Abstract
As global
tensions rise, countries need to draw appropriate lessons from the two ongoing
conflicts. The wars in Ukraine and Gaza has some lessons applicable to the
Indian context, and the article tries to draw some of these major takeaways for
India, including the need to develop hard power as deterrence based on military
capabilities to include weapon systems, backed by the resolve to use their military.
The other major takeaway is that India needs to wean away from import
dependency. While the pursuit to infuse technology in the war-fighting system
indeed remains an enduring one, self-sufficiency in critical technologies and
investment in research and development are inescapable strategic imperatives.
Another dimension of the war is strategic communication, and there are various
communication strategies for social media, print media, and traditional
electronic media that are managed at the national level. India needs to develop
them.
Introduction
Following on the
heels of the protracted Ukrainian War, the horrific attack by Hamas on 07 Oct
2023, and the subsequent Israeli retaliation has now changed the existing
security architecture across the globe. Volatility, uncertainty and
ambiguity now seems to be the norm, and this only appears to be multiplying
with the looming threat of tensions in the South China Sea, with Taiwan casting
its shadow on future landscape. In the Indian context, four years after the
night of savagery in Galwan, relations with China remain strained, and troops
remain deployed in a tense standoff, as the main issue regarding Chinese
intrusions into territory under Indian control is yet to be resolved but also
because the fallout of mutual suspicion is creating new cycles of tension.
After the dramatic swings in territorial
control during 2022, when the Ukrainian military managed to recapture parts of
the Kharkiv region and the city of Kherson, the war settled into a positional
and attritional grind in 2023, with both the tempo of operations and the
intensity reducing.
The Gaza war is also showing no signs of
concluding, despite repeated calls for a ceasefire. The worldwide focus is now
on the humanitarian crisis that Israeli actions have unleashed. Despite
international pressure, the situation in Rafah is dire, with nearly a million
Palestinians displaced and living in tent camps with limited access to basic
necessities like food, water, and sanitation. The humanitarian crisis has been
exacerbated by a significant decline in the delivery of essential supplies,
including food, fuel, and other necessities, to the United Nations and other
aid organisations. The Israeli military’s offensive in Rafah has resulted in
numerous fatalities and injuries, and the situation is heart-wrenching for the
Palestinians living there.
However, these wars have brought out
issues regarding great power conflict, and the capacity to wage protracted wars
while pursuing a strategy focused on attrition. It was believed that an
interconnected global world would not permit protracted conflicts, but an
analysis of conflicts post-World War II including these two seems to disprove
that theory.
In today’s world of war-fighting, those
physically fighting are probably the smallest players. Those standing on the
sidelines are the bigger players, but those nowhere near the war zone, who are
both the perpetrators and the beneficiaries, are the biggest players.1 As global tensions rise increasingly,
countries need to draw appropriate lessons from these conflicts. India has
attempted to draw some lessons as applicable in its context but at no stage can
this list be taken to be all encompassing.
The wars in Ukraine and Israel are
different in multiple ways but yet share commonalities. The world is
increasingly being confronted with both symmetrical and asymmetrical concerns
that can escalate into serious challenges.
Lessons
for India: Fighting a War of Attrition
The
world is witnessing two ‘Attrition Wars’ fought with a ‘Force-Centric’
approach, unlike wars of manoeuvre which are ‘Terrain-Focused’. They are rooted
in massive industrial capacity to enable the replacement of losses,
geographical depth to absorb a series of defeats, and technological conditions
that prevent rapid ground movement. In these wars, military operations are
shaped by a state’s ability to replace losses and generate new forces, not
tactical and operational manoeuvres.2
As conflict drags on, the war is won by
economies, not armies. Economies that enable mass mobilisation and
sustainability, backed by a strong military industrial complex will prevail.3 This is because forces expand rapidly during
such conflicts, requiring massive quantities of war-fighting hardware to
include armoured vehicles and artillery, drones, electronic products, and other
combat equipment. And two more prerequisites, a well-trained manpower and
ammunition for all the assorted weaponry.
High-end weapons have exceptional
performance but are difficult to manufacture and sustain, and they also require
highly trained professional troops. Military operations in an attritional
conflict are also distinct from those in a war of manoeuvre. Instead of a
decisive battle achieved through rapid manoeuvre, attritional war focuses on destroying
enemy forces and their ability to regenerate combat power, while preserving
one’s own.4
The
Myth of Short and Localised Wars
The
Ukraine War has upended many of the theories of war, including the one that
states modern wars will be short, swift, and localised.5
Why is this war dragging on? The fact is that the war has not reached
its logical conclusion yet. Similarly, it is stated repeatedly that wars will
be localised. Again, this too is a myth. Both Ukraine and Gaza have the
capacity of sucking-in the whole region into the conflict if not more. Iran is
already partially ‘In’.
Many wars, of course, do last longer.
There are many reasons why compromises fail to take place. These could range
from public opinion against a compromise, to leaders thinking that a compromise
is defeat, which could threaten their own position. Sometimes there could be a
lack of understanding of one’s own strength and that of the enemy, leading to
underestimating the damaging consequences of the conflict. All these factors have
kept the war going.
Of course, the above reasons are rooted
in a situation where there is not a clash of ideologies such as communism
versus capitalism and autocracies versus liberal democracies or on religious
grounds. Peace is impossible if ideological barriers prevent negotiations. Such
values and ideas will continue to play a leading role in the wars waged in the
future.6
India fought a war in 1971, being a
classic case of ‘Manoeuvre’ and a short and swift campaign achieving its
desired objectives. On the obverse, there’s a continued deployment and
standoff, both on the Line of Control and the Line of Actual Control.7
Wars are not only fought with external
enemies. They can also be fought with internal enemies. Kashmir is an example.
Sri Lanka is another example. A small country, both economically and militarily
weak, showed the world its moral strength. While the world called it genocide,
every human rights organisation thundered with alarm bells, but the Sri Lankan
Army stopped only after the last man standing had been taken care of. Such
internal conflicts too, sometimes defeat timelines.
India cannot be bound by stereotypes.
The era of long wars is back. Therefore, India must recognise the multiple
implications and relook at all aspects, which vary from recruitment, and
mobilisation, to force sustenance and developing war-fighting doctrines.
Need
To Develop and Sustain Hard Power
At
its core, war is about power, who has it, who does not, and who can effectively
use it. General Manoj Pande, the Chief of the Army Staff, has clearly stated,
“The current Russia-Ukraine conflict provides some very valuable pointers. The
relevance of hard power stands reaffirmed with land continuing to be the
decisive domain of warfare and the notion of victory still being land-centric”.
Countries need to develop hard power as deterrence based on their military
capabilities to include weapon systems, backed by the resolve to use their
military.8
Long-range precision strikes have proved
that distances do not guarantee safety, and air is no longer dominated just by
manned aircraft. There is so much more. Technology has emerged as a new
strategic arena of geopolitical competition. However, come what may, the fact
remains that an army needs boots and tracks on the ground.9
The very appearance of tanks over the
horizon has a psychological impact on the enemy. Their employment is a fine art
honed by meticulous planning and training.
To seize and hold ground, you need armour and infantry. The war in
Ukraine has not revealed anything fundamentally new about the tank. It has
confirmed old lessons and reflected the challenges of armoured warfare. When
there is peace the issue of armour getting redundant comes up time and again,
but the moment there is war, countries want armour, as witnessed in Ukraine.
The same is the case in Ladakh, where armour has been moved up, especially
post-Galwan.10
Since the end of the Cold War and the
advent of US-Russia arms control, the threat of nuclear weapons has become less
salient. However, there has been certain signalling of nuclear weapons by
Russia. US President Joe Biden also declared the risk of a nuclear armageddon
to be at its highest level, bringing the nuclear issue firmly back to the
forefront.11 Are nuclear capabilities the ultimate guarantor
of national security? India has two nuclear-armed neighbours, necessitating a
constant vigil.
Globalisation and changes in technology
have made it cheaper and easier for goods, services, and information to flow
across borders and advance interconnectedness between countries, relationships
such as alliances and trade networks have become as important to any assessment
of national power as capability-based measures.12 Though interdependence can be a double-edged
weapon, in today’s world, when two states compete, the one with stronger and
more robust relationships may retain the upper hand, even in the face of
capability imbalances. Hence, relationships matter.
Self-Reliance
Crucial to Sustaining and Winning Wars
One
of the major takeaways is that India needs to wean away from import dependency.
While the pursuit to infuse technology in the war-fighting system indeed
remains an enduring one, the conclusion that we can draw is that
self-sufficiency in critical technologies and investment in the Research and
Development sector is an inescapable strategic imperative. The security of
India cannot be outsourced.13
Inadequacies in military-industrial
complexes have come to light. As per the reports, North Korea has transferred
more artillery ammunition to Russia than the West has been able to supply
Ukraine. Further, the monthly consumption of some munitions is much more than
can be produced in a year.
Therefore, the reserves of ammunition
are the greatest lesson one needs to learn from the Ukraine conflict. India has
been cutting down the holding of reserves, this will need to be rethought. Not
only are reserves required, but also the industrial base to produce more at a
pace the war necessitates.
During the war, global supply chains are
disrupted, and subcomponents may become difficult to obtain. Added to this is
the lack of a skilled workforce with experience in a particular industry. The
bottom line is that India must take a hard look at ensuring peacetime excess capacity
in its military-industrial complex, or risk losing the next war.
Recently, the Army Chief stressed the
importance of self-reliance in the defence sector and called for the infusion
of technology into war-fighting systems. Under this endeavour, major initiatives
are underway to transform the Indian Army into a modern, technology-driven, Atmanirbhar
(Self-reliant) and battle-worthy force, so that India can execute its
operational mandate more effectively.14
However, real Atmanirbharta will
be achieved only when India can produce its own military requirements for the
army, navy, and air force, in terms of hardware, software, arms, and
ammunition. The Indian military support system must have a surge capability
that can sustain military requirements even in a long-drawn conflict. Till that
self-sufficiency is reached, India must enhance the war wastage reserves to a
minimum of 60 days at an intense rate.
The
Right to Precision
Precision
is not only vastly more efficient in the effects it delivers but also allows a
force to reduce its logistics tail and, thereby, makes it more survivable.
Precision weapons, however, are scarce
and can be defeated by Electronic Warfare (EW). To enable kill chains to
function at the speed of relevance, EW for attack, protection and direction
finding is a critical element of modern combined arms operations. Sequencing
fires to disrupt EW and create windows of opportunity for precision effects is
critical and creates training requirements.15
The experience in Ukraine clarifies some
of the critical effects of a contested Electro-Magnetic Spectrum (EMS).
Military discourse has focused on the problem of EMS denial. The war provides a
better canvas to assess the impact of EW on armies with appropriately resilient
systems, tactics, techniques, and procedures.16
Denial can be achieved for a short
period, or across a limited geographic area.
However, any kind of targeted denial of bands of the EMS can be evaded
by altering frequencies.
Left uncontested, EW slows kill chains
and most importantly, degrades precision. The inability to determine accurate
locations, let alone transmit timely data on target locations, or for munitions
to achieve precise impacts against targets, all risk a force losing
competitiveness against an opponent.17
As Lieutenant General Raj Shukla (retd), the former Army Commander of
Army Training Command said, “The Indian military needs to evaluate the entire
challenge of precision weaponry and upgrade its capacities”. However, for
precision munitions to function properly, it is essential to actively contest
the EMS.18
Requirement
of Trained Manpower
Manpower
costs are increasingly becoming unmanageable. Despite progressing from third to
fourth-generation weapon technologies in the short span of about two decades, modern
armed armies are still far from being able to effect substantive reductions in
manpower. A case in point being the North Atlantic Treaty Organization armies
downsizing at the end of the Cold War which has now exposed their hollowness.19
Military manpower is increasingly
becoming more expensive to recruit, train and retain. Modern technology may
enable industry to reduce manpower, but similar benefits cannot be applied to
the armed forces, where ‘Boots on the ground still matter’.20 Some analysts fear that while Ukraine may not
have trained soldiers to man the weapons received from the West. Training also
has various levels ranging from individual, crew, sub-unit, unit, and formation
level training. At the end of the day, weaponry is not everything, you need a
man behind the weapon.
Strategic
Communication
Strategic
communication forms an important component of today’s battlefield. Social media
and digital manipulation are the new tools of misinformation. It is getting
increasingly difficult to distinguish the ‘Truth’. The very ‘Rules of War’ have
changed. The role of non-military means of achieving political and strategic
goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force.
A relevant lesson is that in conflicts,
public support for the conflict often hinges more on perceptions of the
campaign’s success than it does on casualties and loss of territory. Non-state
groups have also used this power. There must, therefore, be various
communication strategies for social media, print media and traditional
electronic media that are managed at the national level.21
Conclusion
Wars
often do not end until both sides are convinced that they are better off
coexisting with their enemies than confronting them. Countries need to be
well-prepared to face the future. The ongoing wars have once again brought to
the forefront deterrence by developing hard power, backed by a strong
military-industrial base to ensure a fair degree of self-reliance.
While India is faced with territorial
disputes with two of its neighbours, the challenge lies in balancing the
developmental and welfare needs with those required to be spent on security.
The country, therefore, needs to balance the two requirements while building on
its hard power which is reflected not only in troop strength but also
technology, capability and operational readiness backed by doctrines and
resolve. India cannot afford to lower its vigil.
Endnotes
1 Maj Gen VK Singh
And Maj Gen Jagatbir Singh, “Ongoing Conflicts: Major Lessons for India - DI Conversations”,
DI Conversations, 5 May 2024.
https://www.diconversations.com/ongoing-conflicts-major-lessons-for-india/
2 Alex Vershinin, “The Attritional Art of War:
Lessons from the Russian War on Ukraine”, Royal United Services Institute, 18
Mar 2024.
https://www.rusi.org/explore-ourresearch/publications/commentary/attritional-art-war-lessons-russian-war-ukraine.
3 ibid.
4 ibid.
5 Manoj Joshi, “The Long(Er) Ukraine War:
Lessons for the Indo-Pacific”, ORF, 16 Aug 2023
https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-long-er-ukraine-war-lessons-for-the-indo-pacific.
6 Maj Gen Jagatbir Singh VSM (Retd), “Two Years
of the Ukraine War: Is It Heading Towards a Forever Frozen Conflict?”, USI, 05
Mar 2024.
https://www.usiofindia.org/strategic-perspective/Two-Years-of-the-Ukraine-War-Is-It-Heading-Towards-a-Forever-Frozen-Conflict.html
7 Chadha, Vivek, “India Executed Manoeuvre
Warfare in 1971. It Has Answers to China’s LAC Misadventures Too”, ThePrint, 31
Jul 2020.
https://theprint.in/opinion/india-executed-manoeuvre-warfare-in-1971-it-has-answers-to-chinas-lac-misadventures-too/471660/.
8 The Hindu Bureau, “Recent Geopolitical Power
Plays Show Countries Will Not Hesitate to Go to War: Army Chief”, The Hindu, 23
Apr 2024.
https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/recent-geopolitical-power-
plays-show-countries-will-not-hesitate-to-go-to-war-army-chief/article68098227.ece.
9 Maj Gen Jagatbir Singh VSM (Retd), “Looking
Back at Two Years Of The Ukraine War: Lessons For India Salute”, Salute, 29 Apr
2024.
https://salute.co.in/looking-back-at-two-years-of-the-ukraine-warlessons-for-india/.
10 Maj Gen VK Singh VSM And Maj Gen Jagatbir
Singh VSM, “Ongoing Conflicts: Major Lessons for India - DI Conversations”, DI
Conversations, 5 May 2024.
https://www.diconversations.com/ongoing-conflicts-major-lessons-for-india/.
11 Williams, Nathan, “Ukraine War: Biden Says
Nuclear Risk Highest since 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis”, 7 Oct 2022.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-63167947.
12 Aqib Aslam, Johannes Eugster, Giang Ho,
Florence Jaumotte, Roberto Piazza, “Globalization Helps Spread Knowledge and
Technology Across Borders”, IMF, 9 Apr 2018.
https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2018/04/09/globalization-helps-spread-knowledge-and-technology-across-borders.
13 Press Trust of India, “Relevance of Hard Power
Reaffirmed with Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Army Chief”, 23 Mar 2023.
https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/relevance-of-hard-power-reaffirmed-with-russia-ukraine-conflict-army-chief-123032300795_1.html.
14 “News on AIR,” n.d.
https://www.newsonair.gov.in/army-chief-stresses-self-reliance-and-high-operational-preparedness/.
15 Mykhaylo Zabrodskyi et al, “Preliminary
Lessons in Conventional War-fighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine:
February–July 2022,” Royal United Services Institute, 30 Nov 2022.
https://www.rusi.org/explore
our-research/publications/special-resources/preliminary-lessons
conventional-war-fighting-russias-invasion-ukraine-february-july-2022.
16 ibid.
17 ibid.
18 Maj Gen Jagatbir Singh, “Lessons For India
From Ukraine”, Salute, 31 Dec 2022.
https://salute.co.in/lessons-for-india-fromukraine/.
19 Gurmeet Kanwal, “Salient Issues Affecting
Defence Manpower in India”,
Journal of
Defence Studies, MP-IDSA, Vol 4. No 4, October 2010, Pg-47.
20 ibid.
21 Cohen, Raphael S., David E. Johnson, David E.
Thaler, Brenna Allen, Elizabeth M. Bartels, James Cahill, and Shira Efron,
“Lessons from Israel’s Wars in Gaza”, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017.
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9975.html.
@Major
General Jagatbir Singh, VSM (Retd) is a Distinguished
Fellow at the United Service Institution (USI) of India. Commissioned in 1981
into the 18 Cavalry, he has held various important command and Staff
appointments including command of an Armoured Division
#Major General VK Singh, VSM (Retd) was
commissioned into the SCINDE HORSE in Dec 1983.
He has had command and staff appointments in varied terrain including
command of an Assam Rifles Battalion, Missile Brigade as part of Strategic
Forces and a RAPID Division. Qualified on the Higher Command and the National
Defence Courses, he has been a Major General, General Staff of an Army
Command. The General officer is a
Distinguished Fellow at the USI.
Journal of the United Service Institution
of India, Vol. CLIV, No. 636,
April-June 2024.