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Arguably, the post cold war and a globalised Asia-Pacific remains
fluid and in search of tenable medium term equilibrium. The
geo-strategic and economic architecture of the region is still
evolving and a new power balance is taking shape. The pieces of the
jigsaw still remain to fit in a settled slot. While the region is
unique, diverse and fraught with imbalances and disparities, its
evolving paradigm, arguably, is characterised and being defined, among
others, by certain emerging imperatives. These are given in the
succeeding paras.
Some would argue that in recent years, the USA, which had dominated
the region as the sole super power, has diffused and possibly even
downgraded its regional priorities, resulting in what some would call
a strategic vacuum in the region. The current US focus, though not
exclusive, appears to be on China and Northeast Asia. The USA,
apparently, is not unduly concerned about its exclusion from the
recently held East Asia Summit in Kuala Lumpur; nor does the USA
appear to be overly keen to revive the moribund APEC or participate
actively in other Asia-Pacific arrangements. It does not appear to be
keen to take on new regional commitments. The global war on terror, no
doubt, is a US priority but it appears to be selective and in
consonance with its larger global view and policy. If this argument
were to be advanced further, then it would be logical to assume that
the USA would prefer its regional partners to play a more proactive
and substantive role in the region. Japan, Australia and, perhaps,
even India, Pakistan and South Korea would, in American calculations,
be expected to assume greater regional geo-strategic responsibilities.
This, indeed, could be the rationale behind the idea of promoting a
regional response to the emerging challenges, involving Australia,
Japan, South Korea and India, now actively being propagated
specifically by Australia and Japan, no doubt, at the behest of the
USA.
China unquestionably is the rising global power with a strong regional
and global agenda. Evidently, China-is slowly but surely occupying the
strategic space vacated by the USA and taking advantage of the
short-term regional opportunities whether strategic, political or
economic. China’s strategy also appears to be to work in partnership
with regional countries rather than to go it alone, albeit on its
terms. In any case, China would like to work towards blunting any
scope for causing it discomfiture. Its evolving strategic ties with
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), its now dominating
position in East Asia and its leadership and proactive role in the
Asia-Pacific institutions [East Asia Summit, Summit dialogue with
ASEAN, Asean Regional Forum (ARF), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC),
Northeast Asia Six Party Talks, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO),
Council for Security Cooperation in Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) etc.] are all
integral parts of the evolving Chinese strategy in the region. At the
bilateral political level, China has developed special strategic
relations with countries like Myanmar, the Indo-China countries and
neighbouring countries surrounding it, apart from forging deeper
political and economic links with the other regional countries purely
on political considerations and not always insisting on arithmetical
reciprocity. In furthering this policy, it has taken tactical steps to
downplay its territorial and other differences with the countries of
the region [eg on the Spratly Islands issue and its still persisting
border and political differences with some neighbours], has signed and
ratified regional agreements like ASEAN’s Treaty of Peace and Amity
and a path breaking Free Trade Agreement with ASEAN. Briefly, China’s
growing presence and goals in the region have raised a number of
issues resulting in new challenges and forging of new equations in the
Asia-Pacific. In the 1960s, China was a feared political force aiding
and abetting in subversion and insurgencies in some countries; today,
even as the Chinese shadows lengthen, China is not feared but held in
awe and respect. The imperative of China’s dominance is manifest and
compelling. The ASEAN countries, in the 1960s and 1970s, had used
economic integration and enmeshing as an instrument of policy to blunt
Chinese propensities to cause them discomfiture; today China is using
the same strategy to further its own regional geostrategic and
economic interests.
As stated above, it is argued by some that countries like India,
Japan, South Korea and Australia should play a more proactive and high
profile role in the Asia-Pacific to counter the Chinese. This was
apparently a purpose of Prime Minister Abe’s recent visit to India and
the many calculated overtures made by him to India. The Americans
would surely welcome a greater role by these countries in cooperation
with some other countries, under, of course, US leadership and
direction. The Japanese, it appears, may have lately lost some edge in
the Asia-Pacific and may be in search of strategic partners. The
Japanese Prime Minister Abe’s recently articulated proposal during his
visit to India in August 2006 for an “axis of democracy” comprising
India, Japan, Australia and South Korea is, no doubt, in pursuance of
that policy. Japan, it appears, would prefer to proceed collectively
rather than traverse the path alone. The Japanese proposal is in
consonance with US strategic aims and purposes in this region. Our
Prime Minister’s earlier call for an “arc of advantage” was made
mostly in the context of India’s evolving economic relations with the
Asia-Pacific and may not have had any strategic implications. It,
therefore, should not be confused with the Japanese proposal. The
joint military exercise “Malabar” involving Japan, USA, Australia,
Singapore and India held in September 2007 and the earlier exercises,
may however, have a larger strategic purpose from the point of view of
these countries, possibly inspired by the USA. In recent times, the
Japanese and others have shown interest in consolidating and deepening
their strategic relations with India. Their troubled relations with
China, most recently following the Yasikuni shrine visit by their
former Prime Minister, and the continuing tense situation in the
Korean Peninsula have more or less bogged Japan down to its own
immediate neighbourhood and preoccupations. It would appear that Japan
is passing through an unsettled phase and may take time to play its
legitimate full role in regional and global affairs. Australia and
South Korea, by themselves, may not be able to play a leadership role.
Australia is keen to improve the quality and content of its relations
with India. Its recent offer to sell natural Uranium to India, albeit
under safeguards, has to be seen in this larger context. ASEAN, some
believe, is not even convinced of Australia’s credentials in the
region. In any case, some analysts would argue that Australia’s focus
has been the South-Pacific and the adjoining regions more than the
larger canvas of East and South-East Asia. Also, Australia has
carefully and deftly calibrated its relations with China, which it
considers important. To what extent this nascent coming together of
countries like Australia, Japan, South Korea and India along with
ASEAN is aimed at containing the growing influence of China is a
matter of conjecture but that could be the driving force in US
calculations and the calculations of its allies in the Asia-Pacific.
India on her part, may not have any such strategic purpose as it would
independently like to develop and maintain good and mutually
beneficial relations with China and not get too closely involved in
the USA led game of containing China. China’s response in the NSG on
the question of granting waiver to India and Chinese sensitivity to
India’s other concerns will, no doubt, demonstrate her real intentions
towards India. I personally do not believe that China will confront
India on this issue, even though it will demand a price for its
benevolence. There is nothing free that the Chinese offer and they
seem to have a grand strategic design always in view.
India’s Look East Policy, initially, was premised more on economic
rather than strategic considerations. More recently, however, India
has expanded her low level links with the Asia-Pacific to include
political, defence, maritime, strategic and hitherto unexplored areas
of economic cooperation. The Look East Policy, in other words, has now
acquired a strategic dimension. The Southeast Asian countries too are
beginning to see strategic convergences evolving with India. India, to
them, provides an additional option and an enhanced comfort level.
Their own Look West Policy takes into account India’s potential
political and military strengths, apart from her enormous economic and
other attractions. The growing non-economic convergences include areas
such as the war against global and regional terrorism and extremism,
trans-national crime, cross border subversion and insurgencies and
maritime cooperation, including safety of sea lanes, ports, economic
zones etc. The economic convergences also go beyond traditional trade
and commerce and now include areas such as energy security, HRD,
environment, science and technology and the emerging areas of the
knowledge economy. India is appearing attractive and a new imperative
is beginning to become evident.
On her part, India is now looking at its growing relations with her
eastern neighbours from the prism of her domestic compulsions,
particularly in the Northeast and in the Andaman Sea. Some of these
problems, it is now recognised, have transnational dimensions and
implications. Peace and normalcy in the Northeast, for example, cannot
be fully restored and ensured without the cooperation of Bangladesh,
Nepal, Myanmar and Thailand. This region is unique and has always had
transnational links. Subversion and terrorism, drugs and its nexus
with crime and trans border trade and economic links, for example,
have to be seen in a historical and traditional context. Over 95 per
cent of the borders of the Northeast are with foreign countries, a
reality we can ill afford to ignore. While there is no precise
estimate of trans border informal trade, it is widely believed that it
is larger than formal trade. There are other trans border links too
based on cultural affinities, tradition, connectivity and ethnicity
that have governed relations between the Northeast of India and the
neighbouring countries. Likewise, the security of the Andaman Sea, the
sea-lanes and our economic zone will need sub-regional cooperation
with countries like Thailand, Myanmar, Indonesia and Bangladesh.
Cooperation in preserving the ecology, environment and the unique
fragile bio-diversity of this region is also an imperative, which we
cannot ignore. This region has emerged as a hub of piracy, poaching
and maritime crimes. Even intelligence gathering by foreign powers in
this space is said to have increased. If China’s growing influence and
presence (China has military bases in Myanmar close to India and plans
to augment her military presence in this strategic space) in this
region is to be contained and managed, strategic links with our
eastern neighbours are indispensable. That is a rationale of our
renewed Look East Policy in the contemporary context. The Asia-Pacific
now again is our strategic partner.
While the above makes for closer and mutually supportive relations
between India and Southeast Asia, it would be too simplistic to look
at the evolving India-ASEAN relations from the prism of countering
China or its growing influence alone. While India does wish to expand
and deepen her growing all-round relations with ASEAN and the
Asia-Pacific, she does not see herself as a counter-weight to China.
On the other hand, Sino-Indian relations are at an all time high and
growing to our mutual advantage; our two-way trade is nearing the US $
25 billion mark and growing at about 20 per cent per annum. China is
expected to emerge as India’s number one trading partner ahead of the
EU and the USA in about ten years time. Indian investments in China
and vice versa are growing. India and China are emerging as partners
in the Asia-Pacific, Central Asia and the Gulf and in evolving a
triangular partnership involving Russia; they, as major consumers,
have an overriding interest in energy cooperation and security and in
shaping a new world economic order in which they have a voice
commensurate with their stake and interests. There are evident
convergences. All three countries now sit on the G-8 high table and
have overarching global responsibilities. There are other evident
complementarities and enough space for India and China to work
alongside in all these regions. In strategic terms, India still has
and will have in the future problems with China but need not look at
China as an adversary. There will be areas of tension and friction but
there is no reason why the two countries should not learn to live
together. The Asia Pacific certainly should be an area of cooperation
rather than confrontation. India should not overreact or be unduly
concerned about China’s present policy of support for Pakistan as this
is bound to change with improved relations between China and India and
India and Pakistan. China’s overt and covert support for Pakistan’s
nuclear and missile programmes is a matter of concern to India and to
the international community. China’s somewhat guarded and negative
comment on the recently concluded Indo-US nuclear energy cooperation
agreement is symptomatic of China’s uneasiness over India’s emergence
as a major regional and global power with deepening relations with the
USA, which could potentially challenge China. This too should moderate
given the rapidly changing world view on proliferation issues. India
and the other countries will have to engage China in dialogue rather
than leave China alone. It is in our interest to see China act as a
responsible global player subject to international discipline. Indian
diplomacy’s greatest challenge in the coming years will be to balance
its relations with China, even as Indian diplomacy seeks to protect
its long term national interest, an exercise that is not going to be
easy but which is not beyond our ingenuity. Bill Gates was right in
believing that the choice for the world is not between India and China
but the reality may be that the world will have to engage and deal
with India plus China as partners in the future.
The EU has historically had very close relations with some parts of
the Asia-Pacific. However, following the emergence of a uni-polar
world order, EU it would appear, has downgraded its once close ties
with the Asia-Pacific. EU’s current priorities, it appears, are more
Europe and trans-Atlantic centered rather than truly global. While EU
is a participant in Asia-Pacific fora like ARF, APEC, Asia-Europe
Meeting (ASEM), CSCAP etc, its participation and profile appear to
some to be low key, if not proforma, rather than substantive. Even
though India’s and EU’s perceptions on many issues of regional and
global importance differ, India and the EU are now strategic partners.
Though still meagre, India has excellent relations with individual
European countries; however, at times there is disappointment in India
that Europe has chosen to see India through the US prism or in the
narrow context of SAARC and India-Pak equation and has failed to
measure and fully appreciate India’s potential and emerging regional
and global role. Happily, this is changing now. Until recently, some
thought that EU followed a policy of balancing its relations with
India and Pakistan. Likewise, EU too must have had some difficulties
with India’s position on European and global issues. We must admit
that we have had and we continue to have differences on many issues
but the areas of agreement, congruence and constancy are also many and
constantly enlarging. There is nothing that fundamentally should
divide India and the EU, although we need to give greater strategic
depth and content to our relationship to make it mutually beneficial
and enduring. For India, EU has always been the middle point in our
foreign policy calculus and India considers it to be in her national
interest to build an independent and mutually beneficial all-round
relationship with EU. Unfortunately, India-EU Summit level dialogues
or the Troika Dialogues have so far been used to focus mainly on
bilateral issues, mostly economic, where the two have differing views.
Strategic partnership should involve comprehensive exchange of views,
action and engagement on global issues covering all subjects and
regions. India and the EU should also talk about possible areas of
cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region including, for example, on
issues like combating terrorism, trans-national crime, energy,
environment, economic cooperation, maritime issues and on harmonising
views on global economic and strategic issues. Likewise, India and
ASEAN, and ASEAN and EU should also cover extra bilateral issues such
as the above in their dialogues at all levels. The same is true of
Russia. India and Russia, and EU and Russia must also expand the scope
and canvas of their interaction beyond bilateral issues.
China, India, ASEAN, Japan, South Korea and Australia are pillars of
any emerging Asia-Pacific architecture. In a globalised world order, a
modus vivendi among all these powers, if not cooperation, is necessary
to maintain peace and stability. The USA, EU and Russia could play a
very important supportive role to ensure regional equilibrium and
stability. Three fourths of the world’s population inhabits this
region, which also accounts for about two third of the global GDP. No
part of the world can remain unaffected by the fortunes of the
Asia-Pacific. The coming decades will clearly establish whether the
Asia-Pacific will find equilibrium or remain in a fluid situation.
India has a deep and abiding interest in the peace and prosperity of
this region and the eastern flank of India. In that sense, India could
be the fulcrum of a new geo-strategic and economic order on which the
edifice of global and regional peace and prosperity could be built and
sustained.
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