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After the conclusion of seventh summit of Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation(SCO) in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan on August 16 this
year the grouping has come a long way from 2001 when it was formed to
address issues of common concern. SCO has evolved from Shanghai Five
grouping, formed in 1996 to address the boundary issues between China,
Russia Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Thereafter, it has moved
on to include a range of security and economic issues. The nations in
Central Asian Region (CAR) are undergoing a difficult transitional
process of nation building. Internally, stability and political
processes are yet to mature and there are real threats from terrorism
and radicalism. Process and pace of economic development has yet to
gain the required degree of momentum. Further, CAR has also become a
playground for external players with their own agendas. Then there are
many overlapping structures in the fields of security and economy in
CAR which has the effect of diluting the unity of purpose and missions
as envisaged in SCO charter.
It is critical to examine the degree of success which SCO has achieved
so far in the roles set out by it. Has it been able to gain
credibility as a security provider to the CAR? Is it poised to enlarge
its scope and missions? Is it moving towards becoming a military
alliance or will it remain an anti-terrorist coalition? How can it
promote better economic integration between its member states and
other regional groupings? How can it promote cooperation rather than
competition especially for hydrocarbon and other resources in the
region? In this uncertain and dynamic environment where each member is
looking to maximise its gains from evolving situation, achieving
cooperation amongst the members would be a complex task.
Evolution of SCO
The erstwhile Shanghai Five grouping, born in 1996 to address boundary
issues, expanded and formed SCO in 2001 to include economic and
security issues. Uzbekistan also joined the grouping in 2001 which
included Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
Uzbekistan’s entrance to the erstwhile club of five also signified
that the grouping had enlarged its interests to strategic cooperation
in the region and had progressed beyond the border security issues. In
last six years SCO has achieved maturity and ability to come to grips
with the problems bedeviling the CAR and its neighborhood. However, it
has still got much to do to achieve the required degree of credibility
as a multi-lateral structure. In the post Cold War era, after
dissolution of Soviet Union, American intervention in Afghanistan was
the second most defining event.
SCO and its members were happy to accommodate the American interests
because Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) also addressed their concerns
on terrorism, extremism and instability being exported from
Afghanistan. Afghanistan during heydays of Taliban regime (1996-2001)
had become epicentre of terrorism with sanctuaries and training
facilities being provided to likes of Al Qaeda, Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan (IMU) and holy warriors from Chechnya and CAR countries.
Even China felt threatened from fundamentalist and extremist Muslim
elements of Afghanistan because of its vulnerabilities in Xingjian.
Therefore, Russia and China raised no objections to the US being
granted air bases and logistics facilities for OEF by Central Asian
nations since it suited their short term strategic interests. SCO at
this stage was in infancy and lacked the capacity to present a
credible and coordinated front against security threats. Central Asian
states also perceived SCO to be not a very effective organisation as
far as security and economic issues were concerned. Both Kazakhstan
and Uzbekistan had pro-western orientation and were keen to obtain
economic benefits and security dividends from their association with
the West through various groupings like NATO’s Partnership for Peace
programme. Thus the USA and NATO were able to improve their influence
and profile in CAR at the expense of Russia and China.
However, by the time SCO summit of 2005 took place a variety of
factors resulted in SCO asking the USA to set a timeline for
withdrawal of their bases from CAR. This declaration was one of the
first steps towards assertion by the SCO as a multilateral institution
on security issues.
Promotion of aggressive democratic practices by the USA and adopting
policies of extreme unilateralism in pursuance of its national
interests led to disenchantment of CAR countries. As a throwback to
Andijon violence of May 2005 in Uzbekistan and severe criticism of the
Uzbek government actions by the USA; Americans were asked to vacate
their base in Uzbekistan. This call was also echoed by the SCO in July
2005 which required US to vacate its bases in Uzbekistan and
Kyrgyzstan1. Tajikistan also provides the USA military and NATO
fly-over rights and a small contingent of French troops is based there
for OEF2. Kyrgyzstan had also demanded vacation of its air base by the
USA but agreed to extend the lease with multifold increase of the
lease money3. Further, by 2005 Central Asian countries also realised
that envisaged economic benefits from the West were not substantial
and were contingent upon many conditions including promotion of
democratic norms as interpreted by the EU and the US.
Thus the middle of 2005 marked the beginning of decline of the
strategic influence of the USA in CAR even though America and the West
continue to exercise substantial influence in CAR affairs. SCO summit
in July 2005 was also important because it took in India, Iran and
Pakistan as observers, thus expanding its geographical reach and
adding the possibilities of improved cooperation on economic and
security affairs. Admission of the aforesaid observers in 2005 and
Mongolia in 2004 may have resulted from some degree of confidence that
SCO’s strategic and economic interests could expand beyond CAR4.
SCO’s summit in Beijing in June 2006, after half a decade of its
existence, was noteworthy for many reasons. It again emphasised the
leading role of China in imparting direction to the organisation.
Documents signed at the end of conference included a joint communique
on closer cooperation, a statement on information security, a
resolution on fighting terrorism, separatism and extremism from 2007
to 2009, an agreement on joint terrorism actions among member
countries and cutting off of infiltration channels of terrorists,
extremists and separatists. Joint declaration also indicated
determination of SCO to prevent interference in its affairs by outside
powers. It said “models of social development should not be exported”.
Another noteworthy aspect of the summit was the Russian proposal for
creating an energy club under the aegis of SCO. It can be seen that
SCO consists of both energy deficient and energy surplus members and
cooperation on energy issues can be mutually beneficial to all the
concerned members and observers.
Assessing the SCO
Cooperation and competition continue to be the defining features of
CAR. SCO members are also using bilateral arrangements in preference
to multilateral arrangements under the aegis of SCO in pursuance of
their security, economic and strategic interests. While China has been
the driver of SCO, Russia created its own grouping of Central Security
Treaty Organisation (CSTO) in 2002, which includes all SCO members
less China. This signifies a certain degree of competition in an area
which Russia considers as its near-abroad.
Even though SCO has completed six years, the big countries like Russia
and China do create apprehensions among the other smaller members
because of the large power differential between them. Therefore, it is
not strange that Central Asian nations are still attracted towards the
West for both political and economic reasons. All of them are pursuing
multi-vector policies to exploit the emerging strategic space to the
maximum and further pursue their national interests. For example, all
CAR nations are members of Organisation for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE) and NATO’S ‘Partnership for Peace’ programme.
Kazakhstan is looking at becoming chairman of the OSCE in 2009 when
new chairman is to be elected. Uzbekistan has not given up on
improving its relations with the EU and the USA. In order to assuage
their concerns, Uzbek President had sacked Andijon Governor thus
attempting to put the blame on local/ provincial authorities for
Andijon incident. But this was not bought by the EU which continues to
place restrictions on trade with that country.
Having learnt its lessons the USA has also become more pragmatic in
criticising the deficiencies in the democratic and political processes
in CAR countries. For example, the USA refrained from criticising
election of Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev in November 2006
because of its interest in getting access to hydrocarbon riches of
Kazakhstan. Similarly Kyrgyzstan, where Seventh SCO summit was held in
August this year, and which is the only country where a democratic
government is functioning, has been recipient of considerable economic
aid from the West and the USA. It is still hosting a USA base for
carrying out operations in Afghanistan.
Turkmenistan President’s presence at the Seventh SCO summit points
towards a shift in its erstwhile policy of ‘positive neutrality’,
though it is not very clear as to when will it become member of the
SCO. However, its membership would definitely be a boost for the SCO
since it is the only CAR nation which remains outside the group.
Turkmenistan has concluded a number of agreements with both Russia and
China on gas supply which point towards rising influence of Russia and
China and tilting of Turkmenistan away from the USA and the West.
Russian sponsored proposal of forming an Energy Club under the aegis
of SCO has found resonance among the members and it has been mentioned
as part of the economic cooperation between the SCO members in the
Joint Communiqué issued after the end of Seventh summit at Bishkek.
Yet, China’s fast paced economic growth and its voracious appetite for
natural resources and raw materials is seen with consternation by
other SCO members. They remain wary of being exploited by a large
powerful neighbour who can not be wished away. CAR nations are looking
for an all round development which is yet to take place in meaningful
way. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have been the two most pro-western
oriented nations in CAR but in the post-Soviet era, the Western
economic aid had not been up to their expectations. The aggressive
democratic practices of the West in concert with the USA also created
their own negative dynamics in the relationship. Further, even though
the complementarities of economy exist in CAR the goal of achieving
regional economic integration and political harmonisation seems to be
far away.
However, as a mark of increased security cooperation among the SCO
members, a joint military exercise (ostensibly an anti-terrorism
exercise) titled Peace Mission 2007 was conducted in August this year.
SCO and CSTO signed an agreement on cooperation in security affairs.
This has several implications on the emerging strategic situation in
the CAR. First, it signifies the cementing of strategic relationship
between Russia and China in the CAR. Second, this security combine
encompasses a vast region from the NATO in the West to China in the
East, prompting comparisons with the Warsaw Pact of the Cold War-era.
Many analysts have also speculated that it could turn into a NATO of
the East. Third, the CSTO is more of a defence pact with the members
required to come to each others aid in certain contingencies, while
the China-led SCO is not a defence pact. Therefore, does it mean that
China is veering away from its oft-stated policy of not joining any
military alliance? Both China and Russia have been emphasising that
the SCO has no plans to mutate into a military bloc.
At the international and regional levels, SCO has also established
relations with regional cooperative structures like ASEAN,
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and Eurasian Economic
Community, besides the CSTO. During its seventh summit, SCO has
resolved to expand and deepen the relations with regional
organisations and intensify international exchanges. SCO had proposed
an Afghan Contact Group in 2005; protocol for the same was signed the
next year. Because of the worsening security situation in Afghanistan
and resurgence of Taliban with concomitant likely adverse effect on
stability and security in CAR, SCO in its joint communique of August
16, 2007 has indicated the possibility of ‘taking bigger part in
Afghanistan affairs to contribute more to regional security and
stability’. This may not be taken kindly by the USA or NATO; yet this
is an exhibition of SCO’s willingness to be a net contributor to the
regional security.
Thus, it can be said that though SCO has come of age and has achieved
a certain degree of maturity and salience, it has yet to evolve as an
effective regional organisation. It has still to achieve the required
degree of harmonistion of competing interests of its members as well
as interests of regional and outside powers. At the international
level it has gradually improved its image (SCO’s seventh summit was
attended by United Nation’s Under Secretary for Political Affairs,
Lynn Pascoe) but it is yet to be given due recognition by either the
USA or NATO.
India and the SCO
India was admitted as an observer in the SCO in its fifth summit
meeting in 2005. Thereafter India has attended SCO’s sixth meeting at
Beijing in 2006 and seventh meeting at Bishkek in August 2007.
Attendance of last two SCO summit meetings by India’s Petroleum and
Natural Gas Minister, Mr. Murli Deora, signifies the importance which
India attaches to its energy needs. India considers Central Asia as
its strategic neighborhood and has been endeavoring to develop
economic and trade relations which, to a large extent, are being
hampered by lack of a direct route to CAR. India’s motivations in this
direction are propelled by rapid growth of economy with rising demand
for energy imports. India, therefore, is looking at Central Asian oil
to diversify its gas and oil imports. Further, India prefers stability
of the current regimes and peaceful change rather than promotion of
any aggressive democratic practices. Therefore, India is considered as
a friendly partner by Central Asian states and a country which can
play a balancing role in fierce power play taking place in CAR.
India shares the goals of anti-terrorism, security and stability in
Central Asia along with the curtailment of drug trafficking in the
region. Therefore, India supports the objectives of SCO which seeks to
ensure stability in the region, combat terrorism and extremist view
points and is keen to play constructive and active role in SCO.
India’s effort during SCO meetings has been to include energy
cooperation among the members as a priority objective because SCO has
important consumers and producers of the world. India has been in
favour of construction of gas pipelines from Turkmenistan through
Afghanistan and Pakistan to India. Turkmenistan President has
indicated that there is enough gas in Turkmenistan to meet the demands
of Pakistan and India. From India’s point of view the formulation of
SCO Energy CLUB would be beneficial, if all the members and observers
are able to evolve a win-win situation and there is more of
cooperation rather than competition on the field of energy. It needs
to be remembered that India had lost to China in its bid for an oil
contract in Kazakhstan towards end of 2005 because of some extraneous
reasons.
The economic cooperation with CAR nations also remains at a low level
and has not seen significant volumes. For instance, India’s trade with
two major countries in the region Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan has been
US $ 95 million and 49 million respectively in 200. With other nations
the trade has been much less. Trade between Central Asia and India is
largely circumscribed by the unstable situation in Afghanistan and
obtuse policies being followed by Pakistan in not allowing the Indian
goods to pass through its territory. The need to develop a North-South
Transport corridor, which provides a shorter and more efficient trade
route to Russia and landlocked Central Asia, can not also be
overemphasised.
It is too early to say whether SCO platform has been of any use to
India as only two years have passed since India became an observer.
But it an certainly be said that India has made progress on all issues
of concern on bilateral basis with the SCO members rather than trough
the multilateral structure of SCO. Blame can also be apportioned to
lack of any SCO’s formulation on rights and obligations of the
observers in its charter. There is also a moratorium placed on
admission of new members, even though India has not expressed its
intention of becoming a member of SCO very forcefully like say that of
Iran or Pakistan. India may like to abstain from full membership, if
it perceives SCO evolving into a military alliance.
Conclusion
SCO, at the age of seven, has acquired increased confidence and
prominence as a multilateral organisation. Its growth as
politico-security and economic structure has been slow and steady.
Central Asian firmament is awash with number of multilateral
structures led by one or the other major players with their own
agendas thus creating competition for the SCO. Even though it has
shared goals of stamping out terrorism, extremism and radicalism in
the region with other organisations like NATO, it is not seen as a
complimentary security structure by the NATO or the USA. Seventh SCO
summit has resolved to expand its engagement with Afghanistan, due to
worsening situation there, which may raise the hackles of the NATO and
the USA. Further the joint SCO exercise Peace-Mission 2007 and
cooperation between SCO and CSTO, though pointing towards coming
together of two competing security structures also has the potential
of creating discord with the USA and NATO.
Gains to India from SCO’s multilateral platform have so far been
insignificant. India's relations with CAR have been evolving and
gaining momentum independent of SCO. India continues to favour
increased cooperation with SCO on trade, energy and economic issues
while it would steer clear of forming any military alignment with the
grouping.
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