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Nuclear technology (as also aerospace or ocean
technology) always has intrinsic strategic connotations irrespective
of the background context, and even its civilian usage envisaged in
the Henry J Hyde India – US Civil Nuclear Cooperation Act signed into
law by the US President George W Bush on 18 December 2006, is no
exception. As such, the Act and the formal agreement to follow between
the two countries, informally christened as the 123 Agreement (in
reference to Section 123 of the American Atomic Energy Act 1950 under
which it will be negotiated) is ultimately more about the overall
strategic relationships India and the USA look to construct, rather
than exclusively regarding access to sensitive technology. It must
also be clearly understood at the outset, that for India, the core
issue in this engagement with the United States is not so much about
purely civilian use of nuclear energy, rather the unstated but
overwhelming strategic objective of preservation and maintenance of
the country’s indigenous nuclear weapons programme under all
circumstances. Unless this can be ensured, the agreement will not be
in the national interest and not worth the paper it is written on.
Here, it would be well to remember that under the American legislative
system, the Hyde Act is an essential preliminary proceeding before
attempting to induce any modifications in one of the most sensitive
and inviolable precepts of American national security – nuclear
non-proliferation. Successful conclusion of the 123 Agreement between
India and the USA is a sine qua non for the further negotiations down
the line which are to follow with the 45 nation Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG), the international custodians of nuclear materials and
technology, as well as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
the watchdogs over nuclear proliferation. Here it would be well to
remind ourselves that the USA, along with Russia, China, England and
France, is a founder member of the NSG and NPT, and also one of the
permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. It remains a
heavyweight in international negotiations, Iraq and the War on Terror
notwithstanding. These negotiations would want the NSG to allow
country-specific exemptions for transfers of nuclear materials and
technology to India as a non – signatory to the NPT and with the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), regarding safeguards on
Indian nuclear infrastructure declared civilian. Meanwhile,
negotiating the 123 Agreement is also becoming somewhat time sensitive
to both India and the United States as the countdown to the American
presidential elections of 2008 begins, with indicators of a possible
Democrat incumbency, who may not be as supportive of the Hyde Act as
the current administration. The whole issue is assuming all the signs
of speed chess, which India must play with skill and circumspection,
because on first viewing, it is playing with a limited number of
pieces on the board.
That the Hyde Act could at all shoot the rapids of the American
legislative process can be credited entirely to the strong support
extended by President George W Bush (whatever his public approval
ratings), who took it up almost as a personal mission, while at the
Indian end Prime Minister Manmohan Singh similarly exerted himself to
bring around a sceptical Indian Parliament on the issue. Formal
discussions on the agreement are likely to commence in the near
future, but there are strong misgivings in India about the fine print
of the Hyde Act which appear to indicate shapes of some of the things
to come, as for example, the clear directive to the Government of the
United States to adhere to the parameters of the Non Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) in all transactions under the Act – in effect a nuanced
reiteration of the basic Clintonian non – proliferation dictum “Cap,
Roll back, Eliminate”. The American presidential signature culminated
but did not terminate the extended public debate in both India and the
United States against the proposed Agreement. The debate in both the
countries was intense, contentious, and often bitter, though for
differing reasons. It also generated strong adversarial resonance in
China and Pakistan who also criticised it, but only because it would
be detrimental to their own national security, an aspect which does
not seem to have registered at all in this country, perhaps because it
is not politically fashionable to do so. The opposition in India was
driven by environmental, strategic, and ideological considerations,
with objections ranging from nuclear waste disposal and threat of
terrorist attacks on nuclear installations, to compromise on
non-alignment and resultant loss of strategic independence, plus
knee-jerk anti – Americanism in which Islamic fundamentalists
converged with politically correct left intellectuals. In America, the
anti – Hyde Act debate was fuelled by classical non-proliferation
theology and a sense of rewarding transgression by India, along with
perhaps a leftover dash of Cold War pique over the country’s
pro-Soviet - non-alignment during those years. But all this
notwithstanding, the Henry J Hyde Act is, undeniably, a truly
watershed legislation which marks a momentous departure for the United
States from the basic tenet of non – proliferation, one of the main
pillars of its national security doctrine and foreign policy almost
ever since the commencement of the nuclear era at the end of the
Second World War in 1945, and through the Cold War thereafter. The Act
is very specifically India - centric, and an acknowledgement that
India’s special status as flourishing democracy as well as a
non-formalised but de facto nuclear power requires a special tailor -
made engagement, rather than the earlier broad brush of technology
denial. Even as a non-signatory conscientious objector country, India
has adhered to the spirit and guiding philosophy of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), even as it has developed civilian and
military nuclear capability through entirely indigenous efforts. Some
tend to read into the Henry J Hyde Act – even if somewhat between the
lines – a tacit, unstated, perhaps plausibly deniable, acceptance of
India’s nuclear weapons programme by the United States, but in the
shifting sands of international geo-politics such speculations can be
either naïve or motivated, and in any event are downright unsafe.
On the Indian side, what has been completely missing so far is a
degree of balance and focus on the wider strategic environment within
which India has to engage with the United States on this very
sensitive issue, with its many implications for geo – political
vectors impinging on India’s national security, whose possible fallout
requires to be assessed within a cat’s cradle of several other
connected factors which also converge on the issue. These include the
overall rivalry between the United States and the Peoples Republic of
China, the strong military component in the “peaceful rise” of the
Peoples Republic of China and its influence on the currently evolving
Sino-Indian relationships, the well entrenched Sino-Pakistan military
- nuclear axis which underpins Pakistan’s endemic hostility to India
and which China retains as a contingency strategic option should need
arise in future, Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons programme and the
implications for India, and the pervading cloud of international jehad
emanating from epicentres in Pakistan, the Middle East, and now the
Horn of Africa. It is precisely on these other realities that logical
debate on the Indo-US agreement has been conspicuously absent at the
Indian end. Meanwhile, additional masala is being stirred into the
cooking pot, beginning with China’s President Hu Jintao’s surprising -
almost off hand - offer during his visit to India of cooperation in
civilian nuclear energy. China is always a major – almost predominant
- factor in Indian geopolitical calculations, so, on the face of it,
such an offer could open up many hitherto unheard of prospects.
However, no further details are in the public knowledge as yet, so it
will obviously be desirable to await them, meanwhile attempting to
ascertain if any terms and conditions are attached to this bumper
offer, and if so, what these could be. Would it for example, be
independent of the ongoing Indo – US dialogue on the civilian nuclear
issue, or would it be conditional on their short closure ? The
possibility of a dummy offer with intent to delay, confuse, and derail
ongoing process can of course never be totally discounted (which by
the way would be in consonance with China’s grand strategies vis a vis
the USA on other issues as well). On an overlapping track, outcomes of
President Putin’s visit on Republic Day 2007 have been extremely
positive, but again with the clear precondition of a finalised 123
Agreement. Russia is competing strongly with the USA for strategic
relationship with India, but is simultaneously also in a close
strategic partnership – almost economic dependency - with China as a
major market for weapons technology, and hydrocarbon energy. Russia is
undoubtedly a tried and trusted friend of long standing, but the world
has changed, and so too have national interests. The Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh also murmured something about a China – Russia – India
triangle, but it is difficult to estimate if this, too, is a serious
offer. Meanwhile, “trust but verify” even with old friends in new
circumstances.
Blast waves from the Iraq situation are uncovering Iran as yet another
major factor in India’s “near abroad”, which needs to be handled with
circumspection. On the one hand are India’s requirements for natural
gas from that country, (via Pakistan, which has its own set of
problems), and also access by road to Central Asia via Bandar Abbas
and other Iranian ports on the Persian Gulf, but on the other are also
misgivings of nuclear weaponisation by an avowedly hardline Shia
Islamic State. As a signatory of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT),
Iran is fully entitled to develop nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes, but western intelligence casts doubt on the possible end –
use of indigenously enriched uranium, and suspects an ultimate intent
of weaponisation on their part. No matter that the credibility of
western intelligence has been severely eroded after their total
dishonesty in respect of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, but it
will nevertheless be advisable for India to tread extremely softly
because the prospect of a nuclear armed Iran under its present hard
line evangelical leadership, even if conveyed by a generally
discredited source, cannot really be regarded with any degree of
equanimity. In this connection, it would be well to remind ourselves
that India’s frequent overtures proclaiming the common cultural and
social linkages for over five thousand years with Iran are generally
not reciprocated, and in any case interaction between the two
countries in more recent times has not been too fraternal either.
Under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlevi, Iran, a member of CENTO (Central
Treaty Organisation), supported Pakistan materially and morally during
the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War. After his deposition in 1979 by Ayatollah
Khomenei and the Islamic revolution, the country governed by the
Ayatollahs of the Supreme Religious Council presented itself as the
spiritual source of hardline Shia fundamentalism, which President
Mahmoud Ahmednijad’s violent diatribes against Israel seem to
perpetuate further. Indo – Iranian relations must, therefore, be
viewed realistically for what they are - formal, correct, but distant,
rather than warm or especially close as some want to propagate.
The Peoples Republic of China demonstrates its “peaceful rise” not
only through surging economic growth, but also by periodic displays of
iron beneath the velvet, this time the anti-satellite missile. For
India, this is specifically manifested in the ring of China’s regional
defence agreements with countries in the neighbourhood particularly
the “firm all weather” military-nuclear nexus with Pakistan which has
imposed a strategic check since 1963. Both India and the USA cannot,
therefore, be faulted if China’s galloping advance also creates
concerns of thunderclouds on the horizon. Traditionally addicted to
soft-line rhetoric, but without the requisite back up in terms of hard
muscle, India is undoubtedly aware of its vulnerabilities vis a vis
China in almost all aspects of hard national power and capability.
This makes it important to utilise every opportunity to try and regain
some of the strategic balance lost in the aftermath of 1962. In this
context, might the time have arrived for policy makers to examine the
feasibility of initiating an Indian military - nuclear strategic nexus
of its own with a suitable geo-political “natural ally”? Could such a
strategic partner at least in the short or middle term, be the United
States? Might the upcoming negotiations for the 123 Treaty be an
opportunity for this? Public responses to such proposals in both India
and the United States have necessarily to be of denial, framed in
politically correct phraseologies. Such reactions will have to be
accepted at face value, but are unnecessarily pejorative to both
countries, one a superpower and the other emerging into a status of
its own. India is a powerful entity, too large and firmly established
to be “used” by anybody, even a superpower, while the United States
has discovered the limits of power in Iraq and Afghanistan during its
War on Terror. Under the circumstances, might both countries be
receptive to strategic partnership on mutually beneficial terms? Are
such arrangements at all feasible and if so, what are the conditions
on which they could be workable? How much could India concede, yet
preserve its core interests intact? Could there be Sino-Pak
counter-moves to such an agreement, and what would be a possible
response? The outcomes of such hypothetical speculations have of
course to be totally imaginary – but nevertheless might be worth the
effort. The envelope of negotiating skills will have to be pushed to
the outermost limits in such endeavours, but one thing is quite clear
even at the very outset - if the US side should indeed intend to build
the discussions around the letter of the NPT, 123 is definitely likely
to go kaput as far as India is concerned, with the inevitable residue
of acid spillover on Indo-American relations, and every likelihood of
leaving a permanent stain. There is need for fall back strategies, -
for a Plan B as it were, if matters do not work out as anticipated.
Failsafe alternatives for such contingencies ultimately boil down to
two – either acquire alternate “natural allies” agreeable for nuclear
cooperation on mutually advantageous terms, or launch out in the self
reliance mode of nuclear development, both civilian and strategic,
under a philosophy sometimes designated as Swadeshi, a historic term
but since much devalued in contemporary times by hardline liberal
politicians who have bestowed lunatic Hindu connotations upon it. But
here too, what are the practicable options? Alternate alliances with
other “natural allies” for a 123 - type treaty appear far fetched
enough to be unlikely in the foreseeable context. In any case, Russia,
the most publicly supportive of putative “natural allies” has politely
conveyed that a clearance from the United States through an Indo-US
123 Treaty is an essential prerequisite for future transactions. As
for the Chinese offer, it would be advisable to consider it with
extreme prudence, like an invitation into the spider’s parlour. The
second is the Swadeshi option of self reliance which does not carry as
much international baggage, but demands a sustained national
determination and focus which has often been difficult to achieve.
Here, it may sometimes slip the mind that notwithstanding stringent
denial regimes after the 1974 Pokhran nuclear test, India has
developed well established infrastructure and substantial indigenous
programmes covering the entire nuclear cycle. Indeed, aftesr listening
to the severe denouncements of the Indo-US nuclear dialogue by India’s
undoubtedly talented nuclear scientific community, it would be
justifiable to take them at their word and challenge them to take the
country, India, to its strategic goals without depending on foreign
resources and technology. Nevertheless, a restrictive factor remains
the limited availability of nuclear fuel from the natural uranium
deposits in the country (resources estimated at 74,000 tons). This is
compensated to a large extent by rich deposits of thorium bearing
monazite sands, which can be processed downstream into plutonium, but
that technology is still some distance in the future, fifteen to
twenty years by some estimates. Until that time, however, the threats
posed by uncertain neighbours armed with nuclear weapons, together
with the demands of an economy poised to gallop into the ten-per cent
growth range have to be met by other alternate means. Nuclear weapons
and alternate sources of industrial energy are both inescapable as an
ongoing requirement which cannot and must not be compromised or
diluted under any circumstances. Assuming our scientific community can
be taken at face value that indigenous science and technology will not
be a problem, the critical bottleneck is of adequate natural uranium
resources within the country for both nuclear weapons as well as
industrial energy. To meet these divergent goals, an option based on
self-reliance will compel several perceptions to be stood on their
head, for which few major policies will require to be implemented.
Firstly, the quantum of “minimum credible” strategic capability will
have to be determined and indigenous uranium resources reserved
primarily to achieve it. Only after these have been attained, can
available balances of nuclear fuel be made available for the civilian
energy sector. Secondly, in the interim, energy security will require
to be developed primarily from non - nuclear fuels and renewable
technologies, where there must be a massive scientific and
technological campaign to reduce, preferably eliminate, dependence on
imported hydrocarbon fuels especially from the Middle East and Gulf
regions. With a whole host of latest power generation technologies
arriving on the scene from non-petroleum hydrocarbons like coal and
methane, bio mass and renewable energy sources, this might now be
capable of achievement, but requires resources, urgency as well as
enthusiasm and sense of purpose. To date, the latter have been
conspicuously missing. Thirdly, exploitation and recovery of natural
uranium resources in the country will have to be enhanced and
maximised by technological modernisation and upgradation of
prospecting and mining capacities in the country. In the process,
extreme attention will be required to mitigate the attendant socio –
political and environmental issues, which will arise. People-
sensitive legislations, essential for the social and economic
rehabilitation of those who will inevitably be displaced, will require
to be put in place as rapidly as possible, along with its positive
implementation, which has so far been the weakest link in the chain.
Fourthly, indigenous nuclear research development, and engineering
capabilities must be resourced and oriented for rapid surge, with
thorium based fast breeders as the technological Holy Grail. Given the
necessary focus and will, Swadeshi nuclear power is definitely
do-able.
The traffic signals ahead for 123 are definitely amber and blinking
rapidly, requiring movement with extreme caution. But, at this stage,
the million dollar question that should be posed to national policy
makers – is there a Plan B?
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