Abstract
The
objective of this article is to try and uncover what we know about the planning
process of the airborne operation at Poongli Bridge, along with its execution,
to achieve the desired objectives. This was the first classic parachute
operation mounted by the Indian Army since Independence and in its success we
need to know what went into its making: with the starting step being the
planning stage. This article first looks at the different accounts of the 1971
war by various authors, specifically relating to the chosen area of interest,
including as many possible key participants and other critical observers and
researchers. Based on these, one could apply logical analysis and
counterfactual arguments to identify the most likely scenario(s) to arrive at
what may have been the case. Once we have some idea of the key planning factors
and evolution sequence, we could also briefly correlate our understanding with
the initial execution of the plans as they were put into motion.1 This preliminary study will, hopefully, lay the
foundation for a more informed debate on certain highlights and issues that
this article will bring up. This article is in two parts and part 2 shall be covered in the next
issue of USI Journal.
Introduction
The
execution of the airborne operation at Poongli Bridge in the vicinity of Tangail, (referred to at
places simply as the airborne operation at Tangail, in what was then East
Pakistan (now Bangladesh), on 11 December 1971 is considered the golden chapter
in the history of the Indian Army and, especially, the Parachute Regiment. A
generation of young officers has grown up reading about it and wondered if
those days are now truly past when such operations could be planned, mounted,
and successfully executed. To appreciate this realistically in situational
context, we need to first understand what went into the making of the
successful airborne operation and ask critical questions about its planning,
execution, and effectiveness. Thereafter, we can more methodically review the
lessons learnt and what they tell us about the future to come. This article
collates what we today know about the planning of this operation on the basis
of publicly available information that we have been able to access (and the one
acquired during the course of the writer’s service in the Parachute Regiment
and the Para Brigade) and draw out a some key points for consideration and
critical analysis. The underlying purpose is to apply an analytical lens and
invite further deliberations and debates to extract useful learning for the
future since an army that does not learn from its past operational experiences
(and, additionally, those of others) will only do so at great cost to itself
when faced with exigencies ahead.
The
Airborne Operation
To set
the context, let’s briefly see how this operation unfolded. After the war in
the east had begun on 03 December 1971, the thrust by 101 Communication Zone
Area (101 CZA) in Northern Sector commenced consisting of 95 Mountain Brigade,
(Mtn Bde, and Bde for Brigade) and F-J Sector (an ad-hoc Infantry Bde level
force).2 Of the
four major thrusts along the four sectors in the Eastern Command Theatre, it
was the weakest as compared to the others which were all Corps-sized
offensives. The initial move of 101 CZA was slow against enemy resistance, with
its associated logistic problems and resource constraints. By 10 December, 101
CZA’s advance was held up along the Jamalpur-Mymensingh line (see Figure 13).
However, two things were to happen shortly. One, Pakistan’s Brigadier Abdul
Qadir Khan, Commander of 93 Pakistan Infantry Brigade, overseeing the defence
in this sector, was asked to fall back to Kalaikar (south of Tangail) on 10
December.4 So, both
garrisons of Jamalpur and Mymensingh were evacuated on night 10-11 December. At
the same time, in a pre-planned operation, 2 Para Battalion (hereafter, Bn)
Group was para-dropped north of Tangail at 1650 hours on 11 December to occupy
the Poongli Bridge and a nearby ferry over the Lohaganj River in order to cut-off
the retreating enemy forces (see Figure 2). It was sheer coincidence that 11
December was chosen for this drop quite in advance.5 This task was successfully accomplished and 1
Maratha LI of 95 Mtn Bde linked up with 2 Para Bn Group by 1700 hours on 12
December thus, speeding up 101 CZA’s advance towards Dacca, leaving only very
hastily organised Pakistan resistance enroute.
Review
of Accounts covering planning of proposed Airborne Operations (on the Eastern
Front)
In this
part, I first summarise the findings from relevant literature by the various
institutions, key participants and other observers/authors, roughly organised
in a hierarchical order, i.e., from the Army HQ downwards to the operational
formations, to help us trace how the planning for the airborne operation,
including its need and possible payoffs, played out.
Official
History of the 1971 India Pakistan War
Dr SN
Prasad, a respected military historian, was called back from retirement in
1983, to helm this project for the Ministry of Defence.6 The first draft was completed before the
target date in 1985 and this version was finally put out for ‘limited
circulation for official use’ in June 1992. As Prasad mentions in the Preface
to this effort, the historical record is based on “studying the secondary or
published sources and some 5000 files of the Government, and after interviewing
66 of the important participants in the war”.7
Prasad
states that “HQ Eastern Command developed its war plans based on a series of
war games and joint planning in the period leading up to the war, culminating
into four major thrust lines “directed at nodal points and communication
centres rather than important towns” (p. 503). For purpose of getting an
overall perspective, sector-wise allocation of forces was approximately as
under (p. 499 and following pages):
n 2
Corps in South-Western Sector, consisting of 4 Mtn Div and 9 Inf Div; 50
Para Bde less Para Bn (6-10 Dec. only); 45 Cav less Sqn and a Sqn 63 Cav; other
supporting elements;
n 33
Corps in North-Western Sector, consisting of 20 Mtn Div, 6 Mtn Div (limited
use—9 Mtn Bde) and 71 Mtn Bde; 63 Cav less Sqn and a regiment PT-76 tanks;
other supporting elements;
n 4
Corps in South-Eastern Sector, consisting of 8 Mtn Div, 23 Mtn Div and 57
Mtn Div; two Sqn tanks; other supporting elements; and
n 101
CZA in Northern Sector, consisting of 95 Mtn Bde and F-J Sector (ad-hoc Bde
level equivalence)
It
was envisaged that, “101 CZA with 95 Mtn Bde Gp of four battalions, 2 Para (Bn)
Group, followed by 167 Mtn Bde, would advance to Dhaka from the North.” (p.
504) He briefly summarises the airborne asset allocation and planning as
follows: “It was appreciated that the most important area for the main drop was
Tangail in order to ensure the early capture of Dhaka. Second priority was
given for two-coy drops to assist in securing Magura if necessary. Due to the
limited availability of Mi-4 helicopters, all these helicopters were allocated
to 4 Corps to enable them to ferry troops as required” (p. 504).
The
para drop operation to secure Poongli Bridge, north of Tangail, was planned for
D+7 (p. 573). During its advance on this axis, despite successive delays
imposed on the advance of 95 Mtn Bde, it had captured Jamalpur to (north of
Tangail) by 0730 hours on 11 Dec. (p. 578). The same day, 2 Para Bn Group was
dropped near Poongli Bridge by 1650 hours for its operations. Here, Prasad’s
account does not go very much into the process of selection of the airborne
objectives other than a brief reference to the airborne asset allocation and
utilisation plan resulting from the discussions at HQ Eastern Command. There is
also no mention of whether any discussion went into modification of the initial
plans once the operations of the formations were underway.
Lieutenant General JFR Jacob, the then Chief of
Staff, Eastern Command (in the rank of Major General)
Among the direct participants in these
operations, we have written accounts by Lieutenant General JFR Jacob,
then Major General and Chief of Staff, Eastern Command that specifically refer
to the selection of objectives and employment of the airborne assets with the
Eastern Command.
Lieutenant
General JFR Jacob writes in his book “Surrender at Dacca: Birth of a
Nation”8, first published in 1977, that having received
early warning, he had made a draft plan by end of May 1971 (p. 60). Providing
details of the next steps (though, the datelines are not very clear here), he
talks of being assured of resources to achieve their objectives, which included
“a battalion group of 50 Parachute Brigade” (p. 61), which he allocated to
their envisaged tasks “to drop at Tangail” (p. 63). For crossing of the river
Meghna, while discussing the South-Eastern sector’s plans, he mentions as the
existing landing crafts were unsuitable due to their draught, we shifted our
attention to the possibility of obtaining additional helicopters” (p. 62) (a
point that subsequently contributed significantly to the course of war in 4
Corps zone, but that’s another story).
Jacob
also writes in his book “An Odyssey in War and Peace”9, (first
published in 2011), that “The operation order for the drop was prepared in
mid-October by Air Vice-Marshal Charan Das Guru Devasher, Brigadier Mathew
Thomas then commanding 50 Para Brigade, and me. We planned the drop to take
place on D plus 7 and the link up within twenty-four hours” (p. 86). He goes on
to state that “I had earlier briefed the GOC 101 CZA in Fort William on the
details of the plan. He was optimistic and told me he would capture Dacca by D
plus 10. I sent him a demi-official letter detailing the outline plan as
Manekshaw was yet to agree to the employment of brigades from the Chinese
border”. (p. 86) Though 101 CZA initially only had a brigade of four battalions
under it, the plan was to place two more brigades to be relieved from the
Chinese border under it, in addition to the battalion under Brigadier Sant
Singh (F-J Sector) to support Mukti Bahini operations (p. 86). Lieutenant
General Jacob also mentions that the plan was jointly formalised in
consultation with Major General IS Gill, who was the Director General of
Military Operations at the Army HQs then10. It is
understandable that Maj. Gen. IS Gill, who was also the Colonel of the
Parachute Regiment at that time, must have been keen to give his battalions a
chance to contribute to the writing of the nation’s history.
Elaborating
on why specifically Tangail, Jacob writes, “We planned to drop a battalion
group at Tangail, selecting Tangail as a safe drop because it was held by Tiger
Siddiqui with his force of 20,000. Tangail afforded a suitable jumping off area
for the attack on Dacca and was also suitably located for a link up by forces
from the north”. (p. 86)
As
to the pertinent question about options considered, Lieutenant General Jacob
further writes, “Gill, on receiving the order for the airdrop, asked me to
consider the airfield at Kurmitola in Dacca rather than Tangail, and Brig.
Mathew Thomas also agreed with his view. I told Gill to remember Crete and the
very heavy losses suffered by the Germans. Kurmitola was well defended with air
defence batteries. […] stressing that we could not link up with Kurmitola but
could at Tangail. In the inter-service operation order issued, Gill included
Kurmitola as an alternative. Later Gill said, “Jake, you were right about
Tangail and I was wrong about Kurmitola”. (p. 88).
Lieutenant General IS Gill, then Offg DMO (in
the rank of Major General)
Lieutenant General IS Gill, who as Major
General was Director of Military Training at that time, was moved to the
Directorate of Military Operations as ‘Officiating Director’ (Offg DMO) at the
end of August 1971, in which capacity he served through the 1971 operations. He
was personally very reticent about writing his autobiography after his
retirement, saying, “What have I done? What’s so special about any of it?”.11 So, while there is no personal written account
available of his experiences during the 1971 war, we have his biography written
by Subbiah Muthiah, first published in 200812, which
includes a number of relevant details for our purpose.13
Major
General Gill as the Offg DMO, appears to have played a key role in the
employment of the airborne forces in the Eastern Command as his name appears
repeatedly in various other accounts referenced for this analysis. However,
Gill sets the record straight in a letter written after his retirement to Major
General Tej Pathak, (who had asked him a question relating to his then
Division’s role in the 1971 war), that the operation instructions had already
been issued by the Army HQ and operation plans of the Commands made and
discussed with the Chief of the Army Staff, before he took over as the Offg
DMO; hence, he did not have as much say in “certain aspects which appeared to
me to be defective” (p. 190). But he had “strong convictions on the usefulness
of Special Services Operations in successful conduct of war, based on his
experience in Greece” (p. 183). A paper presented by him to Chiefs of Staff
Committee in April 1971 led to the training and employment of Mukti Bahini
(though not quite as envisaged by him). The other was the employment of
airborne and heliborne forces where he certainly seems to have shared his
advice on their employment, which is also confirmed by other key participants.
On this, Muthiah writes that when Tangail was being identified as an ideal
drop-zone during the planning, Gill “had wanted the drop further ahead, at the
erstwhile airfield of Kurmitola on the outskirts of Dacca (now Dhaka), but the
Air Force considered it too risky. Inder believed, a drop in Kurmitola,
coordinated with pushes by the two divisions of 4 Corps that had moved within
striking distance of Dacca in the east, would have brought the war to an end by
12 or 13 December. But Tangail proved good enough”.14 (p. 188)
In
the only public comment made by Gill on his role in the 1971 war, at the
release of Vice Admiral MK Roy’s book in Chennai, he said, “Based on the
agreement of the Chiefs of Staff to co-operate with each other for the common
good, joint planning of operations proceeded in 1971. My work in this direction
was mainly with the Air Force — related to air support for army operations and
the conduct of airborne operations, both in the East and the West”. (p. 189)
Perhaps, it is just Gill being himself — giving credit where due, not interfering
in others’ tasks but supporting them all the while. In any case, he would have
had too much going all around him to micro-manage such aspects once the ball
got rolling.
Finally,
to make two brief mentions here about what is missing from the big picture
relating to Major General Gill’s role as the Offg DMO. One was his habit of
writing “neatly handwritten slips in a large, clear hand, distributed to all
sections every morning” in the DMO, which presumably set the tone for the day.15 Whether these notes exist anywhere today is
not known; they would indeed provide an excellent authentic record of how he
thought through what was happening on the operational front in those critical
days. Next is, reference to a detailed ‘After-Action Report’ of the 1971 conflict
which he supervised after the war, of which “he prepared ‘a brilliant summary’,
every word his own”, which, as Muthiah writes, “is not available to even
military personnel” and where certainly all his efforts to get to it failed as
well (p. 202).
Regimental History: “India’s Paratroopers: A
History of The Parachute Regiment of India”
Major KC Praval was commissioned to write the
history of the Parachute Regiment by the then Colonel of the Regiment, Major
General IS Gill (later Lieutenant General) in January 1970. It was first
published in 1974.16 So, it
is fortuitous that this historical record was already being assiduously
compiled by Praval17, when the 1971 war began. Therefore, it is
natural to expect that the parachute operations therein would be carefully
documented to preserve as a record for future generations.
Praval’s
coverage of the Poongli airborne operation is more an account of its execution
by 2 Para. He gives an overview of the prevailing scenario and then moves to
operations undertaken by 50 Para Brigade and 2 Para Bn Group. He states that,
“To cater for the contingency of war over Bangladesh, plans for several
airborne operations had been under consideration. As the campaign proceeded, it
became obvious that only two of them would yield worthwhile results. A portion
of the brigade was therefore released for ground operations under II Corps”.(p.
288) Subsequently, the airborne task envisaged for two companies of 8 Para was
cancelled and the companies reverted back to the battalion (p. 290).
Coming
to 2 Para Bn Group, he writes that “[…] a number of airborne operations had
been planned as part of the campaign in Bangladesh but the Tangail operation
had the highest priority, and it was the only one carried out” (p. 291). He
adds that “early in November, a Joint Coordinating HQ had been set up at
Calcutta to coordinate the execution of the airborne operation and the Air
Transport Force Commander Group Captain Gurdip Singh was involved with the
Commander Para Brigade in the conduct of a series of war games to fine-tune the
operational execution”.(p. 291-2) He then describes the conduct of the
operation, mentioning that the time of the drop was advanced to 4 pm to make it
a day-drop in view of India’s complete supremacy in the air.
Lieutenant General Mathew Thomas, then
Commander, 50 (I) Para Brigade
In what was the preparatory period leading up
to the 1971 War, Brigadier (later Lieutenant General Mathew Thomas took over
command of 50 Para Brigade from Brigadier TS Oberoi in August 1971. It was he
who would have had a ring-side view of the planning process. Till very
recently, there was no independent published version of the events leading up
to the airborne assault on Tangail, put out by him that I had come across, even
though his assent can be counted upon with regard to Praval’s account and the
account of the operation contained in the history of 2 Para which he edited18 and was published in 2002. Therein, he has
written an introductory note to this airborne operation’s planning and followed
that up with Praval’s account published earlier (referred above), agreeing with
that narration as being a faithful account close to factual reality. As to the
planning process, he indicated that “In the conceptual and planning stages
several airborne operations had been considered. But as the campaign proceeded,
it was appreciated that out of these only two would yield appreciable results.”
(p. 466; possibly, Tangail and Kurmitola, though not clearly mentioned here).
As only 2 Para’s airborne task was finally chosen for execution, the Bn HQ and
two Company Groups of 8 Para reverted back to the Para Brigade for ground
operations. He also points to the critical role of Major General IS Gill, at
the Army HQ, in pushing for the employment of airborne forces for effect (p.
469).
Fortunately,
he is currently working on his personal memoirs, covering his time in the
services, and there is new material in the online blog that is publicly
accessible19; hopefully, we will see it in print in the
near future.20 In it,
he provides clear timelines which more or less match Jacob’s account given
above, other than the one-on-one meeting with Lieutenant General Jagjit
Singh Aurora, which Jacob does not refer to, as where the Tangail idea sprang
up.
Lieutenant
General Thomas mentions of a one-on-one meeting with the GOC-in-C
Eastern Command, Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Aurora in September
1971, where he discussed the possible airborne objectives, before narrowing
down on the area in the vicinity of Tangail to help speed up the advance
towards the final battle for Dacca. This was keeping in mind the time-frame
when the Air Force could make sufficient air resources available. He also
mentions the other objective that was considered, Kurmitola:
“The
question of a ‘Coup de Main’ such as the capture of Kurmitola airfield (Dacca)
by an Airborne Assault Operation and, thereafter fly in the rest of the Brigade
in the air transported role, to assist in the battle for Dacca, was also
considered. A major air effort would be required for this latter task and such
an operation could only be executed towards the closing stages of the war to
hasten the end, especially, if world opinion and UN Security Council pressure
was mounting for a ceasefire, particularly if Dacca was threatened and ripe for
the taking.” (p. 11)
Thomas
was later called to the Army and Air HQs in the third week of October 1971, to
discuss and coordinate the planned airborne operations, during which he also
met with the Offg DMO and discussed the same. On the question of the
availability of the required air effort, it emerged that the following was
possible:
“It
transpired at this discussion that up to D plus 3, the IAF would be committed
solely in the gaining of air superiority. Therefore, any Airborne Operation
would only be feasible D plus 5 onwards as between D plus 3 and D plus 5, the
transport aircraft that were needed for paratrooping and heavy drop would have
to be moved from base airfields to interim airfields and only thereafter to
mounting airfields. … [A] Task Force of a Tac HQ and two Rifle Company Groups
could be mounted in an Airborne Operation on D plus 5. The lift of an entire
Parachute Battalion Group would only be possible on D plus 7 while the lift of
a Parachute Battalion Group for an Airborne Assault Operation and the
subsequent fly-in of the remainder Brigade in the Air-Transported mode would
only be feasible on or after D plus 14.” (p. 14)
He
also adds that on 20 November 1971, he visited HQ 101 CZA to discuss with the
GOC, Major General GS Gill, the ground operational plans once 2 Para Bn Gp
completed its airborne assault operation and came under command of 95 Mtn Bde,
commanded by Brigadier HS Kler. (p. 20-21). With the ruling out of employment
of the remainder Para Brigade in an air-transported mode, 50 Para Bde, less the
earmarked airborne force, was released for ground operations under 2 Corps,
where the brigade moved for their allocated tasks.
Figure
1 : Sketch-map of Area of Operations: Tura-Jamalpur-Mymensingh to Tangail to Dacca
Figure
2 : Area of Paradrop at Tangail
(Sketch overlaid on contemporary Google
map of the general area)
Endnotes
1 My interest in this study was aroused as I
worked on writing an account of the participation in the Poongli bridge
airborne operation by two young officers of the 2 Para Battalion Group, Capt.
TC Bhardwaj, who was the Pathfinder group commander and Capt. KR Nair, who was
the reserve pathfinder group commander; this was in addition to their other
roles upon landing at the drop-zone. Some of these initial observations came up
there and I got interested in developing this line of thought further. Account
under reference now published as follows: Lt. Col. RS Bangari, Col. TC Bhardwaj
and Col. KR Nair, Spearhead into Tangail: An Account of the Pathfinders and
their Subsequent Operations, in Sqn. Ldr. RTS Chhina (Ed.), Battle Tales:
Soldiers’ Recollections of the 1971 War: Chapter 2; Vij Publishers, New Delhi,
2022.
2 I am laying out the larger picture of the
operations in this sector very briefly, as much is required for us to follow-up
here. This can be traced in the maps and sketches enclosed with the review article
for better understanding of the situation. More details are readily available
in the references that are listed in this paper going forward or any other
authentic account of the 1971 India Pakistan war in the Eastern sector.
Note
that, broadly, the eastern front war of 1971 was conducted in four main
geographical sectors as per the lay of the ground and waterways: the
South-Western sector; the North-Western sector; the Northern sector; and the
Eastern sector. Some more details are given in the following sections.
3 Figure 1 is an extract from a larger map of
Indian Army’s operations undertaken in East Pakistan (1971) prepared by the
author in the mid-1980s while preparing to take the Part B exam; it is based
primarily on Maj Gen DK Palit’s The Lightning Campaign: The Indo-Pakistan War,
1971, (Thomson Press, 1972). Figure 2 shows the area of the paradrop operation
at Tangail, overlaid on contemporary Google map.
In
addition, one can also explore the following links to Google maps of the area
of operation as described alongside each, for those interested in relating the
places named in this account on more current maps/terrain.
a) https://goo.gl/maps/sarTRemYiqu : Link to
general area of operation from the Indian border to the north, showing Tura,
Jamalpur, Mymensingh, Tangail and Dacca.
b) https://goo.gl/maps/UJZQAHKtsRWnhZtN6 :
Link to the area of the 2 Para battalion group paradrop operation at Tangail.
4 S Salik, Witness to Surrender, Oxford
University Press, Karachi, 1998, Third Impression, Lancer Publishers, 2000, p.
188.
5 Lt Gen JFR Jacob writes in Surrender at Dacca:
Birth of a Nation, Manohar Publishers, New Delhi, 1977/2018 (13th reprint) that while issuing out the Operation
Instruction for the air drop, “even at that early date we spelt out that the
para drop would occur on D plus 7 and the link up within twenty-four hours.
Subsequent events were to prove the accuracy of this time frame.” (p. 77)
6 SN Prasad, Official History of the 1971 India
Pakistan War, Preface, v. Available online, e.g., at https://www.php.isn. ethz.ch/lory1.ethz.ch/
collections/coll_india/1971War3593.html?navinfo=96318; accessed August-October
2020; April-May 2022. Full official citation: History Division, Ministry of
Defence, Government of India: History of the 1971 India Pakistan War, ed. SN
Prasad et al., New Delhi, 1992.
(This
has now been published in 2019, as: SN Prasad and UP Thapliyal (Eds.), The
India-Pakistan War of 1971: A History, Natraj Publishers, Dehradun, 2014/2019.
However, the print version is currently not available and hence has not been
referenced. Hence, some corrections from the draft referenced here are likely,
though the broader picture is not likely to vary much.)
7 Prasad et al, op. cit., Preface, v.
8 Jacob, op. cit.
9 Lt Gen JFR Jacob, An Odyssey in War and Peace,
Roli Books, New Delhi, 2011.
10 Jacob, 1977/2018, op. cit., p. 88; Lt. Gen. J
F R Jacob, Liberation of Bangladesh, dated 1 September 2007, available at
http://jacoblectures.blogspot.com/2007/09/liberation-of-bangladesh.html,
accessed May-December 2018, Sept.-Oct. 2020.
11 S Muthiah, Born to Dare: The Life of Lt Gen
Inderjit Singh Gill PVSM, MC, Viking, Penguin Books, New Delhi, 2008, Author’s
Note.
12 S Muthiah, Born to Dare: The Life of Lt
Gen.Inderjit Singh Gill PVSM, MC. Muthiah was a journalist, later turned
historical-cum-heritage writer based in Chennai.
13 Muthiah had become close friends with Gill
after he settled down in Chennai upon his retirement in 1979 and got to know
him well over time to draw him to share many anecdotes of his service life.
While he may have begun work on this book when Gill was still alive, major part
of the research for the book appears to have been done after Gill passed away,
including permission from the Army HQ to access Gill’s service records, etc.
14 It is not clear from Muthiah’s account where
this statement comes from. Is it a recollection that Gill shared with him
during one of their conversations or does it comes from Lt Gen Jacob’s
Surrender at Dacca: Birth of a Nation, first published in 1997?
15 Also, referred to by Lt Gen Satish Nambiar in
his account, With the Jangi Paltan in the 1971 War for the Liberation of
Bangadesh, in Sqn Ldr RTS Chhina (Ed.), Battle Tales: Soldiers’ Recollections
of the 1971 War, 2022, pp. 61-86.
16 KC Praval, India’s Paratroopers,
Thomson Press, New Delhi, 1974.
17 Praval writes about the challenges he faced in
compiling this account, where he almost drew a blank even at the Ministry of
Defence Historical Section, Delhi to begin. He eventually tracked down British
officers from the pre-Independence era who shared with him detailed notes, maps
and photographs to piece together the early history of India’s paratroop forces
during the World War II, covering the retreat in Burma and later the heroic
stand of the paratroopers at Ukhrul’s Sheldon’s Corner-Shangshak and Imphal in
1944 (refer chapters 5-7).
18 Lt Gen Mathew Thomas, The Glory and the Price:
The History of 2nd Battalion The Parachute Regiment (Maratha), Kartikeya
Publications, 2002.
19 Lt Gen Mathew Thomas, The Planning and Conduct
of Airborne Operations in the Indo-Pak War of 1971 Part 2: The Air Assault Op
at Tangail (East Pakistan)—11 December 1971, accessed on 4 Sept. 2020 at
https://htppijump4joy.wordpress.com/.
20 This has subsequently happened. The chapter from
his online blog that I have referred to in this review article is finally in
print: Lt Gen Mathew Thomas, The Planning and Conduct of the Air Assault Op at
Tangail – 11 December 1971, in Sqn Ldr RTS Chhina (Ed.), Battle Tales:
Soldiers’ Recollections of the 1971 War, 2022. Page numbers referred hereafter
while quoting Thomas refer to the 2022 publication here as there is no
pagination in the draft at the blog.
@Lieutenant Colonel Ravindra Singh Bangari was commissioned into 6 Para in June 1982 and has served in various operational sectors. A graduate of DSSC, Wellington, he is also a PGDM and ‘Fellow’ in Management from IIM Bangalore, with research interests in leadership, decision making and learning and development.
Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CLIII, No. 632, April-June 2023.