Abstract
Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul
(MRO) set up in the Indian Defence Forces is responsible for rendering
engineering support to the widest possible inventory of military weapon
systems/platforms/equipment with multidisciplinary state-of-the-art
technologies, albeit on an individual Service basis. Over the years, there has been limited
modernisation and automation while the systems and processes have largely
remained static. In future, apart from the shortage of
assemblies/modules/spares for equipment of foreign origin, the system is likely
to face even greater challenges with higher resource constraints on the
horizon. In order to retain/enhance the existing levels of Equipment Readiness
and Mission Reliability, it is felt that re-imagining/total restructuring of
the MRO set up will be required.
Introduction
Over the last two decades, militaries the world over have been swept over by the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), predicated by the rapid advances in technology which have altered the Doctrines and Tactics of war fighting. The transformation has gathered further steam with the lessons learnt from more than a year-old Russia – Ukraine conflict. Technology has also led to ‘Revolution in Logistics’ involving supply chains and military inventories. However, a generation of technology has passed by (at least two decades or ‘Techades’) without touching the military Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul (MRO), at least in the Indian context. The only change has been manpower optimisation (there have been several rounds) with an objective to improve the teeth to tail ratio. Even the Committee of Experts (Shekatkar Committee) has ended up only optimising manpower with its recommendations on Corporatisation yet to gain traction. The in-house initiatives for modernisation and technology insertion in repair/overhaul set up haven’t found adequate support. Although, all appears well on the equipment availability front in defence, the professionals know that the problems of MRO are getting exacerbated and will now need to be tackled on a war footing if the defence forces have to achieve equipment readiness desired for operations. The urgency also stems from a couple of major triggers which have emerged over the last few years, which when analysed will make it clear that now is the time for transformative changes in MRO, incremental changes will not suffice.
Triggers
for Transformative Changes in MRO for Defence
The
first impulse for a transformative change in MRO is the Defence Budget
itself. While in absolute figures, the
Defence Budget keeps hitting new highs every year, yet as a percentage of GDP,
it is in a secular decline over the last two decades or more. From a figure of
3.5 per cent of GDP, once upon a time in the eighties, it is down to almost 1.4
per cent of GDP (excluding pensions). Defence allocation in the latest Union
Budget 2023-24 marks a paltry1.5 per cent increase from Revised Estimates (RE)
2022-23 figures.1 It implies that in real terms, lower financial
resources are available for defence and that the Capital Budget needs a fillip.
The govt is now aptly focusing on modernisation of the Forces, increasing the
Capital expenditure while limiting the Revenue Budget. The corollary of an
increase in Capital Budget in a largely stagnant Defence Budget (real value
after inflation) is a reducing Revenue Budget, which will compress the
resources available for operational maintenance of the Forces. This is borne
out by an increase of just 3.76 per cent2 in Revenue head of Defence Budget 2023-24 over
RE 2022-23, not sufficient to even cover inflation. The salaries component of
Revenue Budget being rather inelastic and by itself contributing to almost 10
per cent annual increase, based on additional Dearness Allowance (DA) granted
by the govt, the brunt will obviously be borne by the budget allocated for MRO
(stores and repairs), impinging adversely on procurement of requisite spares,
components, and assemblies. With likelihood of continuously declining
availability of financial resources, foreseeable in future for MRO, a complete
re-think on the MRO set up is imperative now so that ‘war like equipment
readiness of forces’ is not compromised.
The next trigger for requirement of a
transformative change is the Agnipath scheme of recruitment introduced
by the govt for the Defence Forces in June 2022. The number of Agniveers
to be recruited in the balance six months of year 2022 was 46000.3 Thus, on an annual basis, the intake of Agniveers
for the three Services becomes 92000.
After completion of four years of service, “Up to 25 per cent of each
specific batch of Agniveers will be enrolled in regular cadre of the
Armed Forces”.4 The held strength of the armed
forces, uniformed personnel excluding officers, in year 2019 (pre Covid) was
13,72,666, while armed forces recruits under training were 74575.5 With the Agnipath scheme likely to
recruit 92,000 Agniveers annually, after four years, only 23000 will
become regular Sepoys/equivalent on an annual basis. This is a much lower
number than the annual intake number of regular Sepoys/equivalent hitherto fore
and will have an impact on the overall strength of the defence forces. It is
estimated, as per a quantitative model developed for Agnipath scheme,
that unless there is an increase in annual intake of Agniveers in future
(i.e., higher than 92000) or the retention percentage is enhanced from existing
25 per cent, there will be a gradual reduction in the overall strength of the
Forces. As per the current intake and retention parameters, this force
optimisation will stabilise after 20 years and the combined strength of defence
forces in 2046 will be approximately 40 per cent of the existing strength (see
Appendix at the end). Whatever be optimisation level of the Forces over next
two decades, it is reasonable to infer that manpower engaged in MRO will also
get pared proportionally. The moot question is that can the existing setup of
MRO function effectively with drastically reduced manpower but an
ever-increasing repertoire of weapon systems and equipment, or will it require
a total rethink to be future ready?
Together, the significant cuts in MRO
budget, foreseeable as of now, as well as reduction in MRO manpower present a
challenge which appears insurmountable unless it is accompanied with
transformative changes in the MRO domain. The existing set up has to be
discarded/totally reengineered and a new construct, a new lean and mean
structure, tailored to the needs of Defence 2050 has to be imagined and
gradually implemented over next 20 years. Technology insertion in military MRO
for ensuring a resource efficient system will be a sine qua non;
however, it has to be planned realistically as cutting edge technology involves
heavy upfront costs which the govt, unlike the private sector, cannot afford,
given the budgetary limitations.
Reimagining
the MRO System
The
existing legacy MRO system in Defence is characterised by an echeloned system,
manpower intensive nature, limited automation, little modernisation, inadequate
overhaul capability with perennial shortages of requisite
spares/assemblies/modules. With the fresh major constraints now getting placed
on the system, it will have to be totally restructured, if the otherwise
inevitable deterioration in overall Equipment Readiness of the Forces in future
has to be checked. In such a scenario,
where technical manpower resources availability in future may halve and MRO
budget compressed, the Theory of Constraints makes it imperative that an
altogether new MRO system is designed around the twin constraints as
incremental changes are no longer adequate. Accordingly, ten tenets of the new
system have been formulated, and are briefly enumerated below:
n Separate Tri-Service MRO Computer
Network. Automation is the key when
any organisation has to do more with less manpower. A pan India, secure, tri-Service MRO network
is going to be the backbone of the new system. It is proposed for war like
equipment only; civil end-use items like vehicles can be excluded so that the
focus is firmly on readiness of war fighting assets. The tri-Services character
will assist in pooling skills, infrastructure, and capacities for equipment
used by more than one service, such as helicopters, small arms, air defence and
communication equipment etc. The network can be suitably segmented into
separate Services and further into equipment verticals, organised into
Units/Regiments on War Establishment. A secure system is of paramount importance
and a distributed database with block chain technology with top-of-the-line
crypto algorithms like RSA need to be employed.
n War Like Equipment Centric System.
The MRO system will be centred around war like equipment; ‘Equipment Readiness’
will be the mantra and optimum ‘Mission Reliability’ will be the
objective. Each equipment will have a designated operator whose bounden duty it
will be to key in the equipment status into the MRO network on a daily/status
change basis. The formation repair echelons will also be hooked on the network.
Thus, commanders at all levels will be able to monitor the ‘Mission Capable’
status of each of their war like equipment in their jurisdiction. At the
central level, there will be an Analytics Module hooked on to MRO network and a
specialist Analytics Team which will keep a tab on equipment readiness and
mission reliability of various category of equipment. They will be responsible
for pre-empting problem areas and tendering advise to senior commanders.
n Collapsing the MRO Echelons. The
existing four echelons of repair, i.e., light, field, base, and Factory Repairs
corresponding to ‘O’, ’I’, ‘D’ and ‘FR’, have stood the test of time but in the
drastically altered scenario of severely compressed availability of resources,
the MRO echelons also need to be collapsed. Accordingly, the ‘O’ level will no
longer be manned by equipment specialists; with more tech savvy soldiers being
inducted and retained through the Agnipath scheme, it will be possible
to finally implement the User Repair Concept. Thus, effectively, there will be
only two echelons of repair ‘I’ and ‘D’/’FR’. For any assistance required in
repairs, the operator of the equipment will be able to reach out to the
equipment specialists on a help line riding on the MRO network and utilise
remote diagnostics. For training on any new modifications/technicalities, there
will be provision for Extended Reality (Virtual and Augmented) modules,
Artificial Intelligence (AI) based chat bots and digital twins for major
equipment.
n Minimal Move of Equipment for
Field/‘I’ Level Repairs.The new system will be designed to be ‘Equipment
Centric’. In a major departure from the existing system, it is envisaged that
war like equipment does not move for ‘I’ level repairs, but in-situation
‘Repair Teams’ move for the job. It is anticipated that this system will be
more cost effective, enable focused use of equipment specialists and have
higher user satisfaction. The only exception is when the equipment requires
special infrastructure (i.e., clean rooms, jigs and fixtures etc.), in which
case the equipment is transported to the nearest Equipment Specialist
Workshop/Facility. For ‘D’ level repairs/overhaul, the existing system
continues.
n Pool of Equipment Specialists. The
Formation Engineering Support Units will hold a pool of equipment specialists
as per the formation equipment profile. They will be responsible for in-situ
repairs as also repairs of equipment transported to the Engineering Support
Unit. In case of shortfall of this manpower during peace time functioning,
equipment specialists from neighbouring or higher echelons will be summoned.
However, during operations, the formation affiliations of this manpower will be
ensured.
n Greenfield Private Sector Projects for
Augmenting Capability of ‘D’ Level. There is a need to ensure that there is
no backlog of Recapitalisation of major war fighting equipment which has a
direct bearing on combat potential of the Forces. In the simplest analysis, the
national capability for ‘D’ level repair needs to be enhanced since the
existing tri-Services set ups cannot liquidate the backlog with existing
capacities, even if requisite assemblies/modules are made available. The
defence Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) also have their capacity and
resource constraints. Financial crunch prevents expansion of capacities of this
Defence Industrial Complex in the govt sector; thus, the only rational
alternative is to encourage private industry to establish greenfield projects
in order to augment national capacity of ‘D’ level repairs/Recapitalisation in
various equipment domains. Although, the industry does not have any ready
expertise in overhaul of complex weapon systems and platforms, yet, they have
the flexibility of speedily entering into collaboration with foreign Original
Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) for training, technology transfer, and
procurement of requisite spares. Ultimately, the aim should be to have a
healthy mix of intrinsic in-house defence capability and private sector
enterprise so that under no circumstances, war time requirements are
compromised while ensuring most efficient utilisation of limited financial
resources.
n Manufacture/Indigenisation of
Spares/Modules by Private Industry. Availability of components of
weapons/equipment of foreign origin is a major constraint in existing capacity
utilisation. The defence PSUs, responsible for supply of such spares, have
developed a vendor eco-system, in addition to their intrinsic capacities, but
are still unable to meet the demand. Still, many items have to be imported
which causes outgo of foreign exchange as well as time penalty. In recent
years, govt has encouraged private sector and Micro, Small and Medium
Enterprises (MSMEs) to meet the shortfall. However, for giving a mega boost to
indigenisation and manufacture of such assemblies/modules, much more needs to
be done, including separate procedures in the Defence Acquisition System,
especially for revenue procurements. This, by itself, merits separate detailed
deliberations.
n Modernisation of MRO Infrastructure. Repeated
attempts in the past to modernise the MRO infrastructure have met with limited
success due to the resource crunch and the consequent lower priority being
accorded. However, it needs to be realised that, beyond a point, antiquated set
up has an adverse impact on output as well as quality and is
counter-productive. The argument is only for outcome-based modernisation of MRO
infrastructure in the initial phase and not straightaway aiming for the latest
technology like ubiquitous IoT based sensors and AI for predictive maintenance,
which has very high upfront costs for pan India deployment which the govt can
ill afford. For the same reason, even introduction of Enterprise Resource
Planning (ERP) based systems may be planned for subsequent phases while the MRO
system is hooked on a tri-Service network with central analytics, as outlined
earlier.
n Inventory Support by Logisticians.
While the three Services have made progress in recent years in computerising
the inventory control systems, the same need to be reconfigured in consonance
with the tenets of the new MRO system. Primarily, there has to be a paradigm
shift in three dimensions. Firstly, change to a Push System, shifting the onus
of delivery, wherein, the requisite items, based on a demand originating from
computerised network, are delivered directly to the Air Base/Ship/Unit or at
least the Formation HQ in case of far-flung deployment. Secondly, the speed of
delivery for at least the critical items, which are available, could be fixed, say
48 hours (except remote areas), using all available means of conveyance
(including private couriers) and drones. And, thirdly, the supply chains have
to be configured for non-linear, non-hierarchical modes of operation based on
the most economic model. Given these three terms of reference, the logisticians
should be asked to propose a reorganised warehousing and inventory control
system, which will feed the new MRO system. The implementation of this
reorganised set-up can run concurrently with the execution of the transformed
MRO system and planned to be completed within a decade.
n Establishment of MRO Hubs for ‘D’
Level and Factory Repairs. For all major weapon systems/equipment/rotables
with state-of-the-art propriety technology, tri- Service MRO hubs for ‘D’
level/’FR’ need to be established. The planning should be an integral part of
Defence Acquisition Procedure, the objective being to eliminate need for
sending the items to foreign OEM, reduce expenditure and turnaround time, fill
the engineering voids, and give a fillip to technology transfer. The
tri-Services nature, whenever applicable, will help economies of scale and
efficient use of resources. These hubs can be established by foreign OEMs
(propriety technology for major equipment), DPSUs, or private industry for
respective equipment. They may even be established by DPSUs or private sector
in collaboration with foreign OEM.
Way
Forward
The
significant impending compression of financial and manpower resources for the
defence MRO vertical will be a double whammy for the ‘equipment readiness’ and
‘mission reliability’ of weapon systems/equipment. The prognosis is quite
evident; if the present levels of equipment readiness have to be sustained,
existing MRO system has to be totally revamped/transformed. The re-imagined
system has to leverage technology realistically to reduce MRO operational costs
significantly, while limiting the upfront financial outgo. Automation at all
levels will enable frugal utilisation of human resources and the new collapsed
echelon MRO system will be able to adapt to drastic reduction in available
technical manpower. The system has to be ‘Equipment Centric’, emphasise minimal
move of weapon systems and maximum in-situ repairs. The tri-Service nature will
pool human and technical resources, while private sector should augment the
capacities of govt Defence Industrial Complex. The logisticians will have to
simultaneously evolve an efficient warehousing and inventory supply system,
conforming to the rigours of the new system.
There is a requirement of constituting a
committee of MRO Subject Matter Experts in defence, which has to define the
broad contours of this new MRO system re-imagined on the terms of reference of
overall drastic reduction in resources over next two decades, while
retaining/enhancing existing ‘equipment readiness’ and ‘missionreliability’
levels. The Committee could co-opt a suitable civili MRO automation expert
while being tasked to formulate an implementation roadmap over next two
decades. Almost simultaneously, there will be a requirement of constituting
another committee of logisticians for designing a new Warehousing and Inventory
Supply Chain, which will support this new MRO system. The Committee will have a
MRO Subject Matter Expert and be tasked to evolve an automated system based on
‘Push Model’ and 48 hours spares delivery. It is envisaged that with the
successful implementation of these transformative changes, archaic systems and
procedures will be finally laid to rest and a new lean and mean organisation
will emerge towards MRO Defence 2050.
Endnotes
1 Based on figures from Page 9, Serial 19-22,
Demand for Grants 2023-24
2 Analysis of figures from from Page 9, Serial
20, Demand for Grants 2023-24
3 In a
transformative reform, Cabinet clears ‘AGNIPATH’ scheme for recruitment of
youth in the Armed Forces https://pib.gov.in/Press Release
Page.aspx?PRID=1833747
4 ibid
5 Estimating
India’s Defence Manpowerhttps://idsa.in/issuebrief/ estimating-indias-defence-manpower-040820
@Lieutenant General KK Aggarwal, AVSM, SM, VSM (Retd) was commissioned in the Corps of EME in Dec 1979. He has done his MTech (Electronics Engg) from IIT Kharagpur and during his service has piloted and institutionalised concepts on engineering support in the operational domain. He retired as Director General, EME.
Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CLIII, No. 632, April-June 2023.