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Background
The visit was the outcome of concerted efforts made over the last few
years to develop a dialogue with Armed Forces personnel and strategic
analysts from Vietnam in context of a security relationship with an
important South East Asian country that is an immediate neighbour of
the People's Republic of China (PRC) and one that is more than well
disposed towards India. These efforts culminated in the acceptance of
an invitation extended by the United Service Institution of India
(USI) for a visit to Delhi by a five member delegation of the
Institute for Defence International Relations (IDIR) from 10 to 15
January 2006.
Unfortunately, a few days before that visit was to take place, we
received intimation from the Vietnamese expressing their inability to
undertake the visit as planned due to (as they put it) "heavy schedule
of internal programme". However, in the same communication, the
Director IDIR extended an invitation for a USI delegation to visit
IDIR at mutually convenient dates. The invitation was accepted and a
USI delegation visited IDIR from 10 to 15 May 2006.
Assistance from the Indian Mission
It is in the fitness of things that we record the contribution made by
the erstwhile Defence Attache Colonel Ahuja, and the current one,
Colonel Dua, in making the dialogue possible. It is also appropriate
that we acknowledge the efforts made by Colonel Dua in making the
visit a most productive and useful one. The USI is indeed grateful to
him for sparing the time and effort to be with us for most of the
time.
The USI is also grateful to the Indian Ambassador in Hanoi, Shri N
Ravi and the Consul General in Ho Chi Minh City, Shri Mowana, for
their gracious hospitality and consideration. The insights they
provided were most interesting and educative.
Composition of the Delegation
The USI delegation comprised the following :
| (a) |
Lt Gen RN Kapur, PVSM, AVSM and Bar, DCIDS
(DOT). |
| (b) |
Lt Gen K Balaram, PVSM (Retd). |
| (c) |
Lt Gen Chandra Shekhar, PVSM, AVSM, (Retd). |
| (d) |
Lt Gen Vinay Shankar, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd). |
| (e) |
Lt Gen Satish Nambiar, PVSM, AVSM, VrC (Retd). |
The Vietnamese delegation at the formal discussions comprised the
following:
| (a) |
Senior Colonel Nguyen Dat Phong, Director IDIR. |
| (b) |
Senior Colonel Phung Quang Tao, Deputy
Director, IDIR. |
| (c) |
Colonel Nguyen Van Hai, Deputy Director, IDIR
(Attended the course at the Defence Services Staff College,
Wellington (Nilgiris) in 1998). |
| (d) |
Senior Colonel Nguyen Van Lich, Chief,
Asia-Africa Department, IDIR. |
| (e) |
Senior Colonel Le Van Mai, Senior Researcher,
IDIR (Was Defence Attache in Delhi in the late 1990s). |
Visit Programme
The programme was short on professional content to the extent that
only the 11 May 2006, was devoted to discussion of security issues.
That afternoon there was a courtesy call on the Deputy Chief of the
General Staff, Lt Gen Pham Hong Loi. The rest of the programme focused
on visits to places of national importance and in conveying to the
delegation an idea of what the country went through in achieving
independence from the French and then in dealing with the operations
conducted by the USA, and how the country is now coping. Given the
fact that the IDIR is new to the whole process of institutional
dialogue and that we were keen to set the process in motion, no
attempt was made to impose any changes to the programme drawn up by
the IDIR. Even so, since the Deputy of the Institute and a couple of
other officers accompanied us throughout the visit, it was possible to
engage them in discussions on aspects of professional relevance from
time to time. Many of the observations in succeeding paragraphs are
the outcome of such informal inter-action. In the event, the visit was
professionally satisfying, fruitful and educative.
An Introduction to IDIR
The formal part of the visit commenced with a briefing by Senior
Colonel Nguyen Dat Phong, the Director of the Institute. On conclusion
of that briefing, the Director USI gave a short brief on the USI. In
the briefing on the USI special emphasis was placed on the training
for UN peacekeeping operations conducted at the USI Centre for UN
Peacekeeping as also the international stature it has achieved in
keeping with India's acclaimed reputation in this field.
The IDIR is recent in origin in that it was set up only in 2003 to
complement the activities of the 'Military Strategy Institute' whose
head had visited the USI on 15 October 1997. Post 2003, the work
related to 'internal aspects' of the Vietnamese Armed Forces in terms
of evolving strategy, doctrine, higher defence organisation, and so
on, is apparently being carried out by the Military Strategy
Institute, while those related to 'strategic studies' and aspects
related to 'defence and military diplomacy' are being carried out by
IDIR.
The re-naming of the Institute (the original name being Defence
Institute of International Relations), some time in 2004 was possibly
due to some 'defining of turfs' between the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and the Ministry of Defence.
Despite being relatively new in origin the IDIR has made a beginning
with dialogues with South Korea and Japan, and now India. Some of
their researchers have participated in events attended by
representatives from Australia, the USA, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia,
Singapore, and so on. Officers from this Institute now, apparently
provide inputs to their Ministry of Defence (MOD) for security
dialogues. They also attend Asean Regional Forum (ARF), Council for
Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) and other security
related meetings and seminars. Two officers who attended courses at
the USI Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping in 2004-2005 are on the
rolls of the Institute (One of them attended the discussions on 11 May
2006).
Officers at the IDIR are all serving Vietnamese Armed Forces officers.
Most of the senior officers (Senior Colonels and Colonels) are former
defence attaches or deputy defence attaches. Many have side-stepped
from the General Staff Department-II. Whereas the Institute is
apparently intended to be an autonomous "think-tank", it is in reality
at present an institutionalised body providing researched inputs to
the MOD for developing defence and security relations with other
countries. It is one of the very few defence organisations that have
been permitted to inter-act with foreign institutions and foreigners,
independent of the 'External Relations Department'. The erstwhile
Director of the Institute was a graduate of the National Defence
College in Delhi and was a Defence Attache in Delhi.
Regional Security Perspectives
Brief presentations on regional security perspectives were made by
Senior Colonel Le Van Mai and Lt Gen Vinay Shankar on behalf of IDIR
and USI respectively.
In the IDIR presentation and in the discussions that ensued, the
following major points emerged:
| (a) |
In the last few years, SE Asia has generally
remained stable, peaceful and dynamic in development. However,
there are some uncertainties due to disputes over territories
and resources as also non-traditional security issues. |
| (b) |
Main dispute is over the territorial
sovereignty in the East Sea- Spratly Islands between five
countries (PRC, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia and the Philippines)
and one 'territory' Taiwan. Besides its great strategic
significance and rich natural resources, this is important
economically and militarily not only to its littoral countries
but also for many others. This remains a big challenge. There
are also other territorial disputes. |
| (c) |
Non-traditional security challenges Include
terrorism, piracy, drug trafficking, illegal migration and
trans-national crime. These issues will be a big concern for the
region and may cause uncertainties and endanger peace,
cooperation and development. Separatist movements, ethnic and
religious conflicts are also matter of concern. |
| (d) |
The US influence in the region is significant
due to the fact that many nations in the region are in the early
stages of development and are thirsty for induction of capital,
science and technology, advanced management techniques, and
markets for their goods. In addition, the USA has traditional
military alliances with Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines,
as a consequence of which it maintains troops in several
military bases in these countries. In the foreseeable future the
USA may be expected to enhance military relations with ASEAN
nations and increase its role in the ARF. The US military
presence in the region may ostensibly be for counter-terrorism
but in the main and longer term it could well be for containing
and restraining the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). The aspect
of China's greater importance as an immediate neighbour was
stressed as also the desire not to provoke either of the two
powers. |
| (e) |
The influence of the PRC is unquestionable.
It established relations with the countries of the region early
and has become an important partner in ASEAN; in recent years in
three areas: military, security-politics and culture-society.
This heightened role is manifest in: trade between China and
ASEAN, only $ 7.9 bn in 1991 to $ 39.5 bn in 2002, $78 bn in
2003, $82 bn in 2004 and a record $ 130 bn in 2005; Chinese
direct investment from $ 62 mn in 1997 to $ 225 mn in 2004;
ASEAN has been the fifth biggest trading partner of China for
ten years. ASEAN and China have signed a framework agreement on
comprehensive economic cooperation including the establishment
of a China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA) by 2010. China has also
signed a 'Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia'. In
October 2003 China and ASEAN endorsed a joint statement on
strategic partnership for peace and prosperity committed to
counter terrorism. Though the Code of Conduct in the South China
Sea (East Sea) between ASEAN and China is being drafted, the
implementation of the Declaration of Conduct serves as an
important base to ensure marine security and order. Notably,
China is striving to develop comprehensive relations with ASEAN
in order to compete with the USA and other nations in the
region. |
| (f) |
Though Japan's role is not as significant as
that of the USA and China, it is an important partner and holds
a remarkable position in the region. As ASEAN's longest standing
partner and having over 30 years of diplomatic relationship with
the grouping, Japan's role is increasingly enhanced through
cooperative relations with ASEAN in general and with each ASEAN
member individually. Besides trade, Japan is strengthening its
security role in SE Asia. |
| (g) |
Russia and India are also asserting their
roles in SE Asia by participating in joint agreements. Two-way
trade between India and ASEAN reached $ 9 bn in 1997 and $ 17.7
bn in 2004. Due to cooperative relationships, asean members have
also gained access to high technology sectors, energy, science,
Information Technology (IT), culture, tourism and so on. |
Implications of the Rise of China
Brief presentations were made by Senior Colonel Le Van Lich and Lt Gen
Chandra Shekhar on behalf of IDIR and USI respectively.
In the IDIR presentation and the discussions that ensued, the
following major points emerged :-
| (a) |
The 21st Century is unlikely to see
conventional armed conflict like world wars but more of conflict
based on religious, racial and territorial issues. |
| (b) |
The Asia-Pacific is from China's point of
view, a region where all its national vital interests exist and
converge. It is also the place where competition between major
powers takes place. |
| (c) |
The first and foremost goal of China is to
maintain stable relations with major powers. The second goal is
to try and keep good relations with regional countries for fear
of a US led alliance that may seek to contain and restrain
China. |
| (d) |
China is becoming an economic powerhouse in
the region but it is also facing the challenge of how to
persuade regional countries that Chinese economic development is
not a threat to other countries but brings opportunities. |
| (e) |
Political transitions appear smooth and stable. |
| (f) |
China defines Asia as a region where it has
an advantage of general influence and where China must create a
dominant role for itself to help it rise to the status of a
world power. The key Chinese strategic goal was assessed as
becoming a strong and unified nation, a world power and a super
power in Asia, and also a world-leading player in economics,
politics and military by the middle of the 21st Century. |
| (g) |
To implement its Asia strategy, China is
likely to pursue the establishment of comprehensive cooperative
relations or partnerships with all countries of the region; take
all the responsibilities that it can to manifest its role as a
'responsible power'; accept the US role in the region and avoid
confronting the USA; opening its domestic market, enhancing
regional integration, sharing opportunities of development with
regional countries; combine regional strategy with global
strategy, promoting international activities. |
| (h) |
In NE Asia, China seeks to enhance relations
with Russia, South Korea and Mongolia and to improve relations
with North Korea. China may be expected to work with others to
prevent a 'new war' on the Korean peninsula. Another important
intention in the sub-region is to establish a collective
security system that eliminates the influence of the USA and
Japan and weakens the US-Japan alliance. |
| (j) |
In SE Asia, China will promote its
traditional influence and use it as a springboard to become a
world power. In this process it will take full advantage of the
leverage of the overseas Chinese populations. |
| (k) |
China has developed its relations with the
Central Asian countries through the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation (SCO) effectively to balance the USA in the region;
enhance multi-polarisation; and to propel relations with Europe.
China's role in the SCO is now ,quite central. |
| (l) |
In South Asia, China has upgraded its
relations with India to a strategic partnership as part of its
general strategy to build a peaceful and stable surrounding
environment for China to develop. Relations with Pakistan are
being further enhanced. To pursue the 'Strategy of Exploitation
of the Great West' China may build a railroad from Xinjiang
through Pakistan's borderline (within Pakistan's economic
corridor) to shorten the geographical distance between China and
the countries in the Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea and Africa;
meanwhile it also helps to shorten the sea-lanes to European
countries. |
| (m) |
While there are many factors that influence
China's Asia strategy, the two primary ones are the US role that
is seen as an effort at containment of China and the fact that
the major powers of Asia like Russia, Japan and India have some
suspicions about Chinese long-term intentions. |
| (n) |
One of the analysts interestingly observed
that China has been 'taking advantage of Pakistan against India,
just as it took advantage of Cambodia against Vietnam'. |
| (o) |
Two other interesting observations made were
that "Prior to 1995, China focused its attention on the West,
but after 1995, it turned towards the East, and is presently
focused on improving relations with immediate neighbours, and
follows a policy of peace and friendship. Chinese definition of
neighbouring countries extends upto Middle East and Australia"
and "After 2004, China is getting ready to have several joint
military exercises including with India and Russia. They want to
indicate that they are a giant military power". |
General Observations on Strategic Aspects Based on Informal
Inter-Action
An observation was made that the Taiwan and Korean issues are
inter-linked; one cannot be solved without addressing the other.
Constant effort was required to balance the US pressures vis-a-vis
interests with the Chinese. China's perception that the USA is trying
to contain it is an obsession that has to be factored into all
strategic calculations. Both are competing in Central and SE Asia. But
China has the advantage of geographical proximity. It is, therefore,
stepping up trade and investment in all SE Asian countries.
Japan's growing interest in a security role in the region was a matter
of some significance. Japan is apparently investing considerably in
various projects connected with infrastructure and general improvement
of living conditions.
While indicating significant and growing Australian interest and
investment in Vietnam, it was discreetly suggested that India rather
than Australia should in fact be doing so.
South Korea has apparently evinced interest in upgrading equipment
left behind by the US forces.
Relations with China are being managed rather well by Vietnam. The
border demarcation has been settled on the 'watershed' principle and
both sides claim the other has benefited. The Vietnamese do not want
to unsettle relations with China and to that end, possibly made
greater concessions.
Observations on Bilateral Issues
Given the excellent relations that exist between Vietnam and India due
to India's unqualified support during Vietnam's struggle for
independence, one would have imagined that there would have been much
greater inter-action between Hanoi and New Delhi. However, indications
during the visit suggest that Vietnam does not figure adequately on
the radar screen in the relevant ministries of the Government of
India; like External Affairs, Defence, Commerce, Industry, Cultural
Affairs, Education, Science and Technology, etc. A sad commentary on
our capacity to exploit the goodwill and interest that prevails in a
country that is of so much importance strategically.
Private investment by Indian corporate house appears to be marginal.
Some incentives by the Government of India may be called for to
encourage the process.
Conversations with our Vietnamese interlocutors indicated that there
would be considerable scope for exploiting Indian expertise in English
language training and information technology. The possibilities of
establishing a tri-Service English training school could be explored;
we may need to show some flexibility in meeting their requirements.
There was considerable interest in exploiting the Indian experience in
peacekeeping including increased inter-action with the USI Centre for
United Nations Peacekeeping. It appears that the Vietnamese
authorities are still rather tentative and somewhat uncertain in their
approach to the whole aspect of participation in international peace
operations. Should they, however, decide in favour of such
participation, they may well seek assistance not only for such
training but also in setting up training facilities in the country. It
would be appropriate for us to not only be prepared to respond to any
such request made, but to positively encourage moves towards this end
during inter-action at various levels. For its part the USI delegation
offered full cooperation to the extent possible.
The IDIR delegation as also the Deputy Chief of the General Staff
evinced keen interest in continuation of the dialogue between the two
institutions on aspects of mutual interest on a regular basis. There
was also mutual agreement on periodic exchange of research scholars on
a reciprocal basis.
The visit was without doubt an unqualified success. While thanking our
Vietnamese hosts for the utility of the dialogue and for their
kindness and hospitality, the USI delegation extended an invitation to
the IDIR to send a delegation to the USI for a continuation of the
dialogue either in end 2006 or early 2007 at the mutual convenience of
the two institutions.
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