Feng, RAND technical report series 2012
5 “Engineering an Innovation System for Defence
Industrial Corridors“, Lt Gen N B Singh, South Asia Defence Strategic Review,
Sep- Oct 2021
@Lieutenant General
NB Singh, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd) is a former DGEME, DGIS and Member Armed
Forces Tribunal. He regularly writes on technology related operational
subjects, space, and green energy initiatives.
Journal
of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CLIII,
No. 633, July-September 2023.