Abstract
In the West, the Ukraine and
Gaza Wars have been viewed by the power elite as a necessary extension of
Western power politics. Viewing the progress of these wars, several lessons
emerge about the conduct of future warfare. What this article argues is while
some of the lessons of these conflicts are important, for economic reasons
these two wars will not be typical of future conflicts. For scholars of modern
warfare, therefore, these wars provide both opportunities and cautionary notes
about what to do in future conflicts.
Introduction
Carl von Clausewitz is best remembered for writing that war is a continuation of policy by other
means but in the case of both Ukraine and Gaza the more relevant quote may be
that, “War has its own grammar but not its own logic”. In the West, the Ukraine
and Gaza Wars have been viewed by the power elite as a necessary extension of
Western power politics. But, if India looks at how these wars have progressed,
several lessons emerge about how to conduct a war in the new millennium. These
lessons are important since these two wars are not necessarily the type of
conflicts that will be typically conducted in the future but some takeaways
from both conflicts are important. From an Indian perspective, do these wars
provide both opportunities and cautionary notes about what to do in future
conflicts?
The High Cost of War
Both the Ukraine and Gaza Wars have been lavishly bankrolled by
the West, particularly the United States (US). As the Kiel Institute for the
World Economy’s Ukraine support tracker points out, the country has received
approximately USD 95.0 bn from the European Union and USD 71.5 bn from the US
to fund its war effort.1 These sums include military
assistance, humanitarian aid, and assistance to pay the salaries of Ukrainian
civil servants. Additionally, the US will give another USD 61.0 bn while the
European Union is committed to providing another USD 87.3 bn in assistance to
the Ukrainians. This does not cover the cost of future reconstruction which the
World Bank has put at USD 486.0 bn and Ukrainian sources put closer to USD
700.0 bn. In other words, after Iraq and Afghanistan this is going to be the
world’s third trillion-dollar war.
In the case of the
Gaza War, the costs have been equally high. Israeli sources claim that an Iron
Dome missile, used to take out the Hamas rockets reportedly cost USD 60,000 per
missile but some dispute this claim. In contrast, a Hamas rocket is estimated
to cost USD 600, roughly one per cent the cost of an Iron Dome missile and
Hamas was able to swamp the Israeli system by simply firing thousands of
missiles at it, which led to some getting through.2 Israel has also used drones and
precision-guided munitions to inflict damage in Gaza and like Ukraine, it
will benefit from American largesse. The US has approved a
USD 26.0 bn aid package for Israel and this includes, supporting current US
military operations in the region, replacing defence articles that were
provided to Israel, reimbursing the Department of Defence for defence services
and training provided to Israel; and procuring Israel’s Iron Dome, David’s
Sling, and Iron Beam defence systems to counter short-range rocket threats.3
Very few nations in
the world have the ability to sustain such an expensive war and instead, much
like Ukraine and Israel, they will require substantial donations of weapons and
funds from other countries. The question is, can the Europeans and the
Americans provide such kinds of assistance to other nations or are they spent
in terms of their ability to supply weapons to other nations? JD Vance, the
American senator from Ohio, convincingly spelt out why this was not going to be
possible.
Vance pointed out
that the Ukrainians claimed to need between 4 to 7 million 155 mm artillery
shells per year, but the US could only provide 3,60,000 shells per year—less
than ten per cent of the Ukrainian requirement. Similarly, to counter the
thousands of guided aerial bombs, drones, and missiles that Russia was
launching at it, Ukraine required thousands of very expensive Patriot missiles
(approximately USD 4.0 mn a piece) but the US annually produces only 550
missiles.4
The North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation’s production capabilities are worse than those of the US
because for decades the European nations benefitted from the peace dividend and
allowed their military production capabilities to decline. Today, Czechia is
leading an initiative to produce a million artillery shells for Ukraine, but
that would merely cover one hundred days of high-intensity war. Perhaps what
was more laughable was the Danes announcing with great fanfare that they were
giving 15,000 artillery shells to Ukraine, but these shells would only cover 36
hours of warfare for Kyiv. Wars of these types are hugely expensive and it is
clear that the West does not have the wherewithal to logistically support such
wars.
Stockpiles Matter
The second lesson from the two wars is that there is a need to
have large stockpiles of weapons that can be used by the armed forces. Both the
Russians and the Ukrainians have gone around the world buying weapons and
ammunition from whoever can supply them and have paid inflated rates for these
armaments. The Russians, who have a much larger military industrial base, had
to go to North Korea for artillery and missiles and to Iran to get Medium
Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) drones. Ukraine, similarly, got Turkish drones
and through crowdfunding bought sizeable numbers of first-person view drones
and in the initial phase of the war wreaked havoc with these cheap systems.
Modern militaries, therefore, can no longer go with low stockpiles and,
instead, will have to keep up to six months of munitions in reserve since they
cannot depend on allies or the arms market to fulfil their requirements.
Revising Doctrine and Tactics
Ukraine and Gaza have shown that the old ideas of how to conduct
warfare are being rapidly rewritten as drones, missiles, and glide bombs are
dominating the landscape of modern wars. Despite having the Iron Dome, Israel
could not stop the Hamas attack or take out all the cheap rockets that were
launched from Gaza. Ukraine has shown that drones disrupt large formations and
leave traditional instruments of land war, like tanks, particularly
vulnerable—as can be seen in how the Russians have blown up both Leopard and
Abrams tanks which had the reputation of being difficult to destroy. Further,
the Houthis, Hezbollah, and Hamas have all shown how lethal drones can be
because the West, Ukraine, and Israel have spent a fortune shooting down these
relatively cheap weapons systems that are made with off-the-shelf components.
Iran’s attack on Israel was largely with slow-flying drones and old ballistic
missiles. But it took 154 aircraft (American, British, and Israeli) firing
expensive Sidewinder missiles to shoot down the bulk of these drones. As the
American scientist Theodore Postel has written, an Iranian drone costs between
USD 10,000 to USD 20,000 while a cruise missile may be around
USD 1,00,000 but the Sidewinder Aim-9x is a USD 5,00,000 missile so the West and
Israel probably spent between USD 2.0 to 3.0 bn to intercept the Iranian
weaponry.5 Poorer nations, therefore,
are going to use weapons that are cheap to manufacture and cause headaches for
national defences. Armies everywhere will, therefore, have to change their
playbook to counter these systems.
Winning the Narrative
Unlike previous wars, Ukraine and Gaza have shown the vital
importance of shaping the narrative to get global public opinion on one’s side.
Ukraine did a great job of doing this by using social media to successfully
make the Ukrainian case to international public opinion. This was largely done
by young Ukrainians who posted on social media platforms and were even able,
for a while, to create urban myths like the Ghost of Kyiv fighter pilot who was
shooting down Russian aircraft. It turned out that the Ghost was actually a
video game.
In contrast, Israel
was not able to determine the narrative in the Gaza War even though initially
there was international sympathy for the Israelis. In the past, thanks to the
support of the US, Israel was able to prosecute its wars against the Arab
states and the Palestinians largely on its own terms and with little
interference from the rest of the world. In the past, an American veto in the
United Nations, a friendly Western media that permitted the Israeli narrative
to be the dominant one in the global press (where the issue was generally
portrayed as Palestinian terrorism against innocent Israelis), and the fact
that the Palestinians were unable to effectively voice their case, made it a
situation where the coverage became one-sided and the Palestinians disappeared
from the view of the international community.
In this war, however,
the media monopoly of the West, which overwhelmingly supported Israel, failed
as the Palestinians were able to convincingly make their case on social media
like TikTok, Telegram, and YouTube. This along with a generational shift in the
US on how to view Israel has created a situation where nearly 33.0 per cent of
young people support an end to genocide and an immediate ceasefire and the
world has seen protests in university campuses across the US. Further, in the
international community, there was a willingness to appreciate the genocide
perpetrated on the Palestinians—especially as graphic video emerged from Gaza
of the deaths of women and children. This has led to global support for a
cease-fire and a long-term solution to the problem, preferably a meaningful
two-state solution. Future wars, therefore, will also require winning the
hearts and minds of the international community and not through the traditional
means of using mainstream media. Instead, it will require, as in the case of
Ukraine, harnessing the skills of young people who are in tune with the latest
social media tools and know, intuitively, how to work with the new media to get
the best results.
War has its own Grammar but not its own logic
Clausewitz observed that while war may have its own grammar, it
does not have its own logic. In international circles, the bulk of the
discussion on the Ukraine and Gaza conflicts centres on how to conduct the
wars. Very little has been written about war termination and what a future end
state in Ukraine and Gaza should look like. Both the Ukrainian and Israeli
governments need to spell out what they see as possible end states to the
conflict that they can live with—and that would require moving away from
maximalist positions that the other side will never agree to. Ukraine must
espouse a long-term solution for living with Russia and the West cannot go back
to mouthing platitudes about a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine
(Israel has already rejected this proposal).
In both cases, the
fact is that without an end state not only can peace be negotiated, but it only
means that either conflict could once again flare up with adverse consequences
for both Ukraine and Israel. Since the
war started, Ukraine’s population has shrunk from around 43.0 to 35.0 million
and one can only wonder how many of those who left the country will return to a
war-ravaged economy with little prospects of employment. Similarly, in Israel
where there is no concrete peace settlement one has to wonder if the hundreds
of thousands of Israelis with dual nationality will continue to stay in a
country where Israel’s image of invincibility has taken a beating and instead,
people are left to wonder when the next 07 Oct 2023 style attack will be
repeated?
An Economic Shift?
Lastly, India is seeing the start of an economic shift in the
global system brought about by the Ukraine War. Sanctions on multiple
countries, the problem with using the Dollar to trade and make payments, and
the confiscation of assets held in western banks are leading to preliminary
action being taken to make countries less vulnerable to the Western-created
international economic system. These measures include the move towards the
association of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa currencies, the
greater economic cooperation between Russia and China, and the fact that
heavily sanctioned nations like Iran, North Korea, and Russia are increasingly
working with each other and China to defy the West. Thus, despite all the
sanctions on Russia its economy is growing and the Russian arms industry has
seen a renaissance in its abilities.
Conclusion
For a country like India, these lessons are of great importance.
In a future war, the country will not receive unrestricted aid and large
stockpiles of weaponry from the West.
And even if it does get some, the political cost may be too great for
the Indian government to accept. Further, one cannot ignore the military
lessons of these two wars. Ukraine is showing that while artillery, armour, and
even landmines matter, new tactics must be adopted. Part of this would include
a coherent drone policy to buy both First Person View drones as well as MALE
drones for all three services. The Hamas attack is probably being studied very
carefully in Pakistan to try and see what is applicable to an India-Pakistan
conflict. Lastly, starting a war without an endgame is something India cannot
afford. Unlike Ukraine and Israel, it does not have a benefactor like the US or
the European Union and will have to depend largely on itself. While this is
acceptable, it does mean that realistic choices on war initiation, war continuation,
and war termination will have to be made.
Endnotes
1 Ukraine Support Tracker, Kiel Institute for
the World Economy, available at, Ukraine Support Tracker | Kiel Institute
(ifw-kiel.de).
2 Iain Boyd,
“Israel’s Iron Dome air defense system works well – here’s how Hamas got
around It”, Colorado Arts and Sciences Magazine, University of Colorado,
Boulder, October 13, 2023.
3 H.R.7217 -
Israel Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2024, available at, H.R.7217 -
118th Congress (2023-2024): Israel Security Supplemental Appropriations Act,
2024 | Congress.gov | Library of Congress
4 J.D. Vance, “The Math on Ukraine Doesn’t Add
Up”, The New York Times, 13 Apr 2024.
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/12/opinion/jd-vance-ukraine.html.
5 Alastair Crooke, “The Interlocking of
Strategic Positions”, Strategic Culture Foundation, 29 Apr 2024.
https://strategic-culture.su/news/2024/04/29/the-interlocking-of-strategic-paradigms/.
@Professor Amit
Gupta was
on the Faculty of the Department of International Security at the United States
Air Force Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base and is now a Senior Advisor
to the Forum of Federations, Ottawa, Canada. He is the author, co-author or
editor of the following books, Building an Arsenal: The Evolution of Regional
Power Force Structures (Praeger), India’s Nuclear Security (Lynne Rienner), The
Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific: Maritime Challenges, Opportunities, and
Policies (Routledge), Global Security Watch—India (Praeger), Strategic Stability
in Asia (Ashgate) and Air Forces: Next Generation (Ashgate). The last book was
placed on the Chief of the Royal Air Force’s reading list in 2022. In the realm
of popular culture, he has written in academic journals and magazines on Doctor
Who, The Defenders, Star Trek, international cricket, and the Globalisation of
Sports. In his spare time, he coached the Air War College football team.