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(Based on a presentation made by the author at the Asian Regional
Forum seminar at the USI, New Delhi in April 2007)
UN is likely to be a key player in nation-building projects because of
the international legitimacy it enjoys and the confidence the people
of the nation-to-be-built repose in its bonafides. It would be
involved in resurrecting failed states or building new ones as a
consequence of the war against terrorism, humanitarian disaster, civil
war or aspiration of the oppressed minorities to seek independent
nationhood through the self-degeneration route-encouraged by
international community’s interventions in Kosovo and East Timor.
Peacebuilding has been the central concern of the transitional
administrations and an inherent part of UN multi-dimensional
peacekeeping operations in support, for the last 8-9 years. However,
UN’s efforts in peacebuilding in several countries such as East Timor,
Kosovo and Burundi have not been particularly successful in spite of
its earnestness. In case of Congo and Liberia, the jury is still out.
It is relevant to look at the assessment of the current situation
(April 2007) in Timor-Leste by the Economist as an example of the
effectiveness of UN peacebuilding efforts: “hailed at Independence in
2002 as a success for UN midwifery, has since unravelled into near
anarchy.... The UN’s hordes of experts have made huge effort to
nurture democracy and build strong institutions in Timor-Leste. But it
still seems as if one stiff gust of wind could blow it all away”. If
the UN’s efforts, in a small country like East Timor, with a
homogenous population of less than a million, could not establish a
solid system capable of dealing with the problems; it calls for review
of the UN’s approach to peacebuilding,
“In Larger Freedom” Secretary-General Kofi Annan said, “...roughly
half of all countries that emerge from war lapse back into violence
within five years”. The question arises: why is it so?
Aim
This paper would examine the formidable challenges of peacebuilding
and the deficiencies of the UN’s approach to the task, which render
its genuine efforts ineffective in several cases.
Scope
We would go by the definition that peacebuilding is an attempt to
reduce /eliminate causes of violent conflict in conflict-prone
societies while concurrently laying the ground for self-sustaining
peace. Stability and development. While analysing the factors we would
be largely drawing upon, on the one hand, the experience of United
Nations Transnational Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), the most
comprehensive UN peacebuilding effort, and on the other, of United
Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC),
which has been assisting a huge country, Congo, to erase its
reputation as a classical failed state. The observations from these
missions have been validated in the light of experiences of other UN
missions. This paper would deal with only those factors, which the
international community is in a position to address.
Strategic Issues
Concept or the Grand Design for the State
The first fundamental issue that needs to be addressed in any
state-building effort is what kind of democracy should the nascent or
failed state have. The UN system instinctively responds with two
options at the macro level as: British or American. No thought is
given to the fact that the British system, for instance, evolved over
several centuries mainly as a product of its History, Christian
values, Reformation, Age of Science and Industrialisation in the 19th
Century. It is assumed that since Britain and the US became great
powers with these systems and are prosperous societies, these are the
panacea for all countries. The experts of the UN system are not
trained to examine whether the local factors might suggest a different
kind of democracy, more suited to the nature and culture of the
society and in consonance with its history and traditions. And since
the democracies are not rooted in the local milieu, they are not
always durable even if they are good. For instance, would
western-style secular democracy be sustainable in Muslim states? Even
Turkey has found it difficult in spite of the Ataturk laying its
foundation as a modem state. Many countries of the former British
Empire in Asia and Africa adopted the Westminster parliamentary system
but have failed its people.
The emphasis of the UN mission, while advising the host country’s
leadership regarding the new constitution, is on freedom of speech,
individual liberties and universal human rights, and not so much on
good governance, as the advisers are most often from the advanced
(western) countries. The constitution is drafted by the UN experts
whose hi-fi presentations, full of sophisticated jargon, bewilder the
local leadership into accepting their proposals while incorporating
the minor modifications suggested by the latter. The local elite do
not have the experience or confidence to contradict the UN experts.
The few non-western experts are shy of engaging in a debate with the
western experts because either their own country has not done too well
for its people or if it has, then it has not had liberal democratic
norms e.g. Singapore or South Korea.
In East Timor, for instance, the models of Singapore or South Korea
were never considered. It would be worthwhile to find out whether
common citizens of Singapore are happier to have become prosperous but
with restricted freedoms or would have preferred fullest freedoms
which would have retarded economic growth, job creation etc. It is
safe to assume that the common man in a poor country wants good
governance resulting in rapid improvement in law and order situation,
provision of infrastructure, utilities and services and
corruption-free administration. He is hardly concerned with freedoms
of speech etc, which are important only to the elite. When the common
man does not see improvement in his circumstances, even after the UN
intervention and installation of a democratic government, discontent
re-surfaces and the institutions established by the UN begin to
unravel.
Economic Model for the State
The other related fundamental issue on which the UN has to take a
decision or advise the host country is the economic model: options
being socially oriented market economy or laissez faire. If socially
oriented, then to what extent? Most of the senior staff, majority of
which are invariably from the advanced countries, advocate a system as
close to laissez faire as possible. Underlying logic of their advocacy
is that their countries have become advanced because of virtual
laissez faire hence that is the right system to follow, for instance.
They staunchly advocate the ‘user pays’ principle if the issue is of
building a road to, a small impoverished town and oppose provision of
electricity or water at subsidised prices to the common man. (They
are, perhaps, also concerned that if there is a large deficit in the
country’s budget, their countries, as donors, would have to provide
the subsidy). As a result, there is resentment amongst the people who
do not get the basic utilities because they cannot afford to pay its
production cost/ market value.
In the modern world of television, the common man, even in the least
developed countries, has come to regard access to these utilities as a
fundamental right and not a privilege of only those who can afford.
Moreover, the laissez faire system does not have a focus on creation
of jobs, which is the biggest need of the people. Lack of jobs over a
long period of time exhausts people’s patience, fosters bitter
resentment and leads to civil disorder. In the modem era of democracy,
human rights and satellite TV - a newly created state is incapable of
withstanding the severe strain this entails, unlike in the previous
eras, as people resort to violent protests en masse in no time. For
instance, even in Sierra Leone, which is considered a reasonable
success story, the discontent of the people with unemployment, abuse
of power and corruption is growing and if the post-election (August
2007) government does not provide tangible development, the country,
according to the International Crisis Group, might revert to civil
war.
Elections
As elections are usually the exit strategy for the ‘regular’ Peace
Keeping Operations (PKO) (as distinct from follow-on mission), they
are usually held within 24 to 36 months of the cease-fire or peace
agreement (in East Timor and Tajikistan after 24 months, Congo:
scheduled after 36 months). Electoral campaigns within this short span
of time exacerbate the tensions, accentuate the differences and undo
whatever healing might have been achieved between/ amongst the parties
and hence national reconciliation, which is one of the primary
requirements for a durable peace, suffers seriously (e.g. in
Cambodia). Furthermore, since most often elections are conducted on
the Westminster model of parliamentary democracy i.e. winner- take-
all, no side can afford to lose the elections particularly not the
government. In an under-developed country, all power and patronage
belongs to the government - being even a leader of the opposition is
meaningless. The stakes, therefore, are high for both sides.
Since the society has no traditions of sharing power and no
institutions with which to limit it, one either has absolute power to
use and abuse or one is subject to those who do. Power, and only
power, brings security, besides wealth and patronage. Opposition
parties have little chance of success in an election, as they are not
only pitted against the mighty state apparatus controlled by the
government party, but have little time to organise the party across
the country or to learn the art of campaigning. Elections, organised
by the government apparatus even when they are observed/ monitored by
the PKO or international community are, obviously, won by the
government party. In the recent elections in Congo, the incumbent
President deployed his handsomely paid bodyguards at all strategic
places in the country and there were serious complaints of
intimidation by his people. In spite of the presence of 17,600
peacekeepers, there was so much violence in the air that the Chief
Election Commissioner had to travel in an APC to the TV station to
announce the results. Running gun battles between President’s men and
Bemba’s militia followed in the streets of Kinshasa for the next two
days. In Cambodia, the elections were won by the opposition because
the UNTAC was itself the Administration.
International support for the elections tends to be largely procedural
in nature. It is not able to tackle the ways of the Establishment,
which favour the government party. Complaints regarding electoral
fraud malpractices are dealt with by the same state apparatus in the
same high- handed manner (e.g. in Haiti after the elections in May
2000). There are many examples of the above -an illustrative one being
the presidential and parliamentary elections in Tajikistan in November
1999 and February 2000 respectively. Electoral grievances seriously
affect reconciliation. Unfairly conducted elections do not confer
‘legitimacy’ on the government without which chances of a durable
peace are remote.
Often the first election is the last and the parties expect it to be
so; that is why they use all possible means to win it. For instance in
Congo, after winning the elections, the President has already used,
what has been termed disproportionate force by European diplomats,
resulting in killing of 100 civilians in Bas-Congo and 600 soldiers /
civilians in the face off with Bemba’s supporters in Kinshasa in March
2007. Bemba is expected to go into exile as charges of sedition and
treason have been levelled against him; thus decimating the
opposition. Kabila is showing little inclination for reconciliation.
Hence, the UN needs to act as the watchdog and ensure a freer and fair
second election in the country.
Local Ownership of the New System
The UN mission has two conflicting considerations while running the
country (or virtually running the country as in the case of Liberia)
as a trustee. On the one hand, it has to set up the institutions of
the state in barely two years and hence, it needs to take decisions
rapidly and implement quickly using international staff; on the other
hand, it needs to involve the locals sufficiently to give them a sense
of ownership of the new systems. In case of East Timor, the Timorese
complained about their non-involvement in UNTAET’s decision-making
processes and public administration- employing them only as
subordinate staff e.g. clerks, drivers, interpreters and guards. They
did not feel a sense of ownership of what they inherited from UNTAET.
In addition, they complained about other things: use of English,
negligible transfer of skills, rise in prices, non- availability of
jobs-particularly for the former militiamen, inadequate rehabilitation
& re-construction, and dominance by Australia.
Operational Issues
Funding of the New State
The UN mission manages to obtain promises of financial support for the
fledgling country through a donor’s conference sponsored by a major
power. Though the donors promise a lot of funds, they milk a large
part of them by providing their own experts at exorbitant remuneration
for projects of their choice and adopt a ‘doctrine of lapse’ for funds
not utilised in a financial year. In addition, a large number of
donors insist that the contracts/ procurements for their projects go
to contractors and vendors of their countries. Only one-third of the
promised funds ever reach the bank account of the recipient state.
Rule of Law System
Providing security to the people, their property and businesses by
international policemen is a very difficult matter. Good policing
requires good intelligence, which in turn requires reliable sources.
It is not quite feasible for internationals to get the intelligence,
even if they knew the local language, and that too when they are on a
year’s tenure. Furthermore, it is extremely sensitive politically to
carry out searches. Imagine the situation, if policemen from Europe or
even from the sub-continent were carrying out house-to-house searches
in East Timor. If a local dies or few are injured in the firing by the
international police while controlling a violent mob, it provides an
incendiary issue for an anti-UN political agitation! Naturally, the
international policemen are reluctant to use their weapons even when
they should.
The long-term measure of raising and training a local police force
needs funds and time (certainly a few years). The state budget cannot
afford to pay a decent salary to the policemen and the UN budget does
not cater for this kind of expenditure. Finding the donors who would
provide the funds, trainers and subsidise the salaries is very
difficult and adds to the time frame. Then, there is the question of
the judicial system and the penal code. Once again, which country’s
system or code is to be followed? To what extent the existing
traditional (or common /community law) system is to be incorporated
into the new system?
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Rehabilitation (DDR)
Experience has shown that one of most important factors that determine
whether ‘peace-building’ would succeed is DDR. By now it is accepted
wisdom that if the militiaman is not given another gainful way of
life, he would revert to extortion, robbery and murder. Since
government, most often, is not able to deliver essential services and
development to the people, disaffection becomes ripe in the society.
The marginalised warlords then exploit the situation by re-calling
their boys, disenchanted with the ineffective DDR process. Therefore,
recurrence of violent conflict becomes a strong probability.
The UN mission faces formidable challenges in implementing an
effective DDR programme. Firstly, the militias have to be assured that
they would be secure once they are disarmed i.e. there would be no
reprisals or exploitation of their vulnerability by the government or
the antagonistic faction(s). For this the mission has to rely on the
good faith of the government because the peacekeeping force can
provide security to a militiaman only at the assembly/quartering area
but not when he leaves it. Most crucial issue, however, is to
rehabilitate the ex-fighters into their society and provide them with
gainful employment. This requires funds for imparting vocational
training and, most importantly, creating jobs. Creating jobs is a
long-term issue and a product of good economic management by the
government. Lastly, the DDR process has to be funded by voluntary
contributions of donor countries, which act according to their
interests/priorities. Owing to all these difficulties and long
fruition period, the top leadership of the mission is usually not
inclined to spend a lot of its time on it. In some cases, the
leadership does not realise its critical importance to sustainable
peace.
Security Sector Reforms (SSR)
Alongside the DDR process goes the SSR. The most crucial issue here is
that unless the state’s security forces are paid a decent salary, they
would continue to make money through extortion, plunder and robbery.
This is not to say that a decent salary can ensure that they would not
resort to the above abuses, but the chances would decrease. In Congo,
the government’s integrated brigades are hardly paid. They continue to
prey on the population and are the worst abusers of human rights. The
main issue is where to get the funds for paying even the re-structured
army. The state’s budget cannot afford it. The mission has to persuade
countries with strategic interests in the country /region to provide
funds for the training and salaries, for a temporary period, for the
new army. Even sympathetically-inclined donor governments find it
difficult to help because their national legislation does not permit
funding of armies in such cases.
Converting Militias into Political Parties
This is another aspect which if neglected can endanger the peace
process. Whereas the government has control of the state mechanism,
the opposition militia neither, has that nor, the expertise for
fighting an election effectively. This lack of confidence becomes
another reason for the reluctance of the opposition in surrendering
its weapons. Moreover, if the opposition loses the election with the
feeling that it did not a get a fair chance, the peace might be
jeopardised. So it is important to provide all the assistance e.g.
training of its cadres in the democratic process and electioneering,
funds and infrastructure, to the opposition to convert itself into a
political party, like it was done in Mozambique.
Conclusion
It cannot be over-emphasised that the pace of institutional change and
traditional political practices in post-conflict societies are not
amenable to rapid change. History matters and habits die hard.
Democratic transitions are long-term projects which require adaptation
to cultural and historical realities.
It would be evident that in addition to a short time-frame, a UN
mission faces formidable challenges in building peace in a new or
failed state. Most importantly, it lacks guidance from New York,
member states and the Secretariat, regarding concepts and the systems
which should broadly guide the mission. The major issues are: What
kind of a democratic state is to be established? What kind of economic
model and what kind of judicial and policing systems have to be
adopted and how to effectively tackle DDR and SSR? On the issue of
democracy, there is a need to arrive at the right mix between the
modern liberal system of the West and local history and traditions.
Most importantly, the democratic system must result in good
governance.
The economic model must emphasise creation of jobs and basic utilities
reaching the common man as soon as possible. The UN has yet not
arrived at the most effective way of tackling DDR and SSR. Most
recently in East Timor, post-UN peace and stability was rudely shaken
mainly because of badly-handled DDR. In Congo, SSR is a serious cause
for concern. Equally important is the feeling of ownership that the
local leaders and intelligentsia must have regarding the system being
created by the UN. The country’s first elections in the post-conflict
period should not be based on winner-take-all concept but some kind of
proportional representation in the parliament and the government. An
international intervention in case of an intra-state conflict must
also extend to include national reconciliation, which is hardly
mentioned in the mission’s mandate. Overall, there is a need for a
longer-term horizon for change and institutional framework to
accommodate it.
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