Abstract
Two major challenges facing UN
Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs) on the ground today are implementing the
mandate of the UN Security Council (UNSC) on Protection of Civilians (PoC), and
responding to threats to Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) by international
terrorism. It is useful to place these two challenges in context to consider
the most effective response by Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) and the UNSC
working in an integrated manner, as envisaged in Article 44 of the UN Charter.
The article concludes with a vision that drives India’s push for ‘reformed
multilateralism’.
Protection
of Civilians
Protection of Civilians (PoC) has
become the main objective of the mandate of UN PKOs today. This
requires proactive UN peacekeepers, trained to anticipate and mitigate actions
by the warring parties inside the member-states of the UN where they are
deployed. The application of this to UN PKOs has been evident across the board
in recent years. However, in 2011, in the aftermath of the ill-fated UNSC
resolution authorising military intervention in Libya1 on the pretext of a responsibility to protect
civilians in that country, the UNSC has been careful to endorse a
‘multi-dimensional’ approach to PKO mandates, prioritising PoC through national
governance institutions. In order to appreciate how the PoC mandate has
mushroomed into becoming a template for 10 out of the 12 UNPKOs active on the
ground today, it is instructive to look at the case of the UNPKO in South Sudan
(UNMISS).
In July 2011, the UNSC adopted
resolution 1996 establishing the UNMISS PKO “to consolidate peace and security,
and to help establish the conditions for development in the Republic of South
Sudan”.2 India was an elected member of the UNSC when
this resolution was adopted. By the end of 2012, it was clear to the
peacekeepers deployed in UNMISS that instead of consolidating peace and
security, they were witnessing the eruption of a violent civil war inside South
Sudan along tribal lines. The UNSC reviewed this situation in July 2012, and
prioritised the PoC in the mandate for UNMISS, favouring a top-down approach
that relied on the commitments of the Government of South Sudan and the
decisions of the civilian leadership of UNMISS represented by the United
Nations Security General’s Special Representative.3
On 09 April 2013, news came to the UN
Headquarters from the UNMISS PKO deployed in South Sudan that 5 Indian UN
peacekeepers along with two UNMISS national staff and five civilian staff
contractors had been ambushed and killed while escorting a humanitarian convoy
in Jonglei state. In his response, the UNSG called on the Government of South
Sudan to bring the perpetrators of this crime to justice. ‘He recalls that the
killing of peacekeepers is a war crime that falls under the jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Court’.4 The UNSC issued a Press Statement the same day
condemning the attack and calling on the “Government of South Sudan to swiftly
investigate the incident and bring the perpetrators to justice”.5
At the UNSC open debate on PKOs in June
2014, India called on the UNSC “to ensure a mandatory inclusion in all UNPKO
mandates of legally binding provisions for prosecuting, penalising and
neutralising any non-governmental armed groups and armed militias causing, or
threatening to cause, harm to UNPKOs”.6 This has yet to be included in the mandate of
UNPKOs. As President of the UNSC in August 2021, India issued a Statement that
reiterated that attacks on peacekeepers ‘may constitute war crimes’. The
Statement stopped short (due to lack of consensus within the UNSC members) of
proposing an automatic investigation by the UN into such attacks with the
objective of prosecuting and penalising the perpetrators of such crimes.7 On the ground, the PoC mandate of UNPKOs
continues to be challenged by a structural constraint. This is the determined
rejection by the permanent members of the UNSC of proposals by TCCs not
represented in the Council, who have contributed troops to the PKO, to
participate in decisions on the deployment mandate of the PKO. This stand of
the UNSC is in contravention of Article 44 of the UN Charter which clearly
provides for such participation by TCCs in UNSC decisions.
Two consequences of this refusal by the
UNSC to uphold the provisions of the UN Charter are evident in South Sudan. The
first was the UNSC being unable to take inputs from India as a major TCC,
during the mandate negotiations of UNMISS during 2013-2015 into account while
considering how to respond to spiralling violence across South Sudan, which
made 25 per cent of its population internally displaced. African and Indian UN
peacekeepers deployed in UNMISS knew of the traditional tribal local dispute
resolution structures in these communities, which could have been identified by
the UNSC in a ‘ground-up’ approach to prevent local disputes, about grazing
rights, from fuelling the larger civil war and displacing thousands of
civilians. The second was a mismatch between the mission mandate negotiated in
New York by the UNSC and the ground realities in South Sudan, with skewed
allocations of resources including financial and material resources for
strengthening the PoC mandate.
The example ofhow the UNPKO responded to
protecting civilians fleeing from the fighting in Melut in South Sudan in 2015
is instructive. Many of Melut’s population of 49,000 people sought shelter in
the UNMISS base. The area for protecting civilians from attacks had been
demarcated by UNMISS peacekeepers, but apart from expanding the space in the
base and erecting perimeter fencing, the PKO’s requests for appropriate
shelters to protect civilians from mortar attacks and shelling had not been
responded to by the UN Secretariat, reportedly due to lack of funds. In the
fighting for the surrounding oil rich areas, a section of the South Sudan
People’s Liberation Army (comprising of the Shilluk tribal community, commanded
by Major General Johnson Olony) defected from the government forces and marched
towards the oilfields of Palogue through Melut. UNMISS decided, to evacuate the
humanitarian peacekeepers, responsible for feeding the civilians and giving
them medical attention, leaving the 125 UNMISS troops from India to look after
the security of CSB Melut as well as the thousands of sheltering civilians.
Eight civilians died in the attacks, which were repulsed by the UNMISS troops.8 While India was not a participant in the UNSC
discussions on South Sudan following this informal briefing, Resolution 2223
adopted by the UNSC on 28 May 2015 expressed ‘appreciation for UNMISS’s efforts
to support internally displaced persons seeking protection on its sites, while
underlining the necessity to find sustainable solutions for the internally
displaced population’.9
UNMISS is only one example of how the
PoC mandates given routinely by the UNSC for UNPKOs today need to be
conceptualised holistically, and implemented in a ‘human-centric’, proactive,
and flexible manner, using a wider range of inputs from TCCs whose troops know
the ground realities of the region better than many UNSC members in New York.
Threat
to PKOs from International Terrorism
The
first stirring of international terrorist groups targeting UNPKOs came as a
warning shot to UN member-states in New York in 2013. The ‘Arab Spring’ that
brought this phenomenon to UNPKOs had begun in Tunisia in December 2010, and
after impacting Libya and Egypt, it crossed into West Asia and parts of the
Gulf. Syria was a particular focus due to its unique fault lines from the
breakup of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War. The unrest in
the Arab world proved fertile ground for spawning new violent extremist groups
that gravitated towards the umbrella of Al-Qaida, and expanded their footprint
from West Asia to Afghanistan and Central Asia.
On 06 March 2013, the UNSG issued a
statement condemning the kidnapping of 21 Filipino UN peacekeepers of United
Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) by ‘armed elements’, and demanded
their unconditional release. Due to the back-channel efforts by the UN, these
UN peacekeepers were released on 9 March 2013. The UNSCin a press statement
issued on 27 March 2013, after a briefing by the UN Secretariat, “underscored
the increased risk the situation poses to United Nations personnel on the
ground, as highlighted in particular by the detention of the 21 UNDOF
military personnel by armed elements of the Syrian opposition, the firing
directed at United Nations personnel and facilities, and the carjacking of
United Nations vehicles”.10
On 07 May 2013, four UN peacekeepers of
UNDOF were kidnapped by ‘armed elements’, which were released on 12 May 2013
with “the assistance of Qatar” according to the UNSG.11 The UN Security Council in a Press Statement
issued by its President (the UK) admitted that the kidnapping had been
conducted by armed elements of the Syrian opposition’,12 but did not propose any measures to counter
this terrorist act.
The UNGA resolution on Syria on 15 May
2013 provided India with an opportunity to highlight the gestating terrorist
dimension of the threat. In its explanation of vote, India said:
“Violence has assumed a serious
sectarian nature, and terrorist groups, including al Qaida, have entrenched
themselves…We are particularly concerned that UN peacekeepers (in the UNDOF
PKO) have been repeatedly targeted by rebel groups and taken hostage, including
on two occasions in the recent past. This is completely unacceptable. It is imperative
that the sanctity of United Nations peacekeepers be respected by all sides. A
clear signal must be sent by the UN that such acts will not be tolerated and
will attract the full weight of the international community against the
perpetrators”.13
The UNGA resolution against Syria had
been sponsored by Qatar, with the strong backing of France, the United States,
and many Arab League member-states. It sought to endorse a political transition
in Syria in favour of a national coalition displacing the Government of
President Bashar al-Assad, while calling for humanitarian assistance to the
victims of the conflict. Syria stated that “the Ambassador of the Coalition in
Qatar […] had given instructions to the Brigade of Martyrs of Yarmouk to kidnap
UNDOF peacekeepers”. Russia pointed out that the “conflict in Syria was a
serious internal conflict, with the Government fighting terrorist groups,
including Al-Qaida”. The view of Syria on external instigation of terrorism
against the UNPKO was opposed by Saudi Arabia and France. In reply, Syria posed
the question, “The regimes of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey persisted in
funding jihadi and transnational terrorist organisations, […] Special
Representative Lakhdar Brahimi had already referred to the presence of 40,000 terrorists
who had shed blood in Syria, including members of Al-Qaida. How could
Qatar have such influence as to secure the release of UN peacekeepers kidnapped
by rebels in the Golan if not for its involvement with rebel groups”?14 The
resolution was adopted with 107 in favour to 12 against, with
59 abstentions (including countries like Brazil and India).
Due to the low profile adopted by the UN
Secretariat, and the inability of the UNSC to label the ‘armed elements’ as
terrorists, these terrorist groups were emboldened to repeat their tactic of
kidnapping UN peacekeepers in UNDOF for ransom again. On 28 August 2014, a
group of 45 Fijian troops and 40 Filipino troops in the UNDOF PKO were held
hostage by ‘armed elements’. The Filipino troops were ‘extricated to safety’
while the Fijian troops were released on 11 September 2014. This time, the UNSC
declared that this kidnapping had been conducted by ‘Security
Council-designated terrorist groups and by members of non-state armed groups’.
In an indication of UNSC policy on terrorism against UNPKOs, the Security
Council President (the UK) ‘called upon countries with influence to strongly
convey to the armed members of the opposition in the UNDOF area of operation to
immediately release the peacekeepers’.15 On 30
August 2014, the UNSC reiterated its “strong condemnation of the ongoing
detention of 44 Fijian peacekeepers from position 27, as well as the
surrounding of position 68, where Security Council-designated terrorist
groups and non-state armed actors continue to trap 40 Filipino
peacekeepers. The members demanded the immediate and unconditional
release of these peacekeepers, as well as their safe passage”.16 In another press statement issued on 03
September 2014, the UNSC President (the United States) ‘called upon countries
with influence to strongly convey to those responsible to immediately release
the peacekeepers’.17
There was no mention of the Security
Council using counter-terrorism measures adopted by it under Resolution 1267
for terrorists and terrorist entities listed in its Sanctions Lists for
Al-Qaida, creating a dangerous ambivalence that catalysed terrorist attacks
against UNPKOs elsewhere, particularly inUnited Nations Multidimensional
Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). According to the UN, as
many as 163 UN troops in MINUSMA have been killed by “malicious acts”18 (a euphemism for terrorism) since the PKO was
established in April 2013 with a ‘robust’ mandate, making it one of the most
dangerous PKOs active today for UN peacekeeping troops.
At the UNGA review of the annual report
submitted by the UNSC in 2014, India underlined the importance of effective
action to be taken by the UNSC to counter terrorism. It said:
“Specific examples in this case
are of attacks in Golan Heights and Mali. Unless effectively deterred, such
threats will only increase in number and scope. In the case of UNDOF, it has
been alleged that the foreign terrorist fighters who attacked UN peacekeepers
belong to the Al Nusra Front, which is proscribed by the Security Council as a
terrorist group. The Report does not give any information on the Security
Council’s steps to use its authority to investigate, prosecute, and penalise
the perpetrators of such terrorist acts. A clear obligation for all member states
to act against foreign terrorist fighters who attack UN peacekeepers should
become an integral part of the peacekeeping mandates approved by the Council’.19
Honouring
fallen UN Peacekeepers
The
brunt of the costs of implementing UNSC mandates for PKOs is borne by
individual UN peacekeepers. Every year, the TCCs to UN PKOs participate in the
bitter-sweet function on the “International Day of UN Peacekeepers”20 to commemorate UN peacekeepers have made the
supreme sacrifice in defending the principles of the UN Charter. The UNGA had
adopted a resolution in December 2002 to commemorate 29 May every year as this
day of commemoration. The date marked the anniversary of the first deployment
of UN military observers to the Middle East to form the United Nations Truce
Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) to monitor the Armistice Agreement between
Israel and its Arab neighbours.
In 1988, the Nobel Peace Prize was
awarded to UN Peacekeeping. In the citation for this award, it was stated that
“UN forces represent the manifest will of the community of nations to achieve
peace through negotiations, and the forces have, by their presence, made a
decisive contribution towards the initiation of actual peace negotiations”.21
The Dag Hammarskjold Medal, named after
the second UNSG who is widely considered to have been the most effective UNSG
till now and was killed under mysterious circumstances while on an official
visit to Congo in September 1961, was instituted in 2000 by the then UNSG Kofi Annan. Since 2014, the Captain Mbaye
Diagne Medal is also awarded on the International Day of UN Peacekeepers, for
those who lost their lives during service with a peacekeeping operation under
the operational control and authority of the United Nations. Captain Mbaye
Diagne saved hundreds of lives in 1994, before he was killed while serving as a
UN peacekeeper in Rwanda.
The poignancy of these medal ceremonies
on the occasion prompted TCCs led by India, to propose the construction of a
permanent memorial wall in memory of UN peacekeepers since 1948 who have given
their lives while deployed to maintain international peace and security.
In his address to the Leaders’ Summit on
UN Peacekeeping on 28 September 2015, India’s Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi
said:
“I would like to pay homage to the
peacekeepers who have laid down their lives in defending the highest ideals of
the United Nations. It would be most fitting if the proposed memorial wall to
the fallen peacekeepers is created quickly. India stands ready to contribute,
including financially, to this objective”.22
The proposal for constructing a
permanent memorial wall to fallen UN peacekeepers was approved by the Special
Committee, who’s Report was unanimously adopted by the UNGA in 2016.
The operative paragraph of the
Special Committee’s Report reads:
“In this regard, the Special
Committee recommends the establishment, through voluntary contributions, of a
memorial wall at the UN Peacekeepers Memorial at Headquarters and requests that
due consideration be given to the modalities involved, including the recording
of the names of those who have made the supreme sacrifice”.23
The
total number of Indian troops who have given their lives while serving under
the UN flag is the highest among all UN member-states, standing at 177 out of
4245 casualties between 1948-2022.24 The vast majority of the 281 deaths in the
MINUSMA PKO in Mali so far are due to terrorist attacks.
Conclusion
Challenges
to UNPKOs from structural shortfalls in implementing the PoC mandate as well as
the threat to UNPKOs deployed in volatile regions from international terrorist
groups require a more effective UNSC, which oversees UN PKOs. This can be
achieved by implementing the mandate given by world leaders in 2005 to reform
the UNSC to make it ‘more broadly representative, efficient and transparent,
and thus, to further enhance its effectiveness and the legitimacy and
implementation of its decisions’.25 It is this vision that drives India’s push for
‘reformed multilateralism’.
Endnotes
1 United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1973, 17 March 2011, paragraph 4.
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/ N11/268/39/ PDF/N1126839.pdf?OpenElement
2 United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1996, 8 July 2011, paragraph 3.https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/405/83/PDF/N1140583.pdf?OpenElement
3 United Nations
Security Council Resolution 2057, 5 July 2012.
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N12/406/82/PDF/N1240682.pdf?OpenElement
4 United Nations, “Statement
attributable to the Secretary-General on the killing of UNMISS peacekeepers in
South Sudan”, 9 April 2013.
https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2013-04-09/statement-attributable-spokesperson-secretary-general-killing-unmiss
5 United Nations
Security Council Press Statement No. 10968, dated 9 April 2013.
https://press.un.org/en/2013/sc10968.doc.htm
6 Permanent Mission
of India, “Statement by India at UNSC Debate on UN Peacekeeping Operations”, 11
June 2014. https://pminewyork.gov.in/ IndiaatUNSC?id=Mjg4NQ
7 UN Security
Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/2021/17 dated 18 August 2021.
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N21/ 229/25/PDF/N2122925.pdf?OpenElement
8 Al Jazeera, “Battle for Melut, humanitarian
sanctuary in South Sudan”, 16 June 2015.
https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2015/6/16/battle-for-melut-humanitarian-sanctuary-in-south-sudan/
9 United Nations Security Council Resolution
2223, 28 May 2015. https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N15/ 155/65/PDF/N1515565.
pdf?OpenElement
10 United Nations Security Council Press
Statement on UNDOF, 27 March 2012. https://press.un.org/en/2013/sc10962.doc.htm
11 United Nations, “Statement attributable to the
Secretary-General”, 12 May 2013. https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2013-05-12/statement-attributable-spokesperson-secretary-general-release-undof
12 United Nations Security Council Press
Statement on UNDOF, 7 May 2013. https://press.un.org/en/2013/sc10999.doc.htm
13 Permanent Mission of India, New York.
“Statement by India,” 15 May 2013.
https://pminewyork.gov.in/pdf/uploadpdf/52393pmi36.pdf
14 United Nations, “General Assembly adopts text
condemning violence in Syria”, 15 May 2013.
https://press.un.org/en/2013/ga11372.doc.htm
15 United Nations Security Council Press
Statement on UNDOF, 28 August 2014.
https://press.un.org/en/2014/sc11540.doc.htm
16 United Nations Security Council Press
Statement on UNDOF, 30 August 2014.
https://press.un.org/en/2014/sc11546.doc.htm
17 United Nations Security Council Press
Statement on UNDOF, 3 September 2014.
https://press.un.org/en/2014/sc11548.doc.htm
18 UN Peacekeeping, “Fatalities by Mission and
Incident Type up to 30 September 2022”.
https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/ files/stats_by_mission_incident_type_4_79_september_2022.pdf
19 Permanent Mission
of India, New York. “Statement by India”, 21 November
2014.https://pminewyork.gov.in/IndiaatUNGA?id=NzA0
20 United Nations,
UNGA Resolution A/RES/57/129 dated 11 December 2002. https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/546/36/PDF/N0254636.pdf?OpenElement
21 The Nobel Peace
Prize, 1988.https://www.nobelprize.org/ prizes/peace/1988/summary/
22 Narendra Modi, “India’s Commitment to UN
Peacekeeping remains strong and will continue to grow”, 28 September 2015.
https://www.narendramodi.in/ statement-by-prime-minister-at-the-summit-on-peace-operations—356824
23 United Nations,
Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations No. A/70/19, Chapter
V, Section A, paragraph 21, March 2016.
24 UN Peacekeeping,
https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/fatalities
25 UN
General Assembly Resolution A/RES/60/1 dated 16 September 2005. Paragraph 153.
https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_60_1.pdf
@ Mr Asoke Mukerji,
IFS (Retd)
as India’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York in
December 2015. He is an elected member of the USI Council (2023-25).
Journal of the United Service Institution of India,
Vol. CLIII, No. 631, January-March 2023.