Abstract
The article argues that an
effective peace intervention results from a balance between the three sides of
the peace triangle formed by peacekeeping (security), peacebuilding
(development), and peacemaking (political settlement). It examines the
situation in Somalia to highlight that in case peacemaking is neglected, it is
likely that Somalia may fall to the al Shabaab on the draw down and departure
of the African Union peace enforcement force. It, therefore, recommends a
political prong of strategy to complement the military prong to address the
challenge al Shabaab poses in Somalia.
Introduction
An earlier article in this journal
had made the case that for returning peace to a conflict
afflicted area, a modicum of balance is desirable between the three sides of
the peace triangle – peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding.1 During the lifecycle of any peace
intervention, the centre of gravity, at a particular point in time and conflict
circumstance will shift between the three sides. However, the three must be so
poised that together they can contain and roll back a conflict. Operational Art
in a peace operation lies in leveraging the three sides in a manner that the
resulting balances mid-wife success. Somalia suggests itself as a case study
for application of this hypothesis.
Somalia has been site of peace
enforcement for some 15 years now. In the mid to late 2000s, the de-facto
control of Somalia by the Islamic Courts was wrested away from it by
intervention of Ethiopia to install a transitional federal government that had
been formed in 2004 with the support of the regional organisation, the
Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).2 Meanwhile
the Islamic Courts’s administration mutated, with its militant youth wing
forming the al Shabaab. In 2007, Ethiopian intervention was substituted by an
African Union (AU) peace enforcement operation, African Union Mission in
Somalia (AMISOM).3 Over the 2010s, the AMISOM
progressively wrested control of territory from the al Shabaab even as the
Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) was installed in Mogadishu and Federal
Member States (FMS) were formed. In 2013, the United Nations’ (UN) Political
Office in Somalia was transformed into a special political mission, the UN
Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), to assist with statebuilding and peacebuilding.4 The al Shabaab’s association with the al Qaeda
initially, and later the Islamic State (IS) in the 2010s, led to its figuring
on the UN terror entity sanctions’ list since 2010.5 This effectively placed it out of bounds for a
peacemaking outreach. Thus, while peace enforcement and peacebuilding
proceeded, peacemaking was not in evidence. The imbalance between the three
sides of the peace triangle visualised in relation to Somalia, continues till
today.
Somalia today has a follow-on mission to
the AMISOM, the AU Transitional Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), in place since
April 2022. Assessing that instability has reduced considerably and security
sector reform initiatives were in hand to upgrade the Somali National Army (SNA)
and police, in 2021, the ATMIS is expected to draw down and depart within 30
months. The ATMIS is to assist the SNA regain government control through joint
operations and capacity building, even as it draws down while the SNA gains
strength and confidence.6 Despite considerable progress with
both state building and peacebuilding by UNSOM, the situation does not lend
confidence to the assumption that the SNA will hold up on departure of foreign
forces. In other words, with peacemaking absent, peacebuilding and peace
enforcement has not been well served.
A scenario as obtained on the departure
of the US and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) forces from
Afghanistan stares Somalia in the face. There is scope for the international
community and the regional bodies to reappraise the three sides of the peace
triangle in the two fraternal missions in place, ATMIS and UNSOM. While ATMIS
is assisting with provision of security, UNSOM, integrated with the rest of the
UN family of agencies, funds and programs (AFP) and in league with allied actors, concentrates
on statebuilding and peacebuilding. Missing in the menu is peacemaking. In
light of the recent precedence in Afghanistan, this deficit might yet sabotage
not only the long-standing peace intervention but Somalia itself. Consequently,
the question explored here is whether an Afghanistanlike future can be escaped
by Somalia, and, if so, how?
Background
Somalia
has been in an unsettled situation since the end of the Cold War. During the
Cold War, it was stable only in its first decade under democratic government.
In the sixties, the first democratic turn-over of government in post-colonial
Africa was witnessed in Somalia. However, as typical for the era, Siad Barre
installed himself in power in a military coup, whereupon Cold War dynamics took
over. The two superpowers switched clients in the Horn of Africa, with the US
supporting Somalia against Soviet and Cuba-backed Ethiopia. In late seventies,
a war broke out over Oromia in Ethiopia, an area occupied by Somali ethnic
groups. Within Somalia, Siad Barre also asserted his authority with ruthless
suppression in Somaliland, the erstwhile British colonial possession that in
1960 had merged with the Italy-colonised Somali territory to forge Somalia. The
end of the Cold War pried loose the US umbrella over Siad Barre.
The Somali state dissolved in famine.
The story thereafter is more familiar, with India deploying a brigade under UN
Chapter VII auspices as part of an upgraded peacekeeping operation, UN Operation
in Somalia (UNOSOM II). The preceding operation, UNOSOM I, had a mandate to
widen humanitarian access. Met with anarchy, the international community
temporarily deployed a US-led peace enforcement operation, Unified Task Force
(UNITAF).7 It was to contain the clan violence, which it
succeeded in doing by enforcing an elitist peace by deterring the warlords
through a display of military might. The hand over from UNITAF to UNSOM II saw
warlords back in action, targeting, in one infamous incident Pakistani
peacekeepers. American forces, outside the UN framework, went after the warlord
responsible, Farah Aideed, who incidentally had been Somali ambassador in Delhi
for three years. The Black Hawk incident resulted. Withdrawal of Americans soon
thereafter scuttled the UNSOM II.8
Somalia fell out of the international
radar, with the international community fatigued by international humanitarian
intervention post contemporary instances in Bosnia and Rwanda. A lesson from
the American-led ‘global war on terror’ was on the dangers of persistence of
ungoverned spaces. The FGS that initially functioned out of Baidoa and moved to
Mogadishu, when the security situation was stabilised by AMISOM. Since 2012,
when the FGS was finally emplaced formally, it has had two iterations of
elections. Its most recent election, in 2022, returned the first president,
Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, to power.
President Mohamud has set the SNA to
undertake operations in conjunction with ATMIS and the clan militias against al
Shabaab.9 The idea is to soften the al Shabaab and
create conditions for talks from a position of strength for the FGS. The idea
of using clan militia is reminiscent of the Iraqi awakening in which Iraqi
Sunnis were used to wrap up the al Qaeda in the Sunni Triangle in 2007-08.
However, it is predictable that as an insurgent group with demonstrated
resilience against the AMISOM over past 15 years, the al Shabaab will melt away
only to re-emerge elsewhere and by night.10 It is amply
clear that a solely military approach will not suffice.11 Consequently, President Muhamud’s intention to
follow through with talks ‘at the right time’ is a promising opportunity.12 It
gives peacemaking to make a debut,with international community support.
Desirability
Whether
to talk to the Taliban was a perennial question through the 2010s.13 Consensus
had it that military operations needed complementing with a talks outreach,
even as peacebuilding by provincial reconstruction teams proceeded alongside.
In the event, talks did come about in Doha. The anticipated upgrade of the
Afghan National Security Forces was slow in coming as a result, the Taliban
were less eager at the talks table awaiting the departure of the foreign
forces.The fears were confirmed in their take-over of Kabul last year.14 Given
such a possibility in Somalia, it is only desirable that every effort be made
to avoid an Afghanistan redux.
There is a perspective is that talking
to terrorists is not a strategic move. Terrorists will take advantage of talks
for gaining legitimacy. This will make them get ahead of the government in the
stakes for peoples’ hearts and minds, especially since the FGS is hampered by
allegations of corruption, clanism, incapacity, and association with external
powers. Terrorist entities are strategic players and might, through talks, take
power they have been denied militarily. Regional states, as Uganda and Kenya
that have borne the brunt of al Shabaa out-of-area terror attacks, would be
unwilling to treat it as a legitimate interlocutor.
The constraint is that the ATMIS is
slated to depart in the middle term. Under financial pressure, the European
Union - that largely funded it so far - is downsizing the budget. The prominent
regional state, Ethiopia, has been beset with internal security issues. Initially,
when AMISOM was being inducted, a move to plant a hybrid, or UN peace operation
instead, had been struck down. It is uncertain if the international community
would reappraise this decision. The feeling of ‘community’ among the
international community has been considerably strained in wake of the Ukraine
War. There is a recession looming and the prospects of funding another giant UN
mission are not appetising. This inability to up the ante militarily implies
that a ‘politics first’ approach must compensate.
The lesson from the Afghanistan
experience is, thus, not against talks as much as to use talks productively.
Both antagonists were loath to share power in Afghanistan, making talks
infructuous. In Somalia, the al Shabaab is a nationalist outfit. Somalis are
nationalist and - unlike in most places in Africa - are relatively homogenous
as an ethnic group inhabiting a defined space. As with the Taliban, it is not
only religious extremism that drives it, though Wahabbi influence has impinged
on the Sufistic culture in Somalia.
Somalia provides a timely opportunity to
test the UN’s freshly minted motto, ‘primacy of politics’15,
intended to get to peace through peaceful means. For long, other actors have
tried to address their respective troubles in Somalia. Europe, contending with
a migration influx from Africa, funded the AMISOM. The AMISOM, among others
from as far away as Senegal, comprised troops from neighbouring countries
seeking to tackle terrorism at its orgin. However, alleged human rights violations
and collateral damage by peacekeepers has partially alienated Somalis.16 The
US, fearing homeland terror from its Somali diaspora immigrants, intervenes
militarily through its Africa Command base, while at times causing civilian
casualties.17 Somalis have thus been subject to
pursuit of aims of others on their land and at their cost. The UN’s shift to
people-centric peacekeeping makes it inescapable that peacemaking must proceed
apace to rescue people from the cycle of violence.
Feasibility
The
UN has a policy guiding political approaches to armed groups. There is no
proscription on such outreach intended to end violence. Any such outreach would
have to ascertain if the al Shabaab wants to travel away from terror tag.
Continuing humanitarian and peacebuilding support can act as incentive,
particularly as Somalia faces its fourth year of drought. For now, the areas it
controls have restricted humanitarian access. The possibility of exiting the
terror list – as was the case with elements of the Taliban – is another carrot
to influence the al Shabaab. The reputational risk from a rebuff or the talks
going awry, in an egregious terror incident would have to be factored. The FGS
will require forging a consensus and a joint front with the FMS on talks.
There are multiple forums that can act
as lead: the UN, the regional organisation, and the FGS itself. If the FGS
wishes to be in the lead then capacity building support for both parties and
logistics facilitation might be necessary. The regional organisations – both AU
and the IGAD – are well experienced though financing might yet be required.
External actors – such as from the Nordic or Gulf states – could lend a hand.
The multiple special envoys for the Horn of Africa would require a coordination
forum. The UN is better positioned to play a supportive as against a
protagonist role. Itsmission in the country for the last ten years indicates
its political capacity, while the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) that
supported the AMISOM, and now supports the ATMIS and elements of SNA, can help
with the logistics – particularly with helicopter support to access al Shabaab
areas.
Taking cue from the Doha talks with the
Taliban, the talks would require first ending the violence – an issue not taken
up at Doha and which resulted in continuing violence even as talks proceeded.
This is especially important in Somalia to urgently open up the humanitarian
space. Besides, the instrumental use of violence by both sides tends to
influence the negotiations negatively. The table then becomes yet another
battlefield. With violence at ebb, talks could dwell on a road map on the
progressive co-option of the al Shabaab. Usually, an agreement spells out a
transition period of power sharing followed by an election. The ongoing Constitution
review and the reform in election system, away from being clan-based to ‘one
person one vote’, can see al Shabaab participation. The national reconciliation
program underway could, post conflict, also cover al Shabaab controlled areas.18
The period of transition might require
overseeing. Since the AU mission may be too closely associated with
neighbouring countries, it may require substitution. Political momentum in the
talks could perk up Troop Contributing Countries’ willingness to contribute blue
berets and boots on ground in a monitoring and protective role respectively. A
lean mission with a civilian component, including civil affairs and human
rights officers with a pronounced national staff complement, can be foreseen. A
clear timeline culminating with the next elections or as agreed in a
comprehensive peace agreement can serve as focus for an exit strategy and
handover to the UN Country Team.
A Role
for India?
India
is in the midst of taking up its destined role as a leading state. It has been
a member for over last two years of the UN Security Council (UNSC). It has
recently taken over chair of the G-20. India has to seize opportunities to
supplant UNSC declinist veto-holding pen holders, Britain and France.
Envisaging a greater role for itself as a security provider, in the ocean that
bears its name, is a first step.
Its strategic moves in the Indo-Pacific
theatre have not been at the cost of the western Indian Ocean. It has been a
player in anti-piracy operations off Somalia since inception of the joint naval
operations. Managing security along Indian Ocean Rim in proximity of the Horn
of Africa to South West Asia - and the scene of conflict in Yemen - is
significant. The strategic weight of the region is seen in the setting up of
bases in close proximity to each other by the US and China. The risk of
instability multiplying, such as in the increased presence of Islamists
southwards along the African coast in Mozambique, must be acknowledged.
Since India is now a pragmatic power,
balancing China in Africa will not be far from its concerns. Africa is a site
for power competition where India cannot find herself India missing-in-action.
In taking a proactive role, India would only be returning to its historical
role as an important rimland naval power, evidenced by communities originating
in Horn of Africa resident across the Deccan and the Malabar Coast. India must
step up to complete a task left unfinished when, in 1995, its navy evacuated
troops of the UNOSOM II.
India lending a hand as a ‘friend of the
mediation’, through appointing a special
envoy would enable herself to push for consensus in the UNSC on a light
footprint mission to arrive at and help implement any agreement reached. It can
lead with boots on the ground. It could contribute to the humanitarian Somalia
Trust Fund or bilaterally increase humanitarian support.
Conclusion
Peace
operations cannot be done in a political vacuum. In Somalia, absence of a
political prong of strategy to tackle the al Shabaab has resulted in the insurgency
persisting. Current-day dire humanitarian straits compel a political outreach
to the al Shabaab. By all means, care must be taken not to empower terrorist
affiliates but this apprehension can be mitigated by enlightened design of the
mediation or facilitation, taking on board the lessons of the peace process in
Afghanistan. The terror tag to groups must be amenable to revision now that
international terror has subsided considerably. An outreach can, in a first
step, influence the group to distance itself from terror. The FGS is already
contemplating a political solution. Once the regional organisations have bought
into this line of action, the UN could lend a hand by including the remit in
its next resolution on UNSOM.This will pave way for UNSOM to acquire political
teeth and to transform into a short-duration, light-footprint peacekeeping
mission overseeing induction of al Shabaab into the Somali national mainstream.
The Somalia case study validates the hypothesis that all three sides of the peace
triangle need ministration in varying degrees during the lifecycle of a peace
intervention, failing which, peace is liable to prove elusive. Peacemaking must
be added to the peace repertoire Somalia to complete the peace triangle.
Endnotes
1 Ali Ahmed,
‘Operational Art in Peace Operations: Balancing the Peace Triangle’, USI
Journal, Vol. CLII, No. 628, April-June 2022,
https://usiofindia.org/publication/usi-journal/operational-art-in-peace-operations-balancing-the-peace-triangle/?sf_paged=2
2 For a brief history, see
https://www.britannica.com/place/Somalia/Civil-war
3 For background on
AMISOM, see https://amisom-au.org/amisom-background/.
4 For background on
UNSOM, see https://dppa.un.org/en/mission/unsom.
5 Al Shabaab figures on the sanctions list available at
https://www.un.org/french/sc/committees/consolidated.htm#alqaedaent
6 For details on
ATMIS, seehttps://atmis-au.org/
7 For background on
UNOSOM I and UNITAF, see https://peacekeeping.
un.org/sites/default/files/past/unosom1backgr2.html
8 For background on
UNOSOM II, see https://peacekeeping.un.org/ sites/default/files/past/unosom2backgr2.html
9 ‘Somalia Military Makes Gains in Large-scale
Offensive Against Al-Shabab’, VOA, 26 September 2022,
https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-military-makes-gains-in-large-scale-offensive-against-al-shabab-/6764305.html
10 ‘Somalia and al-Shabab: The struggle to defeat
the militants’, BBC, 24 August 2022,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-62644935
11 International Crisis Group, ‘A Strategy for
Exploring Talks with Al-Shabaab in Somalia’, Podcast, 30 June 2022,
https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/strategy-exploring-talks-al-shabaab-somalia
12 ‘Somalia will talk to Al-Shabaab when time is
right: President’, The Guardian, 6 July 2022, https://guardian.ng/news/somalia-will-talk-to-al-shabaab-when-time-is-right-president/
13 For a backgrounder, see
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-taliban-peace-deal-agreement-afghanistan-war
14 For a background
on the NATO mission in Afghanistan, see https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.htm
15 United Nations, ‘Report Of The Independent
High-Level Panel On Peace Operations’, 2015,
https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/report-of-independent-high-level-panel-peace-operations
16 Human Rights Watch, ‘The power these men have
over us’, 8 September 2014,
https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/09/08/power-these-men-have-over-us/sexual-exploitation-and-abuse-african-union-forces
17 Amnesty International, ‘US military sheds some
light on civilian casualties from shadowy war in Somalia’, 27 April 2020,
https://www.amnesty.org/ en/latest/news/2020/04/us-military-sheds-some-light-on-civilian-casualties-from-shadowy-war-in-somalia/
18 For UNSOM activities, see
https://unsom.unmissions.org/political-affairs
@ Dr Ali Ahmed, PhD is a
freelance strategic affairs analyst. He has been a UN official, academic and
infantry officer. He is author of India’s Doctrine Puzzle: Limiting War in
South Asia (Routledge, 2014).
Journal of the United Service Institution of India,
Vol. CLIII, No. 631, January-March 2023.