Abstract
India has huge strategic and economic
interests in the South Caucasus region. The South Caucasus region has also
become key for India’s ambitions to build a transportation corridor linking it
to Europe through the Iranian plateau. The proposed International North South
Transport Corridor effectively outflanks Pakistan while giving India access to
overland routes to Europe and Central Asia. A Black Sea-Persian Gulf trade
route would allow Indian goods to be exported to the West through Georgian
ports. However, the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, the long-disputed Armenian
Enclave within Azerbaijan, the emergence of the next fautlines in Nakchivan and
the nexus between Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Pakistan working together to counter
India’s influence in the Middle East and Central Asia is holding back India’s
ambition in the region.
The paper tends to look in the some of
the key challenges for India emerging out of the geopolitics of the conflict,
regional dimensions of it, stakes for India and finally makes some significant
policy recommendations.
Introduction
While the latest
round of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, the long-disputed Armenian
enclave within Azerbaijan, seems to have been over within hours of it having
started, ending with the Armenian population leaving their homeland, the
reverberations will continue to resound. They had earlier faced a humanitarian
catastrophe with the blocking of the Lachin Corridor. The self-governing region
established after the collapse of the Soviet Union has effectively been
dismantled.
The quick end can be attributed to a
large degree by the unwillingness of Russia to get involved as it seemed
totally preoccupied by its commitments in Ukraine. However, the next fault line
that seems to be emerging is Nakhchivan, an exclave of Azerbaijan between Iran,
Armenia, and Turkey. Azerbaijan is demanding that Yerevan agree to the
establishment of a corridor through Armenian territory that would connect
Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan.
The South Caucasus region, which lies
between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea comprising of Armenia, Georgia and
Azerbaijan has been the crossroads of the Persian, Ottoman and Tsarist empires
as well as the intersection between the Christianity and Islam.1
This land connects Asia to Eurasia,
apart from its significant natural resources. The conflict and emerging
outcomes have both global and regional implications. Countries such as Russia,
Iran, Turkey and Israel also have deep interests in this region but it is also
significant as far as India is concerned.
But the South Caucasus is one of the
world’s least connected regions, both for geographic and political reasons.
Mountainous and on the fringes of larger powers, numerous local and regional
conflicts have also stifled trade and connectivity. Armenia’s borders with
Azerbaijan and Turkey have long been closed due to the dispute over
Nagorno-Karabakh, giving Armenia trade connections to only Georgia, and by
extension Russia, to the north and Iran to the south.2
Map 1
India’s
Broad Engagement in the Region
India
does not have a publicly articulated policy for the South Caucasus, unlike
‘Neighbourhood First’, ‘Act East’ or ‘Central Asia Connect’. However, since
establishing diplomatic relations in 1992, India’s ties with Armenia have
steadily grown. India has a Friendship and Cooperation Treaty with Armenia
which was signed in 1995. Further, the signing of a Comprehensive Strategic
Partnership Agreement in 2019 has resulted in increased cooperation in trade,
investment, defence, and culture.3 Though, India’s provision of military
assistance to Armenia has strained its relationship with Azerbaijan, Armenia
extends its unequivocal support to India on the Kashmir issue whereas
Azerbaijan not only opposes but also promotes Pakistan’s narrative.
In the case of Azerbaijan, Oil and
Natural Gas Commission (ONGC)/ONGC Videsh Limited have made investments in an
oilfield project in Azerbaijan and the Gas Authority of India Limited is
exploring the possibilities of cooperation in liquefied natural gas. Azerbaijan
also falls on the International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC) route,
connecting India with Russia through Central Asia. It can also connect India
with Turkey and beyond through the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars passenger and freight rail
link.4
The conflict is essentially between two
international principles viz. the ‘principle of territorial integrity’
advocated by Azerbaijan and the ‘principle of the right to self-determination’
invoked by Nagorno-Karabakh and supported by Armenia. When it comes to Armenia
and Nagorno-Karabakh, though India had talked of a mediated settlement between
the two sides, it supported Armenia through arms sales and by condemning
Azerbaijan’s aggression in the region.5 This was not without reason as Azerbaijan’s
long-time association with Pakistan had turned the conflict into one of the
world’s more obscure proxy wars.
Lately, India has enhanced its strategic
partnership with Greece which was viewed as a direct challenge to Azerbaijan as
Armenia is a traditional ally of Russia and Greece and strain in relations
between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus dominate their relationship, though both
are part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The recent visit of the
Prime Minister Modi to Greece was part of a broader strategy to diversify its
partnerships in the region. India’s strengthening ties with Armenia and Greece
are aimed at countering the alliance formed by Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Pakistan
by no longer relying solely on its traditional allies like Russia and Iran,
instead seeking new alliances with countries that share its interests, such as
Greece and Armenia.6
India’s strategic approach of steadily
building ties with Armenia, Greece and Iran reflect India’s increasing
strategic interests in the Mediterranean region, which holds significant
importance for its energy security due to its abundant oil and gas resources.
Additionally, India aims to enhance its trade and investment relations with
this region. This also serves to counter China’s expanding influence in the
region.7
India’s strengthening ties with Armenia and Greece have caused concern for Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Pakistan, who have been working together to counter India’s influence in the Middle East and Central Asia.
Region is
Crucial for India’s Trade Corridor
The
South Caucasus region has also become key for India’s ambitions to build a
transportation corridor linking it to Europe through the Iranian plateau,
through INSTC.
As regards the INSTC, India needs a rail
link to go from north-western Iran across the Southern Caucasus to either
Russia or the Black Sea. In this regard, India (and Iran) has two options: one
via Armenia’s Southern Syunik Province, and the other via the Caspian coast
through Azerbaijan.
A key advantage of the INSTC is that it
effectively outflanks Pakistan while accessing overland routes to Europe and
Central Asia, which would otherwise be blocked. It also results in a closer
relationship with Iran thereby countering Iran’s relationship with China and
their Belt Road Initiative in the region.
In Jan 2023, at the Voice of the South
Virtual Summit, Armenia’s Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan mentioned that
Armenia is interested in “advancing
cooperation within the framework of north-south connectivity, as well as the
Persian Gulf-Black Sea international transport corridor”, adding that “Armenia
considers India’s potential and prospective role for these projects as quite
significant”.8
In Apr 2023, Armenia hosted the first
trilateral meeting with Indian and Iranian officials, to facilitate a Black
Sea-Persian Gulf trade route that would allow Indian goods to be exported to
the west through Georgian ports.9
Yet the developments in the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict threaten the viability of the Zangezur including
Turkey and Pakistan as well as Ankara’s expansionist pan-Turkic ambitions.
Meghri corridor is an important corridor linking Azerbaijan to its exclave,
Nakhchivan. Recent comments by President Ilham Aliyev, of Azerbaijan, as well
as Turkish President Erdogan’s speech at the United Nations General Assembly,
now suggest that the territorial viability of this corridor might be in
question. Iran seems to have taken the threat to Syunik seriously enough,
reiterating Armenia’s control over the province which is internationally
recognised and strengthening its troops in its north-western border in response
to the recent fighting.
Irrespective of whether the conflict
actually breaks out over the corridor, the fact remains that building a railway
through a region that has the potential for conflict between Iran and Turkey,
two of the largest militaries in the region, does not bode well for political
stability in the long term.
Defence
Relationship
India’s
support for Armenia shifted gears in 2022 with the provision of USD 250 mn
worth of arms and ammunition. The deal included significant export orders of
Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launchers, anti-tank missiles, rockets and
ammunition to Armenia. In 2020, India also got a USD 43 mn order to supply four
Swathi weapon-locating radars to Armenia.10
It was reported that this was the first
time India had decided to export the Pinaka system to another country.
Azerbaijan’s use of drones was a key reason why Armenia wanted the Pinaka
system, since its ‘shoot and scoot’ capability enables it to escape
counter-battery fire.
India feels it can benefit from being an
arms supplier to Armenia, filling a gap left by Russia’s strategic downsizing
in the Caucasus due to its commitment in Ukraine.
In Oct 2022, Armenia’s Minister of
Defence Suren Papikyan’s visited India and met the Raksha Mantri Shri Rajnath
Singh during the Defence Expo 2022.
As per a report in the Eurasian Times on
07 Nov 2023; Officials who did not wish to be identified confirmed to the
EurAsian Times that Armenia has contracted the Hyderabad-based Zen Technologies
for INR 340 crore (USD 41.5 mn) for the anti-drone system order that includes
both training solutions and an anti drone system.11
In May 2023, Armenia announced it was
posting a military attaché to its Embassy in New Delhi, tasked with deepening
bilateral military cooperation. On 26 Jul 2023 Azerbaijan, summoned the Indian
Ambassador and lodged a protest about India’s defence ties with Armenia saying
that “arming Armenia at a time
when Azerbaijan is negotiating a peace treaty with Armenia, the supply of
deadly weapons by India opens the way to the militarisation of Armenia and
aggravates the situation, hindering the establishment of sustainable peace and
security in the South Caucasus region”.12 The irony is that Baku continues
to arm itself with Turkish and Israeli weapons for offensive purposes, but
protests when Armenia takes a similar step to defend its borders.
Iran has played a crucial role. While
Armenia is unable to purchase Iranian weapons due to fears of United States and
Western reactions, Tehran is facilitating the transit of weapons from India to
Armenia.
On 23 Sep 2023, Armenia appointed a new
ambassador to India despite the ongoing chaos in Nagorno-Karabakh. The
Ambassador’s credentials, as both an Iran expert and as a regional diplomat in
the South Caucasus, suggest the particular direction that Armenia wants to take
bilateral relations.
An analysis from the Observer Research
Foundation, had said that; “India has overtly positioned itself on Armenia’s
side in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and has consequently opted to resist
Azerbaijan and its backers including Turkey and Pakistan as well as Ankara’s
expansionist pan-Turkic ambitions”.
Pakistan
Support for Azerbaijan
While
Pakistan has been siding with Azerbaijan since the outbreak of the First
Karabakh War in the early 1990s, India entered the picture as an arms provider
to Armenia only after Yerevan’s defeat in the Second Karabakh War in 2020 with
both now supplying arms to the principal combatants.
Pakistani support for Azerbaijan is
intertwined with Islamabad’s close strategic relationship with Turkey, Baku’s
primary patron. The Pakistani government was second after Turkey in recognising
Azerbaijan’s independence following the Soviet collapse in 1991, and Islamabad
has never acknowledged Armenia’s independence.
The Pakistani and Azerbaijani militaries
have reportedly been conducting joint exercises since 2016 and maintaining
extensive strategic security contacts. According to some reports, Pakistani
military advisers participated in the Second Karabakh War, providing tactical
advice. Some observers also believe
Islamabad may sell the JF-17 fighter jets to Azerbaijan. There are also reports
that Pakistan may soon join Azerbaijan as a partner in a Turkish-led effort to
develop a new-generation stealth fighter, dubbed Kaan.13
Pakistan’s involvement is helping cement
an Ankara-Baku-Islamabad alliance, informally dubbed the ‘Three Brothers’. The
three countries all supposed democracies are predominantly Islamic. The fact
that all three are engaged in territorial and ethnic conflicts also acts as a
binding agent, encouraging them to assist each other strategically and
diplomatically.
By supporting Azerbaijan militarily and
diplomatically, Pakistan has played a decisive role in stymieing India’s
policies in the South Caucasus. The strategy has its drawbacks as Pakistan is
now linked with a country that is being condemned internationally due to its
aggression.
Nakhchivan:
The Next Boiling Point
A
potential outcome of Azerbaijan’s victory is the future of Nakchivan, an
enclave of Azerbaijan between Iran, Armenia, and Turkey. Azerbaijan is
demanding that Yerevan agree to the establishment of a corridor through
Armenian territory that would connect Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan.
Such a corridor would cut Iran’s access
to Armenia as the two countries would no longer share a border. Iran which
views Armenia as a critical link with Eurasia had threatened to use military
force against any changes to the internationally recognised borders of the
region.14
Even though most of its provisions lie
in tatters, the trilateral ceasefire brokered by Russia in Nov 2020, and
co-signed by Aliyev, Pashinyan, and President Vladimir Putin has as one of its
provisions, for Border Guards from Russia’s Federal Security Service to protect
the transport corridor across Armenia to Nakhchivan a region being referred to
as Western Azerbaijan.15
Syunik is Armenia’s most remote
province, making up the country’s narrow Southern tip. Its slim southern edge
borders Iran; across its eastern border is Azerbaijan’s mainland; and to its
west is Azerbaijan’s exclave of Nakhchivan. The region’s strategic location,
combined with its prominent place in Armenian history, has now put it at the
epicentre of a future conflict.16
Parallel to the Zangezur Corridor
demands, President Aliyev also began promoting a discourse that identified
parts of Armenia, in particular Syunik as ‘Western Azerbaijan’, from which
ethnic Azerbaijanis had been unjustly forced out and to which they should
return.17
This is where the next battleground
lies. It is felt by some that the United Nations should put this under a
broader international umbrella but Azerbaijan and Russia may resist this.
Conclusion
The
conflict involves many external players including Iran, Turkey, Russia, the
European Union, and the United States. That makes the pathway to peace a
challenging and interconnected task.
While it seems difficult for India to
publicly endorse Nagorno-Karabakh’s right to self-determination in view of the
possible repercussions it can have for India, as Pakistan may twist the support
by making erroneous connections with Kashmir. India has done little to indicate
support for Armenia, or even condemn Azerbaijan’s actions with the exception of
the meeting of Mr S Jaishankar with the Foreign Minister of Armenia, Ararat
Mirzoyan in the United Nations General Assembly.
As India refigures its foreign policy to
a region now changed by Armenia’s defeat in Nagorno-Karabakh, it almost
certainly will have to seek out other, more stable avenues for its
infrastructure ties; given the potential of the INSTC project and the ongoing
Israel-Gaza War. The world now needs to focus on the Zangezur Corridor and
Nakhchivan the next time bomb that has the potential to get activated in an
already volatile region.
Endnotes
1 Oliver Reisner, Selin Türkeþ-Kýlýç, Gaga
Gabrichidze (eds.), Experiencing Europeanization in the Black Sea and South
Caucasus, European Studies In The Caucasus, https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/ erasmus-plus/project-result-content/f71640d0-27f9-4a84-b202-dc716f81d979/ISBN1458_x1_final.pdf
2 Eugene Chausovsky, Armenian-Azerbaijan Peace
Might Finally Be on the Table, Foreign Policy November 03 2023,
https://foreignpolicy.com/ 2023/11/03/armenia-azerbaijan-peace-nagorno-karabakh-economic-connectivity/#:~:text=The%20South%20Caucasus%20is%20one,also%
20stifled%20trade%20and%20connectivity.
3 India-Armenia Relations, Ministry of External
Affairs, https://www.mea. gov.in/portal/foreignrelation/armenia_brief_2013.pdf
4 Malhotra, Achal K. “India’s Links with and Footprints
in South Caucasus: From Ancient to Modern Times.” Indian Foreign Affairs
Journal 16, no. 2 (2021): 121–33.
5 Territorial Integrity v. Self-determination
over the Nagorno-Karabakh region, Politicon, 24 February 2021
https://politicon.co/en/essays/80/ territorial-integrity-v-self-determination-over-the-nagorno-karabakh-region
6 Huma Siddqui, From Armenia to Greece: India’s
Geopolitics Unsettles Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Pakistan triad, Financial Express, August 21, 2023
https://www.financialexpress.com/business/defence-from-armenia-to-greece-indias-geopolitics-unsettles-turkey-azerbaijan-and-pakistan-triad-3217127/
7 Maj Gen Jagatbir Singh, Azerbaijan’s capture
of Nagorno-Karabakh opens up challenges for India in the South Caucasus,
Firstpost, 06 September 2023,
https://www.firstpost.com/opinion/azerbaijans-capture-of-nagorno-karabakh-opens-up-challenges-for-india-in-the-south-caucasus-13212652.html
8 Yeghia Tashjian, The Geopolitical Implications
of India’s Arms Sale to Armenia, Armenian Weekly, August 9, 2023 https://armenianweekly. com/2023/08/09/the-geopolitical-implications-of-indias-arms-sale-to-armenia/
9 Ibid
10 Manu Pubby, Arming Armenia: India to export
missiles, rockets and ammunition, 06 October 2022, Economics Times,
https://economictimes.
indiatimes.com/news/defence/arming-armenia-india-to-export-missiles-rockets-and-ammunition/articleshow/94518414.cms
11 Ritu Sharma, After Pinaka Rockets, Armenia
Buys Indian Anti-Drone System To Fight Azerbaijan’s Kamikaze UAVs, After Pinaka
Rockets, Armenia Buys Indian Anti-Drone System To Fight Azerbaijan's Kamikaze
UAVs (eurasiantimes.com)
12 Maj Gen Jagatbir Singh, Azerbaijan’s capture
of Nagorno-Karabakh opens up challenges for India in the South Caucasus,
Firstpost, 06 September 2023,
https://www.firstpost.com/opinion/azerbaijans-capture-of-nagorno-karabakh-opens-up-challenges-for-india-in-the-south-caucasus-13212652.html
13 Akhil Kadidal, Turkey to engage Pakistan over
officially joining Kaan project, Janes 08 August 2023,
https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/turkey-to-engage-pakistan-over-officially-joining-kaan-project
14 Eugene Chausovsky, Armenian-Azerbaijan Peace
Might Finally Be on the Table, Foreign Policy November 03 2023,
https://foreignpolicy.com/ 2023/11/03/armenia-azerbaijan-peace-nagorno-karabakh-economic-connectivity/#:~:text=The%20South%20Caucasus%20is%20one,
also%20stifled%20trade%20and%20connectivity
15 The geopolitical concerns facing Armenia after
Nagorno-Karabakh collapse, Times of India, 02 October 2023
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.
com/world/rest-of-world/the-geopolitical-concerns-facing-armenia-after-nagorno-karabakh-collapse/articleshow/104110738.cms?from=mdr
16 Joshua Kucera, In Southern Armenia, Global
Powers Move In Amid Fears Of A New Azerbaijani Offensive, Radio free Europe, 04
November, 2023
https://www.rferl.org/a/armenia-syunik-region-azerbaijan-russia-iran-united-states/32671001.html
17 Ibid
@Major
General Jagatbir Singh, VSM (Retd) is a Distinguished Fellow at
the USI of India. Commissioned in 1981 into the 18 Cavalry, he has held various
important command and Staff appointments including command of an Armoured
Division.
Journal
of the United Service Institution of India,
Vol. CLIII, No. 634, October-December 2023.