Abstract
On 26 May 2023,
the author delivered a talk on ‘India-China War of 1962’ during the Conference
on ‘Nationalism, War and Defeat’ held at the University of Copenhagen. This
article, an expansion of the above talk, is an outcome of the research carried
out by the author jointly with Dr Beáta Biliková, Assistant Professor at the
Faculty of Applied Languages, University of Economics in Bratislava. Dr
Biliková with her expertise on applied linguistics, textual and critical
discourse analysis, has covered how the American and the British media
represented and reflected upon the war and highlighted some evaluative
representations that tried to influence readers to adopt a specific bias
towards the conflict. The 1962 India-China war is a significant event in Indian
history, marking its only modern military defeat. Despite the importance of
this conflict, key figures like Defence Minister VK Krishna Menon and military
personnel did not leave behind memoirs. This article delves into Indian
writings on the war and examines how Western media, particularly in the United
States (US) and United Kingdom (UK), portrayed the conflict. Indian
perspectives, ranging from military officers to historians, offer diverse
insights into the war’s causes and consequences, while Western media framed it
within the broader context of the Cold War, emphasising ideological tensions
and strategic interests. The US press focused on strategic gains, while the UK
press highlighted moral and historical dimensions, reflecting complex
narratives of politics, ideology, and colonial legacies. Overall, both Indian
and Western perspectives underscored the war’s long-term implications for Asian
security.
Introduction
On 20 Oct 1962,
India was taken by complete surprise politically, diplomatically and militarily and caught unprepared when China’s
Peoples’ Liberation Army attacked Indian Army positions in the Ladakh sector.
The war, which started with baffling suddenness and lasted for about a month,
ended with equal swiftness on 21 Nov 1962, when China declared a unilateral
ceasefire. The Indian Army suffered 9,743 casualties, including 1,423 killed,
3,078 wounded, 1,655 missing believed killed and 3,587 Prisoners of War (PoW).
The country suffered its only military defeat in modern times and it impacted
every Indian; from the Prime Minister to the common man.1
Numerous books, memoirs and articles
have since been written by Indian historians, military men and academicians to
describe various aspects of the 1962 war. Some bureaucrats, journalists and
correspondents, associated with the war, have also written on it.
Indian
Writings on the India-China War of 1962
Although
a large number of books and other writings by Indians are available on the
Indian defeat in 1962, strangely, some key functionaries of the war such as the
then Defence Minister VK Krishna Menon, the Chief of Army Staff General Pran
Nath Thapar and the Army Commander Eastern Command, Lieutenant General LP Sen
did not pen down their experiences for posterity and lesson-learning.2 However, some senior army officers have
written books highlighting their views and experiences. These include
Lieutenant General BM Kaul, Major General DK Palit, Brigadier JP Dalvi and
Brigadier Darshan Khullar, who had taken part in the conflict. Lieutenant
General BM Kaul, who was commanding 4 Corps during the conflict, and was much
blamed for his failures, wrote ‘The Untold Story’ in 1967, which largely
focused on covering his blunders while blaming others for the debacle against
the Chinese.3 Brigadier JP Dalvi, who was commanding the 7
Infantry Brigade and was taken as PoW, along with 26 other personnel, wrote the
‘The Himalayan Blunder’. The Curtain Raiser to the Sino-Indian War of 1962. His
book highlighted the bravery of Indian soldiers on one hand while criticising
the political establishment of the time for overlooking the defence
preparedness of the nation on the other.4
Many more authors, not directly
associated with the conflict, have also written about this event. Sarvepalli
Gopal has written that the then Indian President, Dr S Radhakrishnan, had a
poor opinion of Krishna Menon and was instrumental in getting the latter
removed from the Ministry of Defence in the course of the war.5 Jaswant Singh was of the view that the
decision of the Indian government to adopt a forward posture, based merely on
the recommendation of the Intelligence Bureau, without taking the considered
view of the Indian Army, was flawed and contributed to the miscommunication
between India and China.6 JN Sahani in his ‘The Lid Off: Fifty Years of
Indian Politics 1921-1971’ writes that the reliance by Nehru to resolve issues
of national security through diplomacy had proved fatal for India.7 Another interesting book, ‘1962: The War That
Wasn’t’ by Shiv Kunal Verma, gives a detailed account of outside interference
in the postings and promotions of senior Indian Army officers, that severely
undermined the professional competence of the field formations at the critical
juncture.
Representation
of the War in the Western Media
The
representation of the India-China War of 1962 in the Western print media
reflects a viewpoint relevant to India due to the political implications that
derive from it.8 The second part of the article aims to explore
how individual components and tools of discourse contributed to the
representation and/or reconstruction of events.9
The authentic material for the analysis
of the war’s coverage in the United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK) Press
in 1962 was predominantly retrieved from ‘Newspapers.com’ which is the largest
online archive of digitised newspapers giving access to more than 924 million
pages of historical newspapers from around 24,600 newspapers published in the
US and other countries.10
Representation
of the War in the US Press
The
US press tended to represent the India-China War either as a clash of
‘Communist’ and ‘Neutral’ ideologies or a clash between Indian and Chinese
nationalism ‘In an area of historically vague frontiers’. On 21 Oct 1962, ‘The
News and Observer’ stressed that both the Eisenhower and Kennedy
administrations conceived of the Cold War in Asia as determined by ‘The rivalry
between India and Communist China’.11 On
the other hand, the ‘Statesman Journal’ of 22 Oct 1962, pointed out it was
simply ‘The conflict of the Indians versus the Chinese rather than of Neutrals
versus Communists’.12
However, a certain ideological element
had been perceived as present no matter which of the two views was preferred.
The ultimate aim of China, as the Statesman Journal believed, was ‘To disrupt
India’s economic development’. At the same time, the Statesman observed that
“No area is of vital interest to either country, in economic or population
terms. But there is a nationalistic principle involved”.13 The ever-present ideological element is
reflected in the fact that the toponym China is in the researched newspapers
usually used in combination with the attributes ‘Red’ or ‘Communist’. Some
newspapers are more consistent than others in the use of phrases like ‘Red
China’ or ‘Communist China’, but the high frequency of such expressions
indicated the preoccupation of the US press with the significance of the war’s
ideological background.14
The main concerns of the then-US press
were the fear of a big Asian war, a possible use of the ‘Atom Bomb’, the ambiguous
role played by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) along with its
motive, and the impact of the India-China war on the global political
constellation. Americans seem to have considered the war in question, and their
involvement in it, as one of the strategic moves in their global political game
of chess. At the same time, it was not generally perceived as a major matter.
The Des Moines Register of 21 Oct 1962, labelled it as one of ‘the world’s
‘Pocket-Wars’, albeit the one with ‘By far the most explosive potential’.15
Contemplating the mistakes of India’s
administration, the ‘Bayonne Times’ of 25 Oct 1962, pointed out that what India
naively considered to be a new China in fact ‘Was very old’. For ‘Nothing is
more ancient than tyranny’. The article concluded its evaluation of the
situation claiming that ‘One can have massive sympathy for Nehru’s desire not
to become involved in war, cold or hot, but it is hard to admire blindness that
persists when the enemy is within the gates’. The article employed a rather
patronising attitude, one benefitting from the opportunity of hindsight which
allowed the reporter to imply that the war was inescapable - of course, and
everybody but India’s leaders could see.16 A similar critical note can be identified in
‘Tallahassee Democrat’ of 26 Oct 1962, which opined that ‘Nehru’s non-alignment
policy and especially Defence Minister VK Krishna Menon’s arrogance have not
endeared them to many in the US’. Nevertheless, ‘Her (India’s, author’s note)
loss would engulf all Asia in Communism. India cannot afford to let China
absorb India almost unopposed’.17
It appears that for ideological reasons
the US felt obliged not to let India fail completely. However, they had no
intention of helping India regain the territories lost in the struggle with
China either. ‘Rocky Mount Telegram’ of 26 Oct 1962, for example, mused: ‘(…)
one wonders what India hopes to gain by refusing a cease-fire (proposed by
China18, author’s
note)’. Here, again, a condescending tone can be heard, projecting India’s
stance as immature and irrational. The article considered the situation in
India to be ‘Critical’ and the author claimed that it was ‘particularly
embarrassing because of (…) the statements (…) by Nehru that he was going to
drive the Chinese Red troops out of Indian territory’. In conclusion, the
author laconically underscored the presented analysis with the phrase: ‘One
thing is not difficult to predict: Nehru is in trouble’. Thus, indirectly,
readers get to understand that some changes in the Government of India are
imminent. Along with that, the article echoed the frequently discussed idea
that the then USSR was a factor in the China–India conflict.
On 03 Dec 1962, ‘Winston-Salem Journal’
published an article ‘Indian Nationalism Responded in Fight’. It described two
traditions coexisting in India, one of Gandhi’s nonviolence and the other of
Subhash Chandra Bose’s violent battle. The author of the article argued that
the tradition of violence “Is now coming to the front as India faces China”.19 The country responded to the call of ‘Nehru,
the man of peace turned war leader at age 73’. The ironic transformation of
Nehru into a war leader marked the personal tragedy of a man whose lifelong
mission was turned upside down.
The ‘Kansas City Times’ of 10 Dec 1962,
published W.R. Frye’s article ‘Dividends Accrue to West’ in which he summed up
the outcomes of the India-China War. His description started from the
observation that the war was “One of the most important developments of the decade”20 and then he gave an account of the positive
outcomes of the India-China war. First
of all, it was the fact that, despite remaining officially non-aligned, in
Frye’s view India “Is, in fact, emotionally, politically and militarily with
the West”.21 The second positive side-effect of the war was
an increased antagonism between China and Russia. The next one was a
foreseeable settlement of the India–Pakistan ‘Quarrel’ over Kashmir. And
finally, there was an ensuing joint pressure, including India, on the USSR to
comply with a nuclear test ban. The article concluded the outline of the
benefits brought about by the India-China War by saying that “The West has
reaped rich dividends already from Red China’s incredible stupidity and avarice
in India. It stands to reap a lot more–if it acts with skill and subtlety”.22
On the whole, the presentation of the
India-China War of 1962 in the US press did not focus on the situation and
motives of the two involved countries. The nature and effects of the war were
rather projected in a much broader context of Asia, or even in the global
context of ideological confrontation. Special emphasis was usually laid on the
consequences of the war and their interplay with the US global political
interests, i.e., boosting the democratic ‘Front’ opposing Communism.
Representation
of the War in the British Media
The
British press showed a great deal of concern with the India-China War. One of
the fundamental messages was that India, being a Commonwealth country, deserved
and would get humanitarian and military aid from Britain.
Compared to the US media, the British
press laid emphasis on a different set of issues. One of the most complex
articles concerning the India-China War was published on 26 Oct 1962, in the
‘Daily Telegraph and Morning Post’. It was entitled ‘India’s Hour of Trial’
which may be a distant echo of the darkest hour, a phrase associated with
Winston Churchill and the British resistance against Germany in World War II.
In the introduction, the article contemplated the unique paralleling of the
Cuban Missile Crisis and the Himalayan conflict and remarked it almost looked
as if the two actions had been coordinated, aiming to divert the attention of
the world from the Chinese invasion of India.23 The effect ‘Of the coincidence is to leave
India for the moment isolated (…) from the instant and active preoccupation
which her plight would otherwise evoke’. Next, the article criticised the
outrageous ceasefire offer from China, with the terms humiliating to India, and
appreciated Mr Nehru for ‘Bravely Resisting’ the proposal. ‘All honour to him
(…) it will be accorded no less sincerely by those who have felt him to be
dangerously deluded in his attitude towards international communism and
misguided in his neutralism’.
Another interesting view was presented
by the ‘Glamorgan Gazette’ on 02 Nov 1962, in the article ‘Reds’ Attack on
India Is a Menace to World Peace, says Ogmore MP. It claimed that it was a
‘Real Tragedy’ that the nuclear threat over Russian bases in Cuba distracted
attention from the Chinese-Indian conflict which ‘In the long run may prove to
be more important for the future of humanity than the Cuban crisis’.24
Unlike the US press, the British
newspapers generally did not condemn Nehru for his non-alignment policy and did
not represent it as immature and naive, although they were critical of his
neutralist attitude. Some newspapers even appreciated that he had acknowledged
his fault. The ‘Daily Telegraph’ concluded that Mr Nehru was not a Churchill of
his country, but he “Has nevertheless risen bravely and honestly, though
belatedly, to meet his country’s crisis”.25 The House of Lords debate reported on by the
Guardian on 02 Nov 1962, included the speech of Lord Henderson who had
condemned the Chinese aggression and proposed to give India full support.26 A similar view had been presented by Lord
Attlee who, nevertheless, included a critical remark too in respect of Mr Nehru
finally ‘Waking up to Realities’.27
On 01 Nov 1962, the ‘Birmingham Post’
offered a summary of opinions of Harold Wilson, a Socialist ‘Shadow’ Foreign
Secretary who urged: ‘There is no need to sneer about India’s neutrality’. He
appreciated India’s part in promoting peace. Wilson even proposed to institute
‘A massive programme of lend-lease’ in order to provide India with sufficient
military aid and solve the issue of the India-China boundary line by the
International Court at the Hague.28
Occasionally though, there occurred
articles disclosing the weak points jeopardising India’s ability to fight
China, e.g., the article by RHC Steed in the ‘Daily Telegraph’ on 01 Nov 1962.
The article entitled ‘India Criticism Rejected’ informed that Mr Menon played
havoc with service chiefs and armed services. Their ordnance departments are in
a fantastic muddle. As it turns out Mr Nehru played his role in maintaining
that chaos by appointing Mr Menon as Minister of Defence Production soon after
Menon was dismissed from his post as Minister of Defence.29 The Daily Telegraph and Morning Post of 20 Nov
1962 explained that senior staff officers had been talking about unpreparedness
and preparing for the wrong war for years and mentioned Major General
Habibullah and Major General Kulwant Singh as examples of the state policy
critics.30
Conclusion
The
India-China War of 1962 stands out as one of the most defining moments in the
history of independent India. Unfortunately, the key functionaries of the war
did not leave their memoirs and the war has not been as adequately covered as
the subsequent conflicts with Pakistan. The coverage of the War in the Western
media has brought out some significant facts, that are of relevance today. Both
the US and the UK press showed concern and offered support to India, and
realised the long-term implication of the war to the security of Asia in times
to come.
The textual and discourse analysis of
the collected research material indicates that there were significant
differences between the representations of the India-China War in the US and
the British print media. While the US press offered a markedly pragmatic
portrayal of how the war fits the US strategic goals, frequently employing
metaphors of business (dividends, gain, cannot afford, reap, etc.), the British
press appears to have been more value-oriented in its representation of the
war, often involving expressions such as ‘Bravely Resisting’, ‘Honour’,
‘Accorded Sincerely’, ‘Justice’, ‘Risen Bravely’ and ‘Honestly to meet his
country’s crisis’, etc. In addition, in the case of the British
press media, the motif of the colonial past is not irrelevant. Some newspaper
articles seem to be trying to come to terms with Britain’s responsibility for
the path taken by the relatively young independent India of 1962.
Endnotes
1 Sarvepalli Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: A
Biography, (New York, Oxford University Press, 1989), 435-436.
2 Rohit Agrawal, To the Edge and Back 1962 India
China War, (New Delhi: Centre for Land Warfare Studies 2020), xvii-xviii.
3 BM Kaul, The Untold Story, (New Delhi: Allied
Publishers, 1967), ix, 388-390, 399.
4 JP Dalvi, Himalayan Blunder: The Curtain
Raiser to the Sino-Indian War of 1962, (1969), 2-3.
5 Sarvepalli Gopal, Radhakrishnan: A Biography,
(New York, Oxford University Press, 1989), 313-316.
6 Jaswant Singh, India at Risk; Mistakes,
Misconceptions and Misadventures of Security Policy, (New Delhi: Rupa
Publications India Pvt Ltd, 2013), 52-54.
7 JN Sahni, The Lid Off; Fifty Years of Indian
Politics, 1921-1971, (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1971), 431-432.
8 Laura Filardo Llamas, Michael S Boyd, The
Routledge Handbook of Critical Discourse Studies, (London, 2018), 318.
9 Jackie Abell, Elizabeth Stoke, Michael Billig,
The Discursive (Re) Construction of Events, (London: Routledge, 2000), 180-192.
10 https://www.newspapers.com/
11 “Troops of India Retreat Before Red China
Attack”, The News and Observer at Newspaper.com, 21 Oct 1962, pg. 1.
12 Henry Bradsher, “Nationalism Cause of Fighting
in Asia”, Statesman Journal at Newspapers.com, 22 Oct 1962, pg. 4.
13 Henry Bradsher, “Nationalism Cause of Fighting
in Asia”, Statesman Journal at Newspapers.com, 22 Oct 1962, pg. 4.
14 “Troops of India Retreat Before Red China
Attack”, The News and Observer at Newspapers.com, 21 Oct 1962, pg. 1.
15 William Frye, “China-India War Seen as
Explosive”, The Des Moines Register at Newspapers.com, 21 Oct 1962, pg. 134.
16 “India’s Bitter Awakening”, The Bayonne Times
at Newspapers.com, 25 Oct 1962, pg. 4.
17 “Let’s Turn Chiang Loose”, Tallahassee
Democrat at Newspapers.com, 26 Oct 1962, pg. 4.
18 “India’s Situation Critical”, Rocky Mount
Telegram at Newspapers.com, 26 Oct 1962, pg. 4.
19 “Indian Nationalism Responded in Fight”,
Winston-Salem Journal at Newspapers.com, 3 Dec 1962, pg. 13.
20 William Frye, “Dividends Accrue to West”, The
Kansas City Times at Newspaper.com, 10 Dec 1962, pg. 43.
21 William Frye, “Dividends Accrue to West”, The
Kansas City Times at Newspaper.com, 10 Dec 1962, pg. 43.
22 William Frye, “Dividends Accrue to West”, The
Kansas City Times at Newspaper.com, 10 Dec 1962, pg. 43.
23
“India’s Hour of Trial”, The Daily Telegraph and Morning Post at
Newspapers.com, 26 Oct 1962, pg. 14.
24
“Reds’ Attack on India is a Menace to World Peace Says Ogmore MP”, The
Glamorgan Gazette at Newspapers.com, 2 Nov 1962, pg. 1.
25 op. cit. “India’s Hour of Trial”, pg. 14.
26 “World Applauding Victory of Commonsense on
Cuba”, The Guardian at Newspapers.com, 2 Nov 1962, pg. 2.
27 “World Applauding Victory of Commonsense on
Cuba”, The Guardian at Newspapers.com, 2 Nov 1962, pg. 2.
28
“Mr. Wilson Wants Arms Embargo on South Africa”, The Birmingham Post and
Birmingham Gazette at Newspapers.com, 1 Nov 1962, pg. 7.
29 R.H.C. Steed, “India Criticism Rejected”, The
Daily Telegraph and Morning Post at Newspapers.com, 1 Nov 1962, pg. 28.
30
Stephen Barber, “Double Nemesis for Mr. Nehru”, The Daily Telegraph and
Morning Post at Newspapers.com, 20 Nov 1962, pg.12.
@Major General (Dr) RS Thakur (Retd) an
alumnus of National Defence College, did his PhD in History from Jammu
University in 2010. He is currently pursuing his Post-Doctorate from Goethe
University, Frankfurt on ‘German Response to the Indian Revolt of 1857’.
#Dr Beáta Biliková
graduated from Safarik University, Presov,Slovakia. She did PhD from Comenius
University in Bratislava, in English literature. Currently, she is an Assistant
Professor at the Faculty of Applied Languages, University of Economics, in
Bratislava.
Journal of the United Service Institution
of India, Vol. CLIV, No. 636,
April-June 2024.