Abstract
This article
records the success of United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) in implementing
the Comprehensive Peace agreement (CPA) between Khartoum and Sudan People’s
Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/SPLA), leading to the birth of South Sudan on 09
July 2011 - a unique benchmark by any UN peace operation.
The contents are
based on political developments and personal observations as Deputy Special
Representative of Secretary General (Political) from 2010-2011, primarily based
at Juba. UNMIS mandate operationalisation was achieved through a collaborative
effort. Creating a safe and secure environment and political convergence though
partnered mediation enabled credible conduct of 2010 elections and 2011 South
Sudan referendum. It has been gratifying to recall my association in Sudan in
the entire UNMIS cycle - from initial deployment as Force Commander to
successful liquidation as head of the mission. Team building and integrated
approach stand highlighted as major leadership attributes. Importantly, warm
relationships with the host nation proved pivotal in resolution of tricky
issues. The situation in Sudan has not stabilised - as sensitive issues of
Abyei, 1/1/56 border, oil sharing and ethnic violence persist. Additionally,
issues of Nile Dam and internal conflict in Ethiopia have aggravated ongoing
tensions. These require synergised effort by the UN and international community
for meaningful conflict resolution in the region.
Introduction
I was fortunate to a be part of
Sudan’s peace process, resulting in the birth of South Sudan on 09 Jul
2011 wearing multiple hats (turbans). In the first tenure as Force
Commander (FC) from Jan 2006 to April 2008 in the United Nations Mission in
Sudan (UNMIS), we succeeded in maintaining the ceasefire and redeploy major
forces mandated in the Comprehensive Peace agreement (CPA).1 Post military retirement, I got selected as,
Deputy Special Representative of Secretary General-Political (DSRSG-P) and was
deployed at Juba, effective Jan2010 – the new turf of political ambiguities.
This article records the support – and, at many places, the leads of our
political contribution for peace and development in Sudan. UNMIS was
established in 2006 through UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1590 (2005);2 to support the implementation of CPA signed at
Nairobi in Jan 2005 by the Vice President Ali Osman Mohamed Taha representing
the Government of Sudan (GoS) and Dr John Garang of the Sudan People’s
Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/SPLA).
The historic agreement ended decades of
civil war fought over identity and resources. Both parties, while recognising
the right of the people of South Sudan to secede, had sought to make unity
attractive. There was an unwritten impression that Taha and Garang were
committed to make space for a New Sudan with an autonomous South. Tragically,
Garang died in a helicopter crash within three weeks of signing the CPA and
Salva Kirrtook over his responsibility.3 Post Garang,
the promotion of inclusiveness and national sovereignty got diluted – with
calls for separation gaining momentum.
The
CPA Politics
The
CPA was mediated by the Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a
regional organisation of which Sudan is a member. The CPA incorporated several
previous negotiations and agreements termed as protocols. The Machakos protocol
(July 2002) covered the broad principles of government and governance.4 Multiple agreements signed at Naivasha – on
Security (September 2003), Wealth-sharing (January 2004), Power-sharing (May
2004), Resolution of the Abyei conflict (May 2004), and Resolution of the
conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states (May 2004) formed other
components.
The CPA provided a time table for the
South Sudan referendum. It provisioned a new national constitution and outlined
measures for sharing power, distributing wealth, and providing security in the
country during a six-year interim period. During the period, South Sudan was to
govern affairs in their region and participate equitably in the national
government. Post interim period, the South had the right to vote in an
internationally monitored referendum - either to confirm Sudan’s unity or vote
for secession.
UNMIS was tasked to provide
guidance and technical assistance for the national consensus, state and
provincial elections, and the referendum in coordination with the Government of
National Unity (GNU), relevant UN offices, and international players. A
collaborative effort was necessary to create secure environment and promote
political dialogue for generating coherent conflict management strategies. The
political process proceeded on schedule – though with frequent disagreements on
policy-making CPA clauses. Disturbingly, five issues remained critical for
resolution – 1/1/56 Border, Abyei, wealth sharing, popular consultations in
Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states, and ethnic conflict.
The 200 kilometre international boundary
between North and South follows the broad demarcation done by the British on 01
Jan 1956 – referred to as, Line 1/1/56. Since the demarcation was driven by
administrative, land ownership and grazing convenances, it was imprecise and
stood unmarked. Notwithstanding, the alignment had been broadly accepted by
both sidesover the years - allowing unregulated movement. However, in the
absence of any authenticated map, eight areas stood disputed, the major being
Abyei.5
Abyei’s dispute centred around the
coveted Heglig oil field and residency rights of Ngok Dinka, the pastoralist
tribal group with strong ethnic and cultural ties to the Dinka of South Sudan-
and Misseriya, a northern nomadic Arab tribe which seasonally traversed Abyei
for cattle grazing. The CPA had accorded special administrative status to Abyei
based on the definition of the Abyei areas by the Abyei Border Commission- with
specified oil sharing.6
A referendum was to be conducted in
Abyei in 2011, concurrent with the South Sudan referendum, allowing residents
of Abyei to choose between Sudan or South Sudan. Both Dinka and Misseriya
tribes claimed residency for voting. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) occupied
Abyei through an armed intervention in May 2011, adding altogether a different
angle to the conflict. Since the matter remained unresolved devoid referendum,
the UN deployed a separate mission for Abyei - United Nations Interim Security
Force in Abyei (UNISFA).7
Sudan is rich in oil – an economic boon
but the curse for conflict. While South Sudan holds majority of the oil
reserves, the North has the pipelines and processing facilities along with the
port at Red Sea for export. Ethnicity plays a critical role in oil ownership -
leading to frequent clashes for physical control and/or preferential
allocation. Post South’s independence in July 2011, the oil production got
interrupted by violence. Though production resumed, major differences remain on
royalty and transit issues.
An area of demographic instability
comprises two states - Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile - both located north of
line 1/1/56. Their populations were heavily involved in the civil war – and
though they had no right to decide on separation like the South - the CPA
demanded ‘popular consultations’ on sharing of political power and wealth. This
did not happen in earnest.
South Sudan has been mired in resource
driven ethnic competition, often getting violent on cattle rustling. Ethnicity
has been a dominant factor in the profile and power construct of the SPLA with
many tribes having fought against each other in the civil war for the common
objective of South’s independence. The Dinka, Nuer, and Shilluk form the
majority and are located in the oil-rich areas adjacent to Line 1/1/56.
President Salva Kirr belongs to the Dinka tribe while the Vice President Riek
Machar Tenyis a Nuer.
Sudan
Elections 2010
General
elections were organised in Sudan in April 2010 to elect the president and
national assembly as well as the president and legislative assembly of South
Sudan. A year earlier in March 2009, President Omar al-Bashir had been indicted
by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for atrocity crimes in Darfur.8 This created international diplomatic and
political impasse – but fortunately did not derail the CPA nor
dissuadedal-Bashir from contesting. UNMIS continued to interact with President
Bashir – as also with Ahmed Haroun (also indicted) the governor of Sothern
Kordofan, on mandate driven political and humanitarian activity.
I flew indicted governor Ahmed Haroun to
Abyei in 2010 to build bridges with the Misseriya leadership – an act which
came under scrutiny, in parts, of the international community and media.
Notwithstanding, our conflict-prevention diplomacy helped to reinforce UNMIS
impartiality as also its reach out to multiple voices. There are no red lines
in political dialogue - and we should not hesitate to mediate with groups not
signatory to the peace agreements.
The elections were a political test.
UNMIS used its good offices to work with all concerned in assisting the
Sudanese to establish an environment whereby the elections are acceptable to
the people of the Sudan. We interacted with known political figures in an effort
to make them participate and revive their political relevance. During my
meetings, the main opposition parties (including the SPLM) appeared convinced
to nominate Sadiq al-Mahdi of National Umma Party (prime minister twice before)
as their joint candidate.9 Ironically, they decided to
withdraw from the contest fearing National Congress Party (NCP) rigging.
UNMIS Electoral Division (EAD) worked
with United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to coordinate support to the
National Elections Commission (NEC). This included material, training,
logistics, and public information. Warm relations with the NEC Chairman Abel
Alier Kwai, along with joint planning and coordination, helped to conduct the
elections smoothly. It was ensured that while some heavy lifting may have been
done by the UN, the NEC retained ownership and national face of the process.
The NCP won 73 per cent of the seats in
the national assembly, while the SPLM won 22 per cent, with others going to smaller opposition
parties. Bashir stood and won the elections by 94 per cent votes, which
reinforced his claim as a democratically popular leader. Salva Kiir was elected
as President of the South. The SPLM won 160 out of 170 seats in the
legislative assembly of South Sudan, making them an effective political force.10
The elections evoked widespread
international attention. UNMIS provided security and logistical support to
observers from the Arab League, African Union (AU), European Union (EU), Japan
and Carter Centre through a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The logistics
stretched our capacity to its limit - especially in helicopters and medical
support. The overall verdict was that though there were procedural infirmities,
the credibility and the election results could not be disputed.
An unfortunate development during the
election period was rebellion by General George Athor Dengin Jonglei - after
losing his gubernatorial contest as an independent candidate. Athor was a
towering figure of SPLA struggle and popular in Bor. We developed contact with
the renegade general through satellite phone and made a sincere effort for
reconciliation. I met President Salva Kirr frequently on the issue – who
appeared amenable to a ceasefire. President Kirr even allowed me to brief the
SPLA security body in rare diplomatic gesture to enable amnesty to General
Athor. Sadly, the matter got addressed
militarily after my departure.11
The
Referendum
As
stated before, an internationally monitored referendum was to be organised
jointly by the Government of Sudan (GoS) and SPLM at the end of interim period
for the people of South Sudan - to vote for the unity or secession. Southern
Sudan Referendum Commission (SSRC) became the nodal agency for organising and
conducting the referendum. The SSRC was chaired by Prof Mohamed I. Khalil with
Chan Reec Madut as his deputy and had 10 members representing the military and
foreign service.
UNMIS coordinated with the SSRC on the
lines of our support for the April 2010 elections. The overall authority rested
with Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) Mr Haile
Menkerios, while the ground implementation was led by me. The team comprised
UNDP Country Representative Mr Claudio Caldarone, the Regional Coordinator
David Gressly and UN Country Team resident coordinator Lise Grande – UN
professionals of caliber.
Drawing lessons from 2010, it was
decided to merge the UN election machinery - comprising EAD and UNDP - into one
team termed The UN Integrated Referendum and Electoral Division (UNIRED).
UNIRED was a maiden initiative with streamlined reporting and operational
structure. It workedclosely with the SSRC at both government and county level
on the entire spectrum of referendum activity.
There was uncertainty and at times
scepticism if the South would be allowed to secede by the North. During the
run-up, the political climate appeared conducive. President Omar al-Bashir
stated just months prior to the voting that the southern region had a right to
choose to secede and that unity could not be forced by power. He had also
stated at times that Khartoum would respect outcome of the vote and support the
South.12 Many international pundits
felt that though secession was South’s legal right, it may not resolve their
real issues. There were also fears that a violent South could unstable the
entire region.
Referendum polling took
place from 09 to 15 January 2011. It was an emotional delight witnessinga
sea of drum beating ‘South Sudan Oyee’ humanity. Many had walked miles to be at
the polling stations aspiring to be part of their independence history. Most
had spent nights in the open to be a part of the process.
The referendum witnessed a wide
cross-section of domestic and international monitoring. The Carter Centre
comprising of three members - President Jimmy Carter, ex UNSG Kofi Anan and
former Tanzanian Prime Minister Joseph Warionba - played a major role. US
Senator John Kerry and Actor George Clooney also visited Sudan during the
referendum period. Besides, nearly all international and regional organisations
deployed international observers - AU, EU and League of Arab States being the
forerunners.
In response to a request from the
parties, the UN Secretary General too deployed a ‘Referenda Panel’ (both for
the South and Abyei) to monitor credibility of the process and ensure that the
results are accepted by all stakeholders. The panel comprised three senior
officials - former Tanzania President Benjamin Mkapa, former Minister of
Foreign Affairs of Portugal António Monteiro, andformer Chairman of the
Election Commission of Nepal, Bhojraj Pokharel.13 Though
the panel worked independent of UNMIS, we interacted periodically for political
conformity.
On 07 February 2011, SSRC published the
final results. A landslide majority of 98.83 per cent voted in favour of
independence, with well over the requirement of 60 per cent turnout.14 Nevertheless,
the Abyei referendum did not take place for reason of residency identification
as mentioned before.
Farewell
Sudan
The 09 July 2011 South Sudan
independence parade was impressive and emotional, with John Garang’s memories
dominating the domestic sentiment. The
end of the CPA Interim Period brought UNMIS to a close and a new mission -
United Nations Mission for South Sudan (UNMISS) got mandated at Juba the same
day. However, the situation in Sudan did not stabilise. The Abyei conflict, an
unmarked 1/1/56 border, blurred oil sharing protocols, inadequate reforms in
Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states and ethnic competition in the South and
Darfur continue to pose challenges for sustainable peace.
I moved to Khartoum on 10 July to head
the UNMIS Liquidation Mission mandated through Security Council resolution 1997
and written request of Republic of Sudan effective 11 July 2011 with a deadline
for completion by 15 December 2011.15 The liquidation was uniquely different from
other UN endeavours - being conducted amidst continuing conflict. Accordingly,
the composition of the LiquidationTeam was a typical from past liquidations in
that it was headed by senior substantive leadership (self) and a Liquidation FC
as part of UNMIS force was in place.
The liquidation effort was wrought with
challenges – notably conflict-ridden environment and ambiguous understanding of
UN’s role. While Khartoum was accommodative on retrieval and relocation of UN
assets, many on the ground felt that these were now their property. With
committed GoS support, and an excellent support team led by Clark Toes,
majority of equipment got transferred to missions in Darfur, Abyei, and the
South. A part of the inventory was shifted to UN Regional Logistics Base at
Entebbe. The immovable infrastructure created by UNMIS was gifted to Khartoum
with green signatures. Additionally, many movable assets like vehicles and
generating sets were donated to local authorities.
UNMIS digitised and uploaded required
records in the Total Records and Information Management system (TRIM) and
shipped important hard copies to United Nations Archives and Records Management
Section in New York (UN ARMS). Hard copies belonging to the offices of the
chief of staff and the SRSG were shredded to mitigate the risk of confidential
and vital records being compromised. In the opinion Office of the Internal
Oversight Service (OIOS), UNMIS had performed satisfactorily in management of
the archiving and records management process.16
UNMIS Liquidation Mission cleared all
pending customs - and reconciled payment to the Sudan police as rentals for the
premises occupied by UNMIS – a case which had assumed embarrassing legal
proportions. The timely-effective liquidation left an amenable impression in
Sudan and a range of best practices in UN peacekeeping.
Reflecting, it is gratifying to
recall achievements of the UN in Sudan. On a personal level, my association
with UNMIS had been through the entire mission cycle - from initial deployment
to successful liquidation. It was also a great coincidence that the
Independence Day of 09 July happened to be my birthday, which rightly earns
extra celebration.
Monitoring the Referendum Polling at
Juba
Endnotes
1 CPA 2005
2 UNMISS Closses as
South Sudan Becomes World’s Newest Country, United Nations Peacekeeping UNMIS
-2005-2011
3 Julie Flint, John
Garang: Authoritative Sudanese Leader and Former Rebel Commander with a Vision
of Secular, Democratic Sudan, The Guardian, 3 Aug 2005
https://www.theguardian.com/news/ 2005/aug/03/guardianobituaries.sudan
4 The Machakos Protocol, United Nations
Peacemaker, 20 July 2002
https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SD_020710_
MachakosProtocol.pdf
5 James Gatdet Dak, Sudan’s 1956 North-South
Border Map is Non-Existent – Committee, Sudan Tribune, 28 June 2008
https://sudantribune. com/article27670/
6 https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-protocol-resolution-abyei-conflict 7 UNISFA
8 https://www.icj.org/icc-judgment-in-al-bashir-case-a-victory-for-international-justice/
9 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8481715.stm
10 https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/sudan/politics-2010.htm
11 Gen Athor
Rebellion
12 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/04/bashir-south-sudan-independence-vote
13 https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-un-panel-southern-referendum-expression-peoples-will
14 https://sudantribune.com/article37480/
15 https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/706748?ln=en
16 https://2009-2017-usun.state.gov/sites/default/files/organization_pdf/199085.pdf
@Lieutenant General
Jasbir Lidder, UYSM, AVSM (Retd) was commissioned in
3 Grenadiers in June 1969, the battalion he fought the 1971 War with and later
commanded. The officer is a graduate of the Defense Services Staff College
Wellington, the Higher Command Course, Mhow and the National Defense College,
New Delhi. He has rich UN peacekeeping experience in both military and
political spectrum. He was the Military Chief of Staff of the UN Mission in
Mozambique (ONUMOZ) in 1994-1995, Force Commander of the United Nations Mission
in Sudan (UNMIS) from January 2006 - May 2008 and as Deputy Special
Representative of Secretary General (Political) of the same mission from
January 2010 to December 2011.
Journal of the United Service Institution of India,
Vol. CLIII, No. 631, January-March 2023.