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The Naga insurgency was the first major internal challenge to confront
a young, socialist and somewhat dreamy nation. The oldest insurgency
of the independent India was the first blood for the Indian Army in
dealing with insurgency, imparting some costly lessons, which the Army
has not forgotten till date. Simmering from the pre-independence
years, the insurgency finally erupted in 1955-56, and has kept the
state on boil for decades, besides destabilising the entire Northeast
region. The current insurgency led by the National Socialist Council
of Nagaland Isak-Muivah (NSCN - IM), the dominant faction of the
erstwhile NSCN, has been often described as the ‘mother insurgency of
the northeast’ by the security experts. It was a formidable insurgent
group with strong ideological foundations, which spearheaded the Naga
insurgency since the early eighties. The Naga problem; with which the
word ‘complex’ has become almost synonymous, today after years of
bitter conflict has undergone a distinct shift and the peace talks are
now inching towards a possible political solution. There has also been
a marked change in the perceptions of the local populace, which has
altered the ground realities and the dynamics of the region.
Meanwhile, the once fierce guerrilla groups have made a neat business
enterprise out of insurgency while engaging each other in bitter turf
wars. An intricate cocktail of these factors has made the ongoing
ceasefire an uneasy proposition, hinging the Naga insurgency at a
unique cross-road of conflict and peace. The understanding of this
volatile cocktail is important to comprehend the dynamics of a
protracted insurgency. The future of the ceasefire and the results of
the ongoing peace talks will also have a profound impact on the
stability of the entire Northeast region and could fundamentally alter
our concepts of engaging and containing other terror movements.
Paradise Lost
The popular perception, except in the Northeast India, considers the
Nagas to be an exotic, agile and fierce group of tribes with rebellion
and head-hunting as their primary means of occupation. This sad but
stereotyped perception is extended to most of the tribes of the
Northeast, with some kind of variations. Truly, Sanjoy Hazarika
describes these people as the ‘Strangers of the Mist’, a term
popularised by his book bearing the same name. Naga is a fairly recent
generic term attributed to a group of tribes of Indo-Mongoloid origins
speaking Tibeto-Burman dialects of Sino-Tibetan family. This complex
definition is inescapable, further defying a clear distinction of (and
among) Nagas. Among few conflicting versions, it is commonly accepted
that the word Naga is derived from the word Na-ka, which in Burmese
means people or men folk with pierced ear lobes. They have been rarely
understood, as more often than not, the various insurgent groups have
hijacked their mild agenda, each proclaiming to be the sole arbiter of
the Naga destiny.
The blue hills of Nagaland had lost their innocence to the sound of
gunfire in mid- fifties. After decades of bloodbath, in which
according to estimates, 25,000 people have lost their lives from 1947
till date1, the situation at ground zero in Nagaland is yet to
resemble normalcy. The sound of the gunfire still rattles the
countryside on a daily basis, the only difference being that the
insurgent groups are battling it out among themselves. Presently, the
Khaplang faction of NSCN has joined hands with Federal Government of
Nagaland (FGN) to counter the dominant lsak-Muivah faction of NSCN and
they routinely engage each other in prolonged fire-fights. The pie is
quite lucrative; access to unchecked extortion in the dominated areas
and a share in any possible political arrangement, which may be
adopted upon conclusion of the peace talks. The inter-tribal rivalry,
the Achilles’ heel of Naga insurgency, adds fuel to the factional
fire. As a result, the state and the neighbouring areas have never
seen lasting peace.
After over a decade of ceasefire, commencing with August 1997
ceasefire with NSCN (IM) and the subsequent April 2001 ceasefire with
NSCN (K), the durability of peace is still suspect. Hope for a bright
future is based on a surprisingly vague notion that finally the
insurgent groups will come around and somehow the issue will settle by
itself. Quite the contrary, the repeated extension of ceasefire with
both the NSCN factions and endless rounds of talks with NSCN (IM) has
heralded an environment of endemic factional clashes, rampant
extortion and interference by the insurgent groups in all the aspects
of administration and polity. After carrying out considerable
consolidation, it will not be incorrect to state that they now
actually run a parallel government. They have the impunity to host
websites, post propaganda videos on You Tube, advertise for vacant
posts in newspapers and routinely publish their page-length statements
and rebuttals in the vernacular media. Last year, the ‘Kilo (Home)
Ministry’ of NSCN (IM) opened a new branch called Crime Suppression
Department (CSD) to carry out policing duties, further assuming the
role of a state. This so-called CSD often rounds up some unsuspecting
drug-peddlers and releases them after levying fines. The
ineffectiveness of the Kohima based Ceasefire Monitoring Group (CFMG)
and the failure to revise the Cease Fire Ground Rules (CFGR) to give
more teeth to the security forces, has significantly contributed in
this negative spiral. Today, in spite of the ceasefire with both major
factions in place, the insurgency related incidents are considerably
higher than many other northeastern states where similar arrangements
are absent. According to the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA),
insurgency related fatalities have increased from 97 in 2004 to 99 in
2005, to a further 147 in 2006. Incidents of insurgent violence have
registered an increase from 186 to 192 between 2004 and 2005 and
sharply to 309 in 20062. By all estimates, the toll for 2007 is likely
to be higher.
The Great Game
The ongoing ceasefire between the Government of India (GOl) and NSCN (lM),
which has been ‘indefinitely extended’ on 01 August 2007, is at best
uncertain. Similarly, the ceasefire extension for another year has
been obtained with NSCN (K) in April 2007. This fragile peace is
hostage to the outcome of peace talks and the perceptions of the
involved players. These perceptions have a tendency to harden in the
current circumstances as the odds faced by both sides have subsided.
In almost a decade of ceasefire, these groups have recouped,
multiplied and are almost back to their old ways, basking in the
satisfaction of re-establishing coherent insurgent organisations. NSCN
(IM) in this period has been carrying out approximate 300-400 new
recruitments per year and has raised a few more so-called new
battalions with arsenal to match a regular army. It is estimated that
they now have a 5,000 strong cadre base. Their official annual budget
has more than doubled in the ceasefire years. The group has managed to
infiltrate in key student and tribal bodies viz; the powerful Naga
Students’ Federation (NSF) and the Naga Hoho, the apex tribal body of
Naga tribes, and has turned them into their front organisations. The
resultant credibility loss of these important bodies has further
robbed the issue of few objective opinions. Most of the
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) like the Naga People’s Movement
for Human Rights (NPMHR), Naga Mothers’ Association (NMA) and All Naga
Concerned Citizens’ Forum too parrot the NSCN (lM)’s lines. In these
happy circumstances, the idea of exchanging their AK-47s and easy
money with the vagaries of a political process appealing to them is
debatable.
The main demands of NSCN (IM) are integration of Naga-inhabited areas
of the Northeast, a special federal relationship with New Delhi and a
separate constitution for Nagaland. The NSCN (IM) claims that the
total area of proposed Greater Nagaland’ or Nagalim is about 1,20,000
square kilometres against the present spread of the state of Nagaland
merely over 16,579 square kilometres3. It blames the governments of
India and Myanmar for aggression and creation of artificial barriers
to separate the Nagas. The Naga-inhabited areas in India, which shall
constitute their Nagalim include Ukhrul, Senapati, Chandel and
Tamenglong districts of Manipur, and Tirap and Changlang districts of
Arunachal Pradesh. In Myanmar, they claim large chunks of the
administrative division of Sagaing and eastern parts of Kachin State.
They also claim the forested areas of Assam on the foothills all along
the Assam - Nagaland border, which are presently disputed and already
under demographic aggression of the Nagas who have created new
settlements. Indeed for NSCN (IM) whose many senior leaders including
Thuingaleng Muivah are Thangkuls (or Tangkhuls) from Manipur, this
demand for Nagalim has assumed greater importance in the recent years.
Understandably there is considerable resentment in these states,
particularly in Manipur whose boundary demarcation with the Naga areas
was clearly settled as early as 1872.
Its arch-rival, the NSCN (K) faction is more or less content with the
current boundaries of the Nagaland state and demands independence as
their main requirement. NSCN (K) also challenges the claim of NSCN
(IM) to be the only representative of the Naga people. On this aspect,
they again seem to be right. The third player is FGN, which due to
incessant propaganda of insurgents carries the ‘positive legacy’ of
Angami Zapu Phizo, the pioneer of Naga insurgency, as well as the
‘negative legacy’ of the Shillong Accord. Presently, it is a divided
house with four factions and a few pockets of influence in the eastern
parts of Nagaland. But if not suitably engaged, it has the potential
to disrupt the peace process by misguiding and exploiting the
sentiments of the people. In fact, it is banking on this possibility
to revive its sagged fortunes.
Corporate Insurgents
The new generation of recruits in the NSCN factions and the FGN are a
novel breed. While their predecessors from the previous generation may
be children of deprivation; they are nothing but the children of
opportunity who have made insurgency the most flourishing business in
the region with ideology, ‘cause’ and boundaries tossed aside. The
core competences of their business include organised extortion, narco-trade
and arms running.
The perennial source of revenue for the NSCN factions has always been
the organised extortion carried out from all possible sources. They
call it taxation and in fact assert their right to it, as of a legal
government. Phunthing Shimrang, a senior NSCN (IM) leader, who is also
a self styled ex ‘Brigadier’ and the Convener of the outfit’s
Ceasefire Monitoring Cell (CFMC), when asked about continuing tax
collections by the group despite the ceasefire said, “It is our
right,... Will the Government stop collection of taxes during the
cease fire?”4 The system is deep rooted; not unlike the Income Tax
department, the tax notices go out every financial year and proper
receipts are issued once payments are made. The collection rates are
fixed; it is 24 per cent of one month’s salary per year in case of
salaried employees, including all government employees, Rupees 120-150
as ‘House tax’ and ‘Census Tax’ per household, and so on. Similarly
the rates for all types of shops, commercial vehicles and other
trading or business activities like saw-mills, coal mines, stone
quarries, brick kilns etc are fixed. The annual collection is done
centrally; a town’s taxi union does it from the taxi owners, the local
Chamber of Commerce does it for all the shops, the Village Council
Chairman collects the same from the villagers and the District
Education Officer (DEO) may be required to collect from all the
teachers. The money is deposited with the regional self styled Chief
Administrative Officers (CAOs) or self styled Regional Chairman in
case of the Khaplang faction. At places it is collected by the self
styled Town Commanders. Finally, it is forwarded to the NSCN (IM)’s
‘Chaplee (Finance) Ministry’ to be further distributed as per the
approved budget after being audited by their so-called ‘Comptroller
and Accountant General’s Office’. The ‘Chaplee Ministry’ also sets
region-wise targets for income for the financial year. In areas where
the influence of a particular NSCN faction is less than complete, the
rates may be subject to certain negotiations.
NSCN (IM) has managed a pie in every conceivable business; from
smuggling of the precious Burma Teak and poaching of rhinoceros in the
Kaziranga National Park, to the running of Volvo Coaches, which ply
between major cities of the Northeast. It controls the border trade at
Moreh in Chandel district of Manipur, which is a major trading point
between India and Myanmar. Here, according to estimates, the formal
trade per year is Rupees 100 million while the informal trade is to
the tune of Rupees 20 billion5. The likely increase in the mobile
penetration in the state is likely to be the next ‘sunrise sector’ for
the NSCN factions. Many novel and rather amazing business models have
been devised in their singular pursuit of greed. They have ‘forced
partnerships’ in lucrative business houses- a self imposed business
partner provides ‘security’ and prevents ‘unauthorised extortion’
while sharing the profit. No other contribution, expertise or capital
investment is required. Therefore, a typical flourishing business
house in Nagaland is likely to have a local partner, who shows up to
only pocket his share or is hurriedly contacted in case the lower rung
cadres show up at the shop for some unauthorised collection.
Their participation in the drug trafficking is a well-known fact,
though the NSCN factions try to conduct this trade in a hush-hush
manner by parcelling consignments abroad through Bangladesh and
Myanmar rather than routing them through the Indian cities. After
Afghanistan, Myanmar is the world’s second largest producer of illicit
opium, with whom India shares 1,640 kilometres of unfenced border. The
drugs are sourced from the Heroin and Speed Pill laboratories of the
drug syndicates in Tiddim and Sagaing divisions of Myanmar and along
the Chindwin River, while opium and ganja are procured in bulk from
producers through their middlemen. The proximity of the region to the
golden triangle of Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam and Thailand naturally aids
this lucrative narco-trade. Drug consumption is the Northeast has
reached endemic proportions but the underlying drug trade goes
unchecked and almost undocumented. However, the pivotal role of NSCN
factions in arms running and training of other insurgent groups of the
region is rather well documented. Like MNCs, they believe in providing
complete solutions for running insurgencies to their esteemed clients;
procurement of weapons, training of initial batches, logistic needs,
ideological guidance, provisioning of venture capital and catering for
an umbrella organisation. NSCN (IM) had earlier formed an umbrella
organisation called United Liberation Front of the Seven Sisters (ULFSS)
in 1993, which was later reconstituted as Self Defence United Front of
Southeast Himalayan Region (SDUFSHR) in November 1994. On the other
hand, NSCN (K) had formed an umbrella organisation of insurgent groups
from Myanmar and Manipur called Indo Burmese Revolutionary Front (IBRF)
at Makpa in West Myanmar in May 19906. These associations were forged
for common monetary interests rather than any ideological convergences
inspite of grand designs to destabilise India.
Consequent to the nurturing of new insurgencies, the NSCN factions
often outsource extortion to these surrogate groups. In Tripura, the
National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) and the All Tripura Tiger
Force (ATTF) have been armed and trained by NSCN (IM). In turn, they
assist NSCN (IM) while transiting weapons and personnel to Bangladesh.
In Assam, NSCN (IM) had armed and trained Dima Halam Daoga (DHD) in
the NC Hills. The DHD, fighting for the Dimasa tribe, collaborates
with NSCN (IM) inspite of the fact that their own areas of NC Hills
and Karbi Anglong are within the map of NSCN (IM)’s Nagalim. In Assam
again, NSCN (IM) has outsourced extortion activities to a lesser known
group called United People Democracy Solidarity (UPDS) in return for
training facilities and weapons7. This surrogate group, which demands
a separate state for the Karbis of Assam, was armed and trained by
NSCN (IM) on its raising in 1999. The Hmar Peoples Convention (HPC) is
another surrogate group of NSCN (IM) in Mizoram. In Manipur too, the
NSCN (IM) has forged ties with Kanglie Yawol Kunna Lup (KYKL), Zomi
Reunification Army (ZRA) and even few traditionally rival Kuki groups
like United Kuki Liberation Front (UKLF) and Kuki Revolutionary Army (KRA).
These fledgling groups send their cadres to the training camps of NSCN
(IM), which trains them on a purely mercenary basis. In return for
training and logistical support, NSCN (IM) demands a lion’s share of
the extortion booty, sometimes as high as seventy to eighty per cent.
This booty funds their vast military and civil wings, new
recruitments, arms acquisitions, funding of front organisations and
propaganda machines. Undisclosed amounts of funds are also channeled
for running their offices in foreign locales and sponsoring
jet-setting lavish lifestyles of many senior functionaries. As per a
2001 MHA report on Northeast militants, Th. Muivah, General Secretary
of NSCN (IM), holds 1,24,550 shares, worth about US $ 1,25,000, of an
MNC in Ireland which is well known for its production of consumer
goods. The linkages of the comparatively poorer NSCN (K) are also
evident; they have a marriage of convenience with United Liberation
Front of Asom (ULFA), wherein they train ULFA cadres in their camps
opposite the IB in Myanmar in return for money or weapons. As per the
statement in January 2003 by NSCN (K) leader Zeluolie Angami, the
group has also been providing armed training to the (Meitei) insurgent
groups like UNLF, Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) and People’s
Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK) for several decades in
Myanmar.
The Global Trail
The foreign connections of the Naga insurgency date back to the 1950s
when Naga Nationalist Council (NNC) was trying hard for recognition
and support from the international community. They first succeeded in
1960 when A.Z. Phizo, with the help of Rev. Michael Scott, escaped to
London via East Pakistan and Zurich. His popularity with the British
press which printed stories of “Indian atrocities” alarmed Pandit
Nehru who then sought to negotiate with the moderate Nagas8. The NNC
need not have tried so hard. The ethnic similarities with Myanmar and
the geographical location of Nagaland itself invite a host of foreign
influences.
The insurgent groups of Nagaland demonstrate a distinct ideological
connection with the Peoples Republic of China. Terms like ‘Collective
Leadership’, ‘cadres’, ‘revolutionary’, ‘Socialist Council’ and
‘Government of Peoples Republic of Nagalim (GPRN)’ point in only one
direction. The grainy black and white photographs of seventies of the
Naga insurgents posing with the Chinese officials against the Great
Wall of China and Tiannamen Square confirm the direction. In February
2000, there were reports that NSCN (IM) had established a
‘full-fledged liaison office’ in Chinese territories opposite
Arunachal Pradesh. In the same year, a crossed cheque for US $ 50,000
from an NSCN (IM) front was encashed by a firm in Beijing for an arms
consignment of automatic rifles and machine guns. There are recent
media reports (of October 2007) of Yunnan province of China emerging
as a centre for procurement of arms by the insurgent groups of
Northeast9. But the official support from China has been on the wane
since mid-eighties (circa 1987); perhaps a quid pro quo for India not
supporting any armed resistance of Tibetans. The historical visit of
Shri Rajiv Gandhi to China in 1988, which was famously termed as
‘Breaching the Wall’ by the media, cemented this unspoken
understanding between the Dragon and the Elephant. Furthermore, in a
Christian majority state, where the Church plays an important role, an
atheist communism did not find favour with the Church. Moreover, as
the ties between the two giant Asian neighbours grow, the wily
insurgent groups of Nagaland have reconciled to delete China from
their current calculations.
The Naga insurgency is deeply intertwined with the dynamics in
Myanmar. The state of Nagaland shares 242 kilometres long
international boundary (IB) with Myanmar, wherein the tribals are
allowed to freely cross over under the free border regime. In
addition, the Naga-dominated districts of Tirap and Changlang in
Arunachal Pradesh and Chandel in Manipur too share a long boundary
with Myanmar. Myanmar’s territory opposite all these areas in the
Northwest part of that country is a densely forested and isolated
region, virtually unadministered by the Central authorities from
Rangoon (Yangon). It is no wonder that the areas contiguous to the IB
in Myanmar shelter many training and administrative camps of both the
NSCN factions. The criticality of these camps is more in case of NSCN
(K) as they have their command and control structures located there
due to the pressure of the rival group in the state. Their connections
also run deeper as their Chairman SS Khaplang is himself a Hemi (or
Hemei) Naga from Myanmar. The faction, therefore, enjoys support from
the Hemi and Pangmei settlements in Myanmar.
Bangladesh is now the most favoured sanctuary of all the insurgent
groups of India’s Northeast. Dhaka is a secular terror hub where the
religion is insignificant and no so-called ‘clash of cultures’ takes
place. Here a Hindu dominated United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA)
and an essentially Christian NSCN (IM), which proclaims ‘Nagalim for
Christ’, hobnobs with Islamic terror groups and government spy
agencies with homely ease. Its ports of Chittagong and Cox’s Bazaar
are the preferred entry points for the arms shipments from the arms
markets of Southeast Asia and the Cambodian conflict spillover
weapons. The largest training camp of NSCN (IM) too is based in the
Chittagong Hill tracts of Bangladesh10. Transit facilities for
movement of arms and cadres are conveniently located at Sylhet in the
north and Bandarban (near Chittagong) in south of Bangladesh. These
links are not a sensational development. FGN had a base in Dhaka since
the early sixties when it was part of East Pakistan and their self
styled General Kaito Sema led a group of rebels through Jaintia Hills
to the adjacent areas of East Pakistan11. Presently, apart from
maintaining safe houses, training camps and coordinating the move of
arms and drug consignments; the ‘Alee (Foreign) Command’ of NSCN (IM)
is reportedly based in Bangladesh12. They maintain contacts with the
Directorate General of Field Intelligence (DGFI) of Bangladesh and
Pakistan’s Inter Service Intelligence (ISI). It was in Dhaka that
Pakistani diplomats handed over more than one million dollars to NSCN
(IM) in 1993-94, as confessed by their arrested self styled finance
secretary Khayao Huray. Bangladesh is also the safest induction route
for the counterfeit Indian currency from Pakistan to India. It is the
ubiquitous Bangla-connection which has made NSCN (IM) and ULFA go soft
on the issue of illegal Bangladeshi migrants, which was incidentally
once the raison d’ etre of ULFA and the very start point of the
anti-foreigners agitation in Assam.
In the last few decades, while the NSCN (K) has confined itself mainly
to Myanmar, it is the NSCN (IM) which is going global. The NSCN (IM)
had almost succeeded in internationalising the Naga issue. They
maintain offices in Manila, Bangkok, Geneva and Amsterdam and rely on
the ‘Christian factor’ and human rights related propaganda to entice
support and funds. NSCN (IM) has formed various international front
organisations like UK based Naga Vigil and Amsterdam based Naga
International Support Group (NISG). They have managed to rope-in
prominent personalities like ex US President Jimmy Carter to espouse
their cause. He, in June 2005, wrote to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh,
encouraging him to move ahead to present an ‘acceptable solution’.
Earlier, on 23 June 1993, dealing a major blow to India’s diplomatic
efforts to isolate them internationally, NSCN (IM) was admitted as a
member of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation (UNPO) at
Hague. It is also a member of the UN Working Group on Indigenous
People (UNWGIP). NSCN (IM) got another platform for anti-India
propaganda when Isak Chishi Swu was allowed to address the UN
Commission on Human Rights at Geneva on 24 April 1998. Predictably,
the NSCN (IM) Chairman made full use of this opportunity. NSCN (IM)
has also signed the ‘Deed of Commitment’ in October 2003 under Geneva
Call, a Geneva based NGO for a total ban on anti-personal mines. These
glossy actions are a bid by NSCN (IM) to equate itself with a
government and gain some legitimacy. Sadly for them, the global
perceptions on supporting terrorist movements; most of which were
earlier cloaked as freedom struggles, have undergone a paradigm shift
post 9/11. This has undermined the NSCN (IM)’s attempts to put
international pressure on India. But the international connections
have not become completely irrelevant. NSCN (IM) sources weapons in
Thailand which are then trans-shipped from southern Thailand via the
Three Pagoda Pass opposite Karen state in Myanmar and later along the
Ranong coastline13. In spite of India’s diplomatic concerns, NSCN (IM)
still runs its offices and administrative bases in Bangkok. On 19
January 2000, when Th. Muivah was arrested at the Bangkok
International Airport by the Thai authorities, he had arrived on a
flight from Karachi and was travelling on a fake South Korean
passport. Reports suggested that his fake passport, visa and
air-tickets were arranged by Bangkok based tourist operator Rafique
Khan, an ISI operative.
Religion has played its part. Pandit Nehru, an impeccably secular
leader, conceded the same in a letter in 1952, wherein he stated that,
“As Indian independence gradually approached, some of the British
officers and Christian Missionaries induced them to think in terms of
‘Naga Independence’ ”14. At the instance of Baptist Church leaders of
North America, the celebration of 125th year of Christianity in
Nagaland was organised in Atlanta in July-August 1997. All the
insurgent factions were cordially invited for the same in an attempt
to unite the rebels. The Hong Kong based Christian Conference of Asia
and Geneva based World Council of Churches have also been contributing
in keeping the Naga issue alive. The Nagaland Baptist Church Council (NBCC)
and Council of Nagaland Baptist Churches (CNBC) receive considerable
foreign donations. Kredda, a Dutch Non-governmental Organisation (NGO)
and England based Religious Society of Friends, commonly known as
Quakers, are showing keen interest in Nagaland and their
representatives regularly visit the state. Both organisations have
strong religious undertones.
The Past Beckons
The chequered history of the Naga insurgency is littered with
abrogated ceasefires and failed accords. While the Naga-Akbar Hyadri
Accord of June 1947 became ineffective due to the different
interpretation of its last (ninth) paragraph, the Sixteen Point
Agreement between the Naga Peoples’ Convention (NPC) and the GOI in
July 1960; which resulted in the formation of the state of Nagaland in
December 1963, failed to carry the underground and the hardliners
along. For many, the Naga issue was finally resolved on 11 November
1975 with the signing of the Shillong Accord between the
representatives of the underground organisations and Shri LP Singh,
the then Governor of Nagaland representing the GOI. But there was
non-inclusion of all key players in the negotiation process; wherein
neither, the direct consent of the London-based NNC president A.Z.
Phizo was taken nor, any efforts were made to cater for a group of
about 150 rebels led by key leaders viz; Isak Chishi Swu, S.S.
Khaplang and the then General Secretary Th. Muivah who were then
moving back post-training from China and were camping in upper
Myanmar. It was to prove very costly. While A.Z. Phizo quietly died in
London in 1990 leaving behind a string of ambiguous interviews and a
fading legacy; this ‘China Group’ (or gang) finally abandoned the NNC
and formed the formidable NSCN on 31 January 1980. The dark clouds
again gathered over Nagaland as NSCN ignited the hills for another
round of bloodbath till 1997.
On the other hand, artificial barriers, terminologies and outdated
laws have assisted in keeping the region isolated and preventing
natural assimilation. Simple twists of language have furthered the
differences and given fodder to the vicious propaganda machines.
During the visit of the Simon Commission to Naga Hills in January
1929, a delegation from the Naga Club demanded exclusion from the
proposed reforms scheme. Though the Simon Commission rightfully
rejected their demands, they nevertheless created another barrier,
wherein under the Government of India Act 1935, the Naga Hills were
included in India as an ‘Excluded Area’. The area was to be continued
to be administered by the Governor of Assam instead of the Assam
Legislature. In spite of the Naga areas being very much clubbed with
the rest of the India, the psychological impact of the term ‘Excluded
Area’ certainly lingered. Later, in post-independence years, as a
result of the demand from the moderate NPC, the Government set up Naga
Hills Tuensang Area (NHTA) under the Ministry of External Affairs
(MEA) in December 1957. Subsequently, when the state of Nagaland was
created in 1963, it was also placed under the MEA. The state was
shifted to the Home Ministry only in 1972. The decision to create a
separate state was as a result of protracted negotiations between the
GOI and the NPC. As most of the moderate Naga leaders trusted Pandit
Nehru, who was also heading the MEA, the new state was placed under
this ministry to be directly under Pandit Nehru as per the wishes of
the Naga leaders. If there was a Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) or
Cabinet Secretariat in those days or Pandit Nehru was heading the Home
Ministry, the misunderstanding would have never germinated15.
Another lesson from the past is the fact that contrary to the image of
bellicose fighters, Nagas are very skilled negotiators. They are also
mostly inscrutable and masters of propaganda. Their incessant twisting
of historical facts clouds the thinking of their opponents. This is a
reflection of the deep Maoist influence in their formative years.
Unless the deal is absolutely water-tight, the interpretation of the
agreement is always to their convenience and current political
aspirations. The Hydari Agreement of 1947, signed by Sir Akbar Hydari,
the then Governor of Assam with the Nagas was discarded to the dustbin
of history because of ambiguous interpretation of its ninth clause by
the Naga hardliners. The insurgent propaganda lists various
out-of-context quotations from Mahatma Gandhi, supposedly given in his
meeting with Naga delegation led by A.Z. Phizo on 19 July 1947 at
Bhangi Colony in Delhi. A reading of the entire conversation, as
recorded by Pyarelal, an associate of Mahatma Gandhi is sufficient to
dismiss the gimmick16. They highlight the disintegration of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) into its constituent republics
but conveniently ignore the unification of Germany or the formation of
the European Union (EU). The most current and perhaps the most glaring
example of their shifting interpretation is the non-implementation of
the CFGR.
A Fresh Perspective
In 1965, after extensive travels in Nagaland as a member of the Peace
Mission, Shri Jayaprakash Narayan, had argued in his pamphlet called
‘Nagaland mein Shanti ka Prayas’ (The Prospects for Peace in Nagaland)
that there was a civilisational unity in India which antedates its
political unity 17. Understandably, in a multi-cultural and secular
society like India, mere ethnic diversity should be the last cause for
secession. The ideological basis of the Naga insurgency is a carefully
crafted myth which revolts against the basic foundations of the Indian
Union. Their claims are replete with inherent contradictions. All of
them claim in their propaganda that the Nagas have never been
conquered. The recorded history begs to differ. After putting Assam
under their control by the Treaty of Yandabo in 1826, the British had
turned their attention to the troublesome Naga areas, which were the
origin of unending raids to the adjoining tea gardens of Assam. A
‘Forward Policy’ was adopted and in next few years, a number of
expeditions were launched, many with assistance from the Manipuri
troops, to complete the conquest of Nagaland. Interestingly, these
years were also the first blood for the Assam Rifles in dealing with
the Nagas, which as then Cachar Levy launched the first expedition
under Mr Grange in the Angami Naga areas in 1839. Later, towards the
close of 1878, a formal decision was also taken to gradually extend
British authority over ‘all independent tribes’. In their own
confirmation of this fact, when the Simon Commission came to India in
1929, the Naga Club, a forerunner to the NNC, submitted a memorandum
at Kohima in January 1929, wherein they requested to be left out from
the proposed reforms scheme of India and preferred “direct
administration under British.” Quite simply, since India inherited the
British ruled India, this area was a natural inclusion as per the
provisions of the Indian Independence Act, 1947.
Furthermore, the basic unit or entity of the Nagas has always been a
village. There was never any bigger political entity or any semblance
of a kingdom. Fierce inter-tribal rivalry, inter-village rivalry and
even intra-village rivalry (among different khels of village) with the
associated practice of headhunting ensured no deviations. There was no
unified dialect or homogenous administrative system. Other features of
political commonality like common currency / coinage or common laws
were also simply absent. Therefore, unlike the numerous princely
states which still had an option to exercise, and the possibility of
coercion or manipulation with its subsequent historical versions, the
Nagas are on a non-existent historical and political foundation for
their rebellion. Sending telegram of independence to the UN on 14
August 1947 and its clerical acknowledgment by the UN does not
constitute a ground for secession.
Even the anthropological foundation is not clearly defined. Till late
fifties, the word Naga, which is of the 1920s origin, was resented by
most tribes who preferred to be known by their own names. With the
rise in political consciousness caused by the propaganda of NNC, they
began suffixing Naga to the name of the tribe as a concession. The
consensus on the number of tribes which can be classified as Nagas on
the basis of certain common traits has not yet been reached. The
claims of the anthropologists, British historians, government records,
insurgent groups and the tribes themselves are at considerable
variance. Even A.S. Shimray, in his pro-NSCN (IM) book ‘Let Freedom
Ring, Story of Naga Nationalism’, lists 40 Naga tribes and states that
investigation is still on to ascertain the exact number of Naga
tribes18. But the numbers have swelled as they are the most
politically conscious and visible tribal group, and have attracted
certain tribes which earlier belonged to the Kuki-Chin-Mizo group. The
number of tribes which consider themselves as Nagas may further
increase, if they manage to extract more concessions from the GOI.
Therefore, though it is devoid of any historical, anthropological or
political sanctity, the core issue as propagated here has always been
the ‘fundamental resistance to integration with India’. The NSCN
factions have not yet given up on this rhetoric. The basic thread of
their argument is that Nagaland was never a part of India and
therefore, the question of cessation or independence is per se
meaningless. Their logic appealed to many Nagas who were till then
undisturbed due to the British adopting a policy of non-interference
in their tribal matters. It is another story that the British adopted
this policy as they found Naga Hills unproductive. It is yet another
story that India too intended to leave, and indeed has left their
tribal matters untouched. Thus, it was neither mismanagement, neglect
or step-motherly treatment by the Union Government; nor was it brutal
repression, religious divide or issues like rigging of elections,
which precipitated the commencement of an armed resistance in Nagaland.
The differences here went much deeper than Jammu and Kashmir – but
they never caught the media limelight and the concern of the Indian
people in spite of mounting army casualties.
Many experts are hopeful about the weakening of the insurgent’s
ability to fight the security forces after a prolonged ceasefire. It
is true that most of the new recruits joining the NSCN factions’ rank
and file have monetary rather than ideological considerations. It
shall also be correct to state that the heady days of the insurgency
with hostiles ‘living-off the land’ in thick jungles are passé. The
cadres now are used to a comfortable town life with modern amenities.
Many of their Designated Camps have electricity and cable TV
connections. There is a sharp decline in the discipline with most
cadres resorting to petty extortion, the proceeds of which are
pocketed. In a token attempt to check the corruption in their rank and
file, NSCN (IM) had even opened a so-called ‘National Bureau of
Intelligence’. However this decline in the jungle-based guerrilla
fighting ability and substitution of ideology by greed is not an end
in itself. It may prove counter-productive in the long run. There is
nothing to prevent the insurgency shifting its epicentre to the urban
areas from the jungles and countryside of Nagaland. The urban
insurgency is no less deadly. Similarly, there is no empirical
evidence to suggest that corruption weakens insurgency. The insurgent
groups prefer to keep the pot boiling even when most of their
ideological demands have been rendered irrelevant by changed
circumstances – merely to fund their lifestyles (read vices).
Corruption also prevents a smooth transition to any political process,
wherein the insurgents prefer status quo rather than to face voters to
seek a mandate.
Today, the losses of the nineties have been largely made up by the
NSCN factions. Still, the NSCN factions are in no state to resume the
bush-war. In July 2001, the government rolled back its month-old
decision to extend the ceasefire ‘without territorial limits’ due to
violent protests in Manipur. The provocation and the opportunity were
evident. But in spite of being stung by this major policy volte face
of the GOI on the issue of Nagalim, NSCN (IM) did not ‘go back to the
jungles’, as they routinely threaten. It would have been suicidal for
them to do so. But they can continue this empty posturing as luckily
for them, their bluff is unlikely to be called-off by the GOI which
already has enough terrorists, insurgents and Naxalites to handle.
Since the peace process is now irreversible, the only way left is
forward. The violent history and the trust deficit between the two
sides are definitely going to cast its negative shadow on the forward
movement of the peace process. However, for any political solution to
last, both the sides have to jettison the past. As writes Amartya Sen
in The Argumentative Indian; ‘While we cannot live without history, we
need not live within it either’.
The Peace Dividend
In Nagaland, after bloodshed for decades, ceasefire has been simply
addictive. The once deep-rooted sympathy for the insurgent groups,
wherein the people termed them as ‘national workers’ and willingly
contributed, is now on the wane. The Nagas instead now aspire to share
the rising prosperity of an emerging India. They wish to emulate the
economic turnaround of Mizoram, which commenced after the Mizos
abandoned a 20 years old insurgency. In fact, the economic aspirations
of the comparatively smarter Nagas are much more as their benchmarks
are Singapore and Thailand 19. Commerce, in spite of extortion notes,
is buoyant and revival plans for sick industrial units are underway.
Oil and Natural Gas Commission (ONGC), after pulling out of Nagaland
in 1994 due to threats and extortion demands is back with Canadian
collaboration as Canoro-ONGC to recommence oil exploration in a
potentially oil-rich state.
The per-capita income and literacy rates are steadily rising. The
girls now aspire to become air-hostesses and call-centre executives
rather than unwillingly feed and nurse local-boys-turned-insurgents
whose erstwhile 'guerrilla glamour' has given way to greed. The
respite from violence has seen shops, which used to be shut by 2 PM,
open till late evening and people strolling on the streets. Internet
cafes, dish televisions, sleek mobiles and gleaming Mahindra Scorpios
can be seen in the remote interiors of the state. A recent spate of
MTV style rock shows, band concerts and competitions like Naga Idol
are a big hit in this culturally westernised state whose youth
identify themselves more with Jim Morrison and Ernesto Che Guevara
rather than Sonu Nigam and Bhagat Singh. That too is now changing. In
a small, yet significant symbol of cultural integration, Akuonuo
Khezhie from Nagaland was declared the winner of the Femina Fresh Face
and Sony My Miss India subtitles in the recent Pantaloons Femina Miss
India Contest.
For a political solution to the Naga problem to be successful, there
are certain pre-requisites. The insurgent groups have to realise that
the peace dividend is much more than the conflict dividend. The people
have already realised the same but in an area where insurgency was a
part of the childhood and growing up, they are yet to find a voice in
front of the gun-totting cadres. Nevertheless, the overwhelming public
opinion in favour of ceasefire has ensured its repeated extensions.
All the involved parties including NSCN (K) and FGN factions have to
be a party to the peace process and stop describing accommodations as
‘sell-outs’ to India. More importantly, they must be able to bury
their internal differences to arrive at a common formula and later
carry it through among the populace. For that they have to become more
representative of the people without the force of the gun. The present
status quo may be attractive in the short term, with easy money and
zero accountability towards the people, but they cannot keep on
fighting yesteryears’ battles for long. As a warning of things to
come, the backlashes against NSCN (IM)’s arrogance and extortion
squeezes have commenced. on 22 April 2007, a large mob of about 5,000
people attacked and destroyed the Wungram Colony in Dimapur, home to
several NSCN (IM) leaders.
The age of the ‘angry young Naga’ is over, not much unlike the decline
of the Bollywood’s angry young man of the seventies. The futility of
violence is already on the horizon. But the once dreaded insurgent
groups too require a safe and comfortable exit or ‘honourable
solution’ as they ambiguously term it. The acceptability component is
the key here. For every climbdown by the insurgent groups, the
reciprocation from the Union government has always been quick. A
statehood, granted in spite of serious reservations on the financial
viability of the state and Article
370 A of the constitution are already in place since 1963. Under this
article, the Nagaland state continues to enjoy special rights and
privileges, particularly with reference to customary tribal laws and
land ownership. Furthermore, all laws passed by the Indian Parliament
are required to be ratified by the Nagaland Assembly for them to be
effective in Nagaland. Indeed, when Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru stated in
Lok Sabha on 01 August 1960 while announcing the decision to create
the new state of Nagaland : “Nagas are as independent as any other
Indian citizen”, he was not far from reality.
The government has gone even further. The GOI, in a Joint Communiqué
issued from Amsterdam on 11 July 2002, had recognised the ‘unique
history’ of the Nagas. On 26 November 2002, the Centre allowed the ban
on NSCN (IM) to lapse, paving the way for Th. Muivah and Isak Chishi
Swu to visit India for negotiations. They flew on Indian passports.
But the usual grant of packages and central funds are unlikely to
satisfy them to give up their long standing demands. Nor, is the
repetitive bureaucratic syntax of joint statements a prelude to a
solution. While time is a healer, the absence of any charismatic
second-rung leaders in both the factions will put them against the
wall when the time runs out. In fact, in NSCN (IM) the next important
leaders after Th. Muivah and Isaac Chishi Swu viz; R.H. Raising,
Convener of Steering Committee and V.S. Atem, Special Emissary to
Collective Leadership are known hardliners who oppose any solution
within the Indian Constitution. But inspite of their rhetoric, it will
essentially be more autonomy which shall constitute the solution. In
the present circumstances, it may require some alterations to the
Indian Constitution to satisfy their aspirations, unless of course
organisations or political parties, more representative of the people,
emerge on the scene making these insurgent groups irrelevant. The
Union Government may also rename Nagaland as Nagalim, without altering
any boundaries, as another concession. In this complex game of
realpolitik, only one fact emerges as certain – any further indecision
can only promote an uneasy peace.
Conclusion
The NSCN factions still retain some ideological moorings and unlike
most of the other insurgent or terrorist groups operating on Indian
soil, have not become complete slaves to the dictates of ISI. They
fear the sheer resilience of the Indian state, wherein after six
decades of violence, there is no change in the basic stance of the GOI.
Their worst nightmare is being assigned the faceless label of ‘some
misguided youth’, an all-time and all-encompassing favourite euphemism
of Indian policy makers. At the same time, the futility of violent
means has been well understood by their ageing senior hierarchy.
Indeed when a tired Th. Muivah reportedly said “Let us have a solution
in our lifetime”, much was conveyed. This senior hierarchy; even as
they preside over a systematic criminalisation of insurgency,
understand that they cannot forever remote-control the insurgency from
foreign countries despite handsome doles to the execution level
operatives. They also understand that the current ceasefire, however
uneasy, is nevertheless a fragile bridge between the Union Government
and the NSCN factions. This bridge, albeit hostage to the two sides
having a seemingly intractable stance, is being used by the people of
Nagaland and is changing their lives. The peace process may seem
interminable – but the side which demolishes the bridge will have to
live with its consequences for the decades to come.
But sometimes the lion must roar, just to remind the horse of his
fear. After all, the commitment of the government to work towards
peace is to the people of Nagaland and not to the insurgents.The
urgent need of the hour is to strengthen the CFGR and its monitoring
mechanism to confine the NSCN factions to their designated camps. The
delinking of extortion from insurgency is now not an option, but a
necessity as this illegitimate extortion is a new conflict in its
infancy. The use of force, as an option may be retained. Later, as and
when the GOI and the NSCN factions walk the extra mile to converge on
a pragmatic solution, one of the bloodiest chapters on insurgency in
India may finally come to an end. The closing of this chapter will
initiate a domino effect on other Northeastern insurgencies, which may
find it difficult to operate with stable eastern borders and a huge
ideological and logistical vacuum created by the ouster of the
pioneers of violence in the region. The success in Mizoram and Punjab
was relatively easier. The vexed Naga problem is the real test-bed of
an Indian solution to complex legacies which we inherited at the time
of Independence. The endgame of India’s longest running and a highly
volatile insurgency will make Nagaland the poster boy of the Indian
way of resolving insurgencies.
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