Abstract
The legacy of the Indo-Bhutan
relationship goes back by many centuries which has been only growing after
India’s independence. However, Bhutan getting closure to demarcating its
disputed boundary with China is perceived in India as Bhutan compromising
India’s security despite their years of close relationship. This article argues
that geopolitical and internal compulsions of Bhutan and India’s obsession with
the People’s Liberation Army’s threat to the Siliguri Corridor has brought both
India and Bhutan into an irreversible situation leaving no option for India
other than encouraging Bhutan to solve its boundary dispute as early as
possible.
Introduction
The Indo-Bhutan
relationship is the legacy of Bhutan’s relations with Britain when Bhutan first
clashed with the colonial power in 1865 and later when the British signed the
Punakha Treaty in 1910. This treaty laid the foundation for the Indo-Bhutan
strategic partnership which further evolved after India’s independence in 1947.1 Bhutan shares a 605 km border with India. But
its 470 km border with China is disputed. Out of 764 sq km of disputed
territory, 495 sq km is in the north and 269 sq km lies in the north-western
sector near Chumbi Valley. Being glaciated, the northern border with China did
not draw much attention until a few years back. However, the north-western
boundary is of strategic importance to all three countries.
Despite 25 rounds of talks, Bhutan’s
boundary with China is yet to be demarcated. Whenever there is a boundary talk
and news of a possible solution, there is speculation in Indian media about its
impact on India’s security. Out of all its immediate neighbours, India’s
relationship with Bhutan has been at its best. However, the desire of the
democratic government of Bhutan to solve the boundary problem permanently seems
to hint that the strategic partnership between Bhutan and India has reached a
crossroads. When King Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck of Bhutan visited India
from 03 to 10 Nov 2023, a section of the Indian media portrayed it as Bhutan
trying to mollify India on the eve of a possible border deal with China.2 Bhutan’s last
Prime Minister (PM) Lotay Tshering’s remarks that China and Bhutan were inching
towards completing their three-step Roadmap earlier had created fear in the
minds of the Indian population about a possible trade-off between Chinese
claims in Doklam Plateau (located at the southern tip of Chumbi Valley inside
Bhutan and nearby of the tri-junction between India, Bhutan and China) and ones
in Northern Bhutan.3 The comments of the Bhutanese PM to a Belgian
newspaper that it was “Not up to Bhutan alone to solve the border problem.
There are three of us” were perceived negatively by individuals distant from
the truth. Until now, even though it will be logical to conclude that decisions
taken by Bhutan on the boundary talks have been in consultation with India,
Bhutan has never named India officially. At the same time, China claims that
“India has always been the reason for the delay in negotiations on boundary
issues between China and Bhutan”.4 Therefore, the Bhutanese PM’s public
acknowledgement of India’s stake in the boundary demarcation should have drawn
accolades instead of brickbats.
Such a fear, however, is not completely
unfounded because firstly, crammed between two competing powers of Asia,
Bhutan on one hand is strategically important to both Asian powers. On the
other hand, being a small landlocked country devoid of natural resources,
Bhutan’s geopolitical location dictated its foreign relations and impacted
India’s security.5 Therefore, its destiny is linked to its big
neighbours, India and China. It is hence, a geopolitical challenge for Bhutan
to delicately balance its position without compromising its sovereignty, while
not drawing China’s ire or jeopardising its bilateral relations with India,
with the background of both these neighbours having fought each other in the
past. The 1962 Sino-Indian War, the border clashes in Nathu La and Cho La in
1967, the 1987 Sumdorong Chu standoff, the Doklam standoff in 2017 and the
2020-2021 skirmishes in Galwan in Eastern Ladakh could have easily upset this
balance. Secondly, China had offered to forgo its claim over the
disputed area in the north in exchange for the Doklam Plateau. The Doklam area
is as important to China as it is to India. Straddled by India and Bhutan on
either side and the narrowest point is around 20 km, Chumbi Valley is China’s
‘Achilles Heel’. Any increase in the size of the valley will reduce the
distance between the valley and the Siliguri Corridor and will help China’s
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) compensate for its vulnerability to some extent.
India and Bhutan have always protested and tried to resist the presence of the
Chinese and the PLA outside the valley.
Eyebrows were raised again when India’s
PM paid a state visit to Bhutan on 22 and 23 Mar 2024 just before India’s
national elections. According to official statements, this visit was “Keeping
with the tradition of regular high–level exchanges between India and Bhutan and
the government’s emphasis on its Neighbourhood First Policy”.6 Most other national media picked up the thread
and followed the line. While a head of government visiting another country just
before the all-important parliamentary elections unless it is a national
emergency, is intriguing, the aim of this writing is not to find the reasons
for the visit but to attach importance to the impact of the boundary
demarcation on the strategic partnership between India and Bhutan.
Understanding the dynamics of the Indo-Bhutan relationship will however not be
complete without discussing the security concerns of India and how the common
element – China, impacts this relationship.
China
Factor
Bhutan’s
relationship with Tibet was never particularly good.7 After its independence and post the
India-China War in 1962, as India began to increase its influence in Bhutan, it
caused worries for China. To dislodge India from its space in Bhutan, China
evolved a strategy, that includes solving the boundary dispute to secure the
south-western flank, establishing a diplomatic relationship, resorting to
military and non-military activities like intrusion inside the disputed areas,
and increasing the scope of bilateral trade with Bhutan.
Boundary
discussions have been going on since 1984 and so far, 25 rounds of boundary
talks have taken place without making much headway. Both sides came up with
different claims and counter-claim lines. All the claim lines of China included
the Doklam Plateau. When nothing moved forward, in 1996, China offered to
barter its claim over the northern sector against the north-western sector. It
also wanted to shift the trijunction from Batang La to Gemoychen.
Interestingly, while the talks were on, China gradually encroached inside Bhutan.
Encroachment in the northern sector by and large went unnoticed as these are
outside the immediate area of influence of the Indian Army. China, however,
moved cautiously when it came to Doklam. What happened in Jun 2017 is now
history.8 In the northern area, which is glaciated and
difficult to access, China’s offer of exchange of territory was not taken
seriously. But when China added spiritual content to the not-so-important
disputed areas in the Northern Sector, the matrix changed. It was done by illegally
occupying the Beyul region in Northern Bhutan for the settlement of Chinese
Tibetans.
Image 1
A vivid description of the Chinese
project in the disputed area can be found in the research report of Barnett.9 Beyul means hidden valley and was concealed by
legendary Guru (Spiritual Leader) Padmasambhava also known as Guru
Rinpoche, who is considered the Second Buddha in Bhutan.10 The legend further goes that the Beyuls are
only discoverable by those with heightened spiritual powers. According to local
legends, Beyuls are meant for the Bhutanese to take refuge when the world comes
to an end. Besides, the father of the first King of Bhutan was born in the
Beyul region. Being religious, cultural and for their emotional attachment to
their kings, the Beyul region is an area that the Bhutanese are not going to
give up.
Image 2:
Source:
https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/05/07/china-bhutan-border-villages-security-forces/
China claims this region as part of the
Tibet Autonomous Region, even though it is inside Bhutan. According to Barnett,
Project Gyalaphug or Beyul Khenpajong includes three new villages two already
occupied, one under construction, new roads, a small hydropower station, two
Communist Party administrative centres, a communications base, a disaster
relief warehouse, five military or police outposts, a satellite receiving
station, a military base, and up to six security sites and outposts.
Incidentally, the work for this village began five years earlier than Pagda
village, which came up along the Amouchu River inside Bhutanese territory after
the Doklam standoff. By then, work in Gyalaphug was already more than halfway
through.
Image 3:
Source:
https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/05/07/china-bhutan-border-villages-security-forces/
The second enclave for settlement by
China in Northern Bhutan is in Menchuma Valley, around 2 km to the east of the
Beyul Khenpajong. 19 square miles in size, this region is at an altitude of
more than 14,700 ft and lies in the Lhuntse district. Until now, it never had
settlements, roads, or buildings. The third enclave of Chinese construction is
Jakarlung Valley which is west of Beyul Khenpajong.
China had set its eyes on the Beyul region
as early as the mid-1950s. There are stories about Tibetan yak herders moving
to Bhutan’s traditional grazing ground and later claiming the generally
uninhabited lands. But one story, as learned from one of the author’s reliable
friends in Bhutan is slightly different from what Barnett had to state.11 Four Bhutanese Tibetan families of the Beyul
region were entrusted with looking after four yak herds belonging to the noble
families. These families used to cross over to Tibet for grazing and were also
involved in cattle rustling. Sometime later, two families or maybe all, stole
the same herds, which were their responsibility to protect and moved to a
village called Lagyab in Tibet. In 1995, the same herders were asked by their
Chinese masters to cross over and to go and live year-round in the Beyul region
along with their stolen yaks. Later, Chinese media applauded the four nomads’
dedication to discovering their sacred land which had been hidden since ancient
times.
The areas of the Beyul region under Chinese
occupation are not very far from Bumthang, which is almost midway on Bhutan’s
west-east lateral and known as the cultural and religious heartland of Bhutan.
Further slicing of the Bhutanese territory will present a new security threat
to Arunachal Pradesh from the west. Other than the Doklam, all areas are
outside the immediate area of direct influence of the Indian Army. Since Doklam
has always been at the centre of discussions on the threat to the Siliguri
Corridor, it needs some explanation.
Siliguri
Corridor and the threat
PLA’s
threat to the Siliguri Corridor is not new. According to Claude Arpi, the
French Tibetologist, way back in 1948, Harishwar Dayal the then political
officer of India to Sikkim stated that Chumbi Valley was a threat to India’s
Siliguri Corridor and, hence, India must occupy the valley.12 Because of its geographical location, the
Chumbi Valley is vulnerable to military threats from a probable collusion
between India and Bhutan. With his statement, Dayal made the PLA threat to the
Siliguri Corridor and the Indian Army’s threat to the Chumbi Valley public,
creating fear and leaving room for varying interpretations of the threat. It is
a military compulsion for the PLA to enlarge the size of the valley as far as
south as possible to reduce the threat from the Indian Army, which is currently
occupying heights on the mountains that dominate the plateau. This is why
Doklam was always part of all claims that China has made so far. As for India,
shifting tri-junction is not negotiable. Was there a common point that all
three countries could agree on? The author believes that there was, but the
time has passed.
As for India, the closer the enemy the
bigger the threat. However, since 1948, time has changed, and the gravity of
the threat is not what it was earlier. On the contrary, the PLA on the plateau
is vulnerable to the Indian Army. To mitigate this threat, China either moves
further south to higher heights like the Jampheri Ridge (the watershed ridge
bordering India and overlooks the Siliguri Corridor) or extracts assurances
from India that there will be no military invasion of the valley by
establishing a diplomatic relationship and demarcating the boundary along the
line where the PLA is sitting now.
It is worthwhile to share what a common
Indian citizen feels about the threat to the Siliguri Corridor. Sometime back,
when the author was returning from North Bengal University, Bagdogra to catch
his flight from Bagdogra airport, he engaged the cab driver in a casual
conversation. The driver explained to the author about the new road from
Kolkata and amplified the description by highlighting the importance of the
Siliguri Corridor and China’s threat to it. When asked what he thought about
the threat, he stated, “Aab woh time nahi raha (the old time has
changed)”. The citizens have faith in the Indian Armed Forces to confront any
remaining threat posed by the PLA. It is a matter of pride for the man in
uniform to believe in it and acknowledge it publicly. Not believing in their
capability and not admitting it may mean something else.
Option
for India
Even
though China’s offer of exchange of territory is still open, after having
invested economically and militarily in the occupied areas, such an option
should not be taken seriously. Because, apart from the fact that Bhutan is not
in a position to stand up to China, which has already built its military
infrastructure on the Doklam Plateau. Therefore, there is no compulsion for
China to follow through with the offer any more. What remains for Bhutan is to
bargain for something else in return for the Beyul region. Besides demarcating
the boundary, China’s conditions if it still wants to, can include anything
from establishing a diplomatic relationship, increasing bilateral trade or even
compelling Bhutan to be a part of the Belt and Road Initiative project.
By occupying the unauthorised
territories in the north-western sector, in the northern sector, along the
Amochu River, and staking a claim on Sakteng Life Sanctuary, China has now
checkmated India.13 The strategic pincer by China can be compared
with using pressure points in the human body to either relieve pain or
immobilise the body. Responding to China’s strategic signal does not leave much
choice to India other than preventing China from further encroachment. China
has benefitted from the American playbook about strategic outmanoeuvring rather
than challenging the enemy on the field.14 If war is not an option, India must encourage
Bhutan to demarcate the boundary with China to avoid further compromising
India’s security as early as possible.
Conclusion
India
and Bhutan’s relationship has grown over the past decades. Bhutan has always
stood by India in its difficult times and held a strong position in support of
India’s security when it came to mending relations with China. The singular
factor has been India’s fear of the PLA threatening the Siliguri Corridor.
India’s security establishment’s obsession with the threat to the Siliguri
Corridor has trapped India and Bhutan in a non-retrievable situation. The
presence of a threat factor helps to establish an appropriate response
mechanism. But too much of it will impact the larger security interest of the
country. Besides, war-fighting has changed. The need for the PLA to physically
occupy Jampheri Ridge to threaten the Siliguri Corridor is no longer driven primarily
by the aim of peering deep into Indian territory, as this can be done from a
distance, using modern technology. It is more to mitigate the threat to the PLA
troops positioned on the Doklam Plateau and Chumbi Valley from the Indian Army,
and force Bhutan’s hand to end the dispute by demarcating the boundary. Despite
the irreversible situation of the Indo-Bhutan partnership is now at a
crossroads, is it possible to pick up takeaways for the future? There can be
many. But a few important ones are: firstly, no part of the territory or ground
is not ‘Strategically Not Important’. Creative use of strategy can change a
seemingly unimportant ground to strategically important ground; secondly,
policy and strategy take years to evolve and hence must be pursued by
successive institutions despite differences; thirdly, the formulation of such a
strategy always factors in security inputs from the uniformed community.
Therefore, the inputs must be based on larger security interests and not
influenced by individual needs to survive and remain relevant. For this, the
uniformed community must be well-informed and well-read. This will help them
provide honest input; fourthly, as mentioned by Henry Kissinger in his book ‘On
China’, ‘Far better than challenging the enemy on the field of battle is
manoeuvring him into an unfavourable position from which escape is impossible’;
fifthly, if the demarcation of boundaries helps avoid war, boundaries should be
demarcated provided it does not make one weaker. On the other hand, be mindful
that if not demarcating the boundary makes one weaker, then demarcate the
boundary post haste; sixthly, in the context of China and India military
balance, there is a need to reassess the PLA threat to the Siliguri Corridor
and recommend options for optimal utilisation of the Indian Army troops
currently deployed in that sector; finally, the search question is, has India
done enough to nurture and strengthen the bilateral relationship with India’s
immediate neighbours or does more need to be done?
India needs Bhutan more than Bhutan needs India!
Endnotes
1 VS Coelho, Sikkim and Bhutan (New
Delhi: Indian Council of Cultural Relations, 1967), Pg 65-74.
2 Manoj Joshi, “Bhutan-China: Settling Border
issues”, ORF 17 Nov 2023.
https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/bhutan-china-settling-border-issues.
Also
see, Kiran Sharma and Phunt Sho Wangdi, “India casts a wary eye on revived
China-Bhutan boundary talks”, NikkeiAsia, 5 Nov 2023.
https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/India-casts-wary-eye-on-revived-China-Bhutan-boundary-talks.
3 Sushani Haider, “ Bhutan-China border
demarcation talks inching towards completion: Bhutan PM Tshering”, Hindu, 7
Oct 2023.
https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/bhutan-china-border-demarcation
-talks-inching-towards-completion-bhutan-pm-tshering/article67392769.ece
4 Cao Siqi, Liu Xin and Bai Yunyi, “MoU on
China-Bhutan boundary talks ‘breaks deadlock caused by India, paves way for
diplomatic ties”, Global Times, 15 Oct 2021.
https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202110/1236425.shtml
5 Lynpo Om Pradhan, Bhutan the Roar of the
Thunder Dragon (K Media: Thimphu, 2012), 13-14.
6 “Prime Minister arrives in Bhutan”, Ministry
of External Affairs, 22 Mar 2024.
https://www.mea.gov.in/pressreleases.htm?dtl/37729/Prime+
Minister+ arrives+in+Bhutan
7 VS Coelho, Sikkim and Bhutan (New Delhi:
Indian Council fof Cultural Relations, 1967), 75-78.
8 A K Bardalai, “Dokalam and Indo-China
Boundary”, Journal of Defence Studies, Vol. 12, No. 1, Jan-Mar 2018, pp. 5-13.
http://idsa.in/jds/jds-12-1-2018-doklam-indo-china-boundary.
Also
see, . Bardalai, Major General AK. “Face Off at Doklam Plateau: Implications
for Indo and Bhutan”. Science and Technology Forum. Manipal University,
India. 18 Aug 2017.
https://stsfor.manipal.edu/why-china-encroaching-bhutan/
Bardalai,
Major General AK. “India-China Relation: Is there a thaw?” Science and
Technology Forum. Manipal University, India. 22 Nov 22, 2018.
https://stsfor.manipal.edu/safeguarding-indo-pacific-trumps-disruptive-tactics/
9 Robert Barnett, “China Is Building Entire
Villages in AnotherCountry’s Territory,” Foreign Affairs, 7 May 2021.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/05/07/china-bhutan-border-villages-security-forces/
10 Karma Phuntso, The History of Bhutan (Random
House India: Noida, India, 2013), Pg 84-110.
11 As told to the author by one of his close friends and former high ranking officer
of Royal Government of Bhutan.
12 Claude Arpi, “Occupy Chumbi Valley: A Top
Secret Cable from Harishwar Dayal”, Indian Defence Review, 13 Dec 2015.
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/occupy-chumbi-valley-a-cable-fromharishwar-dayal/.
13 A K Bardalai, “Ecology and Boundary: Mapping
Overlapping Terrain”, External Dimensions of Security of the Northeast Region,
ed. Temjenmeren Ao (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2021), Pg 16-29.
14 Henry Kissinger, On China (Penguin
Books, 2012).
@Major General (Dr)
AK Bardalai, VSM (Retd) is a former peacekeeper and
currently a Distinguished Fellow of the United Service Institution of India. He
holds a PhD in United Nations Peace Operations under the supervision of
Professor (Dr) Joseph Soeters, Tilburg University, Netherlands. He was also the
former Commandant of the Indian Military Training Team, Bhutan.
Journal of the United Service Institution
of India, Vol. CLIV, No. 636,
April-June 2024.