Abstract
The recent global developments
including the war in Ukraine, US withdrawal from Afghanistan, and China’s
aggressive foreign policy approach have threatened the volatile existing global
order and is pointing towards an unstable global situation, a dangerous
decade and a historic hinge. As the new world order is emerging, the Middle East
is witnessing diplomatic initiatives that are reshaping regional alignments and
defining global power equations. The diminishing United States (US) credibility
is pushing the regional power to safeguard their own interests. The increasing
international polarisation is likely to increase instability in the region.
West Asian countries need to build stability with their neighbours and not be
entangled in a state which is reminiscent of the cold war era. They are
now pursuing ‘strategic autonomy’; taking decisions on their own based on their
self-interests. Perceived disengagement by the main security
guarantor, the US from the region has forced both Iran and Saudi Arabia to
re-look at the spectrum of inter-state relations and diversify partners with an
eye on their economic and security interests. The article looks into
the recently concluded Iran-Saudi Arabia Agreement in the context of the
evolving global and regional geopolitical scenario, and dwells on the
intricacies of the Agreement as well as the pivotal role played by China, and
its implication for neighbours and India.
Introduction
A major
rapprochement between two estranged powers, Iran and Saudi Arabia, traditional
rivals and amongst the biggest oil producers who have been on the opposite
sides on a host of issues, took place on 10 Mar 2023. It was an unexpected
development in a fraught relationship with ideological, spiritual, and
sectarian differences, and bringing together a fractured Islamic world where
many different divisions existed. Both Iran and Saudi Arabia perceived the
other to be keen on dominating the region. We now see a convergence of
interests.
Talks first began in Apr 2020 initially
in Iraq and Oman. Five rounds were facilitated by the then Iraqi Prime Minister
Kadhimi, but then, however, Iraqi
politics intruded. Kadhimi was gone in Oct 2022 and his successor Prime
Minister Sudani showed little interest in continuing Iraq’s role as a mediator;
he also did not enjoy the same level of Saudi trust as his predecessor.
Apparently frustrated by the pause,
Saudi Arabia asked China to assume a mediator’s role when President Xi Jinping
visited Riyadh in Dec 2022. In Feb 2023, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi
visited China, and met President Xi, and the proposal for a resumption of ties
was discussed. The talks were then elevated from regional level, with China as
the host. As a result, the path breaking
deal was signed in Beijing on 10 March 2023. China played a major role and Wang
Yi, the Director of the Office of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the
Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee called it a ‘Victory for
Dialogue, Victory for Peace’.1
Iran and Saudi Arabia have been trying
to mend a break in relations that occurred in 2016, after Iranian protestors
seized Saudi diplomatic missions in Tehran and Mashhad in retaliation for the
execution of prominent Saudi Shiite opposition cleric Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr. Iran
then cancelled the Haj Pilgrimage as the troubled relationship reached a new
low.2
Level of tensions between two countries
who have been at loggerheads since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, is high. As
Talmiz Ahmed wrote in his book ‘West Asia At War’; this posed a particularly
dangerous threat for Saudi Arabia – a threat that was at once doctrinal,
political and strategic. The Islamic Revolution challenged Saudi Arabia’s
leadership of the Muslim world, which was based on the fact that its
geographical space encompassed the source of the faith and its ruler’s
guardianship of Islam’s holiest sites.
As a result, Saudi Arabia supported Iraq
in the War of Revolution. Lately, the Iranians also felt that the US withdrawal
from Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018 was due to Israeli and
Saudi Arabian pressure. Saudi Arabia accused Iran of ‘taking advantage of the
revenue generated by the lifting of the sanctions to destabilise the region’.
In Yemen, Iran supported Houthi rebels, though there is an uneasy truce
presently, Iran was attributed to providing weapons that have been fired on
Saudi’s Aramco refineries. During the Arab Spring, they were also suspected of
inciting protests in Bahrain.
In return for Iranian re-implementation
of prior assurances of non-interference in Saudi internal affairs, Iran
demanded that Saudi Arabia should stop funding Iran International, a
Persian-language news channel that gives a platform to opponents of the Islamic
Republic and, their coverage of the protests. Iran believes it is responsible
for fomenting unrest across the country for the past five months.
They want the Saudis to withdraw
completely from Yemen and recognise the Ansarallah (Houthi) movement as a
legitimate authority in the war-torn country. They also asked Riyadh to stop
supporting Iranian opposition groups including the Mujahedin-e Khalq, the
ethnic Arab group Al-Ahvaziya, and the Baloch militant group Jaish al-Adl. Iran
considers these three as a terrorist organisations. In addition, Iran asked
Saudi Arabia to ease the pressure on its Shiite minority and allow members to
visit the Iranian Shiite holy city of Mashhad.3
The competing regional agendas of Riyadh
and Tehran have compounded devastating wars in Yemen and Syria, and continue to
fuel instability in Lebanon and Iraq.
Reasons
for Rapprochement
The
initial push for a reconciliation can be traced to a joint article ‘We Can
Escape a Zero-Sum Struggle between Iran and Saudi Arabia – If we Act Now’
published in ‘The Guardian’ in Jan 2021 by two distinguished scholars; Dr Abdulaziz Sager of Saudi Arabia and
Hossein Mousavian of Iran calling for a dialogue between the leaders of their
two countries, a follow up to an earlier article with a similar theme written
two years earlier.4
Iran was approaching a high level of
enrichment and, with the JCPOA talks going nowhere, it feared a US – Israeli
strike on its facilities. The deal will now diminish the threat of military
action against it. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia’s agreement with Iran
appears to be an attempt to stay out of the fray in case of a conflict.
Further, Iran was facing an increasing
regional and global isolation due to the sanctions imposed on it. It aims to
thwart growing Western pressure by diversifying its options, it’s with this in
mind that it normalised relations with United Arab Emirates recently. Iran has
now pushed back on its regional isolation without changes in its policies.
According to the newspaper Kayhan, a
mouthpiece for Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Tehran’s ability
to neutralise enemy’s hybrid warfare aimed at bringing about regime change
during the protests, and its refusal to give in to foreign pressure to abandon
its nuclear program were instrumental in paving the way for a final agreement
with Saudi Arabia, once the protests subsided in Dec.5
Saudi Arabia showed signs of being
frustrated with the US, particularly the Democrats, after the JCPOA was signed
in 2015 and now due to President Biden’s perceived attitude to region. Crown
Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud felt that he has been targeted over the
murder of Jamal Khashoggi in Oct 2018. In 2021, the US also disclosed a report
on 9/11 that potentially implicated Saudi Arabia.
In 2019, following an Iranian attack on
Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq oil facilities, many Saudis felt that the US government
did not retaliate on their behalf. The realisation dawned that Saudi Arabia was
on its own and would never enjoy Israel-like security guarantees by
Washington. They felt the need to
diversify their security partners. The signs were visible, the US had accused
Saudi Arabia of siding with Russia when Oil Producing and Exporting Countries
(OPEC+) decided to cut oil production over Washington’s objection. The US-Saudi
relationship notably
soured.6
President Biden’s visit to Saudi Arabia,
in Jul 2022, failed to get them to increase oil production with a view to squeeze
Russian oil revenues. While they have largely supported UN General Assembly
resolutions, they have not joined in implementing sanctions against Moscow or
other policies aimed at squeezing Russia. As per Gerald Feierstein, a former US
Ambassador to Yemen; “The Saudis have emphasised in recent years that they seek
to avoid entanglement in what is referred to in the US as ‘great power
competition”.
China is viewed as a neutral party.
Amongst China’s largest oil supplier in the region is Iran, which in turn
relies on China for 30 per cent of its foreign trade and where China has
pledged to invest $ 400 bn over 25 years. Iran, which has few export markets
owing to crippling sanctions over its nuclear program and facing high inflation
sells oil to China at a steep discount. It has trade in the region of
over $ 100 bn.7
China needs to balance its key energy
suppliers and maintain its friendship with both Iran and Saudi Arabia. China
has major investments in Iran, with whom it has a 25-year strategic partnership
with investments of $ 400 bn and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) runs
through region.
Has China moved outside its traditional
role and is now at the centre of global politics? Is it now a geostrategic
force to be reckoned with? Chinese focus is on a strategic partnership with
Iran and economic relationship with Saudi Arabia. No doubt, the trilateral
engagement is seen as a triumph for China.
The US was not part of the negotiations.
US–Saudi ties ever since the 1945 meeting between President Franklin Roosevelt
and King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud, have hinged on energy for the US, and provision
of security to Saudi Arabia, However, both countries agreed to disagree on
Palestine. The US sees itself as the dominant super power in the region. It has
dominated the diplomatic space globally. Now things are looking different, it
was indispensable in the region but could not have brokered this deal in view
of its friendship with Israel and animosity with Iran with whom it has no
diplomatic ties since 1979.
President Obama’s ‘pivot to Asia’
focussed on rise of China and its expansionism in Indo-Pacific and now with the
Ukrainian conflict the US is back to being Eurocentric. The deal is thus seen
as a setback for the US in the region. But does this deal fly in the face of
the order they have been trying to create? To quote Antony Blinken, the US
Secretary of State during a visit to Ethiopia, “From our perspective, anything
that can help reduce tensions, avoid conflict, andcurb in any way dangerous or
destabilising actions by Iran is a good thing”.8
Both Saudi Arabia and Iran were waiting
for some positive developments from the US; the Iranians were looking at the
ongoing talks regarding JCPOA 2.0 and subsequent easing of sanctions while the
Saudi’s were trying to fathom President Biden’s attitude towards them. Faced
with disappointment, due to the retreating and reducing US involvement, they
had few options other than turning towards China to address the issues between
them.The reconciliation can, therefore, be viewed as a necessary and inevitable
step.
Israel’s Concerns
While
the deal was welcomed across the Middle East, for Israel, the Saudi Arabia-Iran
rapprochement comes at a strategic price, with regional and international
dimensions. It will be a setback for Abrahams Accord. Prime Minister Netanyahu has been tough on
Iran and has repeatedly stated that their nuclear programme threatens regional
stability. He was heavily invested in improving ties with Saudi Arabia while sustaining
offensives against Iran. One of Netanyahu’s greatest foreign policy triumphs
remains Israel’s normalisation deals in 2020 with four Arab states, including
Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates. They were part of a wider push to isolate
and oppose Iran in the region.9 A normalisation deal with Saudi Arabia, the
most powerful and wealthy Arab state, would have fulfilled Netanyahu’s prized
goal, re-shaping the region and boosting Israel’s standing in historic ways.10 Since
returning to office, Netanyahu has hinted that a deal with the kingdom could be
approaching.11
Israel was building an Arab Alliance
against Iran but with both UAE and Saudi Arabia now developing relations with
Iran, this seems to be in jeopardy. At the same time, Israel fears that the
Agreement could pave the way for a resolution to the war in Yemen which
presented an opportunity for Israel to increase its influence in the Red Sea
and the Arabian Sea. Another concern for Israel is a potential new Taif
Agreement in Lebanon, whose parties could be Saudi Arabia and Iran, guaranteeing
the stability of the Lebanese regime and economy. YairLapid, the former Prime
Minister and head of Israel’s opposition, denounced the agreement between
Riyadh and Tehran as ‘a full and dangerous failure of the Israeli government’s
foreign policy’.12
The
Global Outlook
The
recent strategic shocks that include the Ukrainian conflict, pull out of US
from Afghanistan and China’s aggression, all point to an unstable global
situation, a dangerous decade and historic hinge. The region is at the heart of
global energy trade, and centre of logistical connectivity. It is also the
destination for millions of religious pilgrims. As the new world order is
emerging, the region is witnessing diplomatic initiatives that are reshaping
regional alignments and defining global power equations.
The Russia-Ukraine war has spurred the
countries in the region to discuss a regional security framework that will
distance them from tensions in the emerging global axes. In contrast to the
Cold War, the Arab Gulf states enjoy good relations with Russia and the US, but
the increasing international polarisation is likely to increase instability in
the region. They need to build stability with their neighbours and not be
entangled in a state of cold war.
China has no doubt promoted dialogue
amongst its principal partners, who were estranged from each other, in order to
promote harmony. It signifies President Xi’s willingness to leverage his
economic clout in third-party negotiations.
Implications
for India
The
West Asian Region forms an important part of India’s extended neighbourhood,
and is vital to India’s strategic outlook. India has vital stakes in the
stability, security, and economic well-being of the region. Ministry of
External Affairs (MEA) spokesperson Arindam Bagchi while commenting on the development
said “India has good relations with various countries in West Asia and that
India has always advocated dialogue and diplomacy as a way to resolve
differences”.
India needs to maintain a balancing act
in a region where it has deep abiding interests and good relations with the
countries, its core interests range from religious ties, energy, trade,
investments, and a large diaspora. The region supplies about 50 per cent of
India’s crude oil requirements, over 70 per cent of natural gas requirements,
hosts about 9 million Indians and accounts for 60 per cent of remittances
received in India annually. Security challenges in the region lead to
instability, which has a direct bearing on the safety and security of millions
of Indians working there.
India has close civilisational ties with
Iran but Iran moved closer to China since India voted against it in
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 2009, though it did abstain from
the vote in IAEA in 2022, and then discontinued oil purchases on pressure from
the then US President Trump in 2019. Iran feels that, India has consistently
subordinated its ties with Iran over other considerations, the latest being the
controversy over the Raisina Dialogues. We need to now enhance our engagement
with Iran, which must, amongst others focus on both the Chabahar Port and
International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC).
De-escalation of tensions in this
crucial area will naturally be a positive outcome for security in the region
which has a direct bearing on India. Further, reduction of tensions in the
region could lead to a more stable oil market which will be good for India’s
energy security. We also need to encash on the positive contribution and
goodwill of our diaspora in the region. For India it is imperative to monitor
the evolving dynamics and assess how it can leverage its own relations with
Iran, Saudi Arabia, and other regional players to secure its strategic
interest. The Iranian Ambassador to India, Iraj Elahi, summed it up by stating
that “this step could benefit India since it helps intensify stability and
peace in the Persian Gulf Region”.13
Problems
in Implementation
While
both nations seemed predestined for immutable rivalry because of the ancient
Persian-Arab divide and the Sunni-Shia divide, the Saudi Arabia–Iran deal
suggests that the two sides have made some progress in addressing critical
areas of their disputes. However, the feud between Iran and Saudi Arabia is
rooted in doctrine, enmeshed in history, and both nations have waged wars via proxies
across the Middle East. They need to overcome sharp differences and wide chasm
of this deep fundamental rift between Shias and Sunnis where a historical fault
line exists.
Iran can neither afford to dismantle
their armed militias nor reduce the power of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC), which is viewed as a terrorist organisation by US, necessary to protect
its ideological character and take on the US and Israel. Both countries are
fighting long running, multiple, and ruinous ‘Proxy Wars’, supporting militant
groups against each other in Yemen, Lebanon, Syria and Libya. In Syria, the
Saudi’s supported the ISIS while Iran supports President Assad along with
Russia, whereas in Yemen, the Saudi’s supported the ruling regime of President
Hadi and Iran supports the Houthi rebels, in Lebanon, Iran supports the
Hezbollah, and in Palestine, both Iran and Saudi Arabia support the Hamas.
Conversely, can actions by these non-state actors torpedo the Agreement?
Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium is
now reportedly at
60 per cent enrichment. Diplomatic relations are unlikely to eliminate Saudi
Arabia’s concerns about Iranian nuclear weapons programme. Conversely, will
Iran now find the roads to bypass the sanctions and render them ineffective?
UAE shares a maritime border with Iran
where there is a dispute over three islands. With India, Israel, UAE and United
States (I2U2) group, it was firmly aligned towards the US. It had also
intervened in Yemen, but returned its Ambassador to Iran last August after
2016. But suspicions still run deep. Last year, a drone strike launched by the
Iran-backed Houthis hit Abu Dhabi, hurting the UAE’s reputation as a safe
harbour in the volatile Middle East.
The
Way Ahead
There
are whispers of Iran looking at reviving the 2001 Security Pact, which Saudi
press at the time described as ‘the end of a long and unproductive period of
disagreement’s and also the broader 1998 Cooperation Agreement between the two
countries.14 The Apr 2001 Security Agreement included
commitments to fight drug trafficking, crime, terrorism, and money laundering.
But there are conflicting interests and compromises that need to be
discussed. The deal emphasises
non-interference in each other’s internal affairs and has the potential to help
de-escalate regional conflicts.
There is a need for reduction of
problems and conflicts in Yemen where there is an uneasy UN negotiated truce
since Apr 2022, Lebanon which has had no President since Michel Auon vacated
office in Oct 2022 and is witnessing a deepening political divide and a
worsening economic crisis, Iraq and Syria where it has the potential to hasten
the acceptance of Syria into the Arab fold. But can these problems just
disappear and does this also underscore China’s desire to play a more active role
as an international mediator?
The next issue as far as Iran is
concerned is the number of pilgrims permitted for Haj, which as of date is
87,550 but Iran has a registered waiting list of over eleven lakhs. An increase
in the quota for Iran will also be a pointer as to the velocity and direction
of the deal.
The
Positives
This
Agreement will, no doubt, pave the way for more dialogue and cooperation
between the two countries and, ultimately, lead to lasting peace and prosperity
for the region. The reconciliation is a major development in international
relations and a positive development in the regional security scenario. No
matter how complex the challenges or complicated the situation, mutual respect
and equal dialogue finds a mutually acceptable solution by working through
contradictions. The Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Faisal bin Farhan, said on
Twitter after the announcement, ‘the countries of the region share one fate.’
One of the major fallouts of the deal is
the INSTC. The progress on INSTC could lead to security, stability,
development, and economic growth of the region, and this will be integrated
with the BRI.
Conclusion
The
Ukrainian conflict has altered the power balance on the world stage. There is
now a fundamental shift in the way China is acting, in countries where it had
invested heavily, to show that it matters.
A new realignment is taking place in the
Gulf Region while a strategic reconvergence is being witnessed between Russia,
China, and Iran, and now Saudi Arabia which is seeking a leading role for
itself at both the regional and international levels. It is converging closer
towards them, driven by its economic power and influence, demonstrating that it
is capable of negotiating the delicate balance of a world shifting from unipolarity
to multipolarity. China, the biggest trading partner in this region, has
stepped into the power vacuum by leveraging its ties and is positioning itself
to become a significant player in West Asia where it has major geo- economic
interests. China is presenting itself as a force for peace in the world, a role
that used to be played by the US. It is, however, the desire for a stable
security architecture that is getting the two major protagonists closer
together.
The deals taking place are unarguably significant
and promising, but how these countries follow up on them, and fulfil their
commitments, will determine their success or failure.
Endnotes
1 Wang Yi:
Saudi-Iranian Dialogue in Beijing is a Victory for Peace, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of People’s Republic of China,
10 March 2023,
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202303/t20230313_11039691. html
2 Saeed Azimi, The Story Behind China’s Role in
the Iran-Saudi Deal, March 13, 2023,
https://www.stimson.org/2023/the-story-behind-chinas-role-in-the-iran-saudi-deal/
3 Ibid
4 Abdulaziz Sager and Hossein Mousavian, “We can
escape a zero-sum struggle between Iran and Saudi Arabia – if we act now” The
Guardian, 31 January 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/ commentisfree/2021/jan/31/iran-saudi-arabia-joe-biden-cooperation
5 Banafsheh Keynoush , How Tehran views the
Iranian-Saudi agreement, Middle East Institute, March 24, 2023
https://www.mei.edu/publications/how-tehran-views-iranian-saudi-agreement
6 Ahmad Elhamy, Moaz Abd-Alaziz, Saudi Arabia,
United States clash over reason for OPEC+ oil cut, The Reuters, 14 October
2022,
https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/saudi-arabia-rejects-statements-critical-opec-oil-cut-2022-10-12/
7 Farnaz Fassihi, Steven Lee Myers, China, With
$400 Billion Iran Deal, Could Deepen Influence in Mideast, The New York
Times, 27 March 2021,
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/27/world/middleeast/china-iran-deal.html
8 Secretary Antony J. Blinken at a Press
Availability, Antony J. Blinken, Secretary Of State Addis Ababa University
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, March 15, 2023
https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-at-a-press-availability-31/
9 PTI, Saudi deal with Iran worries Israel
shakes up Middle East, The Week, 11 March 2023
https://www.theweek.in/wire-updates/international/2023/03/11/fgn24-saudi-iran-deal-israel.html
10 Ibid
11 Isabel Debre, Samy Magdy, Saudi deal with Iran
worries Israel, shakes up Middle East, 12 March 2023, Associated Press
https://apnews.com/article/saudi-iran-diplomatic-relations-middle-east-d78f3ceac0561f4fb
20301e4f32eef88.
12 Ibid
13 Ayushi Agarwal, Resumption of Iran-Saudi
diplomatic ties could benefit India: Iranian envoy on Tehran-Riyadh pact,
ANI,17 March 2023,
https://www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/resumption-of-iran-saudi-diplomatic-ties-could-benefit-india-iranian-envoy-on-tehran-riyadh-pact20230317195810/
14 Why Iran reopening its embassy in Saudi Arabia
is a big deal, The Indian Express, 08
June 2023, https://indianexpress.com/ article/explained/explained-global/why-iran-reopening-its-embassy-in-saudi-arabia-is-a-big-deal-8650311/
@Major General
Jagatbir Singh, VSM (Retd) is a Distinguished Fellow at the USI of India.
Commissioned in 1981 into the 18 Cavalry, he has held various important command
and Staff appointments including command of an Armoured Division.
Journal
of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CLIII,
No. 633, July-September 2023.