We are passing through a decisive stage in the history of the international system. Though the threat of war between great states or nuclear confrontation between the erstwhile Soviet Union and the USA are well behind us and in fact fading in our memory, new and diverse constellation of threats, some clear and present, others only dimly perceived, test our resolve and question the validity of our existing mechanisms. Developments at the international level over the last three and a half years have exposed deep divisions within the membership of the United Nations over our fundamental policies on peace and security. They included debates on how best to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and combat the spread of international terrorism, the criteria for the use of force and the role of the Security Council, the effectiveness of unilateral versus multilateral responses to security, the notion of preventive war, and the place of the United Nations in a world with a single super power.

These debates emerge after several years of agonising debate on issues of no less importance. Such as our collective response to civil wars; the effectiveness of existing mechanisms in responding to genocide; so-called ethnic cleansing and other severe violations of human rights; changing notions of state sovereignty; and the need to more tightly link the challenges of peace and the challenges of development. There is little doubt that restructuring and institutional reform of the UN machinery and its organs to meet the new challenges should not be put off for much longer. The changes called for are not merely a matter of the functioning of the UN Secretariat and other such administrative details. The changes need to focus on the world body's character and ethos.

There is a unanimous view that meeting the challenges of today's threats means getting serious about prevention. The consequences of allowing threats to spread or become active are simply too severe. And in that context there is no difference of opinion that development has to be the first line of response for a collective security mechanism that takes prevention seriously. Preventing wars within states and between them is in the collective interest of all of us. If the international community is to do better in the future in this context, the UN will need real improvements in its capacity for preventive diplomacy, mediation and conflict management. The international community needs to make genuine and concerted efforts to protect democratic governments from unconstitutional overthrow, and for protection of minority rights. The trends towards expediency in this regard must be reversed. And there is a need to work collectively to find new ways of regulating the management of natural resources, competition for which often fuels conflict.

The use of force should only be considered after all other options have been exhausted. And the fact that force can be legally used does not always mean that it should be used. In this context, the mechanism of preventive deployment would appear to be a useful tool. Even so, there can be little argument that prevention sometimes fails. And when that happens, threats will have to be met by military means. The UN Charter provides a clear framework for the use of force. States have an inherent right to self-defence, enshrined in Article 51. Long-established customary international law makes it clear that states can take military action as long as the threatened attack is imminent, no other means would deflect it, and the action is proportionate. Equally, Chapter VII of the UN Charter provides the international community represented by the Security Council, with the authority to deal with situations where military force needs to be applied against an errant state that resorts to aggression against another member state.

The aspect that merits attention is that notwithstanding the fact that the recommendations of the High Level Panel (HLP) on this issue have not been endorsed in the outcome document adopted at the recent UN summit in New York, it would be advisable for us in India to factor such a contingency into future deliberations and planning. Personally, I am convinced that the international community will almost definitely be faced with situations that call for preventive use of force, sooner rather than later. It may, therefore, be prudent for the establishment and the strategic community in India to apply itself to the merits and de-merits of such use of force. Should there be consensus that there is need to plan for such contingencies, some mechanisms would need to be formulated for consultation, coordination, joint training, and so on with the USA, European Union (EU), Russia, Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), African union (AU), Japan, and may be even China.

There continues to be much discussion and deliberation on the aspect of the 'responsibility to protect' in context of the fact that state sovereignty is still very important, particularly to the developing countries that have emerged from colonial rule not too long back. Notwithstanding all the developments at the global level, the concept of state sovereignty remains at the root of the international system. Even so, there is some consensus that in this day and age, such sovereignty cannot be absolute. The emerging norm of a collective responsibility to protect civilians from large-scale violence has been endorsed: a responsibility that lies first and foremost with national authorities. When a state fails to protect its civilians or is incapable of doing so, the international community would appear to have a responsibility to act, through humanitarian operations, monitoring missions, and diplomatic pressure; and with force if necessary as a very last resort. And in the case of conflict or the use of force, this also implies a clear international containment to rebuild shattered societies.

There is some disquiet in developing societies that perceive this as yet another attempt by the more powerful members of the developed world to impose their value systems on the weaker states. In extreme cases even to the extent of threatening use of force to put pressure on what are seen as uncooperative governments in developing states, and to enable use of force to effect regime change. Some reassurance is, therefore, necessary. And in any case, the criteria need to be not only seen as genuine and objective, but effected after detailed consultation and coordination.

Here again, there is need for us in India to deliberate on whether or not we should be part of such processes. In which case we should evolve mechanisms for consultation, coordination, joint training and so on with like minded countries and regional organisations. I am of the view that we should be pro-active on this aspect as we may well be called upon to take the lead role in the immediate and extended neighbourhood.

Deploying military capacities for peacekeeping and enforcement has proved to be a valuable tool in ending wars and helping to secure states in their aftermath. But the total global supply of available peacekeepers is running dangerously low. From indications available today, just to do an adequate job of keeping the peace in existing conflicts would require almost doubling the number of peacekeepers around the world. Developed states have particular responsibilities to do more to transfuse their armies into units suitable for deployment to peace operations. And if we are to meet the challenges ahead, more states will have to place contingents on stand-by for the UN purposes, and air transport and other strategic lift capacities to assist peace operations. There is no greater legitimacy for the use of military forces, and for that matter, civilian police, than for the maintenance of international peace and security. It should, therefore, be a matter of honour and privilege for countries to provide forces for such peace missions. However, the practical experience in this context is invariably rather dismal. The inordinate delay in the arrival of troops in the mission area is always a most frustrating feature of the missions that are being set up. It is in recognition of this basic inadequacy that rapid deployment forces like the Nordic Sherbrig, the European Union Rapid Deployment Force, the proposed sub-regional rapid deployment capability of the African Union, and so on have been, or are being, considered.

One of the measures instituted by the United Nations to overcome this inadequacy is the earmarking of "stand by" forces by member states. This is most commendable and needs to be pursued with vigour. As on date, this arrangement apparently provides for about 100,000 personnel pledged by about 75 member states. However, it is a moot point whether such "stand by" forces would, in fact, be available immediately on demand. The Rwandan experience indicates that political expediency and domestic compulsions will invariably dictate the responses of member states. Therefore, while the arrangement must stand, it would be pragmatic to work on the assumption that forces under this arrangement can only be put together in a certain time frame; namely about three to six months or so. And that too, subject to political acceptance by member states. To expect forces any earlier is unrealistic under current conditions.

There is little need to stress the point that a military force of modest dimensions (together with police and other civil affairs and humanitarian aid personnel) inserted into a conflict zone as soon as some semblance of agreement between belligerents is negotiated, can achieve much more in terms of implementation of the terms of the agreement, than a much larger force introduced three to six months later. During which period, the political situation within the affected country can change dramatically, hostilities may well have resumed, and the ground situation much changed reducing the chances of peaceful resolution. If that is so, inhibitions about having a suitably organised, structured and equipped force that is readily available when required, would seem to be misplaced. In context of ready availability of forces for United Nations peace operations it would appear that the only real answer for meeting crisis situations that call for speedy deployment of military forces, civilian police, and some civil affairs and humanitarian aid personnel for the maintenance of international peace and security, is to raise and maintain a Standing United Nations Rapid Deployment Force.

During the deliberations of the High Level Panel, I had suggested that we recommend the creation of such a force. Whereas there was support from a few members of the Panel and general endorsement of the concept in principle, a number of members felt that such a proposal was unlikely to receive general endorsement of member states of the UN on grounds of costs of establishing and supporting such a force, as also on grounds of political acceptance of the idea. I find these postulations quite unconvincing. In my view, reluctance to endorsement of such a concept particularly by the more powerful countries of the developed world is primarily because they would not like to see their own influence and ability to manipulate events diluted by the provision of such ready capability to the United Nations. To that extent, I am of the opinion that much of the talk about strengthening the UN and making it more effective is rhetoric and symbolism. The point I make is probably underscored by the fact that the developed world has shown increasing reluctance over the last few years to providing militia personnel for the UN peace operations particularly in difficult missions in Africa. Governments of developed countries of the Western world seem to prefer making available their well-equipped and trained forces to North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) or EU sponsored interventions even in missions outside their area of operations, to complement the UN operations rather than being part of such operations, on grounds that they provide the required muscle.

The deployment and employment of such a UN Rapid Deployment Force must be premised on the following conceptual parameters:-

Notwithstanding all that has been suggested in preceding paragraphs, it may be appropriate to make abundantly clear that the United Nations Rapid Reaction Force as proposed is not intended to be a war fighting apparatus nor is it a private army of the UN Secretary General. Equally, it may be important to make clear that the formation of such a force in no way detracts from the institution of such capability at the regional and sub-regional level; as visualized by the African Union for example. In fact, with some coordination and understanding there could be scope for complementing each other's efforts.

India's contribution to UN peacekeeping is a matter of recorded history and continues to be more than significant even today. Our competence in this very visible arena of UN activity is being recognised even by the USA that is trying hard to understand and come to terms with this form of military and police utilisation. We should exploit this to our advantage not only by continued participation in UN operations but also by offering to assist emerging troop contributors and providing expertise where required. The Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) is already calling on us to conduct training courses on their behalf. We should readily respond to such requests without reservations and insist on adequate representation at the UN Headquarters and on decision-making mechanisms there. In addition it may be worth our while to keep preferably a division sized force or at least a brigade group strength including the Indian Air Force (IAF) and the Indian Navy (IN) elements as a standing force to respond to UN requests without delay when called upon to do so. Such a force could also be utilised for a regional or sub-regional requirement should such a requirement arise.