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INTRODUCTION
India's participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations has always been
exceptional in terms of the quality and quantity of troops and
commanders provided to various trouble spots around the world. As on
31 January 2007, India is the third largest contributor to the UN with
8052 troops committed on various UN Missions all over the world.
In the year 1999-2000, we were amongst the largest contributors to the
UN with a total commitment of approx 4,000 troops, mostly deployed in
Sierra Leone, on the West African coast. I was privileged to be
appointed its first Force Commander and was given the unenviable task
of raising the mission from scratch. This proved to be an exciting and
challenging experience with a fair share of trials and tribulations.
Fortunately, long years of experience in the Indian Army, coupled with
an earlier tenure with the UN, came handy in the execution of this
task as also in handling many tricky situations that occurred.
Because the UN is always strapped for resources, establishment of a
mission from scratch is never an easy task. A credible force was
created despite various shortcomings. This Force, on being raised, was
deployed as per the instructions received from UN Headquarters, New
York from time to time, much to the discomfiture of the various rebel
groups, led by the Revolutionary United Front, who saw the deployment
of United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) troops as a threat
to them. This should not have been the case as the rebels themselves
were part of the Government of National Unity of Sierra Leone. It was
evident that the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) were ill at ease due
to the professional conduct of the UNAMSIL and its rapid deployment.
It was not surprising, therefore, that, around May 2000, Corporal
Foday Sankoh, leader of the RUF, a Minister in the Government and a
Vice President equivalent, gave orders to the RUF rebels to renege on
their commitment to the Agreement. The rebels under his orders chose
to attack the Kenyan positions due to the fact that they had achieved
moral domination over the Kenyan troops. They killed a few of them and
took many others as hostages including a number of military observers.
After attacking the Kenyans at Makeni and Maqburaka, the rebels, using
guile, tricked more than half the newly inducted Zambian battalion
into captivity. At Kailahun, in the Eastern part of Sierra Leone, 11
MILOBS were taken hostage and the Indian position was surrounded by
the rebels. However, due to a healthy respect for the professional
capabilities of the Indian troops, they refrained from taking any rash
action such as attacking them, as they did in the case of the others.
According to Michael Fleshman, writing in Africa Recovery, a United
Nations publication, I quote "the repudiation of the nearly an
year-old peace agreement in Sierra Leone by rebel forces reignited the
country's long civil conflict and thrust the UN Peacekeeping Mission
into a war for which it was neither mandated nor equipped. Some
observers, particularly in developed countries, were highly critical
of the operations, arguing that the UN was naive to trust the rebels'
commitment and negligent in deploying poorly trained and lightly armed
troops". He went further to add, "The record, however, shows that
senior UN officials and the Security Council were fully aware of the
challenges awaiting the organization's peacekeepers in Sierra Leone
and that the Secretary-General Mr Kofi Annan, had repeatedly sought -
but did not obtain-the resources required from member States to meet
those challenges". I was unaware of all this.
The attack on UN peacekeepers resulted in steps having to be taken to
salvage the situation. The military solution lay in conducting a
series of military operations to bring the rebels to their senses.
Operation Khukri was one such military operation. Much has been spoken
and written about this operation since then by people whose sources of
information are probably articles and news reviews picked up from the
internet or opinions of so called UN experts. For sure, the sources of
information are either second hand or third hand accounts or they are
accounts from reporting which is biased to cover up lapses.
Before proceeding further, it is essential to highlight a few
important issues pertaining to the geography and terrain of Sierra
Leone, as also the background to the problem in this troubled State,
for without it, it would be difficult to understand the said
operation. Sierra Leone is located on the West coast of Africa. It is
roughly circular in shape and has an area of approximately 72,000
square kms. It measures 332 km from North to South and about 328 km
East to West. It is bounded on the West and South West by the Atlantic
Ocean, on the North East and North West by the Republic of Guinea, and
on the East and South East by the Republic of Liberia.
The conflict in Sierra Leone dates back to March
1991 when fighters of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) launched a
war from the East of the country near the border with Liberia, to
overthrow the government. With the support of the Military Observer
Group (ECOMOG) of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
Sierra Leone's Army tried at first to defend the governments but, the
following year, the Army itself overthrew the government. Despite the
change of power, the RUF continued its attacks. In February 1995, the
United Nations Secretary General appointed a Special Envoy, Mr Berhanu
Dinka (Ethiopia). He worked in collaboration with the Organisation of
African Unity (OAU) and ECOWAS to try to negotiate a settlement to the
conflict and return the country to civilian rule.
Parliamentary and presidential elections were held in February 1996,
and the Army relinquished power to the winner Alhaji Dr. Ahmed Tejan
Kabbah. The RUF, however, did not participate in the elections and
would not recognise the results. The conflict continued. Special Envoy
Dinka assisted in negotiating a peace agreement, in November 1996,
between the Government and RUF known as the Abidjan Accord. The
agreement was derailed by another military coup d'etat in May 1997.
This time the Army Joined forces with the RUF and formed a ruling
junta. President Kabbah and his government went into exile in
neighbouring Guinea.
A new Special Envoy, Mr. Francis G. Okelo (Uganda) and other
representatives of the international community tried, but failed to
persuade the Junta to step down. The Security Council imposed an oil
and arms embargo on 8 October 1997, and authorised ECOWAS to ensure
its implementation using ECOMOG troops. On 23 October, the ECOWAS
Committee of Five on Sierra Leone and a delegation representing the
chairman of the junta held talks at Conakry and signed a peace plan
which, among other things, called for a ceasefire to be monitored by
ECOMOG and - if approved by the UN Security Council - assisted by the
UN military observers. On 5 November, President Kabbah issued a
statement indicating his acceptance of the agreement, and stated his
government's willingness to cooperate with ECOWAS, ECOMOG, the United
Nations and UNHCR in the implementation of their respective roles.
Although the junta publicly committed itself to implementing the
agreement, it subsequently criticised key provisions and raised a
number of issues, with the result that the agreement was never
implemented.
In February 1998, ECOMOG, responding to an attack by rebel/Army junta
forces, launched a military attack that led to the collapse of the
junta and its expulsion from Freetown. On 10 March, President Kabbah
was returned to office. The Security Council terminated the oil and
arms embargo and strengthened the office of the Special Envoy to
include UN military liaison officers and security advisory personnel.
On June 1998, the Security Council established the United Nations
Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) for an initial period of
six months. The Secretary-General named Special Envoy Okelo as his
Special Representative and Chief of Mission. The mission monitored and
advised efforts to disarm combatants and restructure the nation's
security forces. Unarmed UNOMSIL teams, under the protection of ECOMOG,
documented reports of on-going atrocities and human rights abuses
committed against civilians.
Fighting continued with the rebel alliance gaining control of more
than half the country. In December 1998 the alliance began an
offensive to retake Freetown and in January overran most of the city.
All UNOMSIL personnel were evacuated. The Special Representative and
the Chief Military Observer continued performing their duties,
maintaining close contact with all parties to the conflict and
monitoring the situation. Later the same month, ECOMOG troops retook
the capital and installed the civilian government, although thousands
of rebels were still reportedly hiding out in the surrounding
countryside. In the aftermath of the rebel attack, Special
Representative Okelo, in consultation with West African States,
initiated a series of diplomatic efforts aimed at opening up dialogue
with the rebels. Negotiations between the Government and the rebels
began in May 1999 and on 7 July all parties to the conflict signed an
agreement in Lome to end hostilities and form a government of national
unity. The parties to the conflict also requested an expanded role for
UNOMSIL. On 20 August the UN Security Council authorised an increase
in the number of military observers to 210.
On 22 October 1999, the Security Council authorised the establishment
of UNAMSIL, a new and much larger mission with a maximum of 6,000
military personnel, including 260 military observers, to assist the
Government and the parties in carrying out provisions of the Lome
Peace Agreement. At the same time, the Council decided to terminate
UNOMSIL. On 7 February 2000, the Security Council, by its Resolution
1289, decided to revise the mandate of UNAMSIL to include a number of
additional tasks. It decided to expand the military component to a
maximum of 11,100 military personnel, including the 260 military
observers already deployed. The Council also authorised increases in
the civil affairs, civilian police, administrative and technical
components of UNAMSIL, as proposed by the Secretary-General.
Coming back to its pre-expansion days, it is pertinent to bring out
that by end of April 2000, UNAMSIL was more or less deployed at most
of its pre-designated deployment areas in Sierra leone. We had managed
to set up five Disarmament, Demobilization and Re-integration camps (DDR
Camps). The sixth one was to be established in the diamond rich areas
of Koidu. As mentioned earlier, this caused considerable consternation
amongst the rebels, who saw this as the end of the road for them The
situation came to a head on 01 May 2000 with the RUF demanding the
handing back to them of ten rebels from their cadre who had themselves
surrendered RUF rebels at the DDR camp at Makeni. This camp was under
the jurisdiction of the Kenyan troops. RUF attacked the DDR camp and
the Kenyan positions at Makeni and Maqburaka. There were a number of
casualties including fatal ones and the rebels also succeeded in
capturing and taking hostage a number of military observers and some
peacekeepers. They also laid siege to both Makeni and Maqburaka making
movement of supplies, casualty evacuation and other similar activities
difficult. Needless to say, this action of the RUF was a blatant
violation of the Lome Peace Accord and it came as a jolt to UNAMSIL.
To set things right, a three-pronged offensive was planned on the
rebels at Makeni and Maqburaka. This was achieved by using a company
of the Kenyan troops based at Kabala in the North to attack the rebels
deployed around Makeni. The APCs based Quick Reaction Company of the
Indians was moved from the South to attack the rebels deployed around
Maqburaka. The aim of these two thrusts was to beat back the rebels
laying siege to these two places as also to strengthen Makeni and
Maqburaka positions. Using these thrusts as anvils, the newly inducted
Zambian battalion was launched as the hammer from the East.
Unfortunately, while the two thrusts fought their way into the Kenyan
positions and bolstered their strength, the Zambian operation went
awry as most of them were tricked into captivity and taken hostage.
Simultaneous to the attacks at Makeni and Maqburaka, the rebels also
surrounded Indian peacekeepers tactically deployed at Kailahun.
However, due to the professional competence of the Indian peacekeepers
and their earlier humane attitude, the rebels could not muster courage
to attack them. The rebels had, however, taken approximately 500
peacekeepers in the Makeni and Maqburaka areas, as hostages. Spurred
by this the UN entered into protracted diplomatic discussions with the
rebels through President Charles Taylor of Liberia, who succeeded in
getting most of the hostages released through his country viz.
Liberia. He could do this because he had a hold over the rebels. In
fact, he was touted to be the de facto leader of the RUF rebels,
especially after corporal Foday Sankoh of the RUF was captured and put
into prison. While hostage negotiation was in progress, the rebels
continued with their stand-off at Kailahun as it was the only
bargaining chip that they had for extracting concessions. The
continued tension of being surrounded impacted on the morale of the
beleaguered garrison at Kailahun. As it turned out the stand-off was
to last for 75 long days. It was necessary to end the stalemate and
the only means at my disposal was to resort to military action at
Kailahun. Other reasons for the launching of an operation at Kailahun
were denial of supply of food to Kailahun by road and air since the
beginning of July 2000, refusal by rebels to permit air evacuation of
causalities, failure of diplomatic means to convince RUF to desist
from the stand-off coupled with the unwillingness of President Charles
Taylor to secure release of the largely Indian peacekeepers at
Kailahun and last, but not least, the impending rainy season. Sierra
leone as it is well known is the second rainiest place on earth after
Cherapunji.
Planning for the rescue of the garrison had commenced by mid May 2000
and the plan was constantly reviewed and refined. During the planning
utmost coordination was ensured between participating units. We could
not, however, put this plan into effect until mid-July due to various
constraints under which we were working. Primarily the constraints
were lack of resources in terms of troops, attack helicopters and
logistics. There was concern and desire to prevent collateral damage
as long as possible with the faint hope of resolution of the issue
through diplomatic means. There was also the concern for the safety of
the hostages including 23 Indian peacekeepers held captive at Kuiva,
who had all been divested of their weapons.
The UN headquarters New York did keep up its effort to end the
stand-off through diplomatic means but to no avail. Many felt that the
UN's efforts lacked the earlier fervour, but that is perhaps just
conjecture. Simultaneously, hectic efforts were made by the UN to
build up reserves for impending military operations, if the need for
the same arose. By resolution 1299 of 19 May 2000, the Security
Council increased the authorised strength of UNAMSIL, to 13,000
military personnel, including 260 military observers. This resulted in
substantial reserves coming in from Jordan who sent two infantry
battalions and Bangladesh who sent one infantry battalion, India sent
one infantry battalion viz 18 GRENADIERS, one mechanised company, one
engineer company and a flight of attack helicopters. It is pertinent
to bring out here that the British troops, already on Sierra Leonean
soil, neither joined up as part of UNAMSIL nor participated jointly in
any operation against the rebels.
On arrival of the reserves, it became possible for us to put our plan
into action, but we held on until 29 June 2000, when the final
breakthrough of getting the last of the hostages, the 23 Indian
peacekeepers being held at Kuiva, freed by diplomatic means was
achieved. The stage was finally set to launch the operation which was
code named 'Op Khukri',
It is necessary to have an idea of the type of
terrain obtaining in the area of operation, to fully understand the
implications of the same. The entire area was densely wooded with
primary jungles. It was criss-crossed by a number of swamps and rivers
full of water, which made cross country movement extremely difficult.
It also meant that such water obstacles could be crossed only at
existing crossing places where ambushes could be laid by the RUF. Due
to dense undergrowth and overgrowth, the terrain lent itself to sneak
attacks by the rebels. To complicate matters further, there was only
one unmetalled road connecting Kenema with Daru and Daru with Kailahun.
This road had three prominent bridges South of Pendembu after which
there were a number log bridges, which were all potential bottlenecks.
Road Kenema-Daru was not in use due to being in RUF control. Hence,
all move from Kenema to Daru was based on helicopters. Road
Daru-Kailahun was also under the domination of the RUF.
The Indian battalion (5/8 GR) was deployed deep inside RUF held
territory at Daru which was 70 kms away from the nearest
pro-government town of Kenema. Kailahun, where one company of 5/8 GR
and one Indian mechanised company were deployed, was a further 70 kms
East of Daru on the same road.
Soon after the stand off at Kailahun, I started
planning for a military operation to break the same. For this, it was
essential for me to know the exact deployment of the RUF between Daru
and Kailahun. It was also essential to find out about the weapons
available to them. As we were initially on a good understanding with
each other, movement of the 21C of 5/8 GR, being held at Kuiva
alongwith 22 others, was permitted between Kuiva and Daru on the one
hand and sometimes between Kuiva and Kailahun on the other. The
company commander and RMO at Kailahun were permitted to move from
Kailahun to Kuiva to provide medical relief to the sick at Kuiva and
logistics convoys were permitted movement from Daru to Kailahun and
back on a regular basis. All this was done on an “honour–code” basis.
This permitted me to gather intelligence about RUF deployments along
this axis.
Initially, we were also permitted to evacuate casualties by air. This
gave us a bird's eye view of the deployments of the rebels. We took
aerial pictures not only of the rebel deployments but also of open
areas along the axis which would serve as Landing Zones (LZs) during
the operation. By the time I was ready to put my plan into action, I
had a very clear picture of enemy deployment and the terrain. It was
confirmed that the rebels had their Brigade headquarters at Pendembu,
which was roughly half way through from Daru to Kailahun. Despite
great deal of ground and air reconnaissance and inputs from various
other sources, I felt that these inputs were not quite sufficient.
Due to the danger of the plan being leaked out to the rebels by their
sympathisers, planning was restricted to a few key personnel on a need
to know basis. The British troops stationed in Sierra Leone for the
rescue of their one military observer held captive at Kailahun along
with the others, exerted considerable pressure on me to divulge the
plan to them. Their High Commissioner who was always after me to
disclose the plan, finally, acceded to my request for two Chinook
helicopters which had the capability to fly at night and during hours
of bad visibility. Needless to say, he did so after having obtained
approval from his superiors in London. While the plan was more or less
finalised well in advance, the operational order was issued only on 12
July 2000 i.e one day before the actual launch.
Force level – RUF
As per the known dispositions of the RUF in the area of operation they
had an approximate cadre strength of 550 to 600. No 1 Brigade
headquarters was at Pendembu with a cadre strength 250 to 300 rebels.
This brigade had under its command four battalions which included a
strike battalion. The cadre strength of these battalions was between
210 to 240 for No 1 Battalion based at Buedu ; between 210 to 250 for
No 2 Battalion based at Kuiva; between 230 to 260 for No 3 Battalion
based at Koindu and between 230 to 260 for the strike battalion based
at Segbewemba. In addition, the RUF maintained part of its GHQ at
Kailahun. Including their theatre reserves, the RUF had in this sector
an approximate cadre strength of 1700 to 1800 rebels. (See Appendix
'A').
Force Level – Own
Initially, I had conceptualised launching this operation using only
Indian troops. This was because of my confidence in their professional
capabilities and also due to the fact that their motivational level
was the highest. However, due to insistence on the part of Mr Kofi
Annan, Secretary General, whom I met at Lome, capital of Togo prior to
the launching of the operation, I integrated into the over all plan,
two companies each of Nigerian and Ghanaian troops.
I had with me two Indian battalions (5/8 GR and 18 GRENADIERS), two
companies each of the Nigerian and Ghanaian troops, one Quick Reaction
Company (QRC), one team of 2 PARA (SF), one Mechanised Infantry
company, one composite artillery battery, one company of Indian
engineers, a mobile surgical team, an Indian aviation unit. This gave
me a total strength of 1963 fighting troops with an additional
complement of 308 supporting troops. When compared with the RUF in
this theatre, it spelt out a combat ratio of 1: 1. Yet I had a
definite edge over the rebels having with me attack helicopters,
transport helicopters, artillery and mechanised infantry and special
forces. The British contribution of two Chinook helicopters for one
sortie only and one C 130 Hercules aircraft helped to boost up my
combat ratio. In addition, there were chartered UN helicopters flights
of MI8/17/26. (See Appendix 'B').
General
The operation was planned as a multi-national, multi-dimensional and
multi directional one. Two companies of Nigerian troops and two
platoons of the Indian engineer company relieved 5/8 GR at Daru. I
planned to use the Ghanaian battalion less two companies for a
diversionary attack along axis Kenema-Daru, in order to keep the RUF
reserves in this sector tied down. They were to secure Bendu -
Junction by 1200 hours D-Day i.e 15 July 2000.
The attack was to be a three pronged one by ground forces involving
air insertion at three places to establish stops along axis
Daru-Kailahun to enable the Kailahun garrison to breakout. The concept
of establishing an airhead was also planned. This was to be done at
Kailahun. However, if this did not materialise, then it was to be
established at Pendembu, where the link up between these two columns
was to take place. I planned this operation in five phases as under:-
| (a) |
Phase-1. During this phase, it was planned to
induct the participating troops and equipment by land and air
from Freetown to Kenema and Daru on D minus 2 and D minus 1 Day
i.e on 13 and 14 July 2000. On reaching Daru, the Nigerian
troops were to relieve 5/8 GR of their responsibilities of
defence of Daru by last light D minus 1 Day. |
(b)
(c) |
Phase-2. It was initially planned that this
phase would commence with a pre emptive strike by attack
helicopters at Pendembu and Kailahun. However, due to the
reluctance on the part of the British to go in after the
surprise was lost, it was planned to start the operation by the
insertion of a 2 PARA (SF) stop at Kenewa, using British Chinook
helicopters, after which the helicopters were to land at the
helipad at Kailahun and pick up unarmed military observers,
wounded and sick peacekeepers and warlike stores and return to
Daru. Thereafter the operation was to be conducted as under:-
| (i) |
A pre-emptive strike by artillery using
smoke at rebels positions along the axis of advance with
the express purpose of giving a warning to innocent
civilians to evacuate from areas along the line of
advance. By this it was ensured that loss of innocent
human lives and co-lateral damage was avoided. |
| (ii) |
Simultaneously, attack helicopters were
to strike at Pendembu, the rebel Brigade headquarters,
prior to the commencement of the advance by 5/8 GR from
Daru. |
| (iii) |
This was followed by the heli landing by
a company each of 18 GRENADIERS and QRC between 0700h and
0900h to establish pivots at Geihun and 3 Bridges Area
respectively. |
| (iv) |
After the artillery bombardment, columns
of 18 GRENADIERS, 5/8 GR and mechanised company were to
commence advance along axis Daru-Kailahun with a view to
establish pivots at Kotuma, Kuiva and Mobai. |
| (v) |
The Kailahun garrison was to breakout
from Kailahun and link up with 2 PARA (SF) pivot at Kenewa.
Attack helicopters were tasked to saturate the area to
assist the garrison in the breakout. |
| (vi) |
The Ghanaian battalion less two companies
was to launch a diversionary attack as explained earlier. |
Phase-3. In this phase, it was envisaged
that the Kailahun column would breakout towards Pendembu and
link up with 5/8 GR who were tasked to capture it by noon on D
Day. To achieve this, the Kailahun column was to link up with
pivots at Kenewa and Geihun. 18 GRENADIERS after securing
Kotuma, Kuiva and Mobai, was to secure area upto 10 kms short
of Pendembu by 1500h to facilitate launching of 5/8 GR for its
capture. Finally, 5/8 GR with the mechanised company was to
advance and secure Pendembu, establish a link up with the
Kailahun column and create an airhead by 1200h D Day.
|
| (d) |
Phase-4. In this phase, it was envisaged that a
link up between Kailahun column and 5/8 GR would take place at
Pendembu by 1200h D Day after which 5/8 GR was to establish an
airhead. Thereafter, air extrication of the foot column and non
essentials was to take place by air from the airhead. |
| (e) |
Phase-5. 5/8 GR was to carry out a tactical
withdrawal back to Daru by 1200h D plus 1 day. Thereafter, 18
GRENADIERS was also to carry out a tactical withdrawal to Daru
after ensuring safe passage of 5/8 GR through them.
Simultaneously, Ghanbatt was also tasked to carry out a tactical
withdrawal back to Kenema.
The plan has been diagrammatically laid out as Sketch 'P' |
INDEX OF ABBREVIATIONS
HQ East Comd - Headquarters Eastern Command
Bn - Battalion
Sect - Sector
Ghanbatt - Ghanian battery
Mech Inf Coy - Mechanised Infantry Company
Company Arty bty - Composite Artillery Battery
SF team - Special Force Team
QRC - Quick Reaction Company
Eff Str - Effective Strength
NIBATT - Nigerian Battery
IND ENG COY - Indian Engineers Company
Mob Surg Team - Mobile Surgical Team
Comb - Combat
Appx 'A'
FORCE LEVEL : RUF
HQ EAST COMD - KAILAHUN (550-600)
l BRIGADE HQ - PENDEMBU (250-300)
l NO 1 BN - BUEDU
l KAILAHUN (80-90)
l NYANDEHUN (70-80)
l BEWABU (60-70)
l NO 2 BN - KUIVA
l GEIHUN (80-90)
l MANOWA (50-70)
l KUIVA (80-90)
l NO 3 BN - KOINDU
l KANGAMA (80-90)
l BAIAMA (70-80)
l SANDALU (80-90)
l STRIKE BN - SEGBEWEMA (250-300)
l TOTAL IN SECT 1700-1950
Appx 'B'
FORCE LEVEL : OWN
FIGHTING TROOPS SUPPORTING TROOPS
l 5/8 GR - 821 l NIBATT 3 - 64
l 18 GRENADIERS - 53 l NIBATT 4 - 61
l GHANBATT - 230 l INDENGCOY-2 - 75
l MECH INF COY - 86 l AVIATION UNIT - 98
l COMP ARTY BTY - 61 l MOB SURG TEAM - 10
l SF TEAM - 95 l TOTAL - 308
l QRC. - 140
l TOTAL EFF STR - 1963 COMB RATIO 1:1
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