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Introduction
Conventional wars have historically been resorted to with the
intention of being kept short. Military history proves that as often
as not, this is not how wars have turned out. The expectation that
tomorrow’s wars will be short arises from the transition of South Asia
into the Nuclear Age. However, if tomorrow’s wars are to be short, two
aspects will need to be kept in mind. The first is regards the
elements which keep conflict duration limited, and, secondly, are the
factors that militate against this.
Most studies on Limited War suggest a deliberate limitation to
politico-strategic aims, geographic spread, weapons and forces
involved. Keeping conflict ‘limited’ is easier said on account of
factors that stoke the conflict spiral. This article dwells on the
drivers of conflict, through a look at military history and by
analysing the current strategic reality in South Asia. The concluding
recommendations are for working on the pre-requisites of a Short War
during peace and in future conflict; these being, paradoxically,
moderation of national passions, war aims and military means.
The lessons of military history
The key impetus to conflict initiation has been the expectation of
victory. Strategic sense decrees that victory be obtained at the
earliest and at minimum cost and risk. Political masters considering
war initiation in an inter-state setting have historically been
persuaded of war as an option only in case of a short duration war.
Other than the nuclear factor, factors that lend themselves to Short
Wars have been present earlier. These include the role of
international organisations; international opinion and pressures;
tacit understanding between adversaries; sensitivity of leaderships to
the underside of conflict, such as escalation and extension; and
finite military capabilities at the outset of war. But these have not
proven consistently effective in keeping wars short. Recourse to
military history would help identify factors that bring about a
reality contrary to expectation.
A review of military history reveals that most wars in the modern age
dating to the Napoleonic Wars have been long. Napoleon spent the
better part of two decades at war prior to meeting his Waterloo. The
inspired manoeuvres of the revolutionary French armies led to his
opponents joining in concert, thereby prolonging the war1. The
American civil war is taken as the first war in which modern military
systems, weapons and tactics made their rudimentary appearance. It was
a long war with Lincoln preserving the Union through a time-consuming
strategy of bringing the industrial might of the North to bear.
The relatively brief campaigns of the Bismarck-Moltke era were on
account of Prussia having perfected the general staff system. Such
momentary asymmetry can bring about quicker victory; however, German
triumph led to French revanchism culminating in the Great War2. The
First World War was embarked on by all sides with the expectation
that, troops would be home for Christmas3. The static front owed to
Moltke the Younger losing his nerve in carrying through the Schlieffen
plan, evidence that the art in war can confound any science in it.
The limitations of operational brilliance in the industrial age are
revealed once again in the next war. Blitzkrieg heralded joint-manship
of a high order that won campaigns, but could not withstand the test
of war in the industrial age. Industrial capacity in case of Albert
Speer’s Germany was not of the order required to impose Hitler’s
will4. Likewise in the East, Admiral Yamamoto, who struck at Pearl
Harbor, is quoted as saying: “In the first six to twelve months of a
war with the US and Great Britain, I will run wild and win victory
upon victory. But then, if war continues after that, I have no
expectation of success.”5 Ultimately, the Total War doctrine of
‘unconditional surrender’ ensured a prolonged contest eventuating in
the nuclear age.
The nearly half-century long Cold War, curiously dubbed ‘the long
peace’,6 witnessed the Superpowers contending through proxies in the
Third World, with individual conflicts lasting for decades. The three
year long Korean War, energised ‘Limited War’ and escalation control
theories.7 The wars of colonial liberation were also long duration
ones in Africa and South East Asia. The Vietnam War, sustained in the
belief that incremental application of force would ensure its early
conclusion, was a decade long. So was the Afghan war. In the post Cold
War era, wars, both conventional and sub-conventional, have largely
been of long duration, be they in central Africa, the Balkans and,
indeed, counter intuitively, the Gulf. The Iran-Iraq War that consumed
half a million lives lasted seven years, being fuelled by all the
Great Powers interested in its extension for strategic and commercial
reasons.
The two Iraq Wars are taken as Short Wars and seen as heralding wars
of the future. However, this case is based on the interim between the
two Gulf Wars being taken as a period of ‘peace’- an arguable
proposition in face of a decade long blockade, sanctions, air space
restrictions and episodic intervention using missiles and proxies
leading up to an assessed toll of half-a-million.8 Besides, the second
Iraq War has self-evidently not quite ended. The latest Israeli
month-long incursion into Lebanon against the Hezbollah was a short
foray. That it cost the Army chief, General Dan Halutz, his job,
indicates the limitations of Short Wars in gaining war aims.9 The only
gain has been avoidance of the earlier outcome of intervention under
Begin and Sharon of 1982; but the jury is still out as to whether
Israel is more secure today on account of this military self
assertion.
From the foregoing brief survey, certain lessons help identify the
drivers of conflict. The first is that, aims that do not brook
compromise, such as ‘unconditional surrender’, ending secession and
regime change, presage a long haul. Keeping aims limited through a
conflict is at best a difficult proposition. Second, from Napoleon
through Guderian to Petraeus, the lesson is that operational level
advantages cannot make up for strategic shortcomings. Thirdly, in the
Age of Nationalism, political forces in society push for longer wars,
thereby constraining autonomy of decision makers and impacting
strategic rationality. Fourth, the form of the conflict embarked on
could change, such as from conventional to sub-conventional. This
would require viewing the conflict as one and its duration as a
continuum. Periods of ‘phony war’, howsoever normalised in
consciousness and discourse, also require being included as periods of
conflict.
Next, there is no guarantee that external interests would converge to
end conflict. International organisations, including the UN, are
vulnerable to manipulation by the Great Powers; therefore any
expectations of these would have to be suitably tempered. Lastly, the
‘stability-instability’ paradox is permissive of long duration LIC
through which strategic aims other than the most desirable one of
durable peace can be materialised.10 By this yardstick, even a
conventional war can also be chanced in the stability afforded by
nuclear deterrence, as Pakistani planners persuaded themselves to
believe in the run up to the Kargil intrusion.
The sub-continental experience
An analysis of conflicts in South Asia does not unambiguously reveal
an inherent propensity towards limitation from which it can be
confidently extrapolated that wars of the future will be short. The
Sino-Indian border war of 1962 was short, less due to the unilateral
ceasefire by China than to India refraining from joining the contest
in earnest. It need not have been so, especially as Western aid was
requisitioned. The War was kept short by Pandit Nehru taking a
considered political decision on not displacing India’s development
trajectory, even if non-alignment suffered a momentary eclipse.
Earlier Indo-Pak wars have been taken as relatively gentlemanly
affairs owing to shared legacy. Of the wars against Pakistan, the
first was a long duration one lasting over a year. Marshal of the Air
Force in hindsight reflects that the 1965 War ended prematurely as the
full weight of air power could not be brought to bear.11 It was
restricted to the three weeks of intensive fighting. However, in case
the Kutch incident of April, Operation Gibraltar of August, and
subsequent violations of the ceasefire till the Tashkent Agreement of
the subsequent January are included, then the conflict duration
qualifies as long.
Likewise, the duration of the 1971 War need not be restricted to the
two week ‘lightening campaign’. It should instead be dated to April
that year when Sam Bahadur famously withstood political pressure for
an early campaign. The Mukti Bahini period, migration of 10 million
people, killings of hundreds of thousands within East Bengal and local
border violations can be subsumed in the period of conflict.12 Even
the short campaign was fortuitous, in that, the view of Generals
Jacob, Nagra, Sagat Singh and Inder Gill of going for Dacca prevailed
in the last stages of run up to war, as against the original intent of
salami slicing and time consuming capture of towns enroute’.13
The Kargil War, called a ‘short, sharp war’ by the Kargil Review
Committee, is usually taken as forerunner of short duration wars of
the future fought in the nuclear backdrop. According to the suspect
Pakistani perspective,14 a long campaign of attrition was preempted
through US intervention. President Musharraf’s claims in his
autobiography have been credibly disputed on this score by former
Chief, General VP Malik.15 However, a time-continuum can be discerned
with Low Intensity Conflict across the Line of Control abutting either
end of the mid-intensity Kargil Conflict. Conflating the two kinds of
conflict into one would make the conflict a long duration one and part
of the wider proxy war.
The lesson to be drawn is that India’s conflicts, like conflicts
elsewhere, have an equal, if not greater chance, to be of long
duration rather than short. Political heads took decisions to cease
the conflict at a great personal and political cost on both sides of
the border. The development of rival nationalisms and resulting
politicisation of issues since, would impinge on future ease of
settlement of issues. Secondly, these wars have not always yielded a
meaningful result in terms of settlement of issues. A Short War in the
future may also leave core issues unaddressed, begging the question of
its utility. The ‘push’ for resolving issues militarily ‘once and for
all’ may then make an appearance. Precautions require to be built into
the preparation for and conduct of war to ensure a Short War.
An analysis of the present
Understandably, none of India’s sub-conventional conflicts have been
short duration ones: Operation Pawan, Operation Rakshak, Operation
Rhino and the LIC in Siachen.16 This trend is likely to persist into
the future. To escape this strategic cul-de-sac, Short War thinking
has arisen in which space in the conflict spectrum can be opened up
for a conventional ‘Limited War’, with limitation being exercised in
duration as against other parameters as extent of theater of
engagement, weaponry used and targets engaged.
The tendency of conflict towards escalation, leading up to the ‘ideal’
state of Absolute War, has been conceptualised by Clausewitz in his
discussion of the reciprocal actions between opponents.17 This
tendency is accentuated by nationalism, intrinsic to modern nation
states, that yields ground to hyper nationalism in times of crisis.
Historical memories also impact the creation of the ‘Other’, resulting
in stereotyping and dehumanisation of the opponent. This tendency can
be exploited by fringe political formations to tie down the government
to less palatable options. These factors conspire to dispel
rationality.
The expectation that external powers, valuing stability and fearful of
the nuclear genie, would intervene early for conflict termination is
also shaky. Pakistan has persistently defended its untenable position
on Kashmir in defiance even of the US. India mobilised its troops in
response to the Parliament attack irrespective of the effect on the US
led GWOT. The impact of external pressure is limited to what states
are willing to tolerate. International organisations also have their
own limitations, hidden agendas and a case history of limited efficacy
in sub-continental disputes.
Lastly, a look at the nuclear question on conflict duration is in
order. General VP Malik has it that there exists a window in the
conflict spectrum below the nuclear threshold for conventional
operations.18 This is elastic so long as the perceived ‘nuclear
reaction threshold’ is not pushed. It is assessed that a threat to the
threshold is more likely in a longer war in which comprehensive
national power is brought to bear. However, the vulnerable state is
also in a position to mobilise its national resources so as to
preclude a lowering of the threshold. Against extant wisdom, it can be
posited that a high intensity war, intended as a short one at the
outset, poses the threat of stampeding the vulnerable side into
premature nuclearisation to redress some or other emergent asymmetry.
Therefore, the argument, based on the existence of a nuclear backdrop,
is not entirely persuasive.
War termination would be dependent on like-mindedness of the
adversary. In the Indo-Pakistani context, this may not be possible
until Pakistan is able to pull off some gains either tangibly or
psychologically. Its Army would require some face-saving action for
holding onto power post-conflict within Pakistani political structure.
This would likely result in Pakistan extending the war till its
purposes - not amounting to ‘winning’ the war, but merely preserving
itself from ‘losing’ abjectly - are achieved. Such a long war is in
Pakistani interests for it will enable resort to external balancing
and ‘extended depth’. Besides, it may ‘do an Iraq’ on an advancing
India. In the event, India may end up with a partner unwilling to
Tango.
India, on its part, would not like to be left strategically exposed
lest a Short War not serve up its original aims. In trying to pull off
a politically viable, strategically sustainable and militarily
‘decisive’ outcome, it may over-extend. Mission creep’ and ‘surge’
would then transpire, with uncertain outcome. Given the move of the
discourse from Limited War19 to Short War,20 the premium on duration
would necessitate a corresponding compensation through leveraging
national and military power along other dimensions and levels in which
India would be deemed to enjoy escalation dominance. This would
compromise the resulting peace in leaving a bitter aftermath and an
unrequited enemy.
Concluding reflections
Short Wars are desirable as against long duration wars, in that they
imply limited war aims; keep damage limited comparatively; do not
deflect the national economy overly; do not providing enough time for
passions to overtake rationality; and, resultantly, do not permit
these to impinge unreasonably any future peace settlement. However, as
seen here, the term Short War verges on an oxymoron. Therefore,
measures need to be identified and implemented to bring about such an
outcome. A few pointers to this end are recommended in conclusion.
At the political level, firstly, there requires to be a political
consensus on the requirement, nature and aims of the war embarked on.
In case this is not there, then self-interested political elements
could whip up public passions forcing the leadership in unpredictable
ways. Secondly, demonisation resorted to generally in peace needs to
be tempered to the extent of permitting the adversary a locus standi
on a vexed issue. This would enable easier assimilation by the polity
and populace of the necessity for early war termination through
compromise on mutually agreed terms.
On the military level, the first Principle of War, namely, ‘selection
and maintenance of aim’ requires constant foregrounding. Second, the
threat of escalation would require monitoring, particularly as the
demonstration a capacity for ‘escalation dominance’, so as to
influence enemy thinking towards conflict termination, may go awry.
Thirdly, it must be borne in mind that operational brilliance may
beget victory, but, paradoxically, victory is not usually a necessary
and sufficient condition for subsequent peace. Lastly, the military
would require conditioning to a half-fought war. Air power theory of
‘infrastructure busting’; land warfare concept of ‘decisive victory’;
and the naval apprehension of ‘sitting out the war’ may require
muting.
War is the least predictable social activity and the least
controllable political act, and on outbreak is liable to truncate
rational aims and pious intentions. Short Wars have to be brought
about by creating the context and circumstance conducive to early war
termination; best achieved, ironically, through war aims that belie
the necessity of war. The purpose of military power in our context
today is not to compel the enemy to one’s purpose; but to nudge the
enemy to a mutually beneficial end.
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