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“Earth space, like Eastern Europe in Makinder’s design, is most
critical area of astropolitics. Control of
earth space not only guarantees control of outer eaches of space but
provides advantage on terrestrial battlefield”.
- Everett C Dolman
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Space is fast emerging as not only the new ‘Economic High
Ground’ but also as the new military frontier of becoming a new
‘Strategic High Ground’. The ongoing investment by nations in this
arena is expanding in a geometric progression. Space assets have not
only become the hub for communications but also for surveillance,
guidance, navigation and ‘R and D’ activities.
The Gulf Wars and the ongoing Afghan and Iraq wars have vindicated the
theory of space as a force multiplier for military operations. In
India’s case, India is a dominant ‘Space Faring Nation’ with a
potential for harnessing the space assets for enabling land, air and
maritime military operations. The entire architecture for military
missions would require construction of Net Centric Warfare capability,
where a configuration of satellites are pre-positioned and monitored
to serve the end use of either detecting or destroying military
targets both in space and the earth environment.
Military Strategy in the 21st Century requires total synergy between
forces on land, sea and air, the electromagnetic spectrum and space.
Smaller nations with technologically oriented doctrines and concepts
in their forces could succeed in a shorter time frame against huge
armies and huge landmass. Realisation and relevance to India, for
harnessing assets in space for military purposes is only increasing.
India’s prowess in civil space technology coupled with highly
specialised human resources in IT (software), sensor technology
including imaging etc makes India one of the most apt nations who can
integrate these core competencies to develop ‘Space-Military’
capabilities like C4I2 or guidance and PGM development. Therefore, an
environment study to identify security threats to India, immediate and
long term, and how space assets can impact on military vision and
strategy needs to be carried out.
Aim
Evolve a concept and architecture of Space Assets with land, air and
maritime war waging capabilities for enhancing and enabling military
operations in real time.
Scope
The subject being new and innovative would be covered under the
following heads :-
| (a) |
Part 1. Space Assets – Existing Technology
and Military Capabilities. |
| (b) |
Part 2. RMA Perspective and Net Centric
Warfare. |
| (c) |
Part 3. Tenets of Space Power :
Military Analysis. |
| (d) |
Part 4. Threat Analysis : Indian Sub
Continent. |
| (e) |
Part 5. Way ahead for Indian Armed Forces |
Space Assets – Existing Technology and Military Capabilities
Arena of space is fast evolving as a laboratory of emerging core
technologies related to C4ISR, positioning, timing and guidance
system. Satellites are classified into three categories :
geo-synchronous, semi-synchronous and orbital. Satellites having more
relevance to defence applications are enumerated in succeeding
paragraphs.
Surveillance Satellites. These satellites can be divided into
four categories : photographic, electronic, ocean surveillance and
early warning satellites. They are used for arms control verification
and for achieving battle field transparency.
| (a) |
Photographic Reconnaissance Satellites. Such
satellites include television cameras, multi-spectral scanners
and microwave radars, to detect and pinpoint targets. The USA
and Russia are the leaders in this area of space technology. The
Peoples Republic of China has also launched many such
satellites. KH-11, 9 and 12 are all versions of a photo
satellite. |
| (b) |
Electronic Reconnaissance Satellites. These are
the “ears” in space. They carry equipment designed to detect and
monitor radio signals generated by potential adversaries. These
satellites also gather data on missile testing, new radars and
many other types of communication traffic. Not only do they
locate systems producing electronic signals but also measure the
characteristics of the signal so as to be able to plan
penetration of defences. |
| (c) |
Imagery Satellites. India is very advanced in
this satellite technology gaining data through imagery – EO /
Multi spectral and IR. |
Ocean Surveillance and Oceanographic Satellites. Knowledge of
what is happening in the ocean – like the height of waves, the
strength and direction of ocean currents, and salinity of the water, —
can help in the design of sensors to improve detection of submarines.
These factors also contribute to improving the sea-skimming accuracies
of missiles launched from submarines and air craft.
Navigation Satellites. Doppler analysis of signals emanating from
radiating space-based radio beacons helps in navigation and global
positioning. Even weapon trajectories can be monitored and countered
suitably. Both the USA and Russia have developed satellite navigation
systems. In the USA, an added mission is planned for satellites
specifically to detect nuclear explosions in the atmosphere and in
outer space. It is planned that US navigation satellites will carry
sensors for this purpose also. This effort is in support of nuclear
war doctrines, which require early warning of attack, information and
assessing the size of the attack and data on the attacked target so
that an appropriate response can be made. Other applications are:-
| (a) |
GPS data to enable forces to navigate across
any terrain at night or during inclement weather. |
| (b) |
Develop a DGPS based on different GPS systems
available. |
| (c) |
Assist movement of ground troops in areas
where there are no navigational aids like in deserts (in 1990
Gulf War, Infantryman moved with the help of GPS). |
| (d) |
Today, the ‘US Navstar’ GPS is providing
global services. The Europeans are also producing a different
system (Galleleo) with international collaboration of many
countries including Israel and china. India’s investment in this
joint project is also under negotiation. |
| (e) |
Nevertheless, India has to build its own
different GPS (China has one with four satellites in orbit).
From 2008 onwards India would be launching a few satellites for
an Indian Regional Navigation and Positioning system which will
be incremental on yearly basis upto 2012. |
Geodetic Satellites. It is a satellite, which studies the
physical nature of the earth and, thus, assists in mapping the earth.
Satellite laser ranging and radar altimetry have helped in
ascertaining the pattern of earth’s gravitational potential. The
building of military infrastructure on outer space indicates that the
military satellites of the major powers are increasingly becoming part
of the world wide nuclear and conventional weapons systems.
Nanosatellites. Nanosatellites represent a revolutionary
breakthrough in future satellite development. They are a type of
distributed satellite structural system. Such distributed systems, in
contrast to integrated systems, are able to avoid the damage that
follows the malfunction of an individual satellite, and, thus, will
increase the survivability and flexibility of future space systems.
Possibly the best application of nonosatellites is their deployment in
local satellite groups or in distributed constellations. For example,
if we launch nonosatellites in solar stationary orbits, with 37
nanosatellites placed evenly into each of 18 equally spaced orbits,
then there would be a total of 666 nanosatellites in orbit. Thus, we
could ensure that at any given time, there would be continuous
coverage and surveillance of any spot on Earth. Currently, there are
already a few western countries that are researching “microscale”
satellites. Even in India, sponsored research on the it is already
underway. However, there is a case for the military to also initiate
similar projects within the scope of our joint military strategy and
vision.
Anti-Satellite Weapon (ASW). This is yet another field which
requires more investigation from the military point of view. The
potentiality of lasers in this regard has to be explored. The
‘conventional’ weapons are based on missile and satellite
technologies. Unconventional weapons are those which use Laser based
Directed Energy Weapons (DEW) or directed electromagnetic radiation as
a means of destroying or damaging a satellite. Further, adversary's
ASW would have to be countered. Therefore, there is a necessity of
building Anti-Anti Satellite Weapons (AASW).
Militarisation and Weaponisation. In the regional context,
China’s investment in military space capabilities cannot be
overlooked. Therefore, as a deterrent, India would have to work on it.
Militarisation of space falls within the definition of utilising the
services of satellites for enhancing performance of terrestrially
based weapon, surveillance and communication systems. On the other
hand, weaponisation would mean placing of weapon systems in space
i.e., using space platforms. This issue will continue to be under hot
debate internationally in the coming decade as deployment of
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) measures may find place in space.
However, the present outer space treaty prohibits weaponisation. The
military aspects of existing satellite functions would increasingly
encompass the following as our dependence on satellites will increase
manyfold even in the sub-continental or regional context:-
| (a) |
Research in lasers in India has been going on since 1950s. a
further study of its applications in space should be carried
out. |
| (b) |
There is emergence of a newer weapon known as
Non Nuclear Electro-magnetic Pulse (NNEMP), which has been fired
in Kosovo. from space for neutralising or paralysing the
adversary's command and control systems. Such a system if fired,
in space would also jam satellites and other platforms. Thus,
nuclear hardening technology needs to be explored.(A lot of
research on it has been carried out in the UK). |
IMINT requirements to enhance capabilities of the Armed Forces are
given below:
| (a) |
Remote sensing satellites for surveillance
should have a revisit capability to meet the operational data
update needs. |
| (b) |
All weather imaging capability to cater for
coverage during night and during inclement weather. This will
require radar satellites. India is likely to launch its first
commercial RADAR SAT to give high resolution SAR images in 2007. |
| (c) |
High resolution (sub metric) sensors with
ability to provide very high resolution data during operations. |
| (d) |
Stereoscopic capability. |
| (e) |
Seamless coverage through a constellation of agile, manoeuvrable
satellites with different imaging modes including tracking of
moving targets. |
| (f) |
Ground locational accuracy to meet precision targeting
requirements. In this the capabilities of sensor fuzed
ammunition should be taken note of in defining our needs. |
II
RMA Perspective and Net Centric Warfare (NCW)
War fighting has three fundamentals which are, principles of war,
strategy of war fighting and the technology with which we fight the
war. While the principles of war and strategy have slowly evolved, the
technology for war fighting has been growing at a rapid pace with
Information Technology at the core. Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)
encompasses various areas including space. Firstly, the transformation
of analogue weaponry and equipment to the digital domain plays a
critical role in operations. Precision guided long distance attacks
are becoming main form of combat. Precision guided weapons used in the
Vietnam war accounted for only 0.2 per cent of the total ammunition,
the ratio increased to
8 per cent in the 1991 Gulf war, 35 per cent in the 1999 Kosovo war
which further rose to 56 per cent and 68 per cent respectively in 2001
Afghan war and 2003 Iraq war. Second, force structure and systems have
become more streamlined i.e, reducing size, readjusting force
structures and systems, optimising composition of the logistics and
combat elements. the size of military forces are being compressed,
while conferring them with stronger combat capabilities. Third,
automation is increasingly employed in command and control. Commencing
in the 1960’s and 1970’s up to the present, the military command
automation systems of major countries have been promoted from C3I to
C4I, C4ISR and C4KISR, in order to meet demands of real-time and
highly efficient command and control capabilities. Fourth, a
dimensional expansion is taking place from the traditional three
dimensions (namely Land, Sea, Air) to the present five dimensions
(namely, land, sea , air, space and electromagnetism). The armed
forces, who have superior capabilities to control information, will
gain the initiative in the high tech battlefield. Security of own
information structure and the ability to disrupt that of the enemy
will be an important ‘Capability’ indicator and in this area we are at
the stage of ‘infancy’. Fifth, the operational patterns have become
more system-oriented. In future wars, the past methods and
coordination among land, sea and air forces or the “integrated
air-land warfare”, or the “integrated air-land-sea-space warfare”,
will transform to the completely integrated operations of a system vs
system from the strategic to the tactical domains. In this area, we
are at the first stage of coordination between land, sea and air
forces.
NCW. Combat edge will be with the Forces which are better
networked rather than better platform weapons. New architecture
demands space, air and land-based electronic and photographic
equipment and sensors to be networked and gather the array of
surveillance and intelligence data. These are then passed in real time
through communication satellites, to a data fusion centre, integrated
in military command and decision-making system. Computer analyses and
dissemination is done thereafter. In times to come C4I2 systems would
be in place and would also affect the nuclear deterrence capabilities.
India needs to make a concerted effort in this direction. C4I2 cannot
operate without space assets and these cannot but be joint. In the
Indian case, a sub-continental model which is theatre or sub-regional
capable needs to be architectured. Success in an NCW context is
achieved by effectively linking command and control, sensor and
engagement systems. It is a network, to facilitate enhanced
situational awareness, collaboration and offensive potential.
Understanding a few definitions will be of great help.
Space Assets. Space assets, space forces and space systems are
terms used to describe different categories of space capabilities.
Space assets available to our nation include military, civil,
commercial, and foreign space systems, their supporting
infrastructure, terrestrial elements with the primary mission of
affecting space systems and the personnel who operate them.
Space systems. The comprise nodes and links. There are two
types of nodes : terrestrial and space. The space node includes
satellites, space stations, or reusable space-transportation systems
like the space shuttle. The terrestrial node includes land, sea, or
airborne equipment used to interact with space node. These nodes are
tied together by information conduit called links.
Space activities can be planned and conducted to achieve effects to
fulfil individual theatre, multiple theatre and national objectives.
Those space forces that will primarily support multiple theatre and/or
national objectives are referred to as national assets and would
normally be controlled by the COSC/CDS/Commander, Indian Unified Space
Command (IUSC). IUSC’s control function includes the capability,
authority, responsibility, and accountability to execute those forces.
Some forces’ effects are primarily focused on a ‘Single Front’ with
little or no impact outside the designated area of responsibility.
These theatre space forces work under the control of Integrated
theatre commanders in chief and are executed by theatre component
forces. Although commanders are responsible for producing effects,
their decisions on how to do that are greatly influenced by policy,
strategy and doctrine, which influence space operations. All three are
distinct and have the potential to change dramatically. Therefore, a
thorough understanding of both interaction and differences between
policy, strategy and doctrine in relation to the NCW architecture is
important. It is true that we don’t have theatre commands today.
In my view we are already late. How can we have RMA if networks are to
be only Service specific.
The Future Joint Operations Hierarchy of Concepts. Space assets
would become the hub to enable time sensing NCW capabilities.
Space based NCW would serve the Future Joint Operations Concept which
would provide a point of reference for the range of integrated support
to earth, oceanic and space environment operating concepts.
The NCW Package. Success in an NCW context is achieved by
linking command and control, sensor and engagement systems via a
network, to facilitate enhanced situational awareness, collaboration
and offensive potential. Personnel within the networked force rely on
secure and responsive linkages that allow the right information to be
accessed at the right time by the right force elements. Increases in
combat power from being a networked force are derived from the quality
and timeliness of shared information and through the exploitation of
new system and command relationships. Operational experience has
demonstrated that improved information sharing and increased
collaboration through NCW can provide enhanced understanding of the
situation by decision-makers. Synchronisation is improved, permitting
to deliver more controlled and precise military effects. In the future
this could include rapid and reliable, direct sensor-shooter
conűgurations. Same needs to be architectured for the Indian Armed
Forces and thus would require an integrated and joint approach for the
three services to enable NCW capabilities. Synchronisation of effect
is achieved conceptually through four key, interdependent elements:
| (a) |
Command and Control systems (C2 grid). |
| (b) |
Sensor systems (sensor grid). |
| (c) |
Engagement systems (engagement grid). |
| (d) |
The Network (information network) |
Figure below depicts the inter-relationships between these key
elements. In practice these grids are not always distinct and some
systems are a combination of grids. The four elements are in effect
the exterior packaging of what NCW has the potential to offer . Within
this package are few fundamental components, each of which must be
developed for the overall NCW package to function effectively.
ALL SUPPORTED BY SPACE ASSETS
Any NCW package would have to increasingly depend on space based
assets, for enabling future war fighting capabilities. Consideration
and understanding of the NCW Concept is, therefore, a necessary
prerequisite for appreciating the NCW Roadmap. Whilst the NCW Roadmap
seeks to avoid restating the NCW Concept, the central themes of the
Concept, the network dimension and the human dimension which causes
transition directly to the Roadmap are important.
The network dimension. The network connects military systems,
including engagement, sensor and command systems. The network
dimension will be the initial focus of development, and change here is
expected to have a profound inűuence on the human dimension.
The human dimension. The human dimension is based on
professional mastery and mission command. It requires high standards
of training, education, doctrine, organisation and leadership. Human
dimension is about the way people collaborate to share their awareness
of a situation, so that they can fight more effectively (become ‘networkers’).
It requires trust between warfighters across different levels, and
trust between warfighters and their supporting agencies. The NCW
Roadmap develops these reinforcing dimensions through addition of a
third fundamental component, networking.
Networking. It consists of a range of human and technical
networks, which it synchronises to achieve operational effectiveness.
Networking describes the manner in which networks interface or
collaborate to build a self-synchronising, self-informing system of
systems.
Target End States for Network Centric Warfare Capability. NCW
aspirations for 2020 can be described in target End states. These
should be derived directly from national directives. These could be as
given below :
| (a) |
Force Application in 2020. To generate a
range of lethal and non-lethal effects that are both timely and
appropriate and are synchronised with other Assets to achieve
the desired effect. |
| (i) |
NCW allows to accurately applying an
appropriate level of force in close combat and from standoff
ranges in complex environments. |
| (ii) |
Forces are able to identify friendly, hostile
and neutral forces in the battlespace with enhanced accuracy. |
| (iii) |
This information is distributed through a
Common Operating Picture (COP). |
| (iv) |
The COP greatly reduces fratricide and the
number of platforms on standby and deployed, while significantly
increasing the lethality of friendly forces. |
| (v) |
Have a robust ability - in demanding
environments - to gain and share data on the effects of its
application of force. |
| (vi) |
Commanders should possess a greatly enhanced
decision making environment. |
| (b) |
Information Superiority and Support in 2020.
Defence has continuous information connectivity to link fighting
units, sensors and decision-makers in a way that increases
situational awareness and the capacity to act decisively. |
| (i) |
Seamless interfaces exist between fixed and
deployed domains within the Defence Information Environment
(DIE) and between National and Armed Forces intelligence
domains. An inter-Services Group of Officers would be necessary.
(i.e. DISIG). |
| (ii) |
All source coordination of collection and
tasking should exist across both national/services controlled
capabilities. |
| (iii) |
Information is processed and analysed to
provide integrated intelligence products to the right people at
the right time. This would probably involve the help of the
corporate sector for developing right software. |
| (iv) |
The information architecture should be robust
enough to ensure continuous availability under demanding
conditions, including frequent denial of service attacks by an
adversary |
| (c) |
Command and Control in 2020. The command and
control system would only get streamlined after the institution
of the CDS and linkages with the INCP to enable the ‘GIS’ system
to operate effectively :- |
| (i) |
Commanders to achieve a virtual presence with
senior decision-makers. |
| (ii) |
Make Decision-support tools as an integral and
trusted element of decision-making ability of commanders and
their staff. |
| (iii) |
Commanders are trusted and capable of
adaptation and employing highly űexible command arrangements in
the accomplishment of assigned missions. |
| (iv) |
Capable of űltering information for speedy
decision-making in ambiguous circumstances. |
| (d) |
Force Deployment in 2020.Be capable of rapid
and accurate identiűcation, and the protected deployment, of an
optimised force in the Region including the ‘IOR’. |
| (i) |
Deployment assets have access to appropriate
areas of the Common Operating Picture (COP) and the tactical
information environment. |
| (ii) |
The deployment of forces should be conducted
with maximum efficiency and in-transit visibility and with
minimum risk of interdiction enroute. |
| (iii) |
Deployment agility is achieved through self-synchronising
networks at the service level and a signiűcant part of the joint
force. A joint Headquarters would have to play a lead role
towards this. |
| (e) |
Force Protection in 2020.Forces deployed both
towards the Western and the Eastern sides should have a
pervasive network of active and passive sensors which are
automatically fused into a COP in order to achieve an enhanced
level of shared situational awareness about their surroundings. |
| (i) |
Able to predict a wide range of environmental
threats and protect deployed forces against them. |
| (ii) |
The underlying information infrastructure
employed by the networked force has continuous protection in the
most demanding of circumstances to ensure continuous
availability in the face of determined attacks on the network by
an adversary. |
| (iii) |
The fusion of information and intelligence
provides automatic early warning, through secure protected
networks. The existing Army, Air Force and Naval networks would
have to be made interoperable and then integrated securely. |
| (xi) |
The ability to counter an adversary’s
Information Operations has been enhanced to such a level that
they have a minimal capacity to deny the achievement of the
desired effect. |
| (f) |
Force Generation and Sustainment in 2020. India
will have to obtain ‘out of Region’ capabilities. Therefore, key
logistic function networks within the National Support Area (NSA)
should get linked with those in theatre and provide connectivity
and a collaborative ability with industry and cooperating
countries |
| (i) |
Commanders have an end-to-end visibility of the
logistic system providing the ability to rapidly and effectively
prioritise scarce resources required to generate and sustain
deployed force elements. |
| (ii) |
Automated ordering and replenishment takes
place as supplies and ordnance are consumed by platforms and
field units. |
| (iii) |
The deployed force has minimised its
vulnerabilities and greatly enhanced its mobility through more
effective reach back, optimum force presence and the precision
sustainment for the majority of logistic requirements. |
| (iv) |
The target states outlined are necessarily
broad in nature but they do not dictate how this will be
achieved. |
Australian Approach. Australian NCW capability development plan
is being executed by a programme manager headed by a three star
officer on integrated basis. In 2015, the Australian Defence Forces (ADF)
will have achieved the infrastructure, tools and command and control
systems capable of providing a robust battle space network and a fully
networked joint task force. Communications beyond line of sight, will
be synchronised and synergised through significant capability
delivered by 2008 on military satcom Upgrades. Improved technology in
communications would be attained through Battle space Communication
Systems for Land (JP 2072), Maritime Communication (SEA 1442) and Air
Communication (AIR 5432). This will also enable battle space networks
that complement surveillance, engagement and command and control
systems.
| (a) |
2008: Broadband Networked Maritime Task
Group– initial capability. |
| (b) |
2008: Network Aerospace Surveillance and
Battle space Management capability. |
| (c) |
2009: Interim Networked Land Combat Force. |
| (d) |
2010: Networked Fleet – mature capability. |
| (e) |
2010: Integrated Coalition network Capability. |
| (f) |
2012: First Networked Brigade. |
| G) |
2013: Networked Air Warfare Force. |
| (h) |
2014: Second Networked Brigade. |
| (i) |
2015: Robust Battle space Network. |
| (k) |
2015: Networked Joint Task Force |
2008 : Australian Network Aerospace Surveillance and
Battlespace Management Capability
2013 : Australian Networked Air Warfare Force
2015 : Australian Robust Battlespace Network
2015: Australian Networked Joint Task Force. The important
point to note is the phased manner in which the project is being
replaced to create a system with well deferred phased objectives.
Secondly, note the number of joint projects handled by their joint
headquarter meshing neatly with single service projects under a single
capability development officer to produce a joint networked force
which includes space-land-sea and air assets.
Current Status of NCW in India
Current status is almost negligible as no dedicated work in India has
been ordered by the military on this account. It needs to be looked
into by HQ IDS as military planners.
The aspect of Human Resource Development needs a strategic
direction.
Network Centric Warfare Education Training and Development.
The human dimensions of NCW in respect to education, training and
development (ET and D) must examine the follows requirements :-
| (a) |
a common approach to educating Defence
personnel in NCW concepts, and development of an NCW education
strategy for Defence. |
| (b) |
An audit of what is currently being done with
regard to education and training of Defence personnel. |
| (c) |
Identification of key target groups with regard
to education and training in NCW. |
| (d) |
Development of recommendations regarding what
needs to be done now, by 2010 and by 2020 with regard to
education and training of Defence personnel in NCW. |
Doctrine. NCW does not require its own specific doctrine products.
(However, C4I2 doctrine that is developed must support the relevant
aspects of the NCW Concept). The future NCW should include the
following :-
| (a) |
the provision of C2 (including aspects such
as situational awareness, decision making and self-synchronisation)
to the network enabled force. |
| (b) |
the integration and delivery of effects by
the network enabled force. |
This is a time critical task because new and more capable equipment
will be delivered into service within the next five to
10 years. Without adequate doctrine to promote effective networking,
this new equipment will not deliver the capability anticipated. As a
matter of fact capable non-integrated systems are likely to be more of
a liability in future wars than assets.
Implementation A dedicated study on road map would need to be
done by the Armed Force on NCW Capability Development in collaboration
with a number agencies like the National Security Council Secretariat
(NSCS), NTRO, Department of Space, etc. Such a blue print would
necessarily have to consider not just the technological dimensions but
also the areas of organisation, doctrine and operational concepts. NCW
demands flexibility, acceptability innovation and openness to change
at all levels.
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