he recent removal of the
Strait of Malacca from the list of areas deemed dangerous to shipping
by the joint War Committee (JWC) of the Lloyd’s Market Association,
London and subsequent news announcements that the straits are now free
of piracy and other threats, should be viewed with scepticism. While
the acts of piracy and armed attacks on ships transiting the straits
have declined significantly (from 38 in 2004 to 12 in 2005 and to 03
up to Oct 2006) meriting removal from the JWC list, the threat of
maritime terrorism has in no way reduced.
The Global War on Terrorism unleashed by the USA
post 11 September 2001, led to a stifling of land based terrorist
activities worldwide. It is no coincidence that no audacious terror
attack of the magnitude of the 11 September 2001 incident has occurred
in the USA ever since. The recent uncovering of the terrorist plot to
blow up trans-Atlantic flights from Heathrow airport is an example of
how international cooperation in counter terrorism is paying off.
Unfortunately, such coordinated efforts have not yet been made in the
maritime arena. Unless urgent steps are taken to provide a coordinated
approach to tackle maritime threats, the next major terror attack
could well be at sea.
Maritime Terror Hotspot
Criminal and terrorist groups have always been
attracted to the sea, for a variety of activities ranging from acts of
trans-national crimes such as smuggling of drugs, weapons, human
trafficking, piracy, to acts of maritime terrorism such as attacking
ships as in the case of United States Ship (USS) Cole and
French tanker MV Limburg. Use of the sea for terrorist
activities can be broadly classified as maritime terrorism while other
criminal activities can be broadly classified as maritime
trans-national crimes. While there may not be dedicated maritime
terrorist organisations in the world there are several criminal groups
involved in trans-national crimes such as smuggling, piracy, etc. The
link between the two is but natural. It can thus be presumed that the
pirates of today will be the maritime terrorists of tomorrow. By the
same token the hotspots for piracy and other maritime crimes could be
the potential regions for maritime terrorism.
Threat Analysis of the South East Asian Region
The South East Asian region has two of the world’s
busiest shipping lanes. The first running from the Strait of Malacca
across the Indian Ocean to Middle East and the other from the South
China Sea to the Sea of Japan; the former having the highest density
of shipping. Over 60,000 ships transit the Strait of Malacca annually,
transporting 66 per cent of the world’s oil, 50 per cent of global
container traffic and a third of its bulk cargo.
According to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB)
during 2005 out of 208 piracy incidents globally, 101 were reported in
South East Asia alone. While it may be argued that these figures
include both minor acts of robbery as well as piracy, the IMB data
shows a pattern in which South East Asia clearly emerges as a hotspot
for maritime crimes in the world. Some of the world’s largest and
busiest ports such as Singapore, and Jakarata are located in this
region. At its narrowest point the Strait of Malacca is only 1.5 nm
wide. With increase in shipping density, vessels would have to
navigate at slower speeds, thus, making them increasingly vulnerable
to attacks.
The world’s leading terrorist organisations such as
the Al Qaeda, Jammat lslamiyah (Jl), Moro lslamic Liberation Front and
the Abu Sayaff are known to be operating in the region. Al Qaeda was
responsible for the attack on USS Cole in October 2000 and the
French Tanker MV Limburg in October 2002. The Al Qaeda is known
to have members with marine background in its cadres. A case involving
armed pirates trying to practice ship handling on a Tanker transiting
the straits was reported in 2003. Some analysts view this as akin to
the 11 September 2001 hijackers taking flying lessons five years prior
to the incident.
The Strait of Malacca is the artery connecting
economies of Asia and Europe with the Middle East. Needless to say the
threat of maritime terrorism is high in this region. A terrorist
strike in the straits could be in various forms. Some likely scenarios
are as follows:-
(a) Sinking or scuttling of a ship at a choke
point.
(b) Deliberate collision in narrow straits.
(c) Exploding a Light Natural Gas carrier in
port.
(d) Terror attacks in mega ports.
(e) Smuggling of nuclear bomb or biological
weapons through containers into ports.
In the worst case scenario a terrorist attack
rendering the Strait of Malacca unusable, would entail ships being
diverted by nearly a thousand miles or an additional three days of
steaming. The resultant impact will be a ripple effect starting with
heightened oil prices coupled with increased freight and insurance
charges, and so on, leading to incalculable losses on the industrial
production of countries like Japan, China, etc.; eventually affecting
the rest of the global economy.
Ongoing Security Initiatives
A large number of unilateral, bilateral and
multilateral initiatives in combating maritime threats in the region
have been taken by the regional countries. The efforts by Singapore,
Malaysia and Indonesia to secure the straits are commendable. Some
important initiatives are discussed in succeeding paragraphs.
Malacca Strait Security Accord (MSSA)
Under the Malacca Strait Security Accord,
Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore have established the Malacca Straits
Security Patrols as well as ‘Eyes in the Sky’, aerial patrols. A radar
network along the strait is also being established to provide a
complete radar picture of the straits.
Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy
and Armed Robbery Against Ships (ReCAAP).
Another important initiative in this direction is
the ReCAAP, initiated by Japan in 2004 to promote multilateral anti
piracy cooperation. The agreement came into force in September 2006.
Under the agreement the ASEAN 10 as well as Japan, India, China,
Korea, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka have agreed to cooperate in
information sharing, mutual capacity building and combined operations.
Indonesia and Malaysia have not yet ratified the agreement though they
have agreed to cooperate on ground. Under the ReCAAP an Information
Sharing Centre (ISC) has been established at Singapore. Broadly, the
role of the ISC would be to carry out an analysis of various
transnational crimes including piracy in the region with a view to
provide the security agencies with operational intelligence to combat
maritime threats.
International Ship and Port Security Code (ISPS)
The ISPS code has significantly reduced cases of
armed robberies and piracy globally as well as in this region. The
Automatic Identification System (AIS) established under the ISPS code
for vessels above 300 tons has aided in safe navigation and monitoring
of the ships. The greatest benefit to the shipping community from ISPS
code has been increased security awareness on the part of the
mariners.
Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI)
Notwithstanding the reluctance of the regional
countries seeking direct foreign participation in security patrols in
the straits, the United States Navy (USN) has maintained its presence
in the region under the RMSI. It conducts several bilateral and
multilateral exercises such as the annual Coordinated Afloat Readiness
and Training Exercise (CARAT) with regional countries aimed at
combined maritime security operations. This is part of the US strategy
of capacity building of regional countries.
Five Power Defence Agreement (FPDA)
The FPDA between the UK, Australia, New Zealand,
Malaysia and Singapore is another multilateral initiative in maritime
security. The scope of the FPDA has changed over the years from air
defence of Singapore and Malaysia to disaster relief and humanitarian
aid and now maritime terrorism. Under the FPDA an annual exercise
dealing with maritime security is conducted in the region regularly.
The above initiatives in securing the straits have
ensured a drastic reduction in maritime crimes in the region. However,
the challenge now remains in the ability to maintain this tempo and
further expand and synergise regional and global cooperation towards
combating maritime terrorism. The maritime terrorism around the Strait
of Malacca simply can’t be tackled by Singapore, Malaysia and
Indonesia by themselves.
Challenges
Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)
A complete MDA of the region is paramount to the
security of the region. This would involve a myriad of inputs ranging
from AIS data, radar inputs, shipping information, etc. Under the ISPS
all vessels above 300 tons can be automatically tracked. However, a
major drawback of the AIS is that vessels below 300 tons are not
included in the system. This is because the system is primarily
designed for navigational safety and not maritime security.
Unorganised traffic comprising vessels below 300 tons which includes
fishing boats, ferries etc., abound in the straits. These vassels have
a huge potential for use in terror attacks. It may be recalled that
both the USS Cole and the French Tanker MV Limburg were
struck by small boats. Small vessels have been used since World war II
to strike at bigger targets.
Lack of information pertaining to small craft is a
major challenge in the security of the strait. The first step in
securing the straits would be to keep track of every ship or craft in
water. There are broadly two ways of achieving this. The first would
be by adopting technical means. An example is the Harbour Transponder
System (HARTS) being developed by Singapore for tracking of all small
craft. The second method would be by establishing an information
sharing network.
Information Sharing Network
Inputs obtained from Radar and AIS need to be
supplemented by human intelligence and technological intelligence.
This is one area where information sharing arrangements with other
partners is essential. A common protocol for information sharing
between members needs to be established to provide a near real time
MDA. The establishment of the Information Sharing Centre under ReCAAP
at Singapore is a step in the right direction. However, the
non-ratification of the ReCAAP by two major regional players-Malaysia
and Indonesia-highlights a regional divide in the strategy for
combating maritime threats in the region. Thus synergised efforts
towards achieving a singular MDA picture which is vital for the
security of the region remain unachieved. The need of the hour is
total commitment by all members of the ReCAAP to share information
towards building complete MDA of the region.
Funding
The tri-lateral Malacca Strait Security Accord is
largely funded by three major players i.e., Singapore, Indonesia and
Malaysia with contributions made by IMO and shipping companies.
Australia, Japan and the USA have also contributed to various
programmes in terms of funding and material assistance. However, in
order to maintain the current tempo there is a need to
institutionalise contributions from the main users and stakeholders
i.e., ship owners. This can be achieved by imposing a toll for vessels
passing though the strait. The removal of the Strait of Malacca from
the JWC list implies a saving up to 4000.00 per ship. A part of this
saving could be imposed as toll towards ensuring security.
Foreign Assistance
The Increased security patrols since 2005 when the
strait was put on the JWC list have resulted in drastic reduction in
piracy in the region but has stretched to capacity the limited
maritime resources of the regional countries. In order to sustain this
tempo and enhance surveillance through high end technology, it is
imperative that direct involvement of major players such as the USN,
the Indian Navy, the Royal Australian Navy etc. be sought.
So far the issue of foreign participation in the
security patrols has been persistently discouraged by most of the
regional countries. The sensitivities of regional countries against
foreign participation could stem from their historical experiences of
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