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USSR's intervention in Afghanistan and its
consequential failure (some refer to it as USSR's Vietnam) of its
policy is said to have contributed in not an insignificant manner to
the demise of the Soviet Union. By the time Soviet Union withdrew in
early 1989, about 14,500 Soviet and an estimated one million Afghan
lives had been lost since the USSR incursion in 1979. The US's and
Pakistan's policies in Afghanistan gave rise to the emergence of the
Taliban and other factions of Mujahideen, who still remain active in
Afghanistan. While these policies served the short term interests of
both the US and Pakistan, yet as the events have proved, supporting
Taliban did not turn out to be beneficial in a number of ways both for
the US and Pakistan. Afghanistan during heydays of Taliban regime
(1996-2001) had become epicentre of terrorism with sanctuaries and
training facilities being provided to likes of AI Qaeda, Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and holy warriors from Chechnya and CAR
countries besides providing training to other assorted terrorist
groups. Even China felt threatened from fundamentalist and extremist
Muslim elements of Afghanistan because of its vulnerabilities in
Xingjian and its problems with Muslim Uighurs.
Therefore, when American forces launched Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)
against the Taliban regime in October 2001 consequent to 11 September
2001 terrorist attacks, this step was largely welcomed by Russia,
China, CAR, India and others. Russia and China raised no objections to
the US being granted air bases and logistics facilities in CAR nations
since it suited their short term strategic interests. Pakistan was
forced to do a U-turn in its policies, however, till now it remains a
reluctant partner in the US and western nations' global war against
terrorism and its attitude to terrorism continues to be ambiguous.
Stability in Afghanistan
Taliban with the help of its sponsors Pakistan, is on the comeback
path in southern and eastern Afghanistan which threatens to undermine
the international efforts of achieving peace, security and stability
in Afghanistan. Thus, even after five years of demise of Taliban
regime the situation in Afghanistan, at present, looks somewhat
similar to what it was before, except that Taliban is not in power.
Neither the US forces nor International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
manned by the NATO countries or for that matter President Karzai's
democratically elected government have been able to exert control over
outlying areas especially the southern and eastern provinces of
Afghanistan. Several factors are responsible for this continuing state
of instability and insecurity which would have cascading effects on
regional and international security.
There appears to be weakening of commitment on part of the US which
has handed over the most important mission of combating the insurgency
in the South and East to NATO which was more comfortable with its
mission of providing Provincial Reconstruction Teams in northern and
western Afghanistan. The US also diverted its attention, resources and
efforts from building Afghanistan and concentrated more on Iraq which
created conditions for present situation in Afghanistan. Peace
dividend gained after removal of Taliban regime consequent to the
success of Operation Enduring Freedom was not consolidated and
exploited. Half a decade of intervening period has become a tale of
missed opportunities.
The problems of governance, security, unemployment, opium cultivation
and drug trafficking, lack of law and order and reconstruction remain
even after five years of commencement of Bonn process started in
October 2001. An elected parliament (after September 2005
parliamentary elections and October 2004 Presidential elections) was
expected to provide legitimacy and strength to the government to
address these issues in a substantive way. But the Afghan government
has not been able to address the domestic issues in a meaningful and
substantive manner. Neither the international aid which was to be
provided to Afghanistan by the participants of Bonn process has
contributed to improve the lot of the common people.
Current Situation in Afghanistan
The year 2006 has already achieved the dubious distinction of being
one of the goriest year of last 23 years of turmoil in a turbulent
nation which has not seen peace since April 1978 when communist regime
took over. Since beginning of 2006, over 4000 people mostly Taliban
have been killed in violence related incidents in Afghanistan. NATO
forces claim to have killed 180 Taliban insurgents in first week of
November alone. Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar warned in October
2006 on the occasion of holy month of Ramadan that his men will
intensify their fighting to 'surprising levels' to drive out foreign
infidels. Taliban leaders are preparing for a massive spring offensive
in early 2007. The fatal causalities of the US forces and NATO so far
(12 March 2007), from 2001 onwards, have been 540 with the year 2006
contributing 191, the largest so far in a single year. Many innocent
civilians have been killed in Taliban related violence because of
indiscriminate response of the security forces especially due to
heightened intensity of air attacks against Taliban insurgents. This
has further alienated the local populace. Charles De Gaulle, a former
President of France observed, "You may be sure that the Americans will
commit all the stupidities they can think of, plus some that are
beyond imagination” – in the same vein the US and NATO forces have
adopted sledgehammer tactics which have been instrumental in creating
more local support for Taliban rather than causing any substantial
harm to them.
Strategic Underpinnings or the Conflict
The strategic interests of many regional and extra regional players
have a great bearing on the emerging security situation in
Afghanistan. The presence of the US and NATO forces prevents Taliban
and Pakistan from installing a regime of their liking. Instability in
Afghanistan not only justifies the US military presence in Afghanistan
but it also enables the US to maintain its military and logistic bases
in Pakistan and Central Asia which help it to address its other global
security concerns (although such presence may not be liked by many
regional players). Logistic facilities and bases provided by Pakistan
help the US and NATO forces not only in their war against terrorism
but also enable the US to keep a wary eye on a nuclear and unstable
Pakistan, where internal dynamics and external policies are moving it
towards a precipice. (For instance, in the Failed State Index,
Pakistan stands at ninth place for states most likely to fail, ahead
of Afghanistan which is at tenth place). The US military presence in
Afghanistan, Pakistan and other areas puts a serious strategic
pressure on Iran to accommodate the US interests and offers increased
options to the US in its dealings with Iran. The US air base in
Kyrgyzstan, logistics support from Tajikistan for OEF and transit
rights in Kazakhstan keep the US flag flying in Central Asia where
Russia and China are working to expand their strategic influence.
For NATO, Afghan mission has become a test case for its credibility
and relevance. After demise of the Soviet Union it had been looking
for expansion and was involved in missions in its geographical
periphery. Though initially a peace enforcement mission under Chapter
VII of the UN Charter, the Afghan mission is becoming more of a
mission to combat a full blown insurgency. There is also lack of
mission clarity in their role and different NATO partners have their
own rules of engagement thus complicating the coordination of a
disparate force in synergising their fight against Taliban. Years of
neglect of military budgets by NATO nations reflect on their
inadequate performance on the field. NATO troops lack the wherewithal
to fight insurgency in difficult Afghan terrain and look over their
shoulders for helicopters, air support and logistics support from the
US. While the US is in the process of reducing the strength of its
troops by 20 per cent in Afghanistan, NATO is unable to muster
additional troops required (2500 additional soldiers needed according
to one estimate) from its member countries. Poland, a new convert to
NATO is expected to provide 1,000 troops for Afghanistan but it would
hardly solve NATO's problem. Increasing tally of fatal causalities of
NATO partners and public opinion in their respective countries is also
exerting a negative impact on NATO's efforts.
Meanwhile, Pakistan, a fragile state in itself is thriving on
instability and insecurity in Afghanistan. Even though Pakistan's
President, Prime Minister and its military establishment has stated
many times that they support a peaceful, prosperous, stable and strong
Afghanistan, the evidence on the ground points to the contrary. In
fact, a strong and stable Afghanistan has always been a rival of
Pakistan and except for Taliban government no other dispensation in
Afghanistan has either been under Pakistan's tutelage or favourably
disposed to it. A strong government in Kabul has always been a
motivator for Pashtoon and Balochi nationalism in Pakistan and has
raised questions on controversial Durand line, the border between
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Taliban thus becomes an instrument in hands
of Pakistan to suppress nationalistic tendencies and supplant it with
religious fervour that lays emphasis on Muslim Ummah and helps
Pakistan in achieving its long term political and strategic objectives
in Afghanistan.
During the Taliban years, Pakistan had achieved its ambition of
obtaining 'strategic depth' in Afghanistan and had also entertained
visions of extending strategic depth to include Islamic nations of
Central Asia through Taliban. In the bargain it ended up by exporting
fundamentalism, terrorism and instability to Central Asian countries.
Pakistan and Taliban trained and funded terrorists had reached as far
afield as Chechnya.
Pakistan has become a key player in Afghanistan and is in a happy
position to harass the US, NATO and Afghan government through its
support to Taliban on the one hand and also remain an indispensable,
major non-NATO ally by providing logistics and other support to the US
and NATO on the other hand. Whether the US and NATO forces stay or
leave, it benefits Pakistan either way. Presence of the US continues
to make Pakistan strategically relevant to the US and it benefits both
militarily and economically. Because of its support to the US, it
receives military aid which meets one third to one fourth of its
military expenditure and it enables Pakistan to obtain latest military
hardware which need not necessarily be for fighting counter terrorism
missions. It has also received economic aid of over $ 1.6 billion and
the US nod to World Bank and IMF to extend credit facilities which
have improved Pakistan's macro-economic growth. And if and when the
extra-regional forces leave Afghanistan, Pakistan would be waiting to
claim its strategic space in Afghanistan through its Taliban proxies
who have become better placed with their recent resurgence with the
help of Pakistan.
NATO Delicately Poised
Situation for the NATO forces has been worsening since Pakistan signed
a truce with Taliban in Waziristan area of FATA (Federally
Administered Tribal Area) in first week of September 2006 which gave
Taliban a free run of the area. Ahmed Rashid, a renowned Pakistani
analyst considers it a blow to counter-terrorism struggle and has
opined that this agreement would set up a safe haven for AI Qaeda and
the Taliban. His warning seems to be coming true since the incidents
of Taliban attacks against the NATO forces increased threefold between
beginning of September and towards end of October 2006 in the Afghan
provinces bordering Waziristan. And with thaw in winter, frequency and
intensity of Taliban attacks on NATO forces has again picked up.
Further, Waziristan has completely become Talibanised with Taliban’s
summary style of justice being dispensed and local Taliban chiefs
issuing edicts to fight the foreign infidels in Afghanistan.
NATO Commanders fighting Taliban have expressed dismay at George Bush
and Tony Blair for declining to call Musharraf bluff that Pakistan and
ISI are not aiding Taliban. Vice President Dick Cheney also continues
to be a strong supporter of Musharraf's way of approaching the Afghan
issue. During a tri-partite meeting between President Bush, Afghan
President Hamid Karzai and Musharraf on 28 September 2006 at
Washington, President Bush declined to raise the question of
Pakistan's support to Taliban out of Quetta sanctuaries in Balochistan
province of Pakistan. Later on General David Richards, the head of
NATO forces in Afghanistan was expected to present mounting evidence
of Taliban headquarters being in Quetta and the extensive involvement
of ISI in aiding Taliban during his visit to Islamabad in early
October 2006. However, after his meetings with President General
Musharraf and other top generals of Pakistan, General Richards came
back appreciating Pakistan's role and "thanked the President, the
government, the armed forces and security agencies of Pakistan for the
excellent cooperation being extended in the fight against terrorism."
Short of singing paeans he became convinced about the Pakistani point
of view that vast majority of Afghan problems emanated from within the
country and Taliban activity was being funded through narcotics trade
and other criminal activities. Further, with mounting evidence of
Pakistan's involvement in supporting Taliban, Dick Cheney again
visited Islamabad in the end of February 2007. Reports suggested that
it was to give a tough message to Musharraf but on official plane, it
was mentioned that the trip was mostly to praise Pakistan's
contribution to war on terror.
Not only had NATO Chief extolled virtues of Pakistan's role, he had
emulated Pakistan by concluding a Waziristan like truce with Taliban
in Musa Qala a district of Helmand province of southern Afghanistan
where British troops casualties have been the highest. NATO forces and
troops of the Afghan National Army have also withdrawn from the Babrak
Tana area in the Ali Sher districts of the South-eastern province of
Khost in mid-October 2006 upon the mediation of tribal elders. The
Taliban spokesperson referred to the pull out as another major victory
of the Taliban against NATO forces. By end October 2006 talks were
also underway between the Taliban and NATO forces - through tribal
elders - over the pullout of troops from 12 districts along the
Pakistan Afghan border. The talks revolved around Taliban making
concessions to the NATO forces and agreeing not to attack their bases
in those Afghan provinces where the deal is signed. This does not bode
well for shape of things to come in Afghanistan. By the end of
February 2007, Taliban was virtually ruling Musa Kala.
NATO would be fighting for many years in Afghanistan unless Taliban's
head in Pakistan is removed. All these new 'peace zones' would be
sanctuaries for rest and recuperation and training bases for further
Taliban operations. Frederic Grare, an American analyst opines,
“Pakistan's agents can help vary the intensity of Taliban attacks and,
therefore, pressure the Afghan Government and the US and NATO forces
at will, according to the needs of the moment, while it maintains the
fiction that it is still committed to the war on terror, thus
preserving its usefulness and maintaining its standing in the
international community increasingly trapped by its own priorities and
disconnected from on-the -ground realities.”
Pakistan has perfected the art of fighting proxy wars for achieving
its foreign policy objectives and political goals. Though it may have
met with mixed success in Jammu and Kashmir it is looking for a major
success in the shape of installing a Taliban regime in Kabul beholden
to lslamabad. Internally, Pakistan's military establishment has been
described as a predatory institution which, at first, creates threat
to security and then offers itself to neutralise the threat so
created. And in the bargain it remains in the driving seat
appropriating most of the national resources of Pakistan. It can
easily be perceived that it is following similar strategy with the US
and NATO by using Taliban. Thus, a number of American and western
analysts have concluded that removing Pakistan military's stranglehold
on reigns of power and democratising Pakistan is a strategic
imperative and key to improving security and stability in Afghanistan.
Afghanistan's Internal Dynamics
All the problems of Afghanistan are not because of Pakistan or other
external players. President Karzai has not been able to exert control
over warlords and tribal chiefs who still wield considerable power in
their strongholds. Some of them have been allowed to retain their
militias along with their arms which militate against the aims and
objectives of disarmament, demobilisation and rehabilitation programme
enshrined in Bonn Process. Karzai had made some of the warlords who
were accused of serious crimes as police chiefs thus eroding his
reputation. This has also compounded the difficult problems of
enforcing law and order and ensuring good governance.
Drug production in 2006 has reached record levels with almost 60 per
cent rise in its growth since 2005 and it is heading for another high
in 2007. Proceeds from sale of drugs and drug trafficking are fuelling
the insurgency as well as contribute to worsening law and order
situation since Taliban, warlords and Tribal Chiefs stand to gain from
opium cultivation. Government has not been able to find alternative
means of livelihood for the poor farmers and opium cultivation is the
only attractive occupation. Weak government enforcement, corruption in
the government and police force and protection offered by Taliban to
opium farmers in lieu of partaking of some of the proceeds exacerbates
the problems of building a stable nation state.
In addition to the above are the problems of building a strong Afghan
National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Guard and Afghan National
Police. The US goal was to train 70,000 ANA soldiers by 2007 out of
which 31,000 have been trained and mid-term objective was to reach
strength of 62,000 troops. But now the US has surmised that
Afghanistan does not have enough internal resources to support such a
large army. There have been many desertions in ANA and the quality of
soldiers also suffers because of general lack of education. Poor wages
and ethnic tensions also have negative effects on the combat value of
ANA. There are reports of security forces having been infiltrated by
Taliban and pro AI Qaeda elements. ANG and ANP have similar problems.
There are inadequate numbers of policemen for border guarding tasks
which is further compounded by rampant corruption and inadequate
motivation.
Further, the enormous aid promised by the international community
under the Bonn Agreement of December 2001, has not been translated on
the ground as tangible benefits to the poor and common man. About 40
per cent of the aid may be real and rest is phantom aid. Large portion
of this is taken away by the fancy salaries of the members of the NGOs
and other foreigners working in Afghanistan. Afghan government has not
had much say in the utilisation of the aid provided by the foreign
governments. This has not only eroded the authority of the government
but has also deprived it from laying down priorities.
America has been spending on the average one billion dollars per month
in Afghanistan for military operations. Till fiscal year 2005, it has
spent $ 67 billion for defence related expenditure in Afghanistan
whereas for reconstruction programmes from years 2001 to 2005, it has
spent $ 28 billion and for trade security forces, it has spent one
billion dollars. For fiscal year 2006, the US has budgeted for $ 920
million for reconstruction, law enforcement and counter narcotics.
Going by South Asian standards, these are colossal amount of funds.
Some of the activities being undertaken by civilian officials, western
contractors and NGOs can be economically outsourced to countries like
India to get best value for money.
However, Afghan Compact of February 2006 and a successor to the Bonn
process promises to remove the short comings with the aid of
international community. In the Interim-Afghan National Development
Strategy (I-ANDS) which is based on likely aid to be provided, the
Afghan government has made a five year plan to address the problems of
security, governance, social and economic development. A 15 year
development has also been planned which is largely based on foreign
aid to be received since Afghanistan would not be able to generate
adequate internal resources for development. Therefore, international
community has to remain committed to play a larger role in both
security and development in the near and long term future.
India's Goals in Afghanistan
India, the US, NATO, CAR nations and even Iran share similar goals in
Afghanistan because all support a peaceful, stable, democratic and
prosperous Afghanistan, which should never be allowed to become a
haven for terrorists. The visit of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to
Afghanistan in August 2005 was the first by an Indian Prime Minister
after a hiatus of 30 years. India, itself the largest democracy, has
been supporting the movement of Afghanistan towards the goal of
sovereign and democratic state. India has extended aid of $ 650
million out of which over $ 300 million have already been utilised for
a number of projects which would help recovery of Afghanistan.
Additional $100 million have been granted to Afghanistan during
Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee's visited to Afghanistan in January
2007. Some of the areas of assistance are cooperation in development
projects,
health, education, community development and agricultural research. $
50 million have been earmarked for rural development programmes in 100
villages based on the Indian experience. $ 80 million have been
earmarked for rebuilding hydro electric plant in Heart and another $
100 million would be spent towards constructing power lines to Kabul.
However, the most symbolic contribution towards fledgling Afghan
democracy has been the construction of Afghan parliamentary building
in Kabul at a cost of $ 25 million.
India has also been endeavouring to encourage trade, commerce and
integration of Afghan economy within the region and has brought in
Afghanistan as a member of SAARC in November 2005. Afghanistan's
membership of SAARC would be advantageous for economic reconstruction
and it would also be a great opportunity for member countries to
benefit from possible opening of a corridor between South and Central
Asian countries. However, in this age of globalisation, Pakistan
continues to follow obscurantist policies and denies transit
facilities to India for trade, commerce and even aid for
reconstruction and development of Afghanistan linking grant of such
rights with solution of the Jammu and Kashmir problem. This not only
deprives Pakistan of transit fees, but it also deprives Afghanistan of
much needed revenue and trading opportunities through access to vast
markets of South Asia, Central Asia and beyond. For Afghanistan, to
exploit its unique position as a land bridge between Central and South
Asia it needs cooperation of both Pakistan and India as also of other
neighbouring countries. One of the major thrusts of American foreign
policy has been to encourage India and Pakistan towards rapprochement
on their outstanding issues.
Implications for India
With the Taliban resurgence on both sides of the Durand Line and
Pakistan having signed peace deals in North and South Waziristan and
dilution of Pakistan's sovereignty in these areas, contours of a de
facto independent Pashtoonistan are emerging. Pakistan's efforts and
resources are directed towards Taliban resurgence which may not be bad
from Indian point of view. Apparently, there is no need to get into a
zero sum game with Pakistan or get involved in a messy situation in
Afghanistan. It is also being widely perceived that Pakistan is
involved in a 'wasteful extravaganza' and its ambitions of controlling
Afghanistan are unlikely to bear fruit because of nature of fiercely
independent Afghans. In the long run, Taliban is likely to create more
problems for Pakistan rather than solve any or add to so called
"strategic depth" of Pakistan. Further, no Afghan government,
including the Pashtoon-dominated Taliban regime that was recognised by
Pakistan, has accepted the division of Pashtoons along Durand Line.
Afghan leaders consider the British-drawn; colonial-era border line
deprives Afghanistan of Pashtoon territory now inside Pakistan.
Sending of Indian troops to Afghanistan at present juncture and
opening a proxy front against Pakistan would be the most imprudent
step. It is likely to cost us the goodwill of common Afghan people
who, in any case, resent any kind of foreign interference. And as the
history bears witness whether it were British during the Anglo-Afghan
wars of 19th Century or Soviet Russia or even Alexander the Great, all
were routed by proud and freedom loving Afghan fighters over a period
of time.
Better alternative would be to revert to exclusive focus on
people-to-people relations and strengthen our economic, cultural and
historical bonds with the Afghan people. We need to extend additional
aid and promote reconstruction and development projects especially in
peaceful areas in North and West of Afghanistan. Also, there is a need
to have a re-look on our opening of four consulates an Afghanistan,
especially in the areas of conflict. If consulates are not serving any
useful purpose the same may be relocated, their number reduced or may
even be closed till situation improves. However, there is also a view
that consulates in the area of conflict do serve as a pressure point
in the strategic games being played in the arena and it cannot be said
that they are devoid of any use.
Another question which arises is whether there is a need to seek
political accommodation with Taliban. Taliban and its philosophy go
against the grain of nature and ideology of Indian state. However, it
also needs to be noted that Taliban is not listed as a terrorist
entity either in any official list of the US or its allies, perhaps,
because of political expediency. There is also a gnawing feeling among
the western nations and the US that eventually they may have to reach
some understanding with Taliban if further losses are to be avoided
and peace and stability is to be restored. But as long as the US and
NATO stay in Afghanistan, Taliban is unlikely to gain complete
control. At present, India needs to strengthen its relations with
nationalist elements amongst Pashtoons and other dominant ethnic
groups in order to pursue its interests in Afghanistan. Further, in
politico-diplomatic matters one can never take an absolute position.
However, at the present juncture our interests would be well served by
strengthening all non-Taliban forces in Afghanistan.
Conclusion
The development of Afghanistan and improving the lot of its people
cannot take place unless there is peace and stability and further,
peace and security would be as a consequence of development and
prosperity. This is a mutually interdependent phenomenon and
international community has to address comprehensively all dimensions
of problems of Afghanistan in moving it towards a strong, stable and a
vibrant democratic nation.
Over two and half decades of strife in Afghanistan has impoverished a
proud nation with no stability in sight because of policies being
pursued by some of the regional and extra regional players.
Internally, a weak government has not been able to force the rule of
law and provide health, education, employment opportunities and food
security to the populace. Thus, a resurgent Taliban is gaining
strength. Ethnic divisions further complicate the problem of restoring
peace and stability in Afghanistan. Near term future of Afghanistan is
likely to be a continuum of the present situation. Prospects of
achieving peace and stability in Afghanistan in mid-term to long term
period would be brighter if all the benchmarks and timelines outlined
in Afghan Compact can be achieved to some degree with the help of
international community. Failure in Afghanistan would impact both the
regional and global security adversely and Pakistan and India would be
the worst sufferers of unstable and insecure Afghanistan.
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