Author : Major Ankita Mishra,

“The challenge for India with China is not to
compete for trade and economic growth,
but to compete for strategic space”.1

Abstract

The People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) adventurism in Ladakh has been a blessing in disguise in expediting India’s war-preparedness and shifting the focus towards sharpening our own forces, and their response against China from strategic to tactical levels. Though Indian Army (IA) is a seasoned soldiers’ army, it yet needs to match steps with modern technology while also focusing on the upgradation of its strategies, policies, and tactics. The need of the hour is thus, to focus on enhancing situational awareness, improving operational strategies, tactics and grouping capabilities, exploiting the field of human resource through effective training of troops, and, most importantly, focusing holistically on strengthening the administrative and logistic set-up to sustain in rough, rugged terrains, have effective border-area infrastructures, state of the art medical facilities for troops well within their reach as China specialises in the game of attrition. India is committed to a strategy of deterrence against China and to achieve this deterrence IA needs to identify the challenges at various levels vis-à-vis the PLA and, thus, formalise a response system to fortify IA’s position against PLA. This article sheds light on the challenges faced by the IA in relation to the PLA and the measures to mitigate the shortcomings and fortifying IA’s response against the PLA, limited to tactical level only.

Introduction

From ‘Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai’ to ‘Hindi-Chini Bye-Bye’, India- China relations have been marked with ambiguity. Amidst series of intermittent scuffles owing to China’s ‘salami slicing’2 tactics in the state of Arunachal Pradesh and Union Territory of Ladakh to full-fledged action in Galwan since May 2020, China today stands as India’s primary adversary.

        While rumours are rife that Chinese aggressive activities in Ladakh are a ruse to divert India’s attention from Indian Ocean Region (IOR) to its Northern borders, the ongoing dispute definitely highlights several inadequacies. The expeditious deployment of troops in the hot bed, necessity-based emergency equipment procurement, and sudden move of several formations to LAC, can all be summed up in one phrase- ‘knee-jerk reaction’. The present stand-off is, thus, an eye-opener for all stakeholders to cover lost ground and fortify India’s defence forces in a holistic manner through effective policy creation and implementation. Apropos, Indian Army (IA) needs to modernise itself by not just inducting state-of-the-art weapons but also by reorganising its existing tactical formations and fighting units, modernising its administrative and logistic set-up and training methods.

PLA Revolution over the past Decades

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has consistently transformed from a manpower-intensive army to a force-multiplier entity today. The Chinese have long erased the trauma
faced at the hands of Vietnam in 1979, and today stand tall as a world-class military. The ruthless implementation of merit-based policies, large-scale Research and Development (R&D) programmes, and indigenous defence industrial base have invigorated and modernised the PLA through ‘mechanisation’ and ‘informationisation’.3 Post the latest reforms in 2020, PLA now comprises of the following arms:

        n       PLA Army.

        n       PLA Navy.

        n       PLA Air Force.

        n       PLA Rocket Force.

        n       PLA Strategic Support Force.

        n       PLA Joint Logistic Support Force.

        With its strategic policy of ‘Active Defence’, PLA has now been organised into five Theatre Commands, to focus on operations with integrated jointness, as under:

n       Eastern Theatre. Responsible towards Taiwan and the East China Sea.

n       Southern Theatre. Responsible towards South China Sea, South East Asian border security and territorial and maritime disputes.

n       Western Theatre. Responsible for conflict-resolution, with primary focus on India. It includes the military districts of Xinjiang and Tibet and focuses on ‘Counter-Terrorism’ operations along China’s Western borders.

n       Northern Theatre. Responsible towards Korean Peninsula and Russian borders.

n       Central Theatre. Primarily responsible for the
defence of Beijing as also to provide support to the other four theatres.

 

Figure 1 : China’s Theatre Commands

Source: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2020, Annual Report to Congress, Office of the Secretary of Defence, 2020.4

 

Figure 2 : Force Structurewithin China’s Western Theatre

 Source: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2020, Annual Report to Congress, Office of the Secretary of Defence, 2020.5j

 

Challenges Ahead of IA

IA is a professional army, with battle-hardened soldiers. However, amidst the race for modernisation, induction of ultra-sophisticated equipment worldwide, and changing character of warfare, numerous challenges are staring in the face of IA today, highlighted in the Land Warfare Doctrine 2018 of the IA, and are enumerated as under:

n       ‘Two and a half front’6 war in wake of collusive threat from China and Pakistan, in addition to non-conventional counter-insurgency warfare in Kashmir.

n       Ambiguity of operations with nations neither at peace nor at war, or in ‘Grey Zones’, with expansion of domains of warfare from conventional to cyber/space/non-contact warfare.

n       Limited defence budget allotment vis-à-vis ambitious modernisation plan.

n       Exploring combined options of diplomatic, political, military and economic responses to avoid future confrontation.

        It is, thus, imperative for the IA to re-align its policies and strategies from strategic to tactical levels, to strengthen itself against the PLA, by inducting modern weaponry, enhancing advanced professional training of personnel, tailor-made administrative and logistic support, improving connectivity channels, expeditious technical upgradation, self-sustenance and refining existing tactical procedures to adopt fresh tactics, tailor-made for tackling the PLA.

        Moreover, two colluding belligerents require focused and speedy formulation of response mechanisms, with perspective plans, increased budgetary support, and induction of modern weaponry. IA should understand that PLA respects strength and to this end, its own response systems need to evoke adequate caution in the minds of local PLA commanders, lest they plan any adventurism. Simultaneously, the organisational structure and equipment prowess must aid in fortifying the theatre of response, to ensure inter-theatre operability.