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Manipur, maid of the mountains, was the evocative
title of a book, published by R Constantine in 1981. Manipur continues
to be beautiful and lovely, befitting the lyrical title of
Constantine's book. The state, however, ravaged by militancy for the
last forty years and plundered by its politicians is in shambles and
on the brink of a financial emergency. Its environment particularly in
the hills has been degraded and as a result its beautiful lake Loktak,
is fast silting up. There has been continual siphoning of
developmental funds. The insurgency which was initiated by the Peoples
Liberation Army [PLA] in 1979 and by the United National Liberation
Front in the early nineties, both with some ideology, has degenerated
and proliferated into a number of rag-tag groups and is now basically
a widespread extortion racket, which has spread like cancer into all
facets of politics, administration and the social life of the state.
The Manipur hills consist of a series of parallel ranges extending
from the Naga hills to the North and the Mizo and Chin hills to the
South. The hill ranges are divided into the Eastern and Western hills.
The Manipur Eastern hills form a continuous chain along the
Indo-Myanmar frontier for about 200 kilometres with an average height
of 1500 metres. The different ranges are the Nupita, Chiaga, Malain,
Angoching and Yomadung. The Manipur Western hills comprise parallel
ridges and valleys, running North South for about l80 kilometres. They
are the Uningthou, Khoupum, Koubru, Nungba, Kalanag, Nungjiabong and
Haopi.
The Manipur valley enclosed by the eastern and western hills is a
large intermont basin about 70 kilometres long and 35 kilometres wide
with an area of 2067 sq kilometers and an elevation of 760 metres. It
is a lacustrine plain, site of an ancient lake subsequently filled up,
the remnants occupy the south east corner of the valley, ie the Loktak
lake.
The people of Manipur fall into three groups who migrated into the
valley from the east and the south from Myanmar. The main group the
Meiteis, chanced to settle in the fertile valley by its flowing
streams and developed into an agricultural community, thereby getting
a headstart to civilisation. Of the second group consisting of three
tribes, the Thangkhuls settled in the hills to the West in the present
Ukhrul district, the Maos in the North in present day Senapati, and
the Zeliangs in the North and West in Tamenglong district. The third
group came from the south and settled in the south in Churachandpur
district. This is the Chin-Kuki- Mizo group, comprising several sub-
tribes. The main Kuki tribe which is more enterprising spread to other
districts and even into the Naga Hills and North Cachar Hills of
Assam..
The Meiteis having settled in the valley developed into an early
civilisation. There were four principalities–Khumal, Lawang, Moirang
and Ningthouja, the last enjoying royal status. The Meiteis have a
recorded history of two thousand years, the earliest being the
Cheitharol Kumbaba chronicling the period from 33 AD, the year of
commencement of the reign of Pakhangba, upto 1897 AD the reign of
Maharaj Churachand Singh. The Meitei Rajas controlled the valley and
hills and extended their sway well into the Naga hills upto Assam and
into Myanmar upto the Kebaw valley.
Insurgency came to Manipur with the Naga underground in 1956. The
Federal Government of Nagaland [FGN] extended its activities to the
Naga districts of Manipur. The Manipur Rifles, the armed police of the
state was actively involved in counter insurgency operations with the
Army. Led by their Meitei officers it earned a very good name. When
the Naga hills district was given statehood in 1962 it hurt the Meitei
sentiment. An ancient kingdom which had ruled the area including the
Naga hills district, was already insulted when it was given Union
Territory status. Manipuri, the language which was the lingua franca
of the state, learnt by the Meiteis and all the tribals of the state,
was not being included in the Eighth Schedule. And now Naga hills,
only one district of Assam was given statehood..
In the late sixties and seventies, the policy of the party in power in
Delhi was to flush the North East with funds. A group of contractors
had come up in Delhi, all hangers on of the party in power. Nagaland,
Manipur and later on Meghalaya and Mizoram were the states which
suffered this policy. Ninety per cent of the funds poured into these
states were carried back to Delhi by this coterie of contractors, who
had come to be called the Delhi Durbar. Roads were constructed on
paper and development funds were siphoned off. Food grains for the
public distribution system went wholesale into the black-market.
Manipur was sucked into this vortex and its politicians and
bureaucrats quickly adapted to this system.
In 1975, the FGN signed the Shillong Agreement, and peace came to the
hills of Ukhrul, Senapati and Tamenglong. This was short-lived. Muivah,
a Thangkhul and Isaac Swu, a Sema rejected the Shillong Agreement and
formed the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland [nsCn] along with
Khaplang, a Hemi naga from Myanmar. The NSCN had its Headquarters in
northern Myanmar. It was at this time that the Peoples Liberation Army
[PLA] was formed on 25 September 1978 by the late N Bisheswar. An
ideological and chauvinist group, it was formed because of the corrupt
politics and administration of the state.
The PLA was a revolutionary organisation and attracted a number of
young people. Several brilliant Meitei students studying in national
universities left their studies and joined the organisation and were
killed or captured in encounters. The borders of Manipur curiously
were never policed like the borders of West and East Pakistan. The FGN
had established its camps in the Somra tracts across Ukhrul and in
northern Myanmar in Hemi Naga country. There was, however, no border
policy with deployment of border forces along the Myanmar border. The
Army, Assam Rifles and the Village Volunteer Force [VVF] posts were
established, but not on the pattern of the Indo-Pak border. Much later
when the BSF (Border Security Force) was raised, some posts were
established at Behiang, Phaisanjang and Moreh, but these were isolated
and no BOPs (Border Outposts) were strung along the border, to form a
linked line of defence. The PLA also crossed into Myanmar, and
probably with the help of the NSCN reached Kachin and established
training camps with the Kachin Independent Organization [KIO]. The PLA
robbed banks and extorted money from the Marwari traders, who were
part of the unholy nexus of politicians and bureaucrats in siphoning
out development funds.
There were a number of Meitei settlements in the Kubaw Valley,
remnants of the Meitei's earlier domination of the area. With an
increase in pressure of the Army and paramilitary forces in the
valley, the PLA took refuge in these villages and also in Sylhet
district of Bangla Desh, in Srimangal, Chotto Dhamai Adams bazaar,
where there were Meitei settlements – again vestiges of the earlier
extent of rule of the Meitei kings.
In a series of swift actions in the early eighties, the Army was able
to capture Bisheswar; several first and second rank leaders were
killed in encounters. In 1990 Bronsen, the President of the KIO
withdrew support to the NSCN, the PLA and the ULFA who were all being
trained by them. The weapons obtained by these organisations from the
KIO were all seized from the Myanmar Army. Neither the NSCN, nor the
ULFA and the PLA really acquired sizeable weapons from the KIO. When
support was withdrawn, all three groups took refuge in Bangla Desh.
The FGN and the MNF had sought and received help from Pakistan in the
sixties. The NSCN and the ULFA leaders soon established contact with
the Pakistan ISI in their Embassy in Dacca, and very soon the ISI had
arranged arms to be purchased from Thailand. The Khmer Rouge in
Cambodia had just broken up and Russian light weapons and LMGs were up
for sale. An arms bazaar soon formed up in Thailand. Weapons purchased
here were brought in coastal trading ships to Cox's Bazaar. In 1991 a
group of 250 NSCN (IM) exited from Chandel district in south Manipur
and marched south along the eastern border of Mizoram, and cutting
across south of Parva entered Bangla Desh. Here ten of the cadres
deserted and surrendered to the BSF post at Parva, and the government
came to know of the whole plan. Later, the remaining 240 cadres
returned with weapons collected from landings in Cox's Bazaar, and the
NSCN (IM) got its first consignment of weapons through the ISI. They
did two more such trips. When the fourth party was returning with
weapons, they were intercepted by the Army and a number of NSCN and
ULFA cadres were killed. This, however, did not discourage the NSCN
and other groups, and several more consignments were brought. The
route was later changed. Instead of going east from Bandarban in
Bangla Desh , the groups struck north through the Chittagong Hill
Tracts, and crossed into Mizoram near the tri-junction between
Chittagong Hill Tracts, Tripura and Mizoram. From here they traversed
east and crossed at Tipaimukh into Manipur and turning north crossed
into Tamenglong and then into Nagaland. This route was used several
times by the NSCN (IM). It was only once in 1999 that the Assam Rifles
ambushed a group of 60 odd NSCN[IM] marching up the Longai valley;
nine NSCN members were killed in this ambush. This route has been used
several times by the NSCN (IM). It is even reported that the last
consignment brought in July 2000 into Mizoram, was sent by vehicle
from Mizoram via Jiribam, Tamenglong to Nagaland. The consignment of
2001 crossed Jiribam in January 2002. By the late nineties arms
merchants had made their bases in Rangoon. The PLA, UNLF and other
groups started purchasing arms from Myanmar across Chandel district.
The United National Liberation Front was founded on 24 November 1964
by Arambam Somerendra. It was a secessionist organisation and was the
culmination of several movements like the shadowy Pan Mongoloid
movement and the Revolutionary Nationalist Party which raised the
banner of independence in 1953. The UNLF was preceded by the
Revolutionary Government of Manipur (RGM). A rash of robberies
including looting of the Treasury in lmphal in 1968 and 1969 were
probably done by members of the UNLF and the RGM. By 1970 there was
information that the RGM was in touch with the Naga underground. A
link was established in East Pakistan and 52 RGM members crossed the
border in 1969. They were arrested and all except their leader Sudhir
Kumar were deported into India. Most of them were arrested in combing
operations in Cachar and Tripura. Sudhir Kumar was arrested in 1972.
Only Somerendra remained. By 1970 the RGM was leading an anti Mayang
movement. In 1972, when Manipur got statehood, the RGM lost its base.
Many of their volunteers were arrested.
The UNLF remained a social organisation for a decade and took to arms
again only in the early nineties. Funds were collected by extortion
from the business community and government servants and they purchased
arms from across the border in Myanmar. In 1990 a faction led by N
Oken left the UNLF and formed the UNLF Oken group, which later merged
with splinter groups of the Kangleipak Communist Party and the Peoples
Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK) and formed the Kanglei
Yawol Kanna Lup.
The third militant group of the valley – the Peoples Revolutionary
Party of Kangleipak [PREPAK] was founded by RK Tulachandra on 9
October 1977. Another revolutionary and chauvinist group, it collected
money by robbing banks, extortions from the business community and set
up camps in Myanmar for training its cadres.
The Kanglei Communist Party (KCP) was founded in 1980 with a leftist
chauvinist ideology. It has its CHQ in Chandel district and a camp in
Myanmar. It has today degenerated to being an outfit involved in
extortions only.
Till the nineties, these groups operated in the valley alone, and had
only some bases in Chandel district. This district has a scattering of
smaller Naga tribes Maring Anal Chothe Kom along with a number of
Kukis. Hilly and forested with hardly any roads, its border with
Myanmar is totally unguarded. The only main road links Paiel in the
valley with Moreh on the Myanmar border. The NSCN [IM] operated in
Chandel district finding sanctuary in the Naga villages. Churachandpur
district was the only district free of militant groups.
All this changed in 1993, when the Kuki National Army was set up in
Myanmar. The Kuki-Chin- Mizo group and the Nagas had never got along
well ever since they had migrated and settled in the Manipur hills.
The Kukis had been used both by the Meitei Rajas and the British as a
buffer against the Nagas. Perhaps this is what prompted setting up the
KNA across the Moreh border. The bait offered was control of the rich
spoils of smuggling through Moreh. The NSCN (IM) was bidding to
control this zone. The valley group, who had bases in Chandel
district, was also bidding for controlling Moreh through the sizeable
Meitei population there and across the border in the Kubaw valley. It
was only the Kuki population who did not have a say on this issue. The
KNA filled this vacuum.
Fierce clashes took place between the KNA and the NSCN (IM) and the
Chandel hills reverberated with gunfire. The groups turned savage and
attacked each other's villages. The KNA came out badly bruised and a
large number of Kukis whose villages were burnt had to be resettled.
The NSCN (IM) had long been looking for a chance to get a foothold in
the valley. Their first success came when N Oken split from the UNLF
and formed the KYKL. The NSCN (IM) had established an extensive
extortion net in Nagaland, and the Naga districts of Ukhrul, Senapati
and Tamenglong. When it linked up with the KYKL, it got a foothold in
the valley. It now got a chance to link up with a Kuki group also.
The badly bruised KNA appealed for help and volunteers from all other
tribes of the Kuki group. The Paites who live in south Churachandpur
objected and accused the KNA of unnecessarily taking on the NSCN (IM).
The KNA retaliated by attacking the Paite villages. Bitter clashes
broke out between the sister tribes and each burnt the other's
villages. The NSCN (IM) watching from afar must have laughed at seeing
the confusion in their enemy's camp. The Paites sought refuge south of
the border and there ran straight into the waiting arms of the NSCN
(IM). The Zhou Reunification Army (ZRA), comprising the Zhous and the
Paites, was formed. They were armed and trained by the NSCN (IM). The
KNA found the erstwhile defencless Paites fighting back. The NSCN (IM)
had penetrated the Kuki-Chin-Mizo group. They were to do this again.
The NSCN had split in 1988. The Thangkhul Nagas never really got along
with the Konyak and Hemi Nagas. In the NSCN encampments, the tribes
lived in separate camps. When the split came it was violent and quite
a number of Thangkhuls were killed in Myanmar as they fled to the
Indian frontier. After this Khaplang generally controlled the eastern
areas of Nagaland, while Muivah and Isaac Swu controlled the western
areas, and of course the four hill districts of Manipur.
The NSCN (IM) succeeded in penetrating the valley area when the Oken
faction of the UNLF broke off and organised the KYKL. In 1990 the UNLF
developed close links with the NSCN (K). This was natural as Muivah
held that Rajkumar Meghen the leader of the UNLF never warned him of
the impending attack on his group by Khaplang. Ejection of Oken also
drove him into the arms of the NSCN (IM). The KYKL were equipped by
the NSCN (IM) and they started operating in the valley together. In
1994 a clash took place between Oken and Achou Toijamba over
organisational matters and KYKL split into two factions, KYKL (O) and
KYKL (T). NSCN (K) had meanwhile made inroads into Tamenglong and
formed a Zeliangrong unit. They were able to exert their sway over
part of the national highway 53 passing east west through Tamenglong
district. The KYKL [T] linked up with the NSCN (K) and their cadres
began training in camps in north Myanmar.
When the Kuki Naga clashes took place, the UNLF helped the Kukis with
relief. This helped them to get a foothold in Churachandpur district.
They were able to purchase considerable land from the Kuki chiefs. The
UNLF did this as per a plan. Soon after they set up several camps
along the Churachandpur Tipaimukh road. Seeing that there were no
forces posted outside Churachandpur town, and communication was
difficult, they occupied four subdivisional HQs Singhat, Henglep,
Thanglon, and Parbung. The civil administration tamely abdicated, as
there was no force deployed. This was in 1998. It was only in 2000
that the BSF was tasked to clear the area, and they occupied the four
sub divisions. Unfortunately the BSF was withdrawn from three of the
subdivisions and the UNLF and the PLA reoccupied them in 2001.
The broad rectangle comprising several thousand hectares, bounded by
the national highway 53 to the north, the Thangjing hills to the east,
the Churachandpur-Tipaimukh road to the south, and the Man Bahadur
road from Tipaimukh to Jiribam in the west is a free zone, where the
PLA, UNLF and the Hmar Peoples Convention [Democracy] HPCD have
training camps and bases. The NSCN (K) Zeliangrong unit linked up with
the UNLF along the national highway 53. Here again the CRPF, which was
guarding this highway, was withdrawn in 2000. As a result this highway
has been parcelled between the NSCN (IM), the NSCN (K), the UNLF and
the PLA.
The creation of the Kuki National Organization [KNO], and the KNA, led
to the creation of a parallel organisation called the Kuki National
Front, mainly due to leadership rivalries. Further squabbles led to a
second split. The KNF [Presidential] and the KNF [Military Council]
were formed. Later there were further splits. Ideology was just a fig
leaf. All these groups were nothing but unvarnished extortion outfits.
The election held in 2000 spawned two more outfits among the Kukis.
Thangkholem Haokip was left out in the run up to the elections. He
decided to oppose the KNO and the KNA. He sent feelers to the NSCN
(IM) for an alliance. Thangkholem raised a new group called the United
Kuki Liberation Front (UKLF). Chandel district came under the control
of the NSCN (IM) – UKLF combine without any armed forces support. In a
parallel development Khulam Hanshing also denied a chance of
contesting the elections by the KNF (MC) who controlled the Sadar
Hills of Senapati district rebelled and extended a hand to the ancient
enemy. The fertile Saikul valley was lost to the KNF (MC) as a new
outfit, the Kuki Revolutionary Army (KRA), was formed with NSCN (IM)
weapons in November 2000.
The last of the Kuki-Chin- Mizo militant group is the HPCD. Basically
a Mizoram militant group, it operates on the Tipaimukh- Jiribam axis.
It is linked with the UNLF. Its original link with the NSCN (IM) is,
however, not completely forgotten.
A new trend has developed in the last few years. Links have been
established between the militant groups and the politicians. The
elections in 2000 saw several candidates both in the plains and the
hills being backed by different militant groups. For the last couple
of years the valley and hill militant groups have penetrated the state
and central administration and carved out areas of influence. Every
month when salaries are disbursed a percentage is deducted and paid to
the militant groups. This was simply taking a leaf out of what was
done by the NSCN in Nagaland. In the Naga districts of Manipur also,
regular deductions are labelled as house tax and ration money. The
militant groups also interfere in award of contracts and enter offices
carrying files and get signatures of officers at gunpoint.
During the last few years several officers who resisted were shot. An
IAS officer, Director Tourism, was shot in his office for failing to
agree to a payment. The Registrar of Cooperatives was kidnapped and
shot in the leg leaving him lame for the same reason. The Director of
Education suffered the same fate. The Divisional Engineer Telephones
was shot and killed in his house for failing to waive the bills of two
PCOs operated by the NSCN (IM) and the PLA. The Chief Engineer Lok Tak
project was shot and killed on 12 January 2000 after his security was
withdrawn reportedly on unwritten orders to the Director General of
Police. Linking with the politicians the militant groups succeeded in
subverting the public distribution system. It was only after Central
forces were deployed in crucial state government departments, that the
penetration into government departments was broken. Many of the
important heads of department have taken to sleeping in their offices,
as they are guarded.
As some of them wryly put it, "There are queues in our houses every
morning of representatives of different militant groups". In this
respect Chandel district was the worst affected. This was because
there was no deployment of paramilitary forces in this district. On
Friday, 24 November 2000, the Deputy Commissioner left for his office
with five riflemen of the Manipur Rifles. A group of thirty NSCN (IM)
and UKLF cadres were waiting in his office. As soon as he arrived, his
car and his escort were surrounded. The escort was disarmed and locked
up in one of the rooms of the office. The Deputy Commissioner was led
at gunpoint to his room along with five of his block development
officers. The DC was then forced to sign five cheques for Rs.
44,80,000/- DRDA money meant for development projects in five blocks.
The BDOs were then taken to the bank. The bank had by then closed
transactions for the day. The DC was then confined to his house, where
he remained through Saturday and Sunday under custody. On Monday the
BDOs were again taken to the bank and the cheques cashed. The NSCN
(IM) and the UKLF took the money. The rifles of the escort were then
returned. The interesting thing is that neither the Manipur Rifles nor
the police located at Chandel informed the State HQs through Friday to
Sunday about the happenings. It was only on Monday the 27 that the DC
informed the State Government at lmphal.
Besides the above there are any number of incidents, where contracts
are taken by unqualified members of militant groups at gunpoint and
work executed by them. Executive engineers and their seniors are
forced at gunpoint to carry out only 50 per cent of the work and
record in their measurement books that 100 per cent work has been done
and pass cheques for the full amount to the contracter. 50 per cent of
the amount is taken by the militant group concerned. No department was
spared. In the Food and Civil Supplies department whole tankers of
kerosene oil, petrol and diesel were diverted from the dealers and
sold in the blackmarket by the militant groups.
It is clear that ideology had long since been left behind in the
valley and hills. While the common people look to the government for
succour, there is a half educated crust which has become increasingly
anti national and blame everything on the Central Government. The
burgeoning strength of the NSCN (IM) bred fears in the Meitei
community that this underground group and the Thangkul, Mao, Paumei,
Maram, Zeliang and other Nagas behind them would one day control
Manipur. Despite the extortions the Meitei community began to feel
that only their militant groups would ultimately protect them against
the NSCN (IM). There was even a doubt that the North Eastern states
might break up. If this happened the Meiteis genuinely feared that
they would be dominated by the NSCN and the Nagas, putting an end to
the 2000 year domination of the Meiteis. This was intolerable.
Then came the cease fire with the NSCN (IM) in 1997. The fear of the
four Naga districts becoming part of Nagaland became real. The NSCN
(IM) also changed the name Nagaland to Nagalim. The Meithei pride was
hurt and a massive procession was organised in Imphal. It was
intolerable to the Meitei pride that the 2000 year history and
domination of the hill districts would be forgotten and they would be
only left with the valley.
The ceasefire was extended twice. When it was to be extended a third
time, the NSCN (IM) insisted that the ceasefire should be extended to
the four hill districts of Manipur. The Government of India agreed.
But it angered the Meiteis. This led to arson and rioting which was
beyond the control of the Manipur police. The Raj Bhavan was nearly
burnt.The half educated crust made it out as if it was a repeat of the
1891 attack on the Residency, when it was burnt down after the British
garrison retreated. Front organisations of the main valley underground
groups, the All Manipur Union of Clubs Organisation (AMUCO) and the
All Manipur Students Organization (AMSU), utilised the mood to
influence the common people about the intransigence of the Central
Government. For some time the valley groups who had become quite
unpopular, because of the kidnappings and widespread extortions,
managed to come close to the common people. This, however, did not
last very long.
What is the answer for Manipur? One cannot help feeling that the
Central Government in its focus on the Western border and Pakistan has
relegated the North East. We must correct this imbalance. In any
counter-insurgency module the military and the civil effort must go
together. Keeping this as a guiding principle five steps must be taken
by the Centre.
(a) Ensure that officers of the All India Services stay in the
State. Today ninety per cent of them are on deputation and continually
manipulate not to come back. Most of the officers of the last five
batches have got cadre transfers. The Home Ministry must post two
battalions of the CRPF in the State to exclusively guard and escort
all Central and State Government employees. They should guard all
offices and residential colonies. All civil police and judicial
officers should be shifted to government colonies. Once their security
is ensured, there will be no excuses for cadre officers to run away.
The tenure rules should be changed to ensure that five year tenure in
the state is mandatory. Terms of service in the North-Eastern cadres
should be made specially attractive.
(b) Posting of judicial officers in the state should be
specially monitored. If necessary, judicial officers should be
shuffled from among the North Eastern States to ensure that they are
not pressurised to favour militants being tried.
(c) The valley districts have roads and tracks that are fully
accessible. Ten battalions of the CPMF should be deployed in the
valley in a CI (counter insurgency) grid. The hill districts have very
few roads and will need six to eight battalions each with helicopter
support to effectively dominate them.
(d) Since in any case the state is dependent on Central
finance, all development schemes in the state should be monitored by
officers deputed from the Centre on short tours. For example all DRDA
schemes should be monitored by the Deputy Commissioner (DC) and an
officer from the Rural Development Ministry. This will ensure that
there will be no interference by the politicians or the militants.
(e) The BSF should be deployed in a string of BOPs three
kilometres apart on the borders of Myanmar. Together with this,
extensive construction of roads should be taken up in all the hill
districts and all along the border.
Development schemes should be taken up with a view to open up
employment in the private sector. There is enormous scope for
forestry, horticulture, piggery, poultry and fisheries in the hills
and plains. The unemployed educated and dropouts are the main source
of recruitment for the militant groups–it is this section that should
be targeted in all development projects.
The government should come up with a plan on the above lines.
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