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Pre-1947, the Muslim League proclaimed that the sub-continent
could never be governed by a constitution, which enshrined secular [as
opposed to religious] values. So, it demanded Partition and under the
leadership of Mr Jinnah, took the communal path and proclaimed that it
was the sole representative of Muslims in the subcontinent. Muslims
who supported the secular Congress Party were branded as Hindu
chamchas [yes men] and traitors to Islam. By this logic, Pakistan
claimed that Jammu and Kashmir being a Muslim majority state should be
part of Pakistan. Thousands of armed guerrillas crossed the Pakistani
border into the valley. Their mood was up-beat. They were under the
illusion that one Pakistani was equal to ten Indians. Their slogan was
Has kar laya Pakistan, lar kar lenge Hindustan. The trucks in which
they came were marked Chalo Delhi.
When the Indian Army was poised to clear the whole of Jammu and
Kashmir, Pakistan accepted a UN cease fire. This was to be followed by
a withdrawal of Pakistani forces and a UN-supervised plebiscite to
decide the will of the people. Pakistan was afraid to allow a
plebiscite to be held as they knew that Shiekh Abdullah and his
National Conference party would sweep the polls. Thus, Pakistan
refused to withdraw and no plebiscite could be held. Pakistani
propaganda kept repeating that India was refusing a plebscite.
However, Jinnah saw the reality and on his deathbed admitted to his
doctor that the creation of Pakistan was the biggest disaster of his
life.
Pakistani generals accepted the reality that their armed forces were
too weak for them to force a military solution in Jammu and Kashmir.
Pakistan joined US-led anti-Soviet military pacts. In return, it
received significant military supplies. By 1964, Pakistan's armed
forces had a military edge over India in three vital areas: the air
force, armour and artillery. This once again fired their illusions. Mr
Bhutto persuaded President Ayub Khan that this was the time to focus
attention on Jammu and Kashmir as there was little risk of provoking a
military show down. Indian Prime Minister Shastri warned Pakistan that
any violations of the Cease Fire Line (CFL) would be treated as a
violation of the international border and India would be compelled to
take appropriate action to counter this. Ignoring this warning,
Pakistan launched an armoured division across the CFL, captured Chhamb,
threatened Akhnur and the road communications from Jammu to Naushera
and Poonch. On 6 September 1965, Shastri ordered the Armed Forces to
counter this aggression and cross the international border if
necessary. The Indo-Pak War of 1965 resulted in a military and
political defeat for Pakistan. In the battles which ensued, Pakistan
lost the cream of its armour in the Punjab. Pakistan's political aims
had been countered. An emergency was declared in Pakistan. President
Ayub Khan resigned. A UN imposed cease fire resulted in the
re-establishment of a mutually agreed Cease Fire Line [CFL].
Pakistani propaganda claimed that India had wanted to overrun Pakistan
and their aggressive plans had been crushed. This illusion is
perpetuated up to this day, and 6 September is celebrated as "Save
Pakistan Day". But Pakistani generals know the reality. They know that
they cannot defeat India militarily. They have decided to "bleed"
India by arming and training terrorists in occupied Jammu and Kashmir,
and employing these across the CFL to carry out terrorist attacks in
Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistani propaganda claims these people to be
freedom fighters.
Meanwhile, over the years it had became apparent that there were
strong cultural differences between East and West Pakistan, which
could not be overcome by Islam. When the East Pakistani electorate,
led by Mujibur Rehman, gained a lead over West Pakistan's Muslim
League, the latter was not prepared to accept Mujibur Rehman as the
Prime Minister. The President proclaimed martial law in East Pakistan,
appointed Bhutto as Prime Minister, arrested Mujibur Rehman and began
arresting and killing Bengali intellectuals and other prominent
leaders. Millions of Bengali refugees poured across the border into
India where a provisional Bangladesh government in exile was
established. Bengali guerrillas were recruited, organised, armed and
trained. Soon the whole of East Pakistan was up in arms. Pakistani
military positions were isolated and were faced with an impossible
military task. Forces in West Pakistan, out of sheer desperation,
launched futile air attacks across the western border against targets
in India. In the ensuing Indo-Pak War of 1971, Pakistani armed forces
in East Pakistan capitulated. 93,000 prisoners were evacuated to
prison camps in India. East Pakistan was proclaimed as a sovereign
state, Bangladesh. India declared a unilateral cease fire.
Bhutto released Mujibur Rehman and began negotiating for the
repatriation of 93,000 prisoners of war. India demanded that the CFL
be demarcated by a joint team. India wanted this to be treated as an
international border, but Bhutto apparently pleaded that this decision
be delayed until he had consolidated his position in Pakistan. India
agreed and the prisoners were repatriated; the CFL was thereafter
referred to as the Line of Control [LOC]. The Pakistani military was
subdued after this defeat in Bangladesh but it was not prepared to
allow Bhutto to consolidate his political power. Bhutto's opponents
accused him of murdering a political rival. Bhutto was arrested,
tried, found guilty and hanged. The military once again became the
power behind the political throne in Islamabad.
Partition had deeply affected the demographic balance of some areas of
Pakistan. The majority of the migrants who went from India were Sunnis
who were either serving in the armed forces or working as farm
labourers. Many started working on the farms of Pakistani Shia
landlords. Their poverty led to deep resentments and created an angry
group deprived of resources and political representation. Fearful of
Shia activism following the 1978-79 Islamic revolution in Iran,
General Zia inflamed Sunni fears and militarised Sunni militants. With
the praiseworthy exception of Nawaz Sharif, all successive Pakistani
governments have continued to manipulate sectarian tension for
political purposes. With the assistance of Inter-Services Intelligence
[ISI] successive governments also used sectarian elements to sustain
Pakistan's interests in the conflicts in Jammu and Kashmir and
Afghanistan. The Army has been accused of having encouraged sectarian
conflict, which it can no longer control. Yet careful examination
shows that the army has always been able to maintain sectarian
violence at an acceptable level by fostering infighting between groups
and even eliminating key leaders whenever an organisation or
individual became too difficult to control.
Historically the Army has been able to remain in full control of the
country since 1947 in one form or the other. It has occasionally
withdrawn behind the scenes whenever it could not fulfil the economic,
social and political expectations of society or when the Army suffered
a major military set back as happened in East Pakistan or when
international pressures were too strong. But the Army never really
gave up power. After every crisis the Army was able to control the
main lines of power while civilians had to bear the burden of
governance.
The military regime by building up an alliance with religious
organisations made these an integral part of the military system of
dominance. Thus, the emergence of the MMA [a combination of several
religious organisations] as a political force in the North West
Frontier Province (NWFP) did not impose any constraints on the
government. On the contrary, the MMA split the votes of the other
political parties and allowed Musharraf to pass the constitutional
amendments necessary to transform the parliamentary system into a
presidential one and institutionalise the political role of the army
through the creation of a National Security Council.
Although General Musharraf's role as a liberal moderniser is accepted
by many, we should not exaggerate the dangers, which could arise by
the possible assassination of the General. Notwithstanding the human
tragedy of such a loss, his absence will not significantly shift the
power centre of the country. A suitable relief would be found by the
military. The policies on Jammu and Kashmir and Afghanistan would
continue and security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons would remain under
army control.
The military knows that the illusion of formal democracy is an
essential facade when it deals with the west. It, therefore,
perpetuates a political party system and elections. The military
continues to hold the reins of government while letting politicians
deal with the difficulties of governance. Thus, free and fair
elections and the formal transfer of power to a civilian head of
state, though a necessary first step in the restoration of democracy,
will by itself not result in the democratisation of the country. After
they form a government, civilians will face an almost impossible task
of balancing the priorities of civilian politics with the "demands" of
the military. Lacking true autonomy, civilians will not be able to
perform better than the military. At the same time, civil helplessness
in the face of orchestrated sectarian violence will reinforce the
army's role as the only institution able to physically control it.
This is one of the main reasons why democratic politics have been
repeatedly discredited in Pakistan.
Prominent Pakistani politicians have understood this. In May 2006,
long time exiled rivals Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif got together
in London and signed a "Charter to Democracy" for their country. This
takes a comprehensive stance against the overweening position that the
army and intelligence apparatus occupy in Pakistan's polity. This
Charter envisages bringing the military under civilian control,
disbanding the National Security Council, bringing the defence budget
under parliamentary oversight and throwing out military officers who
occupy civilian posts. An independent election commission would
conduct polls and independence of the judiciary would be restored.
This effort, if accompanied by sustained economic growth, will result
in the emergence of a substantial middle class with a democratic
character. It is this element that is likely to demand more
participatory governance and evolve a democratic tradition.
Significantly, the MMA has accepted reality and also declared its
support for the Charter.
General Musharraf's position has been eroded considerably since his
coup in October 1999. His propaganda machine is finding it difficult
to project him as a knight on a white charger, out on a mission to rid
Pakistan of corrupt politicians, or to rid the country of internal
sectarian violence or to protect Pakistan from Indian aggression.
Terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir can no longer pretend that they are
freedom fighters and that their violence is directed at assisting the
political aspirations of the people. Kashmiris have begun to see the
reality of their situation. They have at last understood that
Pakistan's game plan undermines their prosperity, without achieving
any political gains. Moreover, today the West has understood that the
risk of an Islamist take over in Pakistan is a myth created by the
military to consolidate its hold on power. Propaganda on all these
connected issues no longer works.
The Army knows that it can no longer rely on full support from Sind,
Baluchistan or the NWFP. It clings to the illusion that as long as
Punjab continues to remain pro-army, and it can prevent the exiled
politicians from establishing a working coalition, there is little
that they can do to oust the army. To dispel this illusion, the
opposition must sweep the polls and make the Charter work. For this to
happen it is imperative that Sharif and Bhutto return to Pakistan
sometime before elections that are scheduled to be held next year. Of
course the present government will clamp both of them into jail. But
jail can be a good place to lead political campaigns from. Politicians
have one big advantage. The common man has dispelled many old
illusions. The army's propaganda machine no longer works.
Under these circumstances, India should not only continue its "peace
talks" with Pakistan but should prepare and plan for a post-Musharraf
future and an inevitable structural change in Pakistan. Cynics will
scoff at the talk of democracy in Pakistan. There is no reason to
believe that army rule is divinely sanctioned in Pakistan. The
question is not whether Pakistan will forever be under the thumb of
the Army but whether India is preparing itself for inevitable changes
in Pakistan. India has no reason to keep quiet about the forthcoming
elections in Pakistan. Like all the other friends of Pakistan, India
too must insist on an electoral process that is at once 'legitimate'
in terms of first principles, and 'free and fair' in terms of the
process. New Delhi needs to keep in touch with Pakistan's exiled
leaders. It also needs to engage with such leaders as Qazi Hussain
Ahmad, head of the Jamaat-e-Islam. These are very small steps for
India, but could set the tone for a more assertive Indian policy
towards Pakistan that will benefit the people of both countries.
Faint-hearted Indians will feel that these steps might rebound to
India's disadvantage. Musharraf knows that this is a battle for the
hearts and minds of the people. This is an internal struggle for power
and Pakistani strategists will welcome an opportunity to somehow
involve India. Critics warn that by supporting the opposition, India
would be playing into the Army's hands. They claim that this would
help the military to win public support on the grounds of national
security against their arch rivals – devious Hindu infidels who want
to break up Pakistan.
Others note that Pakistani COAS General Aslam Beg has publicly
announced that any threat to Pakistan's security, no matter by whom,
would evoke a nuclear strike against India. Could an internal
political "threat" against military authoritarianism be treated as an
Indian inspired threat? Admittedly it is difficult to know what
desperate crazy leaders will do when they sense that they are losing
power. There is no limit to the scary scenarios nervous strategists
can conjure up. While it is necessary that the Armed forces be
prepared for any eventuality, it is necessary for Indian leaders to
draw a line between possible and probable threats. At the same time it
should persistently remind Pakistan that in the event of a nuclear
threat, India has the power to wipe out Pakistan.
Pakistan Army's best bet would be to avoid a direct confrontation with
India and continue sponsoring terrorist attacks, such as were carried
out on the trains in Mumbai on 11 July 2006. The aim is to provoke
communal riots; to create several mini-Pakistans within India; to
prove to their people that a secular governance doesn't work in India.
India's response to this is to keep cool and improve its intelligence
and security, and deal swiftly with those who plan and execute such
attacks.
History tells us that authoritarian military regimes in due course of
time invariably overstep their limit and collapse. As if to
demonstrate this cliche, on 26 August 2006, Pakistan army launched a
heliborne commando raid on a Baloch stronghold north-west of Quetta.
The ensuing battle left Nawab Akbar Bugti, his guards and about 20
Pakistani soldiers dead. This incident has given a fresh lease of life
to Balochistan's long simmering insurgency and put further strain on
Pakistan's fragile nation state. There have been contrary reactions
within Pakistan's establishment to this incident. Some speak of a
great military triumph, others ask, 'why was it necessary to kill a
highly respected man who is over 80 years old and in the last phase of
his life? Some fear that this could bring about a 'recrudescence of
nationalist sentiment' within Pakistan and discontent within
Pakistan's political mainstream. Some claim that Bugti was never a
target; his death was accidental when his bunker collapsed during a
battle against armed rebels. A few of Musharraf's close associates
appear to be distancing themselves from the attack. Pakistan's famous
political exiles are reportedly in a state of high exultation.
India has balanced its response to this development. India's official
statement has termed the incident "unfortunate" and observed that
"military force can never solve political problems". It is clearly not
in India's interest to get involved with Balochistan insurgency. India
is taking pains to ensure that its empathy for the Baloch cause does
not give an opportunity to Islamabad to either discredit the movement
or divide opposition leaders by laying them open to the charge that
they are toe-ing the Indian line. At the same time it cannot but be
interested in the project of a democratic Pakistan.
Before his violent death, Nawab Bugti had demanded that the Pakistan
military go back to the barracks where they belong. This is the
spectre that is going to haunt the ruling establishment in Islamabad
during the coming elections. Indian leaders must not let their fears
deter them from taking bold action to support the democratic process.
Pakistani propaganda will persistently tell its people that Indians
are undermining the unity of Pakistan. India has no cause to be
apologetic. It's response is that it looks forward to the
establishment of a free, democratic and prosperous Pakistan. The
coming year promises to be a tense period in Indo-Pak relations.
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