Abstract
In August 2021 Taliban seized
power in Afghanistan soon after the US troop’s withdrawal. The new Taliban
regime has not yet been recognised by the international community including the
US and the regional powers. New Delhi appears more cautious about charting a
new Afghan strategy that would secure its vital national security interests
without jeopardising the regional geopolitical environment that emerged in the
post-pandemic era. India has been playing a constructive role for a stable and
secure Afghanistan since the Taliban was ousted by the US-led War on Terror.
The Russia-Ukraine war has drawn the great power focus into the European
theatre. In this context, this article examines the emerging strategic and
security trends and trajectories in the post-Taliban takeover and how they
impinge on India’s National Security.
Introduction
Taliban has returned to power by capturing Kabul in August 2021 after two decades of fighting a fierce guerilla war with the US-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Though the new Taliban regime has consolidated various provinces militarily under its rule, its economy is in shambles and depends on external aid or funding. Taliban regime under the leadership of Mawlawi Hibatullah Akhundzada1 is struggling to run the country. The Taliban administration is sternly implementing the Sharia practices, which prohibits women from access to education and jobs. After the Taliban took over the reins, New Delhi appears serious about charting a new Afghan strategy that would secure its vital national security interests. As an emerging power in the region, India’s role in shaping the regional security architecture is inevitable. India has been engaging with the so-called Good Taliban much before they came to power in 2021. Indian officials and interlocutors had a series of meetings with Taliban leadership in Qatar and expressed India’s stand and concerns.2 New Delhi announced a development assistance of Rs 200 crore ($24.3 million) for the Afghanistan in the Union Budget 2023-24.3
India is largely concerned about the
terrorist groups operating from Afghan soil. The rise of ISIS-Khorasan Province
(ISIS-KP) and Al-Qaeda in the Indian Sub-continent (AQIS) poses security threat
to India. The post abrogation of Art 370, India is focusing on territorial
integrity and does not want any sort of fallouts in Kashmir with the external
support to subvert peace and stability.
The
New Taliban Regime
The
new Taliban regime seems to have embraced the Iranian political Model of
Islamic theocracy wherein the political legitimacy is derived from the
religious leader rather than from the people. What puzzled everyone was the
appointment of other ministers in the newly formed Cabinet to run the country
which was once mired in a democratic process with rampant electoral
malpractices. Given the fact, that the tribal customs and rules are largely
respected and deep-rooted in the Afghan society, any sort of Western model of
democratic practices were less popular among the masses.
Many of them in the Taliban cabinet are
either figured in the UN-designated terrorist list or have bounties on their
heads4. The most notable appointment is
the interior minister in the new regime, Sirajuddin Jallaloudine Haqqani the
head of the notorious Haqqani network that has been quite active in effectively
resisting the ISAF since 2004. Sirajuddin is the most wanted terrorist by the
FBI.5 It is pertinent to mention that it was the
Haqqanis6 who provided shelter and training for the
dismembered Taliban cadres during war on terror campaign. They have had strong
ties with the Al –Qaeda leadership including Osama Bin Laden. There are reports
which indicate that Haqqani escorted Bin Laden to Abbottabad, where he was
later killed in a US operation. Miram Shah in North Waziristan in Pakistan is
the main base for the Haqqani.7 What makes interesting of his appointment to
the interior ministry is his close association with Pakistan’s deep state,
which has been backing the Haqqanis for quite a long period at the same time
being part of the US-led war on a terror campaign against the Taliban and other
related terrorist networks8. Once a terrorist always remains
as a terrorist. According to Jeffrey A. Dressler, “although the Haqqani network
was subsumed with the Taliban under his Quetta Shura, they maintain distinct
command and control, and lines of operations”.9 During the period between 2002 and 2011, the
Haqqani emerged as the core element of the revival of the new Taliban.
The other significant appointment to the
cabinet is Mawlawi Muhammad Yaqoub, the defence minister and also one who used
to control the finance department of the Taliban organization. He is the
youngest in the new team and also the eldest son of the late Taliban chief,
Mullah Omar. He is believed to be the next heir to take over the top leadership
shortly. Though he was hardly seen in public he is quite popular among the
ranks and files of the Taliban force.
Rests of them are just a bunch of loyalists to either Haqqani or Yaqoub.
Given the fact that the International
community had not recognized this new team so far, doubts were raised whether
the new Taliban regime would continue to stay in power?.10 Taliban has been pursuing regressive economic
policies such as keeping the women out of workforce and economic activities.
The biggest challenge that the new regime faces is economic and the key
economic indicators provide a dismal outlook about Taliban governance. According
to a Reuters report, “Eighty per cent of Afghanistan’s budget is funded by the
US and the (other international) donors”.11 So, if the US and international donors cut
their aid, the Taliban regime will plunge into a deep crisis similar to that of
the early 90s. Adding to this misery, the Taliban’s new finance minister, Gul
Agha, again an UN-designated terrorist who was involved in terror financing in
the past, has no roadmap to revive their economy or rebuild a self-sustainable
economy. It is reported that the Taliban still rely on Opium export for
revenue.12
Much of the Afghan central bank’s $10
billion in assets are parked overseas and the Biden administration has no plan
to release those assets in terms of investments, gold, or foreign reserves that
were frozen after the Taliban take over in 2021.13 The US and the western countries may use this
as a tool to leverage the current regime to pay adequate respect to women’s
rights and the rule of law and human rights issues. Even the Taliban leaders
are very much aware of this fact and they are willing to negotiate with the US
and other countries including the neighbors for economic aid. The hospitals in
Afghanistan are facing an acute shortage of vital life-saving medicines and
also there is a severe shortage of food grains. Unfortunately, Pakistan, the
next-door neighbour of Afghanistan is also going through a severe economic
crisis and is unable to even provide any sort of humanitarian assistance at
this juncture. The only benign actor in the region which has been consistently
supporting the needs of the people of Afghanistan is India.
Taliban
2.0 and the US – A Tactical Ally or Strategic Partner?
The
US relationship with the Taliban 2.0 - the new leadership that emerged in the
post-Osama Bin Laden and Mullah Omar has been transactional since the Obama
Administration decided to withdraw its forces by 2014. The US-Taliban dialogue
began in 2018 in Qatar where the Taliban had expressed their willingness to
talk to the US for a road map for peace in Afghanistan. But the actual impetus
was given to the peace talks during the Triumph administration when he signed
the historic ‘peace deal’ agreement with the Taliban in 2020.14 As per the deal, the Taliban has agreed not to
allow Afghanistan soil for Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups and also to
continue to work with the US for future cooperation in counter-terrorism
efforts. As a result, the US has completely pulled out its troops by late
November 2020 much before the US presidential elections. But, the Biden administration
oversaw the implementation of the deal by the Taliban and by August 2021, the
Taliban has slowly taken over entire Afghanistan including Kabul without any
major bloodshed.
Taliban also held a series of talks with
Moscow for garnering international support to recognise its regime.15 It appears Taliban 2.0 has chosen to play as a
tactical ally of the US against terrorism and fundamentalism but the US
continue to value the Taliban as a strategic asset in the region replacing
Pakistan, which once used to enjoy non-NATO ally status with the US. The
Ukraine crisis has intensified the cold war sort of conflict between the US and
Russia. In case of an open military conflict with Russia, the US will not
hesitate to use its assets in Afghanistan against Russia or that matter against
China. Taliban is slowly emerging as a potential US ally in the region. The
killing of Al Qaeda leader, Ayman Al Zawahiri in the heart of Kabul indicates
that the Taliban’s’ still supporting and providing shelter to Al Qaeda leadership.16
Nevertheless, the Western allegations
against the Taliban for violating human rights and deteriorating woman’s rights
in the country remain unchanged. Interestingly, there is a not even single
woman representative in the Taliban’s new regime. Girls are not allowed to
attend schools and colleges. More than seven thousand women were working in the
Afghan security forces and now they fear for their lives.17 In 2022, a delegation was led by the Afghan
Foreign minister to Oslo for a talk with Western government officials and
Afghan civil societies. The delegation was urged on promises to uphold Human
Rights in return for $10bn Afghan money with the US.18 Reports are emerging in the Western think
tanks that see the Taliban as a potential strategic asset to the US
particularly to deal with the aggressive Russia and authoritarian China in the
region. The future relationship will be guided by geopolitical factors rather
than domestic civil liberties issues.
New
Taliban Regime and China – Unholy Bonhomie?
China’s
relationship with the Taliban’s new regime is somewhat tricky and complex. It
initially betrothed by none other than its “all-weather friend” – Pakistan way
back in 2015. According to a media report, “Chinese officials and
representatives of Pakistan’s spy agency — the Inter-Services Intelligence
(ISI) directorate - also attended the talks on May 19 and 20 in Urumqi, the
capital of China’s western Xinjiang region,”.19 China’s interest was to prevent any sort of
external support or propaganda against China on Uyghur Muslims’ protest against
Beijing’s religious persecution. The first-ever formal meeting with the Taliban
happened during the Taliban taking over Afghanistan. In 2022 a nine-member
Taliban delegation led by Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, who headed the political
office in Doha, Qatar met with the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in the port
city of Tianjin.20 Wang Yi said that the Taliban is “a pivotal
military and political force in Afghanistan”21 China has also enhanced its engagement with
the new Taliban regime over the period and closely working to build a strong
strategic partnership with the Taliban’s new Afghanistan and Pakistan, which
would facilitate China, a strategic inroad into the Middle East and fill the
vacuum created after the withdrawal of US-led western troops. Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi’s secret
visit to Kabul in February 2022 heralded a new chapter in China’s Afghan
policy.22 Besides such bilateral thrust, Beijing is also
playing a lead regional role in organising and participating in a series of foreign ministers’ meetings of
Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries excluding India.
According to Jennifer Brick
Murtazashvili “for China, relations with the Taliban are “not a luxury but a
necessity,” and China’s sole interest is security”., said Jennifer Brick
Murtazashvili.23 It was evident in the SCO meeting held in 2022
where Chinese President Xi Jinping urged all the members to support
Afghanistan’s new regime to build a robust political structure.24 This reflects China’s active engagement with
the Taliban regime to stitch a robust network. Interestingly, the Taliban also
reciprocated China’s overwhelming gesture to support and endorse the new
Taliban regime by expressing their interest to join the ailing China-Pakistan
Economic Corridor (CPEC) under China’s flagship initiative of the Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI).25 This is indeed an interesting geo-economic
twist in the region that would favour China to leverage its geostrategic
interests using Taliban-ruled Afghanistan as a base. China is aware that
Afghanistan cannot be brought under direct rule of any foreign country.
Is China trying to fill the strategic
vacuum in Afghanistan? According to John Calabrese, “For China, engaging the
Taliban is more a matter of managing threats than seizing opportunities because
Beijing’s perennial concern remains Afghanistan to become a sanctuary for
militant groups targeting Chinese territory, economic assets in the surrounding
region, and/or diplomats and workers”.26
China seems to have heavily relied on
Pakistan especially ISI for tactical maneuvering in Afghanistan and one cannot
rule out Pakistan’s quid pro quo to extract significant military support from
Beijing. For China, “mere geopolitical
and economic imperatives do not define China’s engagement in post-US
Afghanistan and it is hard for Beijing to buy the new, more pragmatic, less
ideological Taliban 2.0 narrative”.27 China’s role is still limited and largely
relay on Pakistan’s assets in Afghanistan. Given the changing geopolitical
dynamics in the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis, the US and the West are
redefining their role as net security guarantor and protector of democratic
values of human rights and individual liberty and freedom. The Ukraine crisis
is a big blow to China’s ambition to become a global power in terms of rapid
strategic realignments in Eurasia.
Conclusion
The
Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan led by the Taliban’s new regime finds it hard
to run the government for two simple reasons: no recognition from the
international community and any funds or financial support to deliver
governance. It has been a challenging period for the new regime run by
erstwhile hardcore terrorists to engage in a negotiation with the US and the
European powers diplomatically to get international recognition. Taliban are
very well aware that there is no ideological compromise for the sake of
recognition. The US and other international powers including the regional
powers would recognise the Taliban if they strictly adhere to international
human rights and women’s rights. Nevertheless, the Taliban’s hoped that they
would be recognised by their neighbours or regional powers to establish a
formal relationship that would address the security concerns of the regional
powers.
As far as India is concerned, there is
no major change in her Afghan policy. It continues to support the people of
Afghanistan through humanitarian aid and other support. India’s core interests
are very well articulated in the new regime. Taliban’s stand on Kashmir for
instance assures New Delhi’s concern about Afghan soil being used for terrorist
activities on Indian territories. India has also been weighing geopolitical
options to recognise the Taliban shortly despite encouraging official-level of
talks with the various administrations in the present regime in Kabul. The
Ukraine crisis seems to have overshadowed the Afghanistan issue and the
Taliban’s human rights violations. Moreover, the Taliban also seems to have
been cooperating with the US and other European powers to counter the expansion
of Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) and to an extent, AQIS. However, the
killing of Al Qaeda leader Ayaman al Zawahari exposed the Taliban’s commitment
to the peace deal with the US. Taliban still needs to rely on AQIS for finance
and funds to run the government. The economy is in shambles and no plan has
been unveiled by the new regime to revive the economy. If the Ukraine crisis
gets prolonged there is a possibility that Afghanistan could become a
geopolitical hotspot for superpower contestation, especially the US-led west
and the Russia-China and Pakistan. In such a scenario, India will be a fence
sitter rather than a prime actor in the region.
The trends are manifold. First, the
international community may not recognise the Taliban regime at least in the
medium term. Recognising the Taliban’s regime logically means recognising the
UN-designated terrorists and endorsing their past terror records. Second, the
Taliban slowly gravitated towards China and Russia to evade the human rights
questions or preconditions put forward by the US and the western powers. Third,
the Taliban are sensitive towards the international community’s overall concern
that it should not become a haven for terrorist organisations. Last, the
collapse of the Taliban’s already fragile government would mean total anarchy
that would not only destabilise the entire region but also deters international
peace and security. Afghanistan under the new Taliban rule seems to have
achieved a certain amount of political stability but not security. For the
Taliban, it is still a long way to go to get recognised by the international
community.
Endnotes
1 BBC. 2021. Afghanistan: Who’s Who in the
Leadership, August 18, 2021.
2 Times of India. 2021. Indian Officials
Engaging with the Taliban ‘quietly’. available at
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/indian-officials-engaging-with-taliban-quietly/articleshow/83765373.cms,
accessd on March 10, 2023
3 Sibal, Sidhant,” Taliban welcome India’s funds
announcement for Afghanistan in Budget 2023-24" WION, February 28, 2023,
https://www.wionews.com/south-asia/taliban-welcome-indias-announcement-for-afghanistan-in-budget-2023-24-558193
(accessed on 22, March, 2023)
4 United Nations. 2015. Consolidated United
Nations Security Council Sanctions List. available at
https://www.un.org/french/sc/ committees/consolidated.htm, accessed on March
21, 2023.
5 The United States of America. Federal Bureau
of Investigation. Sirajuddin Haqqani. available at https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/ terrorinfo/sirajuddin-haqqani,
accessed on February 3, 2023.
6 Mapping Militant Organisation. 2017. Haqqani
Network. available at
https://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/print_view/363#note23.
Accessed on January 10, 2023
7 The United States. Office of the Director
of National Intelligence. Year. Title.
available at https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups/haqqani_network, accessed on April
21, 2023.
8 Institute for the Study of War. Year. The
Haqqani Network. available at
https://www.understandingwar.org/report/haqqani-network, accessed on March 12,
2023.
9 Ibid.
10 Ahmed, Sayeed Iftekhar. 2021. Can the
Taliban Regime Stay Power?. available at
https://thediplomat.com/2021/10/can-the-taliban-regime-stay-power/, accessed on
February 7, 2023.
11 Landay, Jonathan & Ali, Idrees. 2021. U.S.,
other aid cuts could imperil Afghan government -U.S. watchdog. available at
https://www.reuters. com/article/usa-afghanistan-funding-int/u-s-other-aid-cuts-could-imperil-afghan-government-u-s-watchdog-idUSKBN2B72WJ,
accessed on March 12, 2023.
12 Shahryar Fazli. 2022. The Taliban’s Poppy Ban
Redux. Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime. available at
https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/talibans-poppy-ban-afghanistan/. Accessed
on 20 February, 2023.
13 Shalal, Andrea & Psaledakis, Daphne. 2021.
The U.S. has no plans to release billions in Afghan assets, Treasury says.
available at
https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-has-no-plans-release-billions-afghan-assets-treasury-says-2021-09-03/,
accessed on April 4, 2023.
14 BBC. 2020. Afghan conflict: US and Taliban
sign deal to end 18-year war. available at
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15 Emma graham-Harrison. 2021. Russia holds
high-profile Afghanistan talks with Taliban. The guardian. Available at
https://www.theguardian. com/world/2021/oct/20/russia-holds-high-profile-afghanistan-talks-with-taliban.
Accessed on 222 February 2023
16 The U.S. Department of State. 2022. The
Death of Ayman al-Zawahiri. available at
https://www.state.gov/the-death-of-ayman-al-zawahiri/, accessed on January 10,
2023.
17 ANI. 2022. “Under Taliban regime, Former
Afghan Women Soldiers fear their lives.” The New Indian Express, January
1, 2022. available at
https://www.newindianexpress.com/world/2022/jan/01/under-taliban-regime-former-afghan-women-soldiers-fear-their-lives-2402015.html,
accessed on February 10, 2023.
18 Al Jazeera And News Agencies. 2022. Taliban
delegation begins talks in Oslo. available at
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/23/taliban-delegation-arrives-in-norway-for-first-talks-with-west,
accessed on March 11, 2023.
19 PTI. 2015. “Afghan Taliban leaders meet
secretly in China: Report.” The Economic Times, May 25, 2015. available at
https://economictimes.
indiatimes.com/news/defence/afghan-taliban-leaders-meet-secretly-in-china-report/articleshow/47413160.cms?,
accessed on April 12, 2023.
20 Krishnan, Ananth. 2021. “China Foreign
Minister Wang Yi hosts Taliban, calls them ‘pivotal force’.”The Hindu, July
28, 2021. available at https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/taliban-leader-meets-chinese-fm-assures-not-to-allow-terrorist-forces-to-operate-from-afghanistan/article35582147.ece,
accessed on March 30, 2023.
21 Ibid.
22 The United States of America. Embassy of the
People’s Republic of China. 2022. Foreign Minister Wang Yi Arrives in Kabul
for a Visit to Afghanistan. available at
https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/ceus/ eng/zgyw/t1131885.htm, accessed on
April13, 2023.
23 Rosen, Eshel. 2022. China in Afghanistan:
“Not a luxury but a necessity”. available at https://eurasianet.org/china-in-afghanistan-not-a-luxury-but-a-necessity,
accessed on March14, 2023.
24 Al Jazeera And News Agencies. 2021. China’s
Xi: SCO states should help drive a smooth Afghan transition. available at
https://www.aljazeera. com/news/2021/9/17/chinas-xi-sco-states-should-help-drive-smooth-afghan-transition,
accessed on February 15, 2022.
25 ANI. 2021. “Taliban say they ‘desire’ to join
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor projects.” Hindustan Times, September
7, 2021. available at https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/taliban-say-they-desire-to-join-china-pakistan-economic-corridor-projects-101630976453780.html,
accessed on February 16, 2023.
26 Calabrese, John. 2021. China’s Taliban
Conundrum. available at
https://www.mei.edu/publications/chinas-taliban-conundrum,accessed on March 17,
2023.
27 Ahmadzai, Atal. 2022. Why China Is
Slow-Rolling Taliban Cooperation. available at
https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/27/china-taliban-relations-cooperation-afghanistan-withdrawal/,
accessed on February 18, 2023.
Dr J Jeganaathan is Senior Assistant Professor & Head of the Department of National Security at the Central University of Jammu, J&K. His research interests include India’s Regional Security, Afghanistan-Pakistan and Terrorism, Border Security Studies, Foreign and Security Policy of India, China in South Asia, NATO, Comparative Regionalism, Geopolitics and J&K and National Security. He has been a Visiting Fellow at the following institutes: Fudan Develpment Institute (FDI), Fudan University, Shanghai, China, Otto Suhr-Instittut Fur Politikwissenschaft (Otto-Suhr Institute for Political Sciences, OSI), Free The University of Berlin, Germany, Friedrich Ebert Stifung (FES) Office, Brussels, Belgium.
Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CLIII, No. 632, April-June 2023.