.
Most perceived threats to security in the region
are India-centric. These, in most cases are imagined and even hyped up
to justify defence expenditure and protect vested interests of the
military as a domestic power block. While Nepal, Sri Lanka and Myanmar
have serious internal security threats necessitating higher levels of
weapon systems; arming against external threats, mainly from India,
would be of considerably lower importance. In the case of Bangladesh,
while there is no discernible external threat, there could be an
envisaged threat if India ever decides on a limited military option to
tackle the issue of Bangladesh's collusion in providing safe sanctuary
to Indian terrorists.
India's neighbours have the option of joining cause
with India or playing the balance of power game within the region by
joining cause with Pakistan or with China or even at times with both.
This aspect is evident from the bilateral relations between countries
in the region and the influence wielded by China through the military
dependencies that it has created in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh
and Myanmar. A Times of India editorial summed up the situation
when it stated "the reality is that New Delhi's stasis and Beijing's
dynamism on economic policy is now casting its shadows on SAARC
politics as well, and most of India's neighbours want Beijing to be a
significant player in the region". An overview of military
relationships in the region is given below:-
(a) Afghanistan. Currently developing its
national military and engaged in military relationship with the USA,
the NATO and coalition partners exclusively. It has very little
military relations with India despite a vibrant institutional
military relationship prior to the takeover by Taliban.
(b) Bangladesh. Has major military
relationship with China and actively engages the militaries of other
South Asian countries. It has minimal military relationship with
India.
(c) Bhutan. Confines all its military
engagement to India exclusively.
(d) India. Has major exclusive military
relationships with Bhutan. It has major military relationship with
Nepal and Maldives, some military engagement with Sri Lanka and
Myanmar, and minimal engagement with Bangladesh. It has virtually no
military relationship with Afghanistan and a well documented and
discussed militarily adversarial relationship with Pakistan.
(e) Maldives. Has major military relations
with India with nominal military relations with other Asia-Pacific
nations and the USA. China, it appears, is wooing the Maldives in an
endeavour to obtain a naval base on one of the islands of Maldives.
(f) Myanmar. Has a military relationship
with China, India and Pakistan and virtually very minimal to no
military relationship with other South Asian nations.
(g) Nepal. Has a major military
relationship with India. Its military relationship with China is
slowly developing. It has some military relations with Pakistan and
relatively minimal to no military relations with other South Asian
nations.
(h) Pakistan. Has strategic military
relationship with China and the USA. It has major military relations
with Myanmar. It has a dynamic military relationship with Sri Lanka,
Bangladesh and Nepal and relatively minimal to no military relations
with other South Asian nations.
(j) Sri Lanka. Has a military relationship
with India and increasing military relationships with China and
Pakistan. It has relatively minimal to no military relations with
other South Asian nations.
We see a trend wherein India has mixed military
relations with some countries. Thus, while India enjoys good overall
relations with those countries with whom it has healthy military
relations – Bhutan, Maldives and Myanmar; India has turbulent
relations with nations with whom its military engagement is not so
healthy – Pakistan and Bangladesh. This impacts on India's security
environment, detracting from achieving economic and social development
goals. The militaries in India's neighbours carry more than a
reasonable clout in government affairs. This must be tapped by
establishing a higher level of military to military engagement and
cooperation in the Region. India needs to engage and interact with all
the militaries in the region with the aim of developing institutional
access and relationships as also personal relationships in order to
exchange perceptions and arrive at realistic threat assessments.
Countering of neighbours perceptions of threat, their analysis, and
assessment and resultant defence plans by dissemination of India's
national defence and strategic objectives, both elucidated and
practiced would also be an important objective. While a lot is being
done in the form of offering of military training course vacancies in
India and specific activities such as specialised training for
counter-insurgency, military material assistance etc; there is a need
for greater interaction between the Ministries of Defence at the
ministerial and bureaucratic levels, and more importantly at the
military levels.
The US military's extensive engagement and
interaction programmes for the Asia-Pacific under its 'Theatre
Security Cooperation Programme'
can serve as an excellent example for India. The programmes include
reciprocal visits at various levels, 'Staff Information Exchanges' –
conferences, seminars and staff liaison or exchange meetings,
'Individual Training' including personnel exchange programmes, small
unit training, Joint Combined Training, Disaster Preparedness
Mitigation Assessment (DPMA) Programme, and so on.
In order to create a conducive security environment
in the region the options available to India would range from
unilateral engagement (without taking into consideration the
activities of other regional and extra regional players) to pro-active
military engagement (to countervail the influence of other regional
and extra regional players). A major portion of these engagements
would be as under :-
(a) Assistance in the form of military material
and infrastructure development.
(b) Engagement of the militaries to develop
institutional and personal relationships and better understanding of
respective perceptions.
India must develop dynamic and proactive military
relationships with the countries in the region. Foreign military
relations would be a sub set of the broader bilateral relations and
would serve to maintain a strong institutional relationship as a
catalyst for better strategic relation. Countries, that are not
effectively militarily engaged must be engaged. India must develop an
international military cooperation structure and evolve a strategy for
military engagement of the militaries of the South Asian Region. The
structure must include appropriate organisations with delegated
decision making processes and the provision of funding support for
initiatives. The strategy would comprise a range of initiatives such
as political, defence equipment related activities and defence
ministry relationship. Uniformed military relations must be developed
as part of the overall defence ministry relationships. There must be
country specific defence and military engagement initiatives covering
contact and interaction at various levels, military assistance in
terms of equipment, training and advice; and opportunities for
exchange of perceptions. The Indian Navy has already taken a major
step by 'building bridges of friendship while projecting power' as
part of its foreign military cooperation in the lOR.
Country wise options for India are listed below:-
(a) Afghanistan. India should establish
institutional defence and military contacts with Afghanistan which
could be subsequently developed depending on how the Afghan
political situation unfolds.
(b) Bangladesh. India should be pro-active
and establish defence and military relations with Bangladesh through
a combination of bilateral and regional initiatives.
(c) Bhutan. The current relationship with
Bhutan must be further strengthened. India must ensure that it takes
Bhutanese sensitivities, internal developments and aspirations into
consideration while drawing up long and short term engagement plans.
(d) Maldives. India should build on its
military relations with Maldives as part of the security of the IOR.
Further,
India should dissuade Maldives from permitting China to establish a
naval base on the island of Marao, as this would lead to the
introduction of yet another military naval presence in the lOR.
(e) Myanmar. India should enhance military
relationship with Myanmar. Assistance and cooperation in the areas
of military equipment – supply, maintenance and manufacture;
training – military technology; joint exercises – in India and
Myanmar by the three Services; and joint operations against
militants in border areas; would have to be developed.
(f) Nepal. The military relationship with
Nepal should be further enhanced. India's domestic compulsions to
support Nepalese democracy not withstanding; the presence of
regional and extra-regional entities (Pakistan, China and the USA),
in Nepal may not be in India's national interest.
(g) Pakistan. India should reach an
understanding with Pakistan for lasting peace and stability. This
would hinge on resolution of issues like Pakistan's insistence on
the Jammu and Kashmir Issue and India's requirement of termination
of Pakistani support to terrorism. A lasting peace solution, however
distant, has economic and social benefits for the two countries and
the region as a whole.
(h) Sri Lanka. Assistance and cooperation
in the areas of military equipment - supply, maintenance and
manufacture; training - military technology; joint exercises - in
India and Sri Lanka by all the three Services; operational
assistance in maritime surveillance would have to be developed.
Domestic compulsions in the form of Indian Tamil sentiments would
have to be balanced by national interests.
In addition, there is a need for an Indian
initiative for the region. India would be hard pressed to initiate and
develop programmes for multilateral interaction and cooperation in the
region as is evident from the progress or lack of it in SAARC. A
pragmatic and workable approach would be to take a leaf out of the
cricket organisation for the Wills World Cup in 1996 when Pakistan,
Sri Lanka and India set up a tripartite cricket organising committee
and the more recent successful joint bid by four South Asian
neighbours viz. India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, to host the
2011 Cricket World Cup.
India could set up a South Asian Military
Interaction Programme (SAMIP). Suggested aspects of this programme are
given below:-
(a) The aim of SAMIP would be to facilitate
military interaction at all levels in South Asia to exchange
perceptions leading to threat assessments and realistic military
establishments and expenditure.
(b) All costs for SAMIP should be fully met by
the Indian military in the form of a separate budgetary allocation
for the programme with delegation of authority to plan and execute
the programme. The entire programme could have a consolidated budget
with country wise and event wise sub-allocations. There could be a
programme director at Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff and
appropriate functionaries designated at the Service Headquarters.
They may form part of Defence Cooperation Cells.
(c) SAMIP would essentially be based in India.
(d) SAMIP activities could include the
following:-
(i) Joint border interactions -bilateral and
multilateral.
(ii) Joint maritime patrol and surveillance
programme to monitor the sea lanes of communication and EEZs.
(iii) Joint Humanitarian Assistance and
Disaster Relief in the areas of communications, joint relief
operations, mutual assistance and so on.
(iv) A unilateral Military Assistance
Programme (MAP) covering areas ranging from training to material
assistance.
(v) Joint combined exercises.
(vi) UN peace keeping operations and related
activities.
(vii) Seminars, conferences and symposia on
military related subjects.
(viii) Training institution conclaves for
trainees and faculty.
(ix) Military sports events.
(x) Military adventure activities.
(xi) Indian military training institutions
alumni get-togethers.
India has to reorganise the present system of
military engagement wherein all activities are centrally controlled
from Delhi at the level of the Service Headquarters, with case-by-case
clearances, first from the Ministry of Defence, and then by the
Ministry of External Affairs. Further, Service Headquarters have to
involve regional military commands and assign a greater role in
developing and conducting military relations with countries that fall
in their jurisdiction, such as Eastern Command for interaction with
Bangladesh; Southern Command for interaction with Sri Lanka and so on.
There is a need for dedicated allocation of funds, with delegation of
authority to incur expenditure, for planning and execution of foreign
military cooperation initiatives and programmes.
Conclusion
India's immediate neighbourhood has a sensitive
strategic security and military environment. Its social problems
arising from teeming populations and low human development indices
rating are compounded by a relatively unstable security environment
due to terrorism, sectarian violence and hostile adversarial
relations. If the countries of the region can work together, most
internal security problems, and extra-regional players, would run out
of steam. India has developed mutually beneficial strategic
relationships, duly supported by similar military relationships, with
some countries in the region. It needs to develop similar relations
with other countries. Developing institutional military relations
would be the corner stone of the larger defence and strategic
relationships. In addition to developing and progressing country
specific defence and military engagement initiatives, a South Asian
military engagement and exchange programme like SAMIP would go a long
way in achieving a stable security environment in the region thereby
creating an environment conducive for economic and social development.
